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Summary Recognitional concepts are those concepts whose possession conditions require that one be able to correctly sort, identify, or categorize things that fall under them. Recognitional concepts therefore tie concept possession to specific types of behavioral or cognitive abilities.
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  1. Atomic Event Concepts in Perception, Action and Belief.Lucas Thorpe - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    Event concepts are unstructured atomic concepts that apply to event types. A paradigm example of such an event type would be that of diaper changing, and so a putative example of an atomic event concept would be DADDY'S-CHANGING-MY-DIAPER.1 I will defend two claims about such concepts. First, the conceptual claim that it is in principle possible to possess a concept such as DADDY'S-CHANGING-MY-DIAPER without possessing the concept DIAPER. Second, the empirical claim that we actually possess such concepts and that they (...)
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  2. Recognition Trust.Johnny Brennan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3799-3818.
    Trust is critical for social life, and yet it is alarmingly fragile. It is easily damaged and difficult to repair. Philosophers studying trust have often noted that basic kind of trust needs to be in place in order for social life to be possible. Although philosophers have suggested that basic trust must exist, they have not tried to describe in explicit terms what this basic trust looks like, or how it comes to be. In this article I will identify and (...)
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  3. The Struggle for Recognition and the Authority of the Second Person.Thomas Khurana - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):552-561.
    In this introductory paper, I discuss the second-personal approach to ethics and the theory of recognition as two accounts of the fundamental sociality of the human form of life. The first section delineates the deep affinities between the two approaches. They both put a reciprocal social constellation front and center from which they derive the fundamental norms of moral and social life and a social conception of freedom. The second section discusses three points of contrast between the two approaches: The (...)
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  4. Toward a Theory of Concept Mastery: The Recognition View.Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):627-648.
    Agents can think using concepts they do not fully understand. This paper investigates the question “Under what conditions does a thinker fully understand, or have mastery of, a concept?” I lay out a gauntlet of problems and desiderata with which any theory of concept mastery must cope. I use these considerations to argue against three views of concept mastery, according to which mastery is a matter of holding certain beliefs, being disposed to make certain inferences, or having certain intuitions. None (...)
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  5. Other Minds Are Neither Seen nor Inferred.Mason Westfall - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11977-11997.
    How do we know about other minds on the basis of perception? The two most common answers to this question are that we literally perceive others’ mental states, or that we infer their mental states on the basis of perceiving something else. In this paper, I argue for a different answer. On my view, we don’t perceive mental states, and yet perceptual experiences often immediately justify mental state attributions. In a slogan: other minds are neither seen nor inferred. I argue (...)
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  6. Recognition as a Commitment. [REVIEW]Tadeusz Gadacz - 2018 - Diametros (58):87-91.
    Review of the book: Jakub Kloc-Konkołowicz, Anerkennung als Verpflichtung. Klassische Konzepte der Anerkennung und ihre Bedeutungfür die aktuelle Debate, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2015.
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  7. Observational Concepts and Experience.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Warwick
    The thesis is intended to contribute to the growing understanding of the indispensable role played by phenomenal consciousness in human cognition, and specifically in making our concepts of the external world available. The focus falls on so called observational concepts, a type of rudimentary, perceptually-based objective concepts in our repertoire — picking out manifest properties such as colors and shapes. A theory of such concepts gets provided, and, consequently, the exact role that perceptual consciousness plays in making concepts of this (...)
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  8. Why Believe in Demonstrative Concepts?David Pereplyotchik - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):636-638.
    I examine two arguments for the existence of demonstrative concepts—one due to Chuard (2006) and another due to Brewer (1999). I point out some important difficulties in each. I hope to show that much more work must be done to legitimize positing demonstrative concepts.
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  9. Concepts and Perceptual Belief: How (Not) to Defend Recognitional Concepts.Bradley Rives - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (4):369-391.
    Recognitional concepts have the following characteristic property: thinkers are disposed to apply them to objects merely on the basis of undergoing certain perceptual experiences. I argue that a prominent strategy for defending the existence of constitutive connections among concepts, which appeals to thinkers’ semantic-cum-conceptual intuitions, cannot be used to defend the existence of recognitional concepts. I then outline and defend an alternative argument for the existence of recognitional concepts, which appeals to certain psychological laws.
