Carl Stumpf (1848–1937) is a key figure in the fin de siècle germanophone philosophy. Unfortunately, after the World War One, the interest towards Stumpf as a philosopher waned. One of the reasons was that already in the 1920s the attention of the mainstream philosophers shifted in direction of the rising rivalry between analytic and continental philosophy. The interest towards Carl Stumpf’s philosophy was revived only in the last twenty years or so. Great service in this provided the Neo-Brentanists. (...) But while the association of Carl Stumpf with Franz Brentano fostered Stumpf studies, it also gave rise of one-sided interpretations of Stumpf as a philosopher. In this way his importance and idiosyncrasy as philosopher remained in shadow. (shrink)

This essay explores Wittgenstein’s encounter with Stumpf’s work in Tone Psychology during a rarely studied period in Wittgenstein’s early career when he worked as a researcher in Myers’s laboratory for experimental psychology in Cambridge. I argue that Stumpf’s emphasis on the notion of musicality as the ability to characterize what is ‘musical’ about music troubled Wittgenstein’s initial formulation of his career-long adherence to the comparison between language and music. In the Tractatus the importance of internal projective relations far exceeds that (...) of arbitrariness in language. This results in the curious elision of musicality in the Tractatus, as shown in his gramophone analogy. The acknowledgment of the enormous complexity pertaining to the facts of human life remained underdeveloped in Wittgenstein’s philosophy until the anthropological turn in his middle-period. Only then do we see the blooming of the language-as-music simile and its eventual impact on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. (shrink)

by Carl Stumpf. [467] ii When Zeller, iii in the lecture “On the meaning and mission of epistemology”, iv called for a renewed fostering of this science, he designated as its mission the study of t...

It is well known that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Brentano school interacted fruitfully with early analytic philosophy: the Russell-Meinong debate is a paradigm example of this interaction. But Brentanians also engaged with other schools of philosophy. In his article “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie” (1892) Stumpf took on two opponents: Kant and the leading neo-Kantians – in his terminology ‘criticists’ – as well as the so-called ‘psychologists’. The former want to do epistemology independently of psychology, the latter (...) reduce epistemology to psychology. Both, according to Stumpf, are wrong. In developing his argument, he expounds and clarifies central aspects of his own philosophy. “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie” is therefore, among other things, an introduction to main themes in Stumpf's work. See Mark Textor (2020) Stumpf between criticism and psychologism: introducing “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 28:6, 1172-1180, for an introductory overview. (shrink)

Il lavoro analizza la tempestiva ricezione da parte di Cornelio Fabro della filosofia di Carl Stumpf, così come esposta nella postuma Erkenntnislehre. Fin dai lavori dei primi anni Quaranta Fabro adotta una concezione della ‘fenomenologia’ distante da quella di Husserl perché ricalcata sulla definizione stumpfiana. Più in generale, Fabro si ispira a Stumpf ancor più che allo stesso Brentano. A partire dalla distinzione tra ‘fenomeni' e ‘funzioni psichiche’ Stumpf è infatti capace di proseguire il rilancio dell’aristotelismo con coerenza ancor (...) maggiore del maestro, all’insegna di un pieno riconoscimento del significato conoscitivo della percezione contro gli tipici di eccessi di ogni forma di intellettualismo. (shrink)

Cette étude porte sur l’évaluation par Carl Stumpf de la phénoménologie de Husserl dans ses Recherches logiques et dans le premier livre des Idées directrices. J’examine, dans un premier temps, la réception par Stumpf de la phénoménologie des Recherches logiques. Je me penche ensuite sur les §§ 85-86 des Idées directrices dans lesquels Husserl cherche à démarquer sa phénoménologie « pure » de la phénoménologie de Stumpf. Dans la troisième partie, j’examine la critique que Stumpf adresse, dans la §13 (...) de son ouvrage Erkenntnislehre, à la nouvelle version de la phénoménologie que Husserl élabore dans ses Idées directrices, et dans la quatrième, je me penche sur l’interprétation spinoziste des corrélations noético-noématiques dans ses deux études de Stumpf sur Spinoza. Je conclus en me demandant si la version de la phénoménologie que Husserl élabore durant la période de Freiburg n’anticipe pas, dans une certaine mesure, les critiques de Stumpf tout en confirmant le diagnostic de ce dernier sur la phénoménologie des Idées directrices. (shrink)

