Arguments for Theism

Collin (2022) attempts to break the symmetry between the modal ontological argument for the existence of God and the reverse modal ontological argument against the existence of God by drawing on some Kripkean lessons about a posteriori necessity. He argues that there is an undercutting defeater for taking God’s non-existence to be possible. In this paper, I reply that taking the Kripkean considerations about a posteriori necessity into account does not help break the symmetry. For we can argue in a (...) similar way that there is an undercutting defeater for taking God’s existence to be possible. (shrink)

It is no exaggeration to say that there has been an explosion of activity in the field of philosophical enquiry that is known as natural theology. Having been smothered in the early part of the twentieth century due to the dominance of the anti-metaphysical doctrine of logical positivism, natural theology began to make a comeback in the late 1950s as logical positivism collapsed and analytic philosophers took a newfound interest in metaphysical topics such as possibility and necessity, causation, time, the (...) mind-body problem, and God. This chapter begins by considering how we might characterise natural theology as a field of enquiry. It then proceeds to survey the landscape of contemporary natural theology, which has spawned a large and at times highly technical body of literature. Finally, consideration is given to two epistemological issues confronting the theist who wishes to appeal to natural theology, which could be termed the problem of the gap(s) and the problem of accessibility. (shrink)

In this dialogue a sceptic meets one that convinces him that he is safe from the void of Nothingness although it exists.

Dudgeon, William (1705/6–1743), freethinker and philosopher, is of unknown origins. A tenant farmer who resided at Lennel Hill Farm, near Coldstream, Berwickshire, he was one of several philosophers active in the borders area of Scotland during this period. Other figures in this group include Andrew Baxter, Henry Home (Lord Kames), and most importantly David Hume.....

I argue that the creation and freely chosen salvation and everlasting bliss of even just one person is a greater good than any finite amount of evil and suffering. Since it is extremely likely (if not certain) that, out of all possible individuals that could exist, some (or at least one) would only be freely saved through the contemplation and experience of evil and suffering, then God would be justified in creating a world with evil and suffering to allow for (...) the salvation of such individuals, so long as no one else freely lost their salvation who otherwise would not have lost it because of the evil and suffering. Thus, the problem of evil dissipates, as a world with evil and suffering, even seemingly gratuitous evil and suffering, would be entirely expected given theism. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss an abductive argument for the existence of God from the experience of awe at natural beauty. If God's creative work is a viable explanation for why we experience awe at natural beauty, and there is no satisfactory naturalistic explanation for the origins of such experiences, then we have defeasible evidence that God exists. To evaluate the argument's tenability, we assess the merits of the two main theocentric frameworks that can be marshaled to answer the question (...) of why human beings experience awe at natural beauty: (1) taking the experience of natural beauty as resulting from God's design intentions and (2) conceiving experiences of natural beauty as religious experiences in themselves. We argue that the presence of phenomenological content the fine-grainedness of which exceeds our descriptive and conceptual capacities is better accounted for by the latter hypothesis: experiencing natural beauty amounts to experiencing divine attributes. We conclude that the argument's theological premise is tenable and, having previously argued for the empirical premise (Porcher & De Luca-Noronha, 2021), we conclude that awe at natural beauty is best explained by the existence of God. (shrink)

Bu bildirinin amacı, insanlığın varoluşu ile başlayan ilahî dinlerden (Allah tarafından gönderilmiş dinler) pagan dönemlere ve özellikle Eski Batı anlayışına aktarılan yaratılış kavramını ele almak, varsa benzerlik ve farklılıklarını ortaya koymaktır.

