Abstract
Levinas' view on ethical commitment seems at first sight incompatible with the cultivation of particularistic ideals. The Other from whom the moral imperative originates, is also a Stranger: in submitting ourselves to his appeal, we obey a law radically transcending our autonomy. Therefore, our responsibility for the Other is not a loyalty based on personal sympathies, preferences or common interests. From Levinas' stern universalistic perspective, particularistic loyalty might appear as a form of moral self-indulgence. In this article we draw attention to two forms of particularistic attachment which can paradoxically be seen as a confrontation with a radical moral heteronomy. The moral obligation imposed on us by nearness in space and relations of close kinship are in a sense arbitrary and contingent. Just because they are beyond rational justification, they also transcend the autonomy of our rational will. In this sense it seems to be true that some forms of particularistic commitment can make us aware of the radical heteronomy as it is meant by Levinas