This study is about Carl Stumpf's achievements during his stay in Prague (1879-1884). It can be considered a piece of sociology of knowledge that is meant to uncover the institutional mechanisms used by Brentano from Vienna in order to implement his philosophical program in Prague. I claim that Stumpf and Marty have been instrumental in Brentano's plans and strategies to consolidate his hold on philosophy and its institutions in Austria. There are also several aspects of Stumpf's and Marty's scientific (...) activities in Prague, which I will also examine in this paper, including their scientific collaborations and exchanges with Ernst Mach, Ewald Hering, Gottlob Frege, and William James during Stumpf's stay in Prague (1879-1884). The last part of this study pertains to the circumstances surrounding Stumpf's departure from Prague and Brentano's reaction to Stumpf's arguments. (shrink)

Sous le titre Renaissance de la philosophie sont regroupés ici, en traduction française, quatre textes du philosophe, psychologue et musicologue allemand Carl Stumpf. Outre l'autobiographie remarquablement précise dans laquelle il décrit notamment l'ensemble de ses travaux jusqu'en 1924, nous avons réuni trois textes dans lesquels sont présentés les principes fondamentaux du programme philosophique de Stumpf. " La renaissance de la philosophie " est son discours de rectorat prononcé à l'université de Berlin en 1907, soit exactement cent ans après le (...) discours de rectorat de Fichte prononcé à la même université sous le titre " Discours à la nation allemande ". Les deux textes de l'Académie, " Phénomènes et fonctions psychiques " et " De la classification des sciences ", publiés tous les deux en 1906 par l'Académie royale de Berlin, ont fait l'objet de nombreuses discussions à cette époque. Ils se complètent admirablement puisque la distinction qui donne son titre au premier fonde la classification des sciences qui fait l'objet du second. Cet ouvrage contient également une présentation substantielle de l'œuvre de Stumpf et du contexte historique auquel appartiennent ses quatre textes traduits, une bibliographie complète de ses publications et un index. (shrink)

This study aims to account for the reception of the philosophy of Carl Stumpf since the turn of the twenty-first century and to emphasize the actuality of some of the aspects of his philosophy. The present text is subdivided into several sections, each corresponding to one of the main topics discussed in the recent literature on the work of Stumpf. In the first section, I try to show, using his classification of sciences, that Stumpf's empirical work is driven by (...) a unitary philosophical program. I then examine the ramifications of this program in several areas of philosophy that have been the subject of recent commentaries and publications. I begin with the commentaries on the recent publication of Stumpf's thesis on mathematical axioms, which stress Stumpf's contribution to the philosophy of mathematics and to theory of knowledge, and more specifically to the debate on logical psychologism that Frege and Husserl will address a few years later. I conclude this section by examining the second of two major themes in the work of Stumpf that have been the subject of several recent studies, namely, on the one hand, logic and the nature of states of affairs and, on the other hand, Stumpf's contribution to the mind-body problem and to the topic of relations. The third section is divided into two parts. In the first one, I try to briefly account for the vast literature on Stumpf's contribution to psychology understood broadly enough as to include his work on the psychology of sound, Gestalt psychology, animal psychology and the psychology of child development. I provide, in the second part of this section, a summary of his studies in the area of aesthetics and musicology in general, i.e. his contribution to the history of music and its origins, to ethnomusicology, and to acoustics. Although this study does not aim at being exhaustive, it provides an overview of the important aspects of Stumpf's contribution to philosophy. (shrink)

This study attempts to situate Carl Stumpf's theory of emotions with regard to that of his teacher, Franz Brentano, and to the sensualist theory of William James. We will argue that Stumpf's theory can be considered an attempt to reconcile James's sensualism, which emphasizes the role of bodily feelings, with what we will call, for the purposes of this study, Brentano's intentionalism, which conceives of emotions as intentional states. Stumpf claims that James's sensory feelings and Brentano's affective intentional states (...) are two sides of the same coin in that they constitute two essential ingredients of a full-fledged theory of emotions. The question is whether Stumpf's ecumenism avoids the objections that he himself raises against James's and Brentano's theories. The paper is divided into four parts: the first part presents Stumpf's classification of psychical functions; the second part presents his criticism of James's theory of emotions; the third part is a summary of Stumpf's complex debate with Brentano on emotions and sensory feelings; the last part examines Stumpf's attempt to incorporate into his theory of affects the phenomenological and intentional aspects of emotions. I conclude with a note on the unity of consciousness. (shrink)

