This article has two purposes. The first speaks to the compatibilist quality of Charles Mills’ Black Radical Kantianism (BRK), its strengths and weaknesses and the pertinence of W. E. B Du Bois to it. BRK turns from Mills’ previous critique of Kantianism as representative of arassenstaatlichpolitical liberalism, underwritten and tainted by the racial/domination contract, to his current defence of a compatibilist Kantianism as representative of arechtsstaatlichpolitical liberalism supported by a non-ideal racially corrective critique of both that contract and the kind (...) of political liberalism affiliated with it. The second focuses on what I introduce as the ‘Radicalization of Kant in Black’ (RKB). RKB isnota compatibilist project. Rather it re-examines issues first posed by ‘slave- and black-encoded’ blacks coming to act and struggle with the primacy of practical reason under the historically normative authority of freedom and the abolition of enslavement. What are the ramifications of each for Kant-/Kantian-radicalization? (shrink)

The reasons supporting the ‘Racial Contract’ are reasons supporting the ‘metanarrative,’ which explains the Racial Contract. They are not reasons supportive of actions pertinent to undoing the Racial Contract, but reasons supportive of behavior pertinent to objectively confirming the ‘metanarrative’ of the ‘Racial Contract’ and rightfully establishing its place in political philosophy. This paper shall attempt to address these matters and their consequences.

There are three major items involved in Frederick Douglass's critique of enslavement—moral suasion, political abolitionism, and violent resistance. They are interrelated and comprise his critique. But ever since Angela Davis's use of existential philosophy to interpret Douglass's critique, the focus of existential readings on Douglass has been exclusively and constantly on the item of violent resistance, specifically Douglass's fight with Covey. The three items wholly derive their importance solely from this fight, according to the existential reading. Contrary to that reading, (...) this paper shall argue that a reading of Douglass's critique should endorse a normative coordination, through practical reason, of the three items rather than an existential priority of the fight with Covey over the other two. (shrink)

The recent reception of Du Bois’ notion of “double consciousness” in the humanities has affirmed the notion as crucial and pivotal throughout his work. In contrast, its recent reception in the social sciences has tended to reject its centrality and importance. This essay will give general credence to the former position but, more importantly, show why a turn to Rousseau’s conception of amour‐propre may illuminate the importance of “double consciousness” in and for Du Bois’ 1903 work The Souls of Black (...) Folk , despite the fact that he never elaborated on or embraced the notion in work subsequent to SBF’s publication. (shrink)

The goal of Kant’s transcendental deduction is to demonstrate the reciprocal implication of self-consciousness and objectivity. Kant’s argument is that the subject possesses a priori cognizance concerning the thoroughgoing identity of itself and that this entails a priori for the subject cognition of the manners in which the combining activities of individual cognitive states must and can occur if its self-identity is to be maintained. Kant proposes that the cognitive subject makes judgments concerning its identity, and then shows that these (...) judgments must subscribe to formal rules of synthesis relating cognitive representations, for which the subject affirms such identity, to a domain of empirical things-in-themselves or enduring objects. (shrink)

Although the literature on, and the interest in, the relation of Husserlian phenomenology and Hegelian phenomenology are almost next to nil, the interpretations surrounding this relation are plagued by a number of aporiai. There is too much attention to extraneous matters. There is no adequate attempt to work out and explicate their respective theories of phenomenology and the coherency of the theories. There is a failure to spell out the presuppositions involved in the formation of transcendental philosophy which is to (...) be established within their respective phenomenological frameworks. Our approach avoids these pitfalls by focusing on Husserl's phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy within a subjectively dependent framework, and on Hegel's phenomenology as a propadeutic to a concept dependent framework. As a propadeutic, however, Hegelian phenomenology is an immanent critique of philosophical discourse, which is articulated within a subjectively dependent framework, in order for the concept dependent framework to be instituted. The question is raised as to whether Husserlian phenomenology can be encompassed by the immanent critique of the PhS. This would mean that Husserl's phenomenology must be prefigured by a cognitive formation in the PhS. We answer this question in the affirmative. We give individual treatment to Husserl and Hegel concerning the relation of phenomenology to logic. We go into a detailed analysis of what is involved in Husserl's notion of the subjective-logical and its aesthetic orientation, where we develop Husserl's full phenomenological theory of subjective life and its relation to world. We show that Husserl's full phenomenological theory of subjective life and world is prefigured by and maintains a family resemblance to the cognitive formation "Religion." We demonstrate finally that the argument of "Absolute Knowing" provides for the elimination of the subjective dependent framework as a viable principle for philosophical discourse. With this result, it becomes possible to claim that Hegel's PhS has encompassed and, hence, negated the subjectively dependent phenomenology of Husserl. (shrink)

