: The question of whether science may usefully be viewed as a market process has recently been addressed by Mäki (1999), who concludes that "either free-market economics is self-defeating, or else there must be two different concepts of free market, one for the ordinary economy, the other for science." Here I argue that such pessimism is unwarranted. Mäki proposes (see also Wible 1998) that the conduct of economic research itself be taken, self-reflexively, as a test case for any suggested economics (...) of science. While agreeing that we may expect economics to apply to the conduct of economic research itself, I demonstrate that there is a lack of cogency, both in Mäki's argument for his proposal and in his attempt to implement a reflexivity test. Mäki asks what would be exchanged in the scientific "market for ideas" (see also Sent 1997). The answer is that recognition is exchanged for the opportunity to use another's research results. The identification of an organized and pervasive system of exchange establishes a firm basis for analyzing science as a market process. (shrink)

. The question of whether science may usefully be viewed as a market process has recently been addressed by Mäki, who concludes that “either free-market economics is self-defeating, or else there must be two different concepts of free market, one for the ordinary economy, the other for science.” Here I argue that such pessimism is unwarranted.Mäki proposes that the conduct of economic research itself be taken, self-reflexively, as a test case for any suggested economics of science. While agreeing that we (...) may expect economics to apply to the conduct of economic research itself, I demonstrate that there is a lack of cogency, both in Mäki's argument for his proposal and in his attempt to implement a reflexivity test.Mäki asks what would be exchanged in the scientific “market for ideas”. The answer is that recognition is exchanged for the opportunity to use another's research results. The identification of an organized and pervasive system of exchange establishes a firm basis for analyzing science as a market process. (shrink)

The economics of science is a discipline with a long history, and yet one where there if often too little dialogue between its constituent parts. The articles in this issue's focused discussion begin to address that problem by examining recent developments in science's economic circumstances from a variety of disciplinary perspectives.

To anyone vaguely aware of Feyerabend, the title of this paper would appear as an oxymoron. For Feyerabend, it is often thought, science is an anarchic practice with no discernible structure. Against this trend, I elaborate the groundwork that Feyerabend has provided for the beginnings of an approach to organizing scientific research. Specifically, I argue that Feyerabend’s pluralism, once suitably modified, provides a plausible account of how to organize science. These modifications come from C.S. Peirce’s account of the economics of (...) theory pursuit, which has since been corroborated by empirical findings in the social sciences. I go on to contrast this approach with the conception of a ‘well-ordered science’ as outlined by Kitcher (Science, truth, and democracy, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001), Cartwright (Philos Sci 73(5):981–990, 2006), which rests on the assumption that we can predict the content of future research. I show how Feyerabend has already given us reasons to think that this model is much more limited than it is usually understood. I conclude by showing how models of resource allocation, specifically those of Kitcher (J Philos 87:5–22, 1990), Strevens (J Philos 100(2):55–79, 2003) and Weisberg and Muldoon (Philos Sci 76(2):225–252, 2009), unwittingly make use of this problematic assumption. I conclude by outlining a proposed model of resource allocation where funding is determined by lottery and briefly examining the extent to which it is compatible with the position defended in this paper. (shrink)

Summary To understand the present situation we must know something about its history. The ‘Rise of the West’, which grew out of the ‘European Miracle’, is a special case of cultural evolution. The development of science is an important element in this process. Cultural evolution went hand in hand with biological evolution. Evolutionary epistemology illuminates the achievements and the evolution of cognitive sensory apparatus of various species. Man's cognitive sensory apparatus is adapted to the ‘mesocosmos’, the world of medium-sized dimensions. (...) The biological structures constitute the hardware of the cognitive sensory apparatus, while certain expectations and theories, which are ontogenetically apriori, constitute the corresponding system software. A distinction is introduced between ‘primary theories’ (linked to the sensory apparatus) and ‘secondary theories’. The latter are the result of attempts to meet the demand for an explanation of phenomena that cannot be explained in terms of ‘primary theories’. Two subsets of ‘secondary theories’ are compared: spiritualistic-personalized theories and scientific theories. From the historical point of view the scientific secondary theories are but a special subset of the class of secondary theories. From the systematic point of view it is instructive to focus on a comparison of the two subsets: what do they have in common? in what respects do they differ? The rise of scientific thinking is closely linked to the ‘European Miracle’. How (and when and why) did the West grow rich? To answer this question we must first produce an explanation of the principle: theories about the consequences of institutional arrangements. Then we can give a historical explanation of why this development took place in Europe and only there. It is claimed that the secret of success, economic wealth and the first approximations to relatively free societies, was the taming of the state, the taming of cleptocracy (independent of the nature of the agency having cleptocratic appetites, be it princes or parliaments). The taming of the state is a pre-democratic achievement. Finally, the consequences of institutional arrangements for scientific progress and innovation are examined. Only if the system is market-like, will it link individual effort with reward and, through the competitive process, encourage the wide dissemination and use of new ideas. There is no tradeoff between freedom on the one hand and economic success and the growth of scientific knowledge on the other. Freedom and the ensuing flexibility is the key to the past and to the future. (shrink)