What is the highest good actually good for in Kant’s third Critique? While there are well-worked out answers to this question in the literature that focus on the highest good’s practical importance, this paper argues that there is an important function for the highest good that has to do exclusively with contemplation. This important function becomes clear once one notices that coherent [konsequent] thinking, for Kant, was synonymous with "bündiges" thinking, and that both are connected with the highest good in (...) the third Critique’s moral proof for God’s existence. I show that the original meaning of "bündig," which is from the carpentry trade and has been forgotten, illuminates the stakes of the highest good in Kant’s system. For us, as proverbial carpenters of reason, coherence is essential for the intellectual activity of constructing a philosophical worldview in his transcendental idealism. I motivate the reading further by showing how this function can neatly reconstruct Kant’s proof for God’s existence in the third Critique. I conclude by sketching Kant’s reasons for why the project of creating a coherent worldview grounded in the highest good is worth the labor costs. (shrink)

A new religion was founded in 2013 that goes by the name of Astronism while its community of followers are known as Astronists. This article gives a rigorous account of the eschatology, soteriology and worldview of this new space religion while contextualizing its emergence as part of a broader Astronic religious tradition. This proposed tradition may itself possess prehistoric roots in the Upper Palaeolithic in the earliest human observations of the night sky. Human beings in turn came to establish a (...) relationship with celestial phenomena, one of both spiritual and secular utility that has since produced systems of astrotheism and astrology. In the contemporary, the projection of the Astronist theory of history onto the Astronic tradition has meant that Astronism’s salvific doctrine of transcension is established as a grand narrative and universal ethic that unites the Astronic tradition. In essence, this article considers how Astronism, as a new religious movement, is working to revive astronomical religion, albeit in ways relevant in an age of space exploration and appropriate to modern scientific knowledge about humanity’s true place in the universe. (shrink)

This paper develops an internal critique of Graham Oppy’s metaphilosophy of religion – his theories of argumentation, worldview comparison, and epistemic justification. First, it presents Oppy’s views and his main reasons in their favor. Second, it argues that Oppy is committed to two claims – that only truth-conducive reasons can justify philosophical belief and that such justification depends entirely on one’s judgments about the theoretical virtues of comprehensive worldviews – that jointly entail the unacceptable conclusion that philosophical beliefs cannot be (...) justified. Third, it briefly argues that of his two claims, it is his thoroughgoing coherentism that should be rejected. (shrink)

Metaphysical foundationalists argue that without fundamental facts, we cannot explain why there exist any dependent facts at all. Thus, metaphysical infinitism, the view that chains of ground can descend indefinitely without ever terminating in a level of fundamental facts, allegedly exhibits a kind of explanatory failure. I examine this argument and conclude that foundationalists have failed to show that infinitism exhibits explanatory failure. I argue that explaining the existence of dependent facts in terms of further dependent facts ad infinitum is (...) unproblematic by arguing for the plausibility of a ground-theoretic version of the Hume-Edwards Principle, which states that if each fact in a plurality of facts has a ground, then the plurality itself has a ground. (shrink)

Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy is a collection of essays that are all concerned with major figures and topics in the early modern philosophy. Most of the essays are concerned, more specifically, with the philosophy of David Hume (1711-1776). The sixteen essays included in this collection are divided into five parts. These parts are arranged under the headings of: (1) Metaphysics and Epistemology; (2) Free Will and Moral Luck; (3) Ethics, Virtue and Optimism; (4) Skepticism, Religion and Atheism; and (...) (5) Irreligion and the Unity of Hume’s Thought. A particularly important theme running through many of these essays is the subject of Hume’s irreligious aims and intentions. The fifth and final part of the collection is devoted to an articulation and defence of this specific understanding of Hume’s philosophical thought. (shrink)

This is an earlier version of the argument presented as the appendix to the author's final book, Peri Physeos.

In this essay, I argue that, all else being equal, theism is more probable than naturalism on the assumption that human beings are able to arrive at a body of moral knowledge that is largely accurate and complete. I put forth this thesis on grounds that, if naturalism is true, the explanation of the content of our moral intuitions terminates either in biological-evolutionary processes or in social conventions adopted for pragmatic reasons; that, if this is so, our moral intuitions were (...) selected for their utility, not their truth; and that, if our moral intuitions were so selected, they are probably false. I defend the argument against three objections: first, that the argument amounts to a generic skeptical challenge; second, that ethical naturalism explains how our moral intuitions could have been selected for their truth; and third, that there is a pre-established harmony between the utility of moral beliefs and their truth-values. (shrink)

