Despite claims about the end of history and the death of cinema, visual media continue to contribute to our understanding of history and history-making. In this book, Marcia Landy argues that rethinking history and memory must take into account shifting conceptions of visual and aural technologies. With the assistance of thinkers such as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Cinema and Counter-History examines writings and films that challenge prevailing notions of history in order to explore the philosophic, aesthetic, and (...) political stakes of activating the past. Marshaling evidence across European, African, and Asian cinema, Landy engages in a counter-historical project that calls into question the certainty of visual representations and unmoors notions of a history firmly anchored in truth. (shrink)

David Sterritt _The Films of Jean-Luc Godard: Seeing the Invisible_ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 ISBN 0521580382 (hb) 0521589711 (pb) 297 pp.

Giuliana Bruno _Atlas of Emotion: Journeys in Art, Architecture, and Film_ London: Verso, 2002 ISBN 1859848028 484 pp.

The European Legacy, Volume 17, Issue 4, Page 560-561, July 2012.

Marcia Landy 'Godard: Thinking Media' _Film-Philosophy_, vol. 6 no. 30, September 2002.

Kant’s argument in the First Analogy for the permanence of substance has been cast as consisting of a simple quantifierscope mistake. Kant is portrayed as illicitly moving from a premise such as (1) at all times, there must exist some substance, to a conclusion such as (2) some particular substance must exist at all times. Examples meant to show that Kant makes this mistake feature substances coming into and out of existence, but doing so at overlapping times. I argue that (...) Kant offers an argument against this kind of example in the following passage. Kant’s claim is that, were substances to be created and destroyed as in the example, the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another (A188–9/B231–32). (shrink)

The emphasis on duly in Kant's ethics is widely held to constitute a defect. Marcia W. Baron develops and assesses the criticism, which she sees as comprising two objections: that duty plays too large a role, leaving no room for the supererogatory, and that Kant places too much value on acting from duty. Clearly written and cogently argued, Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology takes on the most philosophically intriguing objections to Kant's ethics and subjects them to a rigorous yet (...) sympathetic assessment. (shrink)

For Shepherd, how many things exist? On the one hand, it looks like the answer is going to be many. It is a central tent of Shepherd's philosophical system that causation is a relation whereby two or more objects combine to create a third. Since there are many instances of this causal relation, there must be many objects in the world. On the other hand, there are several moments throughout her writing where Shepherd indicates that the distinction between causes and (...) effects is in some sense unreal, and that while the world appears to us to consist of many distinct objects interacting causally, really there is just one thing and its merely nominally distinct parts. I argue that Shepherd is an ontological pluralist, and the texts that appear to express a commitment to ontological monism are best understood as expressing ontological holism instead. (shrink)

Gideon Rosen (2014) has drawn our attention to cases of duress of a particularly interesting sort: the person's ‘mind is not flooded with pain or fear’, she knows exactly what she is doing, and she makes a clear-headed choice to act in, as Rosen says, ‘awful ways’. The explanation of why we excuse such actions cannot be that the action was not voluntary. In addition, although some duress cases could also be viewed as necessity cases and thus as justified, Rosen (...) wisely sets aside that complicating factor by zeroing in on those cases where the action clearly is not justified. So why do we excuse in these cases, where the action is not justified and the agent acted voluntarily?Rosen thinks the key lies in the ‘ill will’ condition, ‘the idea that an act is blameworthy only if it manifests insufficient concern or regard for those affected’. He says this is relatively uncontroversial; much of my paper is taken up with calling the ‘ill will’ condition into question. I also take issue with Rosen on just how justifications and excuses differ. I argue in favour of understanding justifications (in a context where we are asking how justifications and excuses differ) as not requiring truth, but only reasonable belief. (shrink)

1. Stoicism in classical Latin literature -- 2. Stoicism in Christian Latin thought through the sixth century.

Friends as well as foes of Kant have long been uneasy over his emphasis on duty, but lately the view that there is something morally repugnant about acting from duty seems to be gaining in popularity. More and more philosophers indicate their readiness to jettison duty and the moral 'ought' and to conceive of the perfectly moral person as someone who has all the right desires and acts accordingly without any notion that (s)he ought to act in this way. Elsewhere' (...) I have argued that such a picture of the perfectly moral person is flawed. In this paper I examine the claim that acting from duty is morally repugnant. There is some truth to this charge, but, I argue, the repugnance attaches not to acting from duty as such, but only to certain ways of acting from duty. In isolating the objectionable elements of acting from duty, I hope not only to vindicate the skeletal concept but also to offer illumination on the question of just how we should understand morally good conduct. (shrink)

During the past decade ethical theory has been in a lively state of development, and three basic approaches to ethics - Kantian ethics, consequentialism, and virtue ethics - have assumed positions of particular prominence.

American doctors in the 1990s are being asked to serve as "double agents," weighing competing allegiances to patients' medical needs against the monetary costs to society. This situation is a reaction to rapid cost increases for medical services, themselves the result of the haphazard development since the 1920s of an inherently inflationary, open-ended system for funding and delivering health care. The answer to an inefficient system, however, is not to stint on care, but rather to restructure the system to remove (...) the inflationary pressures. As long as we are spending enormous resources on an inherently inefficient and inflationary system we cannot justify asking doctors to withhold beneficial care to save money for third-party payers. Doing so serves a largely political agenda and endangers the patient-centered ethic that is central to medicine. (shrink)

This valuable and interesting book attempts to discern the essential Freudian theses about the mind and to give them a cogent philosophical defense. Like many philosophers Gardner sees psychoanalytic explanation as continuous with folk psychology, though he holds that the latter needs considerable expansion in order to accommodate irrationality of the “Freudian” sorts.