In our century, the philosophy of science has been overshadowed by two towering figures: Popper and Wittgenstein, both Viennese emigrants, who have become subjects to the Queen (cf., e.g., Radnitzky [1987a] Entre Wittgenstein et Popper ... ). The discussion has been structured by two great controversies: from the 30s Popper versus logical positivism (or falsificationism versus verificationism/probabilism), and from the 60s 'the new philosophy of science' versus Critical Rationalism. (Exemplary contributions to thes two controversies can be found, e.g., in the (...) two collections Radnitzky and Andersson (eds.) [1978], Progress... Science, and [1979], Structure...Science.) Wittgenstein's Tractatus has been the idee directrice of the Vienna Circle and its successor, Logical Empiricism. The cynosure of 'the new philosophy of science' is Wittgenstein's later philosophy as presented, in particular, in his Philosophical Investigations. If you apply it to the philosophy of science, you will view 'normative' methodology as a counterpart of ideal language philosophy, and hence regard any methodological prescriptions as unrealistic and claim that philosophy of science cannot do more than describe the practice of science, preferably in terms of case studies culled from the history of science. You will be placed on the road to relativism (Kuhn, Feyerabend, Hiibner, and others). An interesting variant of relativism is Stegmiiller's attempt, with the help of the formal methods developed by Sneed, to give Kuhn's results a more exact form (Sneed, Stegmiiller, Moulines, Mostarin)-what Feyerabend has called 'the Sneedification of science'. Today, departments of philosophy of science are dominated by philosophers who either sympathize with logical empiricism or with 'the new philosophy of science'. Critical Rationalism has an outsider position, but enjoys the sympathy of many scientists (Bartley [1989], Unfathomed Knowledge .. .; see also Bartley [198 7b], 'Philosophy of biology ... ', and Munz [1987], ' ... the mirror of Rorty'). (shrink)

Evidence that confirms a scientific hypothesis is said to be ‘novel’ if it is not discovered until after the hypothesis isconstructed. The philosophical issues surrounding novel confirmation have been well summarized by Campbell and Vinci [1983]. They write that philosophers of science generally agree that when observational evidence supports a theory, the confirmation is much stronger when the evidence is ‘novel’... There are, nevertheless, reasons to be skeptical of this tradition... The notion of novel confirmation is beset with a theoretical (...) puzzle about how the degree of confirmation can change without any change in the evidence, hypothesis, or auxiliary assumptions... There have not yet appeared any obviously satisfactory solutions to these problems Much of the literature on novel confirmation relies on the Bayesian analysis of conditional probabilities. Let H represent a hypothesis, E an event that confirms the hypothesis, and B some relevant background information. Denote by Pr the conditional probability of x given y. There are various plausible measures of the degree of support that E lends to H. Among these are: Degree of support = Pr Degree of support = Pr – Pr Degree of support = Pr – Pr Degree of support = Pr – Pt In the work cited, Campbell and Vinci offer a somewhat more involved Bayesian interpretation. Formula is discussed by Gardner [1981] who points out that under this formulation there can be no role for novelty. 'The function Pr contains no third slot in which to insert a temporal relation between the invention of H and the inventor's learning E. Obviously, then, this relation could not possibly affect E's support of H.' Formula, on the other hand, suggests a role for novelty. Bayes's Theorem allows us to rewrite the formula as Degree of support = Pr x [Pr – 1] We can use 1/Pr as a measure of the novelty of E. Then shows that the degree of support increases with novelty of E. In the paper already cited, Campbell and Vinci discuss shortcomings of this analysis. Formula expresses an alternative offered by Howson [1984]. In that formula, Pr represents the probability of H assuming that only B – {E} is known. This allows for the possibility of non-novel facts generating support for hypotheses. Niiniluoto [1984] argues for a variant along the lines of, in which we account for the possibility that the theorist was unaware that his hypothesis entails E. One problem in deciding among these approaches is that the choice of a definition for the degree of support appears arbitrary. What kind of argument could justify the choice of one definition over another? It is our position that there can be no basis for addressing this question in the absence of an explicit model of the process by which hypotheses are generated. Only in the presence of such a model can the various conditional probabilities be given meaningful interpretations. We provide such models in Sections 1, 2 and 4. The simple model of Section 1, incorporating strong assumptions, yields the conclusion that novelty is irrelevant. When these assumptions are relaxed in the later sections, novelty becomes relevant for a variety of reasons. It is at least potentially the case that scientists have more information about their own abilities than is publicly available, and this information might influence their decisions about whether even to attempt novel prediction. If this is so, then it should be incorporated into the model of hypothesis generation. This requires an explicit discussion of how scientists respond to incentives and how the incentives themselves evolve, which in turn takes us into the realm of economic theory. We have addressed these issues in another paper, written for an audience of economists. The results of this research are summarized in Section 3. (shrink)

Empirical reports on scientific competition show that scientists can be depicted as self-interested, strategically behaving agents. Nevertheless, we argue that recognition-seeking scientists will have an interest in establishing methodological norms which tend to select theories of a high epistemic value, and that these norms will be still more stringent if the epistemic value of theories appears in the utility function of scientists, either directly or instrumentally. (Published Online July 11 2006) Footnotes1 The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from DGI grant (...) BEC2002-03715 (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura). 2 The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from grants PB98-0495-C08-01 and BFF2002-03656 (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura). (shrink)

Increasing the “truth per dollar” of money spent on science is one legitimate long-run goal of the economics of science. But before this goal can be achieved, we need to increase our knowledge of the successes and failures of past and current reward structures of science. This essay reviews what economists have learned about the behavior of scientists and the reward structure of science. One important use of such knowledge will be to help policy-makers create a reward structure that is (...) more efficient in the future. (shrink)

How do ideas evolve? Can one speak of scientific progress when there is more than one pathway of intellectual evolution in which different ideas emerge and flow in different directions? Is the history of economic analysis a compilation of a number of intellectual pathways? This essay argues that it is possible to understand the course of history as a number of overlapping, divergent, and endlessly changing pathways. Such pathways operate in different fashions. They sometimes lead to more coherent and high (...) levels of understanding. And sometimes they delay or obstruct advancement in intellectual history. In both cases, outcomes are unpredictable and multi-directional. (shrink)