v. 1. Bibliographia historiæ philosophiæ.--v. 2. Bibliographia philosophiæ.

My dissertation has three interrelated aims: to defend introspectivism, the view that the deliverances of introspection should be basic data for philosophical theories of the mind, from pivotal objections which inspire the currently prevailing anti-introspectivist approach to mentality; to advance a substantive account of introspection; and to lay the groundwork for a more general theory about the mental. ;I begin by analyzing a host of philosophical problems about the mind; in each, I isolate the source of perplexity in an epistemic (...) factor. The body of the thesis is devoted to elucidating the ontological and epistemological status of mind by considering, in turn, phenomenality and intentionality. ;Physicalism lacks the resources to explain the individual subject's greater epistemic authority regarding the phenomenal as compared to the physical. My detailed account of phenomenal state introspection is therefore preferable to the physicalist explanations of phenomenal knowledge; its consequences include a counterexample to a widely-accepted constraint on concept possession and a minor modification to one familiar theory of de se reference. ;Similarly, functionalist reduction of intentional states cannot countenance our refusal to defer to empirical science regarding one's occurrent mental states to the same extent that we defer regarding physical states. My account of introspection, which does justice to the measure of authority we retain about our own intentional states, undermines both functionalism and content externalism about such states. ;Grave difficulties face each of the four currently popular views about the relation between phenomenality and intentionality. According to my alternative, occurrent phenomenal states and occurrent intentional states are importantly different yet share an epistemic feature which distinguishes them from physical states: our deference to empirical science regarding such occurrent states is limited in a way that our deference regarding physical states is not. The key to understanding the mind is thus intimately related to the primary source of philosophical problems about it, namely, the disparity between our knowledge of the mental and our knowledge of the physical. (shrink)

Benadering van enkele klassieke filosofische kwesties vanuit een door de Angelsaksische taalfilosofie geïnspireerde visie op de zingevende rede.

Professor Franklin is correct to say that there are significant areas of agreement between his account of formal science (Franklin, 1994) and my critique of his account. We both agree that the domain-independence exhibited by the formal sciences is ontologically and epistemically interesting, and that the concept of ‘structure’ must be central in any analysis of domain-independence. We also agree that knowledge of the structural, relational properties of physical systems should count as empirical knowledge, and that it makes sense to (...) talk about an empirical ‘science’ of structure. Where we disagree is over the frequency of occasions where ‘practical certainty’ is actually attained: Franklin argues that practical certainty is not uncommon in the formal sciences, while I argue that there are barriers to practical certainty that Franklin fails to appreciate. In Franklin’s response, he briefly presents and offers criticisms of my two main arguments against his central thesis. Franklin asserts that the flaw in my first argument is that it does not appreciate that modern mathematical models exhibit structural stability, and thus that many of their predictions are robust under small variations in input or parameter values (and hence, insensitive to the inevitable gaps between estimates and actual values). Nevertheless, what I had in mind in using the term ‘realistic modelling situations’ were models of fairly complex natural systems, such as the dripping faucet, spruce budworm and ecosystem ecology examples. My objection is not that mathematical models of such systems cannot legitimately and accurately describe structural properties that are genuinely predicable of real-world systems, but simply that for.. (shrink)

Echte Freiheit läßt sich nach Leibniz nicht auf die Möglichkeit reduzieren, so zu handeln, wie man handeln will. Vielmehr muß echte Freiheit mit dem moralischen Verdienst in Verbindung gebracht werden. In diesem Zusammenhang erweist sich die Idee der logischen Kontingenz von besonderer Wichtigkeit. Eine Person hat kein moralisches Verdienst, wenn sie blindlings durch das Gute geleitet wird. Sie hat allein dann ein moralisches Verdienst, wenn sie das Schlechte zurückweist und bewußt das Gute wählt, das sich vom Schlechten abhebt. Insofern ist (...) derjenige, der moralisch richtig handelt, sich anderer Möglichkeiten bewußt. Leibniz trägt dieser Erfahrungstatsache durch den Gedanken Rechnung, daß eine freie Handlung logisch kontingent ist. Diesem Gedanken verleiht Leibniz einen metaphysischen Status: die möglichen Welten haben einen objektiven Gehalt. (shrink)