The book presents a new conceptual framework and a set of research principles with which to study and interpret technology from a phenomenological perspective.

1024x768 Na sociedade da informação as Tecnologias da Informação e do Conhecimento podem contribuir para o aumento da distância social entre quem detém as informações e o domínio das tecnologias e, aqueles que estão a margem da sociedade tecnológica que são considerados os excluídos digitais, revelando a exclusão sociodigital. Por conseguinte, a eliminação da exclusão social encontra-se conectada a inclusão digital. Portanto, a importância dos programas de inclusão sociodigital, destacando-se o Programa Nacional de Tecnologias na Educação, enquanto política pública para (...) a inclusão sociodigital, que foi implantado em 1997 pelo governo federal em âmbito nacional, por meio da parceira União/Estado/Municípios. Neste contexto, o objetivo desta pesquisa foi investigar a implantação do Proinfo em Minas Gerais, especificamente na região metropolitana de Belo Horizonte onde estão localizados seis Núcleos de Tecnologias Educacionais, os quais têm a função de promover as capacitações dos agentes educacionais. Para tal, foi escolhida como metodologia a pesquisa descritiva tendo como estratégias adotadas as pesquisas bibliográfica e documental. Concluiu-se que mesmo enfrentando vários problemas, a capacitação dos agentes educacionais vem sendo realizada em todos os Núcleos Tecnológicos Educacionais, através de cursos sugeridos pelo Proinfo, que disponibiliza os materiais didáticos através da Secretaria de Educação Básica. São ofertadas, também, oficinas de curta duração sobre o uso de softwares na educação. Assim, a implantação do Proinfo em Minas Gerais constitui-se de um elemento gerador de mudanças educacionais e sociais, promotor da inclusão sociodigital, podendo ser considerada uma política pública inovadora, que tem nos NTEs e NTMs a sua garantia de desenvolvimento e execução. Palavras-chave: Inclusão sociodigital. Proinfo. Capacitação de agentes educacionais. Normal 0 21 false false false PT-BR X-NONE X-NONE. (shrink)

This chapter describes Card's characterization as an idealization that captures why hate crime legislation seems (at least prima facie) to be a very good idea. The rationale for enhanced penalties is far more compelling if hate crimes are characterized as Card characterizes them. She focuses on hate crimes that are motivated by hatred. Hate crimes today should be viewed as part of an ongoing campaign of intimidation. Card is of course well aware of the position that the legal category of (...) hate crimes and enhanced penalties for hate crimes are called for to counter the message sent by hate crimes; in fact she notes that she was initially "attracted to the idea of penalty enhancement legislation for hate crimes as a way to send a strong social message against racism, sexism, anti‐Semitism, and homophobia". (shrink)

Balanço da produção científica em Educação Física em Estados do Nordeste, visando a identificar tendências, perspectivas e desafios que se apresentam à consolidação dessa produção. O estudo integra a pesquisa matricial do grupo LEPEL/UFBA.

O nexo entre biopolítica e soberania é de importância central em Michel Foucault e Giorgio Agamben, que possuem um entendimento distinto, porém complementar de tais conceitos. A relação entre essas ideias à luz dos 50 anos de publicação de A sociedade punitiva é abordada em alguns de seus pontos de contato, distanciamento e complementaridade. As interações entre poder soberano e vida humana apontam para um olhar crítico necessário sobre como os governos capturaram a vida como recurso administrável mas, também, passível (...) de inclusão e exclusão através do poder soberano, na figura do homo sacer. Palavras-Chave: Foucault. Agamben. Biopolítica. Soberania. Sociedade Punitiva. (shrink)

...believe that his theory asks too much, demanding total devotion to morality and treating everything worth doing (and perhaps more) as a duty. But, despite their differences, the two sets of...

The distinction between justifications and excuses is a familiar one to most of us who work either in moral philosophy or legal philosophy. But exactly how it should be understood is a matter of considerable disagreement. My aim in this paper is, first, to sort out the differences and try to figure out what underlying disagreements account for them. I give particular attention to the following question: Does a person who acts on a reasonable but mistaken belief have a justification, (...) or only an excuse? One disagreement I highlight concerns the extent to which justification is primarily about agents rather than about actions. Those who think, as I do, of “His action, X, was justified” as “He was justified in doing X” are far more likely to allow that justification requires reasonable belief and does not require truth, than are those who think of “His action, X, was justified” as “Although actions of this type usually are prohibited, X is in these circumstances in fact permissible.” In addition to sorting out the differences and tracing them to some underlying disagreements, I defend the reasonable belief view of justification against some objections, and argue that, whether or not we continue to use the term “justified” in a way that does not require truth, we need the concept. Contrary to the claims of some who reject the reasonable belief view of justification, justification thus understood does not reduce to excuse. (shrink)