Time Does Not Pass if Time Began from an Infinite Past

Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 36 (3-4):291-302 (2022)
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Philosophers have long discussed whether time really passes. Simultaneously, they have also discussed whether time could have begun from an infinite past. This paper clarifies the relationship between the reality of time’s passage and an infinite past. I assert that time cannot have an infinite past if time really passes. This argument is based on a proposition that an infinite series of events cannot be completed if time really passes. A seemingly strong objection to this proposition is that no movement is possible if an infinite series cannot be completed. However, movement is clearly possible; thus, an infinite series can be completed. I argue that although it is sure that an infinite series can be completed in the static view, an infinite series cannot be completed (and thus, time could not have begun from an infinite past) in the dynamic view.



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Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
A Defense of Presentism.Ned Markosian - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:47-82.
The Moving Spotlight Theory.Daniel Deasy - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2073-2089.
What is Presentism?Daniel Deasy - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):378-397.
The Puzzle of Change.Mark Hinchliff - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:119-136.

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