Ante las insistentes críticas del mecanicismo continental que caracterizaban la fuerza gravitacional como una “cualidad oculta” Newton redactó en el “Escolio general” una breve respuesta en la que se afirmaba que la fuerza era real y era suficiente la explicación que había dado de ella en los Principia para sostenerla como tal. Al respecto dos interpretaciones han pretendido explicar cuáles son los aspectos metodológicos y matemáticos de esta respuesta de Newton. En el artículo se muestra que la lectura más reciente (...) permite comprender algunas de las limitaciones de la interpretación clásica, al acentuar el carácter metodológico de la demostración, resaltando la relación entre matemáticas y filosofía natural planteada en el “Prefacio al lector” de la primera edición de los Principia de Newton. (shrink)

The discovery of Neptune was one of the greatest achievements of nineteenth-century astronomy. Using nothing but calculus and some observations of the Uranus’ anomalous motion, Adams and Le Verrier got to determine, independently, the possible place and mass of a hypothetical planet, which would produce its observational discovery. In this paper I will demonstrate that the methods used by these astronomers were influenced by Newton’s method of analysis and synthesis. Considering this, I will also expose, that some astronomy’s general epistemological (...) principles could be deduced when we consider these investigation methods. (shrink)

El descubrimiento de Neptuno fue uno de los mayores logros de la astronomía del siglo XIX. Armados con las herramientas del cálculo y con las observaciones del movimiento anómalo de Urano, Adams y Le Verrier determinaron, independientemente, la posible ubicación y masa de un hipotético planeta, lo que llevaría a su descubrimiento observacional. En este artículo me propongo demostrar que los métodos empleados por estos estaban influenciados por el método de análisis y síntesis de Newton. Mostraré, además, algunos principios epistemológicos (...) generales de la astronomía que se pueden extraer cuando consideramos estos métodos de investigación. (shrink)

Algunos especialistas de Newton han sostenido que la metodología con la que éste demuestra la existencia de la fuerza se fundamenta en el tratamiento matemático de los fenómenos del movimiento, lo que se ha convertido en la lectura clásica del asunto. No obstante, esta interpretación presenta amplias limitaciones si se examina a la luz de la lectura que intérpretes como Guicciardini y Guerlac proponen. Este artículo muestra las limitaciones de la lectura clásica a la luz de esta lectura más reciente, (...) explorando los aspectos metodológicos de la demostración de la fuerza. (shrink)

This paper characterizes José Celestino Mutis’ appropriation of Newton in the Viceroyalty of New Granada. First, we examine critically traditional accounts of Mutis’ works highlighting, on the one hand, their inadequacy for directing their claims toward the nineteenth-century independence from Spain and, on the other, for not differentiating between Newtonianism and Enlightenment. Next, we portray Mutis’ complex Newtonianism from his own statements and from printed sources, including a variety of works and translations from British, Dutch, and French authors, in addition (...) to a wide range of Newton’s writings, unusual for an eighteenth-century reader in the Americas. Finally, we analyze a salient claim of Mutis’ Newtonianism in order to depict his appropriation and transformation of Newton’s ideas: the characterization of Newtonian experimental physics as a useful science. In so doing, Mutis further developed metaphysical and methodological positions not present in Newton’s works. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article interprets a recently recovered manuscript, Tratado de astronomía y la reformaçión del tiempo, composed by Antonio Sánchez in New Granada c.1696, in the context of the Spanish and Renaissance cosmographies. Sánchez’s Tratado proposes a spherical astronomy, in which celestial bodies – including comets — move in orbs containing pyramidal knots that explain the changing speed observed in the motion of planets. From this astronomy and following the peninsular style of repertorios, Sánchez derives two major conclusions: the corrected (...) length of the solar year and a revised birth date of Jesus. Taking as center of reference Vélez, where Sánchez was based, these claims led to conclusions in domains ranging from calendric astronomy to eschatology, including the incorporation of the indigenous peoples into salvation narrative and a demonstration of the arrangement of the celestial orbs at the Last Judgment. Sánchez’s Tratado constitutes an expansion of the Spanish mathematical cosmography that sheds light on the production of knowledge in the Spanish-American world and, at the same time, provides elements to reassess our understanding of the global circulation of Renaissance and early modern ideas. (shrink)

