Popper: Relativism

Based on an epistemological approach, humanities and natural sciences are two completely different realms that are governed by different rules. From this position, it is usually concluded that these two should not interfere in each other's territory. This idea, which also has supporters in other categorizations such as science and theology, relies mainly on Wittgenstein's doctrines. The purpose of the article is to argue that such an approach ultimately leads to the isolation of different realms of knowledge. We argue why (...) this position is incorrect and has adverse consequences for the development of knowledge in all domains. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that Karl Popper was a communitarian philosopher. This will surprise some readers. Liberals often tout Popper as one of their champions. Indeed, there is no doubt that Popper shared much in common with liberals. However, I will argue that Popper rejected a central, though perhaps not essential, pillar of liberal theory, namely, individualism. This claim may seem to contradict Popper's professed methodological individualism. Yet I argue that Popper was a methodological individualist in name only. In (...) fact, methodological individualism faded from Popper's vocabulary as he moved institutions and situational analysis more firmly to centre-stage. Popper's focus on institutions and situations constitutes what I call his communitarianism. If my interpretation is correct, then theorists in the socio logy of scientific knowledge and communitarian epistemology should reconsider their long-standing distrust of Popper's philosophy. Indeed, they may have much to gain by treating Popper as a friend rather than a foe. (shrink)

This paper is based on the assumption that critical rationalism represents a middle position between absolutist and relativistic positions because it rejects all attempts of ultimate justification as well as basic relativistic claims. Even though the critical-rationalist problem-solving-approach based on the method of trial and error leads to an acknowledgment of the plurality of theories and moral standards, it must not be confused with relativism. The relativistic claims of the incommensurability of cultures and the equality of all views of the (...) world and all moral systems can be challenged by two basic critical‐rationalist arguments:(1) Popper’s critique of ‚the myth of the framework’; (2) the criticalrationalist conception of different levels of rationality (Albert, Agassi and Jarvie). In ethics moral standards and norms can be interpreted from a critical‐rationalist perspective as undogmatic suggestions for the regulation of social behaviour and as attempts to answer different problems, resulting from social life. This allows for the comparison of different moral standards, norms, practices and institutions with reference to the underlying problem situation and the search for culturally overlapping moral standards. (shrink)

The Myth of the Framework, Popper attacks the doctrine that truth is relative to one's intellectual background. The same collection refers to his "situational analysis." This article explores the implications of both for spatial planning. Spatial planners have to justify proposals. The article first summarizes earlier work on planning methodology evolving around the rationality principle and the implications for it of Popper's work for how to do this. It then discusses the notion of the definition of the decision situation, which (...) flows from this principle. This, of course, implies taking a leaf out of Popper's book where he discusses situational analysis. The article then gives an account of the author's work on Dutch planning doctrine, relating it to the definition of decision situations in planning and confronting it with Popper's strictures against The Myth of the Framework. The conclusion is that, whereas in the sciences that are after explain ing reality in terms of universal laws, Popper's argument holds, in planning it does not. Planning is about the search for the right course of action. In it, Popper's concern with fighting relativism and what he calls "justification" is misplaced. The quality of decisions depends on the position and the concerns of the decision taker. Relativism is in-built and so is the need to justify decisions. (shrink)

In our century, the philosophy of science has been overshadowed by two towering figures: Popper and Wittgenstein, both Viennese emigrants, who have become subjects to the Queen (cf., e.g., Radnitzky [1987a] Entre Wittgenstein et Popper ... ). The discussion has been structured by two great controversies: from the 30s Popper versus logical positivism (or falsificationism versus verificationism/probabilism), and from the 60s 'the new philosophy of science' versus Critical Rationalism. (Exemplary contributions to thes two controversies can be found, e.g., in the (...) two collections Radnitzky and Andersson (eds.) [1978], Progress... Science, and [1979], Structure...Science.) Wittgenstein's Tractatus has been the idee directrice of the Vienna Circle and its successor, Logical Empiricism. The cynosure of 'the new philosophy of science' is Wittgenstein's later philosophy as presented, in particular, in his Philosophical Investigations. If you apply it to the philosophy of science, you will view 'normative' methodology as a counterpart of ideal language philosophy, and hence regard any methodological prescriptions as unrealistic and claim that philosophy of science cannot do more than describe the practice of science, preferably in terms of case studies culled from the history of science. You will be placed on the road to relativism (Kuhn, Feyerabend, Hiibner, and others). An interesting variant of relativism is Stegmiiller's attempt, with the help of the formal methods developed by Sneed, to give Kuhn's results a more exact form (Sneed, Stegmiiller, Moulines, Mostarin)-what Feyerabend has called 'the Sneedification of science'. Today, departments of philosophy of science are dominated by philosophers who either sympathize with logical empiricism or with 'the new philosophy of science'. Critical Rationalism has an outsider position, but enjoys the sympathy of many scientists (Bartley [1989], Unfathomed Knowledge .. .; see also Bartley [198 7b], 'Philosophy of biology ... ', and Munz [1987], ' ... the mirror of Rorty'). (shrink)

One can assign three different aims to the desire for knowledge : utility, pleasure, truth-for-truth's-sake. Whereas the first two aims have a concretely determinable content and therefore look evident, the third one has been looked upon as strange and problematic : it is not immediately clear what kind of value is defended in this case. Popper is one of the recent defenders of the traditional ideal of truth-for-truth's-sake. He wants to defend the ideal against three positions : a primitive taboo-ridden (...) fear for knowledge and truth, relativism, instrumentalism. Analysing Popper's ethic of cognition we do not agree with the instrumentalist's critique of it. However, precisely in advocating a non-instrumentalist value, Popper's position is not unique, but paradoxically resembles the „primitive” position. Popper's belief that there is an objective or absolute truth is, in his opinion, implied by the belief that the search for knowledge makes sense. We try to show that this thesis of absolute truth is based on a conceptual mistake. In opposition to Popper's view, we sketch a form of relativism avoiding this confusion, without doing away with any concrete possibility of discussion or search for truth. At the same time, we try to understand Popper's aversion to relativism as well as the appeal of his position, in that it is a strange mixture of a heroic cognitive ethic and a desire for imaginary control over the uncontrolable. We argue that the form of relativism we advocate easily and perhaps better fulfilb the „heroic” readiness to forsake security in cognitive matters. (shrink)