Christians affirm that Scripture alone reveals truths about God which cannot be known by mere reason, such as the Trinity or the Gospel itself. But how do we account for Scripture’s apparent talk of a knowledge of God possible solely from creation? Or for our own sense of the divine in nature? Or for the startling insights of ancient philosophers about the nature of God? The answer: natural theology. Often misrepresented as a fruitless human attempt to comprehend God, natural theology (...) has in fact been a significant part of Christian theology throughout history. It has shaped the Christian doctrine of God and provided a starting point for evangelizing non-Christians. In an age when theologians and missionaries alike are in need of stronger doctrinal foundations, it is a doctrine as vital as ever. In this guide, David Haines first outlines the biblical basis for natural theology, suggesting that, if Scripture is correct, certain truths about God should be well attested by non-Christians. A thorough historical survey demonstrates that this is indeed the case, and that the Church has long made use of that which is revealed to reason in order to serve Christ, who is revealed to faith. (shrink)

Abstract: In this paper, I respond to James Sterba’s recent book ‘Is a Good God Logically Possible?’ I show that Sterba concludes that God is not logically possible by ignoring three important issues: (a) the different functions of leeway indeterminism (and the political freedom presupposed by it) and autonomy (the two are very different things, even though both go under the name of freedom), (b) the differences in the conditions of agency in God and in creatures, (there is non-parity in (...) how each must apply the single moral law), and (c) the non-parity between our knowledge and God’s. I provide a brief summary of Sterba’s arguments, and I develop the following points: 1. Sterba’s argument against a Free-Will Defense hinges on his conflation of political freedom and autonomy; 2. Sterba’s crucial premise for his argument against soul-making theodicies (namely, that the “Pauline Principle” should be applied univocally across God and creatures) is false; 3. Sterba’s arguments against skeptical theism depend on his assumption that our knowledge is comparable to that of God. In each case, Sterba either does not recognize non-parity between God and creatures or does not recognize the difference between the profane (e.g., political matters) and the sacred, (e.g., spiritual matters having to do with the inner nature of the soul’s development). (shrink)

A close interrelationship between logic and religious faith is confirmed in many places of the Bible. In the paper, special attention is paid to the dialogue of Jesus and a Samaritan woman (John 4). In a proposed outline of a logical formalization, religious faith is described as a pragmatic function through which the linguistic and logical content is contextually realized. In the continuation of the paper, Gödel's ontological proof is commented, which in a logically rigorous way describes the ontology where (...) we can detect the systematic place of religious faith as an ontological force. (shrink)

The common consent argument claims that widespread belief in God is good evidence for God’s existence. Though taken seriously throughout the history of philosophy, the argument died in the 1800s. Our philosophy of religion textbooks ignore it. In this paper, we hope to resuscitate it drawing upon the demographics of religious belief, the cognitive science of religion, and contemporary epistemology. We develop and defend two common consent arguments, which maintain that widespread belief in a High God is good evidence for (...) theism over metaphysical naturalism. (shrink)

Christian thinkers in the patristic era were not reluctant to integrate classical philosophy with biblical theology as they addressed the seeming incompatibility of free will and determinism (fate). This paper compares and contrasts Tertullian and the Stoics as they explain three issues relating to freedom and fate: 1) The operation of the Logos, 2) Theological Anthropology, and 3) Teleology. While in agreement with the Stoics on several key points, Tertullian crucially departs from them as he argues it is not by (...) necessity—but rather by voluntary collaboration between humanity and the Logos—that the Creation arrives at its determinate end. (shrink)

Many philosophers of theistic religions claim (1) that there are powerful a posteriori arguments for God’s existence that make it rational to believe that He exists and at the same time maintain (2) that God always has the freedom to do otherwise. In this article, I argue that these two positions are inconsistent because the empirical evidence on which the a posteriori arguments for God’s existence rest can be explained better by positing the existence of a God-like being without the (...) freedom to do otherwise. (shrink)