L'obiettivo di questo lavoro è analizzare la percezione che gli insegnanti di scuola secondaria di secondo grado dell’area metropolitana di Bologna (Italia) hanno della storia e del suo insegnamento. Attraverso una ricerca quantitativa svolta attraverso la somministrazione di un questionario su scala Likert a novantanove insegnanti dell’area metropolitana di Bologna si sono potuti identificare risultati ambivalenti. Da una parte, gli insegnanti possiedono generalmente una ottima e spesso consapevole, ma migliorabile, concezione epistemologica nei confronti della storia e del suo insegnamento; tuttavia, (...) emerge una concezione non olistica del patrimonio, degli strumenti e delle metodologie didattiche a disposizione nella pratica docente; infatti gli insegnanti affermano di utilizzare in classe prevalentemente la spiegazione frontale, lasciando alle attività laboratoriali legate alle fonti un ruolo marginale. (shrink)

In discussions of standards of proof, a familiar perspective often emerges. According to what we call specificationism, standards of proof are legal rules that specify the quantum of evidence required to determine that a litigant’s claim has been proven. In so doing, they allocate the risk of error among litigants (and potential litigants), minimizing the risk of certain types of error. Specificationism is meant as a description of the way the rules actually function. We argue, however, that its claims are (...) either mistaken or at a minimum deeply misleading, especially when it comes to standard of proof rules (SPRs) that contain indeterminate formulas, as is typical. As against specificationism, we argue that SPRs are best understood as rules that confer competence to decide whether a given standard has been met—according to whatever vague or inchoate interpretation (if any) of the rule in question triers of fact implicitly or explicitly employ. We call this the competence-norm approach. (shrink)

Donde la palabra se torna insuficiente y la realidad se vuelve inenarrable, la imagen y la ficción pueden convertirse en el único resquicio para contar lo que debe ser contado. Es por ello que el álbum ilustrado se revela como idóneo para abordar la cuestión del Holocausto con un público infantil y juvenil. Este artículo presenta el análisis de los rasgos definitorios de los álbumes con tal temática mediante el estudio de un corpus de cuatro ejemplos, y ahonda en las (...) posibilidades didácticas de un título en particular, Bruno. El niño que aprendió a volar, de Nadia Terranova y Ofra Amit. Los resultados nos hacen concluir que es posible crear desde el lirismo imágenes para enseñar la más infame atrocidad. (shrink)

'Everyone knows what attention is’ according to William James. Much work on attention in psychology and neuroscience cites this famous phrase only to quickly dismiss it. But James is right about this: ‘attention’ was not introduced into psychology and neuroscience as a theoretical concept. I argue that we should therefore study attention with broadly the same methodology that David Marr has applied to the study of perception. By focusing more on Marr's Computational Level of analysis, we arrive at a unified (...) answer to the question of what attention is, what role it plays in the mind, and why organisms like us have that capacity. I propose a methodology for studying attention at Marr's Computational Level that optimizes in a three-dimensional space: it should capture core aspects of our first-person experience of attention, be explanatorily powerful in psychology and neuroscience, and fertile in an interdisciplinary context. I show how this methodology leads to what I call the priority structure account of attention. Attention is what organizes current information to make it more useful for the organism. We can identify it by four features. Attention, in this way, helps a cognitive system to integrate its informational state with its current motivational state. I describe how this account improves on alternatives and shows why attention is a useful concept in many disciplines and for connecting them. -/- This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science. (shrink)