Levinas' view on ethical commitment seems at first sight incompatible with the cultivation of particularistic ideals. The Other from whom the moral imperative originates, is also a Stranger: in submitting ourselves to his appeal, we obey a law radically transcending our autonomy. Therefore, our responsibility for the Other is not a loyalty based on personal sympathies, preferences or common interests. From Levinas' stern universalistic perspective, particularistic loyalty might appear as a form of moral self-indulgence. In this article we draw attention (...) to two forms of particularistic attachment which can paradoxically be seen as a confrontation with a radical moral heteronomy. The moral obligation imposed on us by nearness in space and relations of close kinship are in a sense arbitrary and contingent. Just because they are beyond rational justification, they also transcend the autonomy of our rational will. In this sense it seems to be true that some forms of particularistic commitment can make us aware of the radical heteronomy as it is meant by Levinas. (shrink)

Physical superpositions exist both in classical and in quantum physics. However, what is exactly meant by ‘superposition’ in each case is extremely different. In this paper we discuss some of the multiple interpretations which exist in the literature regarding superpositions in quantum mechanics. We argue that all these interpretations have something in common: they all attempt to avoid ‘contradiction’. We argue in this paper, in favor of the importance of developing a new interpretation of superpositions which takes into account contradiction, (...) as a key element of the formal structure of the theory, “right from the start”. In order to show the feasibility of our interpretational project we present an outline of a paraconsistent approach to quantum superpositions which attempts to account for the contradictory properties present in general within quantum superpositions. This approach must not be understood as a closed formal and conceptual scheme but rather as a first step towards a different type of understanding regarding quantum superpositions. (shrink)

Em 1821, Friedrich W. Schelling inaugura um novo caminho para o seu pensamento. Esse novo caminho, como afirma o próprio filósofo, divide sua filosofia em duas partes, a saber, a filosofia negativa, que diz respeito a toda sua produção anterior, e a filosofia positiva que se inaugura a partir das aulas de Erlangen. Contudo, como veremos neste artigo, suas duas filosofias estão unidas na busca pelo pensamento da Unidade. Essa busca traduz-se na Spätphilosophie como busca do Absoluto. O presente artigo (...) tem como objetivo refletir sobre os escritos da chamada Filosofia da Mitologia que visam pensar o caminho do Absoluto. Tal caminho relaciona-se com o caminho percorrido pela própria consciência humana e, ao mesmo tempo, coincide com ela. Portanto, a análise culminará no que chamou de processo mitológico e sua relação com o politeísmo sucessivo, já que a mitologia teria se constituído graças à sucessão dos deuses efetuada na consciência humana. In 1821, Friedrich W. Schelling opens a new path for his thinking. This new path, as affirmed by the philosopher himself, he divides his philosophy in two parts: the negative philosophy, which concerns all his previous production, and the positive philosophy that is inaugurated by the Erlangen courses. However, both philosophies are linked together by the search of the thought of the Unity, a search manifested in the Spätphilosophie as the quest for the Absolute. The present article aims to reflect upon the writings of the so-called Philosophy of Mythology, which intends to think about the way to the Absolute. Such way is related to the path followed by the human conscience itself and, at the same time, it coincides with the conscience itself. Therefore, the analysis shall culminate in what Schelling called "mythological process" and in its relation with the successive polytheism, since mythology may have constituted itself by the succession of gods, effected in human conscience. (shrink)

In the 5th century BC, in Athens, Antiphon reflects on the relationship between physis and nómos in a way quite different from most sophists. Indeed, one of the particularities of sophist thought is to minimize physis so that thinking focus itself on nómos, on what man can, through thinking and debate, establish in regard to the common good and justice in the pólis. However, Antiphon takes up this relationship between nature and law to direct it to another path. In an (...) unusual way for a sophist, we see physis being emphasized at the expense of nómos. The comparison between the two concepts also serves as a backdrop for harsh criticisms of justice and laws. The objective of this article is, through the criticisms Antiphon makes to the system of the laws of the pólis, to think about the relationship established by the sophist between physis and nómos in order to find out if there is a new understanding of these concepts and to reflect the reason that led Antiphon to revisit them. (shrink)

Entrepreneurs with social goals face various challenges; insights into how these entrepreneurs experience and appreciate their work remain a black box though. Drawing on identity, conservation of resources, and person–organization fit theories, this study examines how entrepreneurs’ social value creation beliefs relate to their work-related well-being (job satisfaction, work engagement, and lack of work burnout), as well as how this process might be influenced by social concerns with respect to the common good. Using data from the German Public Value Atlas (...) 2015 and 2019 and the Swiss Public Value Atlas 2017, a three-study design analyzes three samples of entrepreneurs in Germany and Switzerland. Study 1 reveals that entrepreneurs report higher job satisfaction when they believe their organization creates social value. Study 2 indicates that these beliefs relate negatively to work burnout; entrepreneurs’ perceptions of having meaningful work mediate this relationship. Study 3 affirms and extends these results by showing that a sense of work meaningfulness mediates the relationship between social value creation beliefs and work engagement and that this mediating role is more prominent among entrepreneurs with strong social concerns. This investigation thus identifies a critical pathway—the extent to which entrepreneurs experience their work activities as important and personally meaningful—that connects social value creation beliefs with enhanced work-related well-being, as well as how this process might vary with a personal orientation that embraces the common good. (shrink)