In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel offers the following verdict on Spinoza’s ontology: “According to Spinoza what is, is God, and God alone. Therefore, the allegations of those who accuse Spinoza of atheism are the direct opposite of the truth; with him there is too much God” (Hegel 1995, vol. 3, 281-2). It is not easy to dismiss Hegel’s grand pronouncement, since Spinoza indeed clearly affirms: “whatever is, is in God” (E1p15). Crocodiles, porcupines (and your thoughts about (...) crocodiles and porcupines) are all in God. There is nothing that is not in Spinoza’s God. Spinoza defines God at the very opening page of the Ethics, and the definition (and its explication) unfold in three successively elucidatory steps: First, Spinoza characterizes God as “a being absolutely infinite [ens absolute infinitum]. Then, he spells out this characterization: “i.e., a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence” (E1def6). Finally, Spinoza adds an explicatio to the entire definition: “I say absolutely infinite, not infinite in its own kind; for if something is only infinite in its own kind, we can deny infinite attributes of it; but if something is absolutely infinite, whatever expresses essence and involves no negation pertains to its essence.” Throughout his philosophical career Spinoza plays with the precise formulation of this definition; its core remains pretty stable, though the small variations might indicate attempts to explore alternative nuances (see, for example, KV II.1; I/19; Ep. 2; IV/7; Ep. 83; IV/335). (shrink)

Paul Draper has recently developed an account of intrinsic probability according to which a theory's intrinsic probability is determined by its modesty and coherence. He employs this account in an argument that Source Physicalism (SP) and Source Idealism (SI) are equally intrinsically probable. Since SP and SI are not exhaustive, and Theism is one very specific version of SI, it follows that the intrinsic probability of Theism is very low. I argue here that considerations of fundamentality show that more work (...) needs to be done to defend the claim that P(SP) = P(SI). (shrink)

Maimonides’ Latin translation of Moreh Nevukhim | Guide for the Perplexed, was the most influential Jewish work in the last millennia (Di Segni, 2019; Rubio, 2006; Wohlman, 1988, 1995; Kohler, 2017). It marked the beginning of scholasticism, a daughter of Judaism raised by Jewish thinkers, according to historian Heinrich Graetz (Geschichte der Juden, L. 6, Leipzig 1861, p. xii). Printed by Gutenberg's first mechanical press, its influence in the West went as far as the Fifth Lateran Council (1512 — 1517) (...) "where scholars were encouraged to remove the difficulties which seemed to divide the whole of theology and philosophy (Leibniz, Théodicée, 11)." For centuries, the Guide revolutionized the curriculum of school instruction by reintegrating the natural laws of thought in the sphere of faith (the fourth of which became Leibniz’ Principle of sufficient reason). This complete collection of notes expounds the ideas of the Guide and features all the passages selected and rewritten by Leibniz. This first complete annotated bilingual translation of the original manuscripts in Latin serves as an entry point to the faith in conformity with Reason. This complete collection of notes expounds the ideas of the Guide as selected and rewritten by Leibniz, the famous mathematician inventor of computer arithmetic, considered the last universal genius. The first complete bilingual translation in three centuries features on the front cover Rembrandt's Philosopher in meditation, and a recommendation from Leibniz's himself on the back: "Rabbi Maimonides' excellent book, A Guide for the Perplexed, is more philosophical than I imagined and worthy of careful reading." According to Malbim’s translator, Noah Rosenbloom, the book’s epigraph indicates that nineteenth-century Rabbi Leibush ben Yehiel Michel Wisser, also known as Malbim, was familiar with Leibniz’ Theodicy. In Leibniz’ anthology of the Guide, the reader can get a detailed glimpse of Leibniz' impressions of Maimonides. The Foreword by Leibniz' translator Lloyd Strickland suggests that there were sympathies and perhaps even overlaps between the thoughts of both universal luminaries. -/- . (shrink)

A number of theistic philosophers have recently denied that God is subject to moral and rational norms. At the same time, many theists employ epistemological and inductive arguments for the existence of God. I will argue that ‘no-norms’ theists cannot make use of such arguments: if God is not subject to norms – particularly rational norms – then we can say nothing substantive about what kind of worlds God would be likely to create, and as such, we cannot predict the (...) likelihood of any particular evidence given theism. What is more, I argue that this lack of constraint on God's creative act raises a serious sceptical challenge for no-norms theism. (shrink)