Esta investigación presenta planteamientos fenomenológicos y hermenéuticos sobre el quehacer teológico en el contexto de la Universidad Católica Luis Amigó, en miras a la renovación del trabajo del pregrado definido como una Teología en contexto. Se buscó comprender en qué consiste tal quehacer teológico porque así lo requiere la carrera en los actuales marcos de comprensión socioeclesial, además de las definiciones institucionales dentro de la Universidad. Para esta comprensión, junto a la revisión de los aportes históricos, filosóficos y teológicos en (...) general, se hizo necesario plantear una metodología cualitativa que incluyó, a partir de la técnica del grupo focal, la experiencia de estudiantes y maestros que entienden, fraguan y asimilan este conocimiento teológico-contextual al interior de las aulas de clase. Así se da cuenta del mundo de la vida y de la interpretación del acto de vida, donde se hacen las construcciones teológicas. Finalmente, se comparte el análisis y discusión de los resultados con el propósito de aportar horizontes desde y para la institución, con el fin de facilitar una Teología al servicio de las comunidades y de la sociedad colombiana. (shrink)

The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first (...) aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism. (shrink)

Despite the fact that their disagreement concerns the most basic metaethical and metaphysical questions regarding our relation to nature, it has become apparent that many anthropocentrists share with nonanthropocentrists a concern for the environment for its own sake, that is to say, a noninstrumental concern for nature. This concern is also present in practical spheres of environmental engagement. With regard to the philosophical task of justifying the claim that we ought to protect nature, this concern imposes on those that share (...) it at least three conditions: priority, independence of future interaction, and universality. Reasonably specified, these conditions are neutral between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism and should be attractive to both camps. Although there are reasons to think it would be difficult to meet all three conditions at the same time, with some modification a promising way to do it becomes apparent. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false ES X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 Sin duda, la preocupación básica del pensamiento de Gilles Deleuze es la ontología. Siempre basado en una reflexión ontológica este filósofo abordará otros campos como la política y la estética. Sin embargo, poco se ha atendido al papel que el lenguaje desempeña con respecto al tema ontológico en esta obra. De hecho el lenguaje parece no ser una de las preocupaciones centrales de Deleuze, a pesar de que los casos en (...) que lo considera con cierta exclusividad son muy significativos, pues terminan constituyendo lo que podría considerarse una teoría sobre el lenguaje que lo pone en una relación esencial con la ontología. En este escrito trataré de reconstruir este cuerpo teórico sobre lenguaje y ontología recurriendo, en primer lugar, a Lógica del sentido y luego a la formulación perfeccionada de “Postulados de la lingüística” y Foucault. (shrink)

It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible (...) to reasons to act. Pragmatists who want to preserve a motivational constraint on reasons therefore have exactly two options: either arguing that there are irreducible reasons for being in non-intentional states ; or arguing that we can believe directly for practical reasons. I argue that the prospects for the former option are dim because irreducible reasons to be in states are hard to square with the motivational constraint on reasons. Returning to the more traditional route of arguing for pragmatism by defending a version of doxastic voluntarism therefore seems to be the more promising way for pragmatists to go. (shrink)

The work of Emmanuel Levinas has been both abundantly recognized and criticized in moral philosophy. This Janus-faced attitude is also present in ecological theories, which find fertile ground in Levinas’ thought without being able to explain its apparent anthropocentrism. Opposing hermeneutical paths tend to focus either on otherness as an absolute alterity, implying a potentially unlimited responsibility for all alterities, or on otherness as a re-foundation of humanism, leading to the conclusion that responsibility is unlimited only among humans. Here I (...) seek to disentangle Levinas from these two extreme interpretations, first by reviewing ecological readings of his philosophy, in both the Francophone and Anglophone spheres, and second by analyzing specific Levinasian terms that might be particularly helpful for a non-anthropocentric or deep ecology. The main results of this investigation are a distinction between the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of vulnerability, an explanation of Levinasian compulsory or methodological humanism, and a schematic model of sensibility as enjoyment/vulnerability capable of supporting deep ecology without the traditional notions of free will, rights, or values. (shrink)

The concept of “philosophical normalization” has become common place, recently questioned in the narrative of the historical process of philosophy in Latin America. From the theory of layers of time raised by R. Koselleck this paper proposes a critical review of this concept.

