Modal Error
Edited by Anand Vaidya (San Jose State University)
About this topic
Summary | Modal error is that area of modal epistemology where philosophers debate what the best explanation is for why a subject believes that a proposition is possible or necessary when in fact the proposition has the opposite modal valence. In the epistemology of modality it is important for one to be able to give a coherent account of why it is that we fall into modal error. |
Key works | One key work in the area of modal error is Bealer 2004. In this work Bealer gives a complete account of modal error consistent with his own view of how we acquire knowledge of metaphysical modality. In addition, he discusses the view proposed in Yablo 1993. Other key works in this area are Van Inwagen 1998 and Hawke 2011. |
Introductions | A key introduction is Vaidya 2007 |
Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:
Jobs in this area
Bertrand Russell Visiting Professorship
Visiting Instructor - History/Philosophy of Science
Lecturer in Applied Ethics
Jobs from PhilJobs
11 found
Order:
1 filter applied
|
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server. Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
Editorial team
General Editors:
David Bourget (Western Ontario) David Chalmers (ANU, NYU) Area Editors: David Bourget Gwen Bradford Berit Brogaard Margaret Cameron David Chalmers James Chase Rafael De Clercq Ezio Di Nucci Barry Hallen Hans Halvorson Jonathan Ichikawa Michelle Kosch Øystein Linnebo JeeLoo Liu Paul Livingston Brandon Look Manolo Martínez Matthew McGrath Michiru Nagatsu Susana Nuccetelli Giuseppe Primiero Jack Alan Reynolds Darrell P. Rowbottom Aleksandra Samonek Constantine Sandis Howard Sankey Jonathan Schaffer Thomas Senor Robin Smith Daniel Star Jussi Suikkanen Lynne Tirrell Aness Kim Webster Other editors Contact us Learn more about PhilPapers |