Buddhism is a tradition that set itself decidedly against theism, with the development of complex arguments against the existence of God. I propose that the metaphysical conclusions reached by some schools in the Mahayana tradition present a vision of reality that, with some apparently small modification, would ground an argument for the existence of God. This argument involves explanation in terms of natures rather than causal agency. Yet I conclude not only that the Buddhist becomes a theist in embracing such (...) explanations as legitimate, but also ipso facto abandons their metaphysical project and ceases to be a Buddhist. (shrink)

One classical version of cosmological argument, defended famously by Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, deduces the existence of a First Cause from the existence of a particular sort of causal series: one that is ‘essentially ordered’. This argument has received renewed defence in recent work by Feser, Cohoe, and Kerr. I agree with these philosophers that the argument is sound. I believe, however, that the standard defence given of the ECA in these philosophers can be complemented by a formulation that (...) appeals to the powers theory of possibility. This approach to possibility has been defended in recent years by, for example, Pruss, Jacobs, and Vetter. In this article, I show how this modal theory allows us to defend the ECA in a way that is dialectically advantageous as well as clarifying. (shrink)

Agnosticism has always had its fair amount of criticism. Religious believers often described the first agnostics as infidels and it is not uncommon to see them described as somewhat dull fence-sitters. Moreover, the undecided agnostic stance on belief in gods is often compared with being unsure about such obviously false statements as the existence of orbiting teapots, invisible dragons or even Santa Claus. In this paper, I maintain that agnosticism can properly be endorsed as a default stance. More precisely, I (...) use a strategy presented by Alvin Plantinga and argue that it is rationally acceptable to be agnostic about the existence of God. I also anticipate and answer a number of objections. Finally, I offer my conclusion. (shrink)

Philosophers of religion have traditionally focused their attention on belief in God and assessed such belief in terms of it having some epistemic status like“rationality” or “probability”, or indeed by determining whether or not it constitutes knowledge. In this paper, I focus my attention on the non-doxastic attitude of hope and formulate reasons for whether or not we should hope for God. In light of these reasons, I formulate hopeism as a research programme according to which we should develop concepts (...) of God by starting with the question of what type of being would be worthy of our utmost hope. I compare this view with belief-based concepts of God, such as perfect being theism and what I call worship-worthiness theism. Arguably, the greatest benefit of choosing hopeism is that it is inclusive. Most atheists as well as agnostics and theists can endorse the view. I also suggest a number of directions in which hopeism can be developed. (shrink)

Agnostics as well as theists should answer evidential arguments from evil, at least when confronted with them. In this paper, I answer such an argument by appealing to sceptical agnosticism. A sceptical agnostic is not only undecided about the existence of a perfectly good and omnipotent God, but also believes that we cannot make any judgement about whether or not seemingly gratuitous evil probably is gratuitous. I argue that such agnosticism has several advantages compared with sceptical theism.

Recently, Yujin Nagasawa has argued that “systemic suffering” – suffering inherent in the evolutionary process – poses a problem for existentially optimistic theists and atheists who think that the world is overall good and therefore are happy and thankful to be alive in it. In short, he shows that it is difficult to consistently believe that the world is overall good when also recognising the existence of systemic suffering. In this article, I evaluate a sceptical response to the problem. The (...) idea behind the response is a sort of scepticism according to which we do not know whether our knowledge about the realm of values is representative. I argue that the response fails, but that theism in conjunction with such scepticism succeeds. Atheism in conjunction with such scepticism, on the other hand, does not. I also argue that atheists can at least consistently hope that the world is overall good, despite systemic suffering. Finally, I answer objections and conclude. (shrink)

In this article, I critically examine the religious argument for the existence of God, which Palmquist formulated from Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. After showing the structure of the argument, I point the problematic point of the argument and focus on the concept of Gesinnung. The privateness of Gesinnung is problematized in the analysis of it, and I briefly suggest that an alternative account of the Gesinnung is possible. Yet I emphasize the advantage that this argument has (...) compared to other competing arguments. (shrink)