The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) provides that “an individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead.” We show that the UDDA contains two conflicting interpretations of the phrase “cessation of functions.” By one interpretation, what matters for the determination of death is the cessation of spontaneous functions only, regardless of their generation by artificial means. By the (...) other, what matters is the cessation of both spontaneous and artificially supported functions. Because each UDDA criterion uses a different interpretation, the law is conceptually inconsistent. A single consistent interpretation would lead to the conclusion that conscious individuals whose respiratory and circulatory functions are artificially supported are actually dead, or that individuals whose brain is entirely and irreversibly destroyed may be alive. We explore solutions to mitigate the inconsistency. (shrink)

En este texto se trata de pensar el proyecto que Foucault inició con el análisis de la parrhesía. Se aborda ese problema en relación a otros dos elementos de su obra: la reflexión sobre la función de los intelectuales y sus escritos sobre la noción de crítica. Desde esa perspectiva trataré de mostrar que las investigaciones sobre la parrhesía reflejan el intento de pensar una nueva política de la verdad.

Requiring family authorization for apnea testing subtracts health professionals control over death determination, a procedure that has traditionally been considered a matter of clinical expertise alone. In this commentary, we first provide evidence showing that health professionals’ (HPs) disposition to act on death determination without family’s prior consent could be much lower than that referred to by Berkowitz and Garrett (2020). We hypothesize that HPs may have reservations about their own expertise as regards death, and may thus hesitate to impose (...) their views on patients’ families. We then address the theoretical question of clinical expertise in death determination by distinguishing judgments about facts (e.g., the presence or absence of spontaneous breathing) from interpretations given of these facts (i.e., their meaning for the vital status of an individual). We argue that, while clinicians may claim some expert authority on the former, they hold no particular authority on the latter. (shrink)

Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can (...) make sense of blameworthiness for non-culpable attitudes. In response, voluntarists could propose a revision of our actual practices. This would lead us into a quite different debate. (shrink)

RESUMEN Este trabajo pretende analizar el papel jugado por la ideología en lo que respecta al despliegue histórico de los derechos humanos, interrogándose sobre si dicho despliegue ha cumplido con una función eminentemente ideológica. La reflexión transcurrirá a través de la visión de dos pensadores que han mantenido una de las discusiones filosóficas contemporáneas más interesantes: Louis Althusser y Michel Foucault. En un primer momento, se esbozará la teoría althusseriana de la ideología, con el fin de sostener que los derechos (...) humanos han operado como un "aparato ideológico", interpelando al individuo desde un contexto inmanentemente capitalista. En un segundo momento, comprobaremos que Michel Foucault fue muy crítico con los planteamientos althusserianos. La noción de sujeto trascendental será crucial en dicha crítica, puesto que en la perspectiva foucaultiana nunca existen sujetos constituidos con anterioridad a las tramas de poder efectivas. En el análisis foucaultiano, la ideología dejará de ocupar un lugar esencial. Las aportaciones de Slavoj Žižek también resultarán, por cierto, determinantes en toda esta discusión. Finalmente, se trazarán algunas reflexiones criticas para pensar la posibilidad emancipadora de los derechos humanos en el mundo contemporáneo. ABSTRACT This paper intends to analyze the role played by ideology in regard to the historical implementation of human rights, questioning whether this implementation has fulfilled an eminently ideological function. The reflection will pass through the vision of two scholars who have held one of the most interesting contemporary philosophical discussions: Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault. At first, the Althusserian theory of ideology will be outlined, in order to defend that human rights have operated as an "ideological apparatus", questioning the individual from an immanently capitalist context. Then, we will verify that Michel Foucault was very critical of the Althusserian approaches. The notion of a transcendental subject will be crucial in such criticism, since in the Foucaultian perspective there are never subjects that are constituted prior to effective dynamics of power. In Foucaultian analysis, ideology will no longer occupy an essential place. The contributions of Slavoj Žižek will also be, by the way, decisive throughout this discussion. Finally, some critical reflections will be drawn to think about the emancipatory possibility of human rights in the contemporary world. (shrink)