Since its publication almost 150 years ago, The Idea of a University has had an extraordinary influence on the shaping and goals of higher education. The issues that John Henry Newman raised--the place of religion and moral values in the university setting, the competing claims of liberal and professional education, the character of the academic community, the cultural role of literature, the relation of religion and science--have provoked discussion from Newman's time to our own. This edition of The Idea of (...) a University includes the full text of "University Teaching" and four selections from "University Subjects," together with five essays by leading scholars that explore the background and the present day relevance of Newman's themes. In the essays Martha Garland discusses the character and organization of the early nineteenth-century English universities upon which Newman based much of his vision; Frank M. Turner traces the impact of Newman's influence during the vast expansion of higher education since World War II; George Marsden investigates how the decreasing emphasis on religion has affected higher education; Sara Castro Klaren examines the implications of Newman's views on education and literature for current debates between proponents of a curriculum based on western civilization and one based on multiculturalism; and George Landow considers what the advent of electronic communication will mean to university teaching, research, and community. To aid accessibility, the edition also includes an analytical table of contents, a chronology and biographical sketch of Newman's life, questions for discussion, expanded notes, and a glossary of names, all of which will help make this the standard teaching text for Newman's work. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Millennium Jahrgang: 12 Heft: 1 Seiten: 41-74.

Regards an orientation toward success (i.e., winning the approval of others) as an obstacle to hope. Moods and expectations unrelieved by hope can degenerate into a compulsive idea that life is a process of losing and dying without any compensatory gains. The prime source of deepened hope is to move toward the experience of presence with another. Acknowledging the dialectic nature of hope is itself also a source of hope. Affirming life and love enables one to face their opposites—death and (...) suffering. (shrink)

In his first summer lecture at Berkeley in 1914, Josiah Royce, American philosopher of community, confessed as follows.

: This article aims: 1) to review several, key, earlier studies of Josiah Royce's relations to Asian thinkers (mainly Indian); 2) to discover through a survey of Royce's writings how widely and deeply Royce familiarized himself with, and employed Hindu, Buddhist, and other Asian traditions; and, 3) to measure how relevant Royce's most mature philosophy (1912–1916) is for the currently needed inter-cultural, inter-religious, and inter-faith dialogues. Parts One and Two supply foundations which reveal Royce's lifelong commitment to open "windows" to (...) Eastern thought, in order to dialogue with Asian thinkers and invite other Westerners to do the same. The article climaxes in Part Three by revealing the relevance of the late Royce's "philosophy of the 'Spirit,' his "philosophical pneumatology." I trace ten of its implied positions, significant for contemporary philosophers of religion and theologians. I conclude by showing that Royce's "philosophy of the 'Spirit"' and its implied positions are all rooted in Royce's view of a "middle faith." Such a faith supports his view of the "invisible church," his "Beloved Community of all "Christians"—"Christians" taken in his wider sense of "all genuine loyalists who are members of a Beloved Community.". (shrink)

: Josiah Royce, a Johns Hopkins Fellow (1876–1878), polished two manuscripts for publication: "The Spirit of Modern Philosophy" (SMP; 62 pp.), and his dissertation, "The Interdependence of the Principles of Knowledge" (IPK; xi + 332 pp.). Although he penned the texts in blue ink and headers and footnotes in red, he never published either work. SMP—not Royce's 1892 work of the same title—critiqued Francis Bowen's Modern Philosophy from Descartes to Schopenhauer and Hartman, and created a new epistemology. My essay ventures (...) the hypotheses that Royce prudently abstained from publishing SMP to avoid alienating Bowen, a Harvard board-member for faculty admissions, and IPK to avoid advancing an interpretation of Kant he felt unsure of and would later publicly disown. Mainly, however, this paper inquires whether, in drafting SMP, Royce created an outline for IPK. I sketch Royce's life at Hopkins and present context and content of these two MSS. From these I unearth seven philosophical themes running parallel in SMP and IPK. This grounds the paper's major hypothesis that Royce's overriding aim in SMP was less to critique Bowen than to create an outline for the long Introduction and Part One of IPK. (shrink)

Josiah Royce, a Johns Hopkins Fellow (1876–1878), polished two manuscripts for publication: "The Spirit of Modern Philosophy" (SMP; 62 pp.), and his dissertation, "The Interdependence of the Principles of Knowledge" (IPK; xi + 332 pp.). Although he penned the texts in blue ink and headers and footnotes in red, he never published either work. SMP—not Royce's 1892 work of the same title—critiqued Francis Bowen's Modern Philosophy from Descartes to Schopenhauer and Hartman, and created a new epistemology. My essay ventures the (...) hypotheses that Royce prudently abstained from publishing SMP to avoid alienating Bowen, a Harvard board-member for faculty admissions, and IPK to avoid advancing an interpretation of Kant he felt unsure of and would later publicly disown. Mainly, however, this paper inquires whether, in drafting SMP, Royce created an outline for IPK. I sketch Royce's life at Hopkins and present context and content of these two MSS. From these I unearth seven philosophical themes running parallel in SMP and IPK. This grounds the paper's major hypothesis that Royce's overriding aim in SMP was less to critique Bowen than to create an outline for the long Introduction and Part One of IPK. (shrink)

This article aims to clarify how these two thinkers interacted philosophically to develop, challenge and enrich each other's thinking. To this end, the article employs a chronological order, tighter than Perry's, of six periods of interaction: Royce's pre-Harvard period, four at Harvard, and one after James's death. Pertinent to the genesis of James's will-to-believe doctrine, in his "Principles of Psychology" James credited Royce's account of the psychology of belief as the clearest he knew. When James later compared Bradley's "Appearance and (...) Reality" with Royce's self-confessedly "hasty and unsound" "Conception of God", James's suspicions about Royce's argument for the "absolute" were further aroused. (shrink)

The present article examines the philosophical temperaments of James and Royce, as well as the kind and development of their philosophical styles. After surveying their stances toward the universe, attitudes toward the more, and their openness to other philosophers’ ideas and critiques, this article focuses on the streams of philosophical thought from which James and Royce chose to “drink”-British, German, Asian, and the work of logicians. Some evidence is drawn from their correspondence and places of study. Their philosophical styles, despite (...) many common traits, differed in ageric tone, use of dichotomies, and frequency of reduplicative expressions, here called “double-barreled shotgun expressions.” Clearly, this research constitutes only one piece in the full mosaic of the increasingly studied James-Royce relationship. (shrink)

The present article examines the philosophical temperaments of James and Royce, as well as the kind and development of their philosophical styles. After surveying their stances toward the universe, attitudes toward the more, and their openness to other philosophers’ ideas and critiques, this article focuses on the streams of philosophical thought from which James and Royce chose to “drink”-British, German, Asian, and the work of logicians. Some evidence is drawn from their correspondence and places of study. Their philosophical styles, despite (...) many common traits, differed in ageric tone, use of dichotomies, and frequency of reduplicative expressions, here called “double-barreled shotgun expressions.” Clearly, this research constitutes only one piece in the full mosaic of the increasingly studied James-Royce relationship. (shrink)

First, I offer an introduction to set the context suited for scholars engaged in studies of Josiah Royce, focusing upon how “process” operates in Royce’s late philosophy. After that, I want to offer signposts to inform Royce scholars about several paths of possible future research.For students of Royce’s late philosophy, frequent encounters with the terms “Community” and “the Holy Spirit” may seem indeed to overshadow the usage of the term “process.” Granted, the index of Royce’s Problem of Christianity cites ten (...) entries under the term “process.” Yet John Clendenning’s own indexes to Royce’s Letters and his revised Life of Royce do not mention the term “process” in their lists. Students of Royce, both old and... (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Biography The Issues Royce