In this paper, I will investigate the early work of William Temple (1881–1944). My contention is that Temple’s systematic philosophy contains resources for an interesting variant of a desire argument for God’s existence and for the truth of Christianity. This desire argument moves from claims about the nature of human reason to the conditions for its satisfaction and how that satisfaction might be achieved. In constructing this argument, Temple confronts the problem of evil, and so I will also outline his (...) response to the problem here. Temple is often overlooked in histories of philosophy, though he was conversant with philosophical classics, including Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Lotze, and, to list a few of the contemporaries or near-contemporaries: Balfour, Haldane, F. H. Bradley, A. C. Bradley, Moore, Bosanquet, Joachim, and Croce. He also acknowledges, in the preface to his main philosophical work Mens Creatrix, a special debt to Bergson, but also signals distance from him in the same place. Temple presents an interesting case of a philosopher and theologian (most of his books are a mixture of the two, some being more predominantly one or the other) because of his commitment to philosophical system in the midst of early analytic philosophy. (shrink)

This article explores various issues with Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's theology including his view of God, his articulation of a "new religion," and his thoughts about transhumanism. This article published is a commemoration of Monsignor Vincent Foy's contributions to Catholic thought. -/- After having examined many of Teilhard's writings and commentaries that have been articulated by both supporters and detractors, I am persuaded that one should not take an all-or-nothing approach to Teilhard (or any other thinker for that matter). The (...) works of Teilhard are often written in poetic prose and remain obscure, in part because of his mysticism. He uses scientific language which at times is conflated with his evolutionary and spiritual understanding of the world. This article looks at some of the theological missteps of Teilhard's works. (shrink)

The Institutional Dictionary of Astronism is the cumulation of receptions between Cometan and the astronomical world during the Founding era (2013-2021). The publication of this very first full-length Institutional Dictionary of Astronism represents eight years of the development of Astronism from its inception to how it stands today in 2021. The publication of this dictionary also encapsulates Astronism exactly as it exists now and how Cometan conceives it by the end of the Founding era. This dictionary and its contents capture (...) what Astronism is now for posterity to look back on how this astronomical belief system will change as time progresses. Many of the words and definitions of this dictionary will alter as we enter the Establishment era and Astronism continues its progression in becoming world religion. However, what will not ever change is Cometan’s absolute devotion to the stars of the night sky and his discovery of their secrets through his receptions, personal inspirations, and his overall relationship with The Great Cosmos. -/- Covering all the major Astronist beliefs, practices, cultural elements, theories, branches of study, and historical events, A Dictionary of Astronism, also known as the Institutional Dictionary of Astronism, is published by the Astronist Institution through its subsidiary, Astral Publishing, to commemorate the end of the era of The Founding of Astronism. -/- The Founding of Astronism began exactly eight years on 1st July 2013 which sparked Cometan's ideations and indrucies and which afforded him the insight, knowledge, and vision to found a new religious movement, philosophy, spirituality and political ideology. As The Founding of Astronism, also simply known as the Founding era, comes to an end, the Astronist Institution wants to acknowledge the fundamental importance of this year period of the history of Astronism and to the wider history of religion, philosophy and spirituality as a whole. -/- The Dictionary of Astronism immortalises that commemorative spirit by providing thousands of definition entries of Astronist terms that have been authorised by Astronist Institution scholars for dissemination worldwide. This dictionary captures the most up-to-date understanding of what Astronism is and how it as a whole and its component parts should be defined. Enjoy this dictionary that emblematises Astronism and how this new religion has so far developed. (shrink)

Where did the universe come from? Is life a result of chance, or design? If God is loving and all-powerful, why does evil still exist? Is religious belief just a byproduct of undirected evolutionary processes? Or did God make sure humans would evolve in such a way as to believe? Are philosophers closed-minded about religion? And why is so much of philosophy of religion about God-but not about gods? Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Religion introduces students to some of the (...) major traditional arguments for and against the existence of God. It also includes discussions of some less well-known, but thought-provoking arguments for the existence of God, and one of the most important new challenges to religious belief from the Cognitive Science of Religion. An introductory chapter traces the deep interconnections between philosophy and religion throughout Western history, and a final chapter considers what place there is for non-Western and non-monotheistic religions within contemporary philosophy of religion. Whatever your religious beliefs-or lack of beliefs-we think you will find many of the arguments in this book fascinating to think about, and useful starting points for deeper philosophical discussions. (shrink)