According to ordinary language philosophy (OLP), philosophical problems can be solved by investigating ordinary language, often because the problems stem from its misuse. According to ideal language philosophy (ILP), on the other hand, philosophical problems exist because ordinary language is flawed and has to be improved or replaced by constructed languages that do not exhibit these flaws. OLP and ILP together make up linguistic philosophy, the view that philosophical problems are problems of language. Linguistic philosophy is opposed to what may (...) be called, for lack of a better word, ‘traditional philosophy’ (TP), the view that philosophical problems can be solved by discovering non-linguistic facts. In the following, OLP, ILP, and TP are taken to be methodologies, that is, frameworks in which to interpret and evaluate different philosophical methods (i.e., argumentative strategies). The two linguistic methodologies are discussed separately with TP as a foil, and then used to interpret the status of different philosophical methods. While each of the methods discussed here finds a plausible interpretation in each methodology, there are other arguments for and against linguistic philosophy in general, and for and against ILP and OLP in particular. As none of these arguments is decisive, I conclude with a superficial moral about peaceful co-existence. (shrink)

Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is (...) to be explained in teleological terms, then the function of a state cannot depend on its phylogenetical history, given the metaphysical possibility of a duplicate of an intentional being that lacks an evolutionary history. In this paper, I present a method to produce, according to our current knowledge in genetic engineering, human-like individuals who are not the product of natural selection in the required sense. This variation will be used to shed light on the main replies that have been offered in the literature to the Swampman thought experiment. I argue that these replies are not satisfactory: representations should better not depend on natural selection. I conclude that a non-etiological notion of function is to be preferred for characterizing the relation of representation. (shrink)

Alireza Bagheri supports a policy on organ procurement where individuals could choose their own definition of death between two or more socially accepted alternatives. First, we claim that such a policy, without any criterion to distinguish accepted from acceptable definitions, easily leads to the slippery slope that Bagheri tries to avoid. Second, we suggest that a public discussion about the circumstances under which the dead donor rule could be violated is more productive of social trust than constantly moving the line (...) between life and death. (shrink)

What is attention? How does attention shape consciousness? In an approach that engages with foundational topics in the philosophy of mind, the theory of action, psychology, and the neurosciences this book provides a unified and comprehensive answer to both questions. Sebastian Watzl shows that attention is a central structural feature of the mind. The first half of the book provides an account of the nature of attention. Attention is prioritizing, it consists in regulating priority structures. Attention is not another element (...) of the mind, but constituted by structures that organize, integrate, and coordinate the parts of our mind. Attention thus integrates the perceptual and intellectual, the cognitive and motivational, and the epistemic and practical. The second half of the book concerns the relationship between attention and consciousness. Watzl argues that attentional structure shapes consciousness into what is central and what is peripheral. The center-periphery structure of consciousness cannot be reduced to the structure of how the world appears to the subject. What it is like for us thus goes beyond the way the world appears to us. On this basis, a new view of consciousness is offered. In each conscious experience we actively take a stance on the world we appear to encounter. It is in this sense that our conscious experience is our subjective perspective. (shrink)

The well-known distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness has moved away from the conceptual domain into the empirical one, and the debate now is focused on whether the neural mechanisms of cognitive access are constitutive of the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I want to analyze the consequences that a negative reply to this question has for the cognitive phenomenology thesis – roughly the claim that there is a “proprietary” phenomenology of thoughts. If the mechanisms responsible (...) for cognitive access can be disentangled from the mechanisms that give rise to phenomenology in the case of perception and emotion, then the same disentanglement is to be expected in the case of thoughts. This, in turn, presents, as I argue, a challenge to the cognitive phenomenology thesis: either there are thoughts with cognitive phenomenology we lack cognitive access to or there are good reasons to doubt that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology. I discuss a... (shrink)

La investigación, al ser un ejercicio de naturaleza humana, permite realizar la descripción de una porción de realidad desde su objeto de estudio; por tanto, este trabajo investigativo permitió abordar algunos aportes de la teoría crítica de Frankfurt a través del ejercicio filosófico-reflexivo, orientado a pensar lo social desde lo humano con el fin de transformar una postura tradicional, desde lo crítico, contrastando la heteronimia que seculariza las voluntades humanas, pensando las problemáticas sociales desde el reconocimiento del otro como sujeto (...) y generando acciones encaminadas a la emancipación de los fenómenos tradicionales como es la “Cultura de Guerra” desde la educación policial. (shrink)

En el artículo se retoma el problema de la “identidad personal” con el fin de mostrar que la forma como ha sido planteado conduce a un callejón sin salida o a una antinomia insoluble: o se acepta el “yo” como una entidad metafísica, una sustancia permanente, una cosa, una sustancia consciente o “un yo” inmaterial alojado en el cuerpo, o, por el contrario, se niega una entidad de ese tipo y se rechaza como un fantasma metafísico. Además, se pretende demostrar (...) que el dilema se origina en un planteamiento equivocado del problema apoyado en presupuestos falsos muy arraigados en la filosofía y aceptados desde la Modernidad. Tales presupuestos son El sustancialismo y la cosificación, el paralelismo psicofísico y la perspectiva egocéntrica. Finalmente, se plantea y se analiza la salida que ofrece Ricoeur a través de la “identidad narrativa”. (shrink)

El artículo pretende realizar el debate en relación con dos posiciones enciencias sociales: una posición reduccionista que pretende que para queuna disciplina sea científica debe seguir el modelo de las ciencias naturales,razón por la cual las sociales no lograrían ese estatus en cuanto no puedenconseguir la universalidad que ellas alcanzan.Adiferencia suya, pero sin laapropiada discusión a ese modelo, se ha generado en estas ciencias unaposición relativista que considera que efectivamente el conocimiento quealcanzan es solamente particular y relativo a cada cultura. (...) Esta posición seha desarrollado, en parte, siguiendo la interpretación realizada por MartínHollis al círculo hermenéutico. En discusión con esas concepciones, el artí-culo defiende que es posible alcanzar una generalidad en ciencias sociales yque, en contra de la tendencia a escoger entre la universalidad de las cienciasnaturales y la particularidad de las sociales, es preciso aceptar diversosniveles de generalidad. Finalmente de la mano de Ricoeur se expone la maneraen que cabe entender este sentido de generalidad. (shrink)

El presente trabajo discute el relato de la “normalidad filosófica”, tal como se decantó en algunas versiones posteriores a 1980, con varios elementos de la producción textual de la filosofía en Colombia, entre 1940-1950. A partir de la exposición de distintos enfoques textuales en la escritura de 1940-1950, se dará cuenta del programa o las aspiraciones que algunos escritores depositaron en la filosofía, para poner esto como trasfondo de la revista Ideas y Valores y proponer así una mirada más completa (...) a los textos de los primeros años. (shrink)

In the first place, I propose to specify the debate between non-anthropocentrists and anthropocentrists as one between those who defend that the environment has intrinsic value, that is, value that while independent of all relation to human beings is still morally binding, and those who deny this, i.e., assert that the environment only has extrinsic value. I argue for the second option but claim that this should not be an obstacle to address some of the worries of environmental ethics, since (...) extrinsic value is not limited to instrumental value. In this regard, I present sentimentalism as an alternative according to which there are ways of valuing things as ends in themselves and not only as means. (shrink)

En el presente ensayo se propone una lectura de la obra Taberna y otros lugares (1969) de Roque Dalton. Se considera que es oportuno pensar la figura del poeta salvadoreño a la luz, no simplemente de los exilios políticos, sino también de la privación (en términos genéricos) de la figura del poeta de sus antiguas funciones en –lo que Ángel Rama denominó– la ciudad letrada. La ciudad modernizada (Rama, 1984) expulsó al poeta de su lugar privilegiado, lo que provoca un (...) trauma y una búsqueda novedosa. En ese contexto, el poeta redefine su voz y la literatura sufre una reterritorialización, es decir, redefine sus márgenes. En América Latina, el problema fue abordado por José Martí que incluso propuso nuevos desafíos a la disciplina (como el problema de la identidad latinoamericana). Se cree que Taberna y otros lugares (1969) retoma estas búsquedas y se arriesga la hipótesis ue, al redefinir su campo, la obra de Dalton puede ser leída no solo en clave literaria, sino también historiográfica desde una mirada benjaminiana. (shrink)

This entry reviews Rudolf Carnap's philosophical views on the quantum mechanics of his time. It also offers some thoughts on how Carnap might have reacted to some recent developments in the foundations of quantum mechanics.

Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of evaluating and improving our representational devices. But how should we conduct this enterprise? One increasingly popular answer to this question proposes that conceptual engineering should proceed in terms of the functions of our representational devices. In this paper, we argue that the best way of understanding this suggestion is in terms of normative functions, where normative functions of concepts are, roughly, things that they allow us to do that matter normatively (for example, things in (...) virtue of which we have normative reasons to have these concepts). Not only does this introduce a novel view about functions to the literature. This proposal also fits more naturally than the alternatives with conceptual engineering as a normative enterprise, and it allows functions to play all of the explanatory roles assigned to them in the conceptual engineering literature. Our discussion of the explanatory advantages of normative functions also advances the understanding of the ways in which concepts can be authoritative, what this means for conceptual engineering, and highlights the importance of political philosophy for thinking about conceptual engineering in practice. Furthermore, the paper explicates what kind of role considerations about function can and should actually play in conceptual engineering. (shrink)

La expansión de las actividades informales de feriantes en el conurbano bonaerense constituye una de las manifestaciones del fenómeno de la heterogeneidad no regulada del aprovisionamiento de bienes de consumo, que a su vez, emergen como intermediarios económicos que atienden a necesidades y demandas de consumidores territorialmente segregados y no articulados a los mercados formales, en su mayoría.Es en ese sentido que el presente artículo quiere rescatar y señalar los componentes centrales que asoman en un proceso que parte con el (...) supuesto de que la confianza constituye un elemento central cuando otras formas que actuarían como garante de las interacciones aparecen débiles, ausentes o no primordiales como garantía de las interacciones sociales, como es el caso de la feria de Solano. (shrink)

The three ancient philosophical introductions translated in this volume flesh out our picture of what it would have been like to sit in a first-year Philosophy course in ancient Alexandria. Ammonius (AD 445-517/26) set up a new teaching programme in Alexandria with up to six introductions to the philosophy curriculum, which made it far more accessible, and encouraged its spread from Greek to other cultures. This volume's three introductory texts include one by his student Olympiodorus and one each by Olympiodorus' (...) students Elias and David. Elias' Introductions to Philosophy starts with six definitions of Philosophy, to which David adds replies to the sceptical question whether there is such a thing as Philosophy. Olympiodorus' text translated here is an Introduction to Logic, which is just one of the three introductions he wrote himself. (shrink)

El estudio examina mediante una revisión sistemática la literatura científica. La metodología se basó en la aplicación de los principios de la declaración PRISMA. Los resultados indicaron que la mayor producción de estudios fue en 2021, con predominancia de idioma inglés, España como el mayor productor, Reino Unido con el mayor número de revistas y el uso de realidad aumentada como la estrategia más estudiada. La producción científica en educación, y más particularmente en metodologías aplicada a la educación, ha generado (...) una serie de estudios bibliométricos, los cuales han demostrado la evolución de las mismas en lapsos de tiempo diversos. (shrink)

The development of artificial intelligence (AI) in medicine raises fundamental ethical issues. As one example, AI systems in the field of mental health successfully detect signs of mental disorders, such as depression, by using data from social media. These AI depression detectors (AIDDs) identify users who are at risk of depression prior to any contact with the healthcare system. The article focuses on the ethical implications of AIDDs regarding affected users’ health-related autonomy. Firstly, it presents the (ethical) discussion of AI (...) in medicine and, specifically, in mental health. Secondly, two models of AIDDs using social media data and different usage scenarios are introduced. Thirdly, the concept of patient autonomy, according to Beauchamp and Childress, is critically discussed. Since this concept does not encompass the specific challenges linked with the digital context of AIDDs in social media sufficiently, the current analysis suggests, finally, an extended concept of health-related digital autonomy. (shrink)