Synthese 198 (6):5395-5413 (2019)

Harmen Ghijsen
Radboud University Nijmegen
According to pluralistic folk psychology we make use of a variety of methods to predict and explain each other, only one of which makes use of attributing propositional attitudes. I discuss three related problems for this view: first, the prediction problem, according to which PFP’s methods of prediction only work if they also assume a tacit attribution of propositional attitudes; second, the interaction problem, according to which PFP cannot explain how its different methods of prediction and explanation can interact; and third, the difference problem, according to which PFP cannot explain how all of its methods are truly different if it also assumes a dispositionalist account of belief. I argue that a promising solution to these problems should not overestimate the importance and ubiquity of propositional attitude attribution even if the difference between propositional attitude attribution and other types of attribution is a matter of degree rather than kind. Instead, a solution should be sought in a better appreciation of the breadth of folk psychological theorizing and the way in which this can be incorporated into model theory.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-019-02412-5
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References found in this work BETA

The Predictive Mind.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Oxford University Press UK.
Direct Perception in the Intersubjective Context.Shaun Gallagher - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):535-543.
Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal. [REVIEW]Dan Zahavi - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):541-558.

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