One of the common claims of the eternalists is that the "actual" infinite is possible and the universe is eternal. They are trying to refute the Kalam argument. What I wanted to show in this paper is that the "actual" infinite is impossible for logical reasons, and I have shown further that infinity has an effect and application over time, and that there is no way to deny the beginning of the universe for existence. The paper points out the problems (...) of infinity and points to the beginning of the universe. (shrink)

In the essay I analyse Micheletti’s three theses concerning: (a) the notion of mystery in relation to the “evidentialistic claim”; (b) analogical metaphysics in relation to “univocist immanentism” and to the importance of developing an analogical theism; (c) the fallibilistic conception of reason in relation to natural law, universalistic ethics and the so-called “essentialism” applied to individual human nature. I will try to show how deep is the intertwining and mutual implication of mystery and analogy – in metaphysics and theology, (...) in epistemology and ontology, in anthropology and ethics – and how Micheletti’s works have been an important step in bringing these two notions back to the center of the discussion that introduces oneself in the “question of God” and in the “question of Human being”. (shrink)

This paper develops a new argument from consciousness to theism: the argument from psychophysical harmony. Roughly, psychophysical harmony consists in the fact that phenomenal states are correlated with physical states and with one another in strikingly fortunate ways. For example, phenomenal states are correlated with behavior and functioning that is justified or rationalized by those very phenomenal states, and phenomenal states are correlated with verbal reports and judgments that are made true by those very phenomenal states. We argue that psychophysical (...) harmony is strong evidence for theism (or, at least, strong evidence against atheism in its standard naturalistic form). (shrink)

It is sometimes thought that the Problem of Evil entails the inexistence of God. However, this is not the case: it only entails the inexistence of an omnipotent-benevolent god, of which the God of Classical Theism is an example. As for ‘limited’ deities such as that of process theology, or malevolent deities such as that of dystheism, the problem of evil is not a problem at all.

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 3, Page 425-437, May 2022.

In this paper, we present an abductive argument for the existence of God from the experience of awe at natural beauty. If God’s creative work is a viable explanation for why we experience awe at natural beauty, and there is no satisfactory naturalistic explanation for the origins of such experiences, then we have defeasible evidence that God exists. To evaluate the argument's tenability, we assess the merits of the two main naturalistic frameworks that can be marshaled to answer the question (...) of why human beings experience awe at natural beauty, Wilson's biophilia hypothesis, and Keltner and Haidt's prototype approach to awe. We show shortcomings of both accounts in explaining the relevant experiences and argue that the reliance of these accounts on an adaptationist reading of our aesthetic appreciation of nature entails a commitment to questionable hidden premises: that affordances themselves can figure in the subject's perceptual experience, and that experiences of awe have adaptive value. We maintain that the argument's “empirical” premise is tenable and conclude with directions for future research regarding the argument's “theological” premise. (shrink)