This study is a commentary on Carl Stumpf's evaluation of Husserl's phenomenology as presented in the Logical Investigations and the first book of Ideas. I first examine Stumpf's reception of the version of phenomenology that Husserl presented in the Logical Investigations and I then look at §§ 85-86 of Ideas I, in which Husserl seeks to demarcate his "pure" phenomenology from that of Stumpf. In the third section, I analyze the criticism that Stumpf, in § 13 of his book (...) Erkenntnislehre, directs toward to the new version of phenomenology that Husserl develops in Ideas I, and in the fourth, I summarize the Spinozist interpretation of the noetico-noematical correlations that Stumpf proposes in his two studies on Spinoza. The last section addresses Husserl's self-criticism regarding the Cartesian aproach to the reduction in Ideas I and the parallelism that the late Husserl establishes between intentional psychology and transcendental phenomenology. I try to show that the version of phenomenology that Husserl develops during the Freiburg period anticipates in many respects Stumpf's criticism and partly confirms the latter's diagnosis of the version of phenomenology advocated in Ideas I. (shrink)

A substantial introduction to Stumpf's work in philosophy and science.

This bibliography of Stumpf’s publications is the most comprehensive to date. It relies in part on the bibliography published by Stumpf in his autobiography (Stumpf 1924), which is incomplete and does not include his publications after 1924. In addition to the works of Stumpf published during his lifetime or posthumously, we indicate the translations of his works in several languages and some of the syllabus and lecture notes of his students that are available in different institutions.

Introduction to a series of unpublished letters from Brentano and Stumpf.

This essay addresses the interrelations between philosophy and experimental sciences that lie at the heart of Carl Stumpf’s epistemology. Following a biographical exposé demonstrating how Stumpf succeeded in acquiring a dual competence in both philosophical and scientific fields, we examine the vast array of academic disciplines encompassed by his research. Such a biographical treatment aims, indeed, to better promote the thrust of Stumpf’s assertion that philosophical enquiries should always be carried out in close connection with scientific practices, and underlines (...) how philosophico-scientific interactions established his work as a central pillar in the history of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German thought. (shrink)

La thématique de l’attention apparaît de manière topique dans les deux tomes de la Psychologie du son, publiés respectivement en 1883 et en 1890. W. James, proche ami de Stumpf, publiera de son côté dans The Principles of Psychology (1890) un chapitre entier sur l’attention. Carl Friedrich Stumpf (1848-1936), psychologue et musicologue, a joué un rôle crucial dans la constitution de la philosophie phénoménologique au tournant du xxe siècle. F. Brentano, qui fut le professeur de Husserl à Vien...

Both Franz Brentano and his pupil Carl Stumpf, in their psychology, laid stress to the description and analysis of psychical phenomena, or functions, in order to get a taxonomy of mental acts. In their logic, they undertake the proof of whether empirically given knowledge is logically necessary.

Allievo di Brentano e Lotze, maestro di Husserl e Halle e dei Gestaltisti a Berlino dove fu voluto da Dilthey, Carl Stumpf fu per oltre mezzo secolo un protagonista della filosofia accademica tedesca. Ciò nonostante, il suo ruolo nella storia della filosofia tra Ottocento e Novecento è ancora sottovalutato dalla critica. Il saggio ricostruisce le linee generali del pensiero di Stumpf sottolinenandone il costante impegno in favore di una «Rinascita della filosofia» – come recita il titolo della sua prolusione (...) rettorale del 1907, che può avvenire solamente grazie alla proficua ma critica interazione con le scienze naturali. In ciò Stumpf sviluppa originalmente il pensiero di Brentano ma in una direzione diversa da quella di Husserl, Marty o Meinong. (shrink)