On the one hand, non-reflexive logics are logics in which the principle of identity does not hold in general. On the other hand, quantum mechanics has difficulties regarding the interpretation of ‘particles’ and their identity, also known in the literature as ‘the problem of indistinguishable particles’. In this article, we will argue that non-reflexive logics can be a useful tool to account for such quantum indistinguishability. In particular, we will provide a particular non-reflexive logic that can help us to analyze (...) and discuss this problem. From a more general physical perspective, we will also analyze the limits imposed by the orthodox quantum formalism to consider the existence of indistinguishable particles in the first place, and argue that non-reflexive logics can also help us to think beyond the limits of classical identity. (shrink)

O problema da felicidade é recorrente nos tratados sobre Ética da Antiguidade. Os medievais defrontam-se com eles ao escreverem seus próprios textos. Neste trabalho procura-se analisar a forma como Tomás de Aquino e Boécio de Dácia, ao produzirem textos não teológicos, incorporam a seus tratados as obras antigas, principalmente de Aristóteles e Severino Boécio.

G. Deledalle is the author of a Histoire de la philosophie américaine, and of some excellent studies on Dewey, such as La pédagogie de Dewey, philosophie de la continuité, and "Durkheim et Dewey". These are all works that deserve full attention by students of the Golden Age of American philosophy. For a European, Deledalle has an unusual capacity to detect the vitality and freshness, but also the depth, of the growth of higher education in the U.S. in the first half (...) of this century. At the heart of this growth were philosophical ideas, and in particular those of Dewey. Philosophy did not have then dictatorial or competitive designs regarding education, the social and political sciences, psychology, or the natural sciences. It freely mingled with them, not just imparting methodological or epistemological rigor but also contributing some insights and giving the hypotheses and conclusions in these fields the character of "experiences." Experience is the guiding theme of this rich and complicated work, covering a multitude of subjects and positions. The treatment is divided into six parts dealing respectively with Dewey's leanings toward unitary experience, organic experience, dynamic experience, functional experience, instrumental experience, and transactional experience. In the study of the intellectual of Dewey's life practically all of his production is critically examined by Deledalle: a monumental task in itself, made possible by the critical bibliography of Milton Hasley Thomas. There is enough early biographical detail to make this work an effective and affectionate intellectual portrait. The best pages of this work are devoted to a thorough explication and comparative study of Dewey's final synthesis of experience. There are very helpful comparative references to Marx, Freud, Bergson, and Heidegger, and also indispensable parallels and contrasts with Peirce, James, and Whitehead. This is not a modest contribution from a regional point of view: Deledalle is, perhaps more than anybody else, aware of an ongoing international dialogue on Dewey, a dialogue that is preserving experience as a problem-complex at the front line of contemporary reflection.--A. de L. M. (shrink)

Recent sequencing of the metazoan Oikopleura dioica genome has provided important insights, which challenges the current understanding of eukaryotic genome evolution. Many genomic features of O. dioica show deviation from the commonly observed trends in other eukaryotic genomes. For instance, O. dioica has a rapidly evolving, highly compact genome with a divergent intron‐exon organization. Additionally, O. dioica lacks the minor spliceosome and key DNA repair pathway genes. Even with a compact genome, O. dioica contains tandem repeats, comparable to other eukaryotes, (...) and shows lineage‐specific expansion of certain protein domains. Here, we review its genomic features in the context of current knowledge, discuss implications for contemporary biology and identify areas for further research. Analysis of the O. dioica genome suggests that non‐adaptive forces such as elevated mutation rates might influence the evolution of genome architecture. The knowledge of unique genomic features and splicing mechanisms in O. dioica may be exploited for synthetic biology applications, such as generation of orthogonal splicing systems. (shrink)

El hombre crea su moral tomando en cuenta las aportaciones más íntimas de su espíritu. Así como la historia de la humanidad presenta una serie gradual y emocional de conquistas espirituales, así también la moral se ha logrado a través de la historia, pero siempre sobre el fundamento de la esencia humana, pues no cabe duda de que la jerarquía de los valores depende de cada ser humano. Ella orienta toda su conducta y señala sus grandes metas. El espíritu religioso (...) coloca, en primer término, a los valores de la religión, el moralista a los éticos, el pragmático a los útiles; el estético a las bellas artes, dando preferencia cada una a su valor favorito. (shrink)