This is a technical treatise for the scientific-minded readers trying to expand their intellectual horizon beyond the straitjacket of materialism. It is dedicated to those scientists and philosophers who feel there is something more, but struggle with connecting the dots into a more coherent picture supported by a way of seeing that allows us to overcome the present paradigm and yet maintains a scientific and conceptual rigor, without falling into oversimplifications. Most of the topics discussed are unknown even to neuroscientists, (...) biologists, philosophers, and yet are based on the findings published in their own mainstream peer reviewed literature or on deep insights of the scientific, philosophical and spiritual giants of the past. -/- A scientific, philosophical, and spiritual overview of the relationship between science and spirituality, neuroscience and the mystery of consciousness, mind and the nature of reality, evolution and life. A plaidoyer for a science that goes beyond the curve of reason and embraces a new synthesis of knowledge. The overcoming of the limitations of the intellect into an extended vision of ourselves and Nature. A critique of physicalism, the still-dominant doctrine that believes that all reality can be reduced to matter and the laws of physics alone. A review and reassessment of the old and new philosophical and metaphysical ideas which attempts to bring closer Western and Eastern traditions where science, philosophy, consciousness, Spirit and Nature are united in a grand vision that transcends the limited conventional scientific and philosophical paradigm. A possible answer to the questions of purpose and meaning and the future evolution of humankind beyond a conception that posits a priori a purposeless and meaningless universe. A report of the new scientific discoveries of a basal intelligence in cells and plants, on the question if mind is computational, the issue of free will, the mind-body problem, and the so called ‘hard problem of consciousness’. An essay on ancient as modern philosophical conceptions, from the One of Plotinus, the God of Spinoza until the recent revival of panpsychism or the universal consciousness. A journey into quantum physics from the perspective of philosophical idealism and an invitation to adopt new ways of seeing that might help us to transform our present understanding, expanding it into an integral cosmology, with a special emphasis on the spiritual and evolutionary cosmology of the Indian seer Sri Aurobindo. -/- Not just a philosophical and metaphysical meditation but, rather, an appeal to work towards a change of consciousness, a widening of our perspective towards a new way of seeing beyond a purely mechanistic worldview to avoid a social, environmental and economic collapse. Humans are transitional beings that will have to make a choice: relapse into a pre-rational state or evolve towards a new trans-rational species supported by an ideal of human unity in diversity as the expression of a spiritual evolutionary process, the call of the Spirit on Nature. (shrink)

Three qualities of “The Argument from Human Behavior” make it superior to other arguments for God. First, this argument discovers a universal indirect perception of God that everyone has many times every day: the fact that we all take seriously our sense of “wrong” (our sense of everyone’s moral obligations). Second, this argument reveals that the Biblical God claims He is the legislator of the moral laws in our mind. Third, it understands that discovering God will always demand a step (...) of faith, making an objective proof of God unattainable. However, the fact that we all have indirect perceptions of God produces the extreme probability, and possibly the inductive certainty: God exists. -/- Only God is able to enforce our inborn normative value of "wrong" and thereby keep it from being an unenforced absurdity. Since no one acts as if his or her sense of "wrong" is an absurdity, everyone behaves as if God exists. -/- This book also reveals that if the Biblical God exists, a slam-dunk rationale for His existence also must exist! No one will protest God’s judgment by saying that it was impossible to achieve the certainty that God exists. -/- Further, it contains innovative analyses of the major objections to God, including the Problem of Evil, Objective Morality, Euthyphro's Dilemma and the Philosophy of Science. (shrink)

Discuto la tesi di Micheletti secondo la quale ogni spiegazione fattuale presuppone premesse di ordine superiore rispetto alla spiegazione (M.Micheletti, “Radical Divine Alterity and the God-World Relationship”). Nella prima sezione del testo introdurrò la tesi, muovendo dalla analisi di alcuni esempi di spiegazione, ed elencherò le ragioni che (apparentemente) richiedono la postulazione di higher-degree propositions per rendere conto di factual propositions. Nella seconda sezione regimenterò logicamente la tesi di Micheletti. Nella terza sezione discuterò la validità della logica della spiegazione così (...) introdotta, con un’attenzione particolare alla analisi semantica della nozione di spiegazione, allo statuto modale delle ragioni che costituiscono una spiegazione, e all’approccio grammaticale alle higher order propositions. Nella quarta e ultima sezione avanzerò brevissime considerazioni conclusive. (shrink)

The paper explores Pascal’s idea according to which the teachings of the Church assume the hiddenness of God, and, hence, there is nothing surprising in the fact of the occurrence of nonresistant nonbelief. In order to show it the paper invokes the doctrines of the Incarnation, the Church as the Body of Christ, and the Original Sin. The first one indicates that there could be greater than nonbelief obstacle in forming interpersonal bonds with God, namely the ontological chasm between him (...) and human persons. The assumption of the human nature by the Son of God could be seen as a cure for this problem. The doctrine of the Church shows it as an end in itself, and in order for the Church to have meaning and to exist there has to be nonbelief in the world. Finally, the dogma of the Original Sin shows that there is no category of purely nonresistant nonbelief. The paper also addresses Schellenberg’s “accommodationist strategy” from the perspective of the Christian theology and in the last part it investigates what should be the influence of the fact of the hiddenness on theology’s take on the divine revelation. (shrink)