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  10. The 'Compositional Rigidity' of Recognitionality.Darragh Byrne - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (2):147-169.
    Abstract Empiricist philosophers of mind have long maintained that the possession conditions of many concepts include recognitional abilities. One of Jerry Fodor's recent attacks on empiricist semantics proceeds by attempting to demonstrate that there are no such, ?recognitional? concepts. His argument is built on the claim that if there were such concepts, they would not compose: i.e., they would exhibit properties which are not in general ?inherited? by complex concepts of which they are components. Debate between Fodor and his critics (...)
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  11. On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts. [REVIEW]Timothy Schroeder - 2003 - Dialogue 42 (1):148-149.
    Here is an apparently straightforward philosophical story about concepts. In the style of Jerry Fodor, a concept is a mental “word” ; it means what it does because of its causal dependencies, and it contributes this meaning to the meanings of the mental “sentences” it helps to form. The mental word OWL means owls because owls have a special causal relationship to OWLs, and when the mental word OWL is combined with other mental words, such as THERE, IS, AN and (...)
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  12. Overcoming Aduality of Concepts and Causes: A Unifying Thread in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Robert B. Brandom - 2002 - In R.M. Gale (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. Blackwell.
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  13. On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2000 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Written by one of today's most creative and innovative philosophers, Ruth Garrett Millikan, this book examines basic empirical concepts; how they are acquired, how they function, and how they have been misrepresented in the traditional philosophical literature. Millikan places cognitive psychology in an evolutionary context where human cognition is assumed to be an outgrowth of primitive forms of mentality, and assumed to have 'functions' in the biological sense. Of particular interest are her discussions of the nature of abilities as different (...)
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  14. There Are No Recognitional Concepts, Not Even RED.Jerry Fodor - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:1-14.
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  15. Recognitional Concepts and Compositionality.Richard E. Grandy - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:21-25.
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  16. Recognitional Concepts and the Compositionality of Concept Possession.Terence E. Horgan - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:27-33.
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  17. Recognitional Concepts and the Compositionality of Concept Possession.Terry Horgan - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:27 - 33.
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  18. Concept Constitution.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:15-19.
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  19. A More Plausible Kind of "Recognitional Concept".Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:35-41.
    It's a sort of moebus strip argument. Rather than circularly assuming what it should prove, it assumes one of the things Fodor says he has disproved. It assumes that the extensions of those concepts thought by some to be recognitional are in fact controlled by stereotypes. Why do I say that? Because Fodor assumes that what makes an instance of a concept a "good instance" is that it is an average instance, that it sports the properties statistically most commonly found (...)
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  20. Words, Concepts, and Entities: With Enemies Like These, I Don't Need Friends.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):89-100.
    A number of clarifications of the target article and some corrections are made. I clarify which concepts the thesis was intended to be about, what “descriptionism” means, the difference between “concepts” and “conceptions,” and why extensions are not determined by conceptions. I clarify the meaning of “substances,” how one knows what inductions to project over them, the connection with “basic level categories,” how it is determined what substance a given substance concept is of, how equivocation in concepts occurs, and the (...)
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  21. On Unclear and Indistinct Ideas.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:75-100.
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  22. A Study of Concepts.Christopher PEACOCKE - 1992 - MIT Press.
    Philosophers from Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein to the recent realists and antirealists have sought to answer the question, What are concepts? This book provides a detailed, systematic, and accessible introduction to an original philosophical theory of concepts that Christopher Peacocke has developed in recent years to explain facts about the nature of thought, including its systematic character, its relations to truth and reference, and its normative dimension. Particular concepts are also treated within the general framework: perceptual concepts, logical concepts, and (...)
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  23. Human Likeness and the Formation of Empirical Concepts.Edward Calhoun - 1960 - Review of Metaphysics 13 (3):383 - 395.
    I shall add to this suggestion that what we would ordinarily think of counting as concepts--those for which we can find words --demand an extension or distribution of this likeness among those who use language together. I have little confidence in a method that would look to words for the original derivation of concepts. It seems clear that sounds or written signs that are to pass for words must be recognized as words. No signal or indication that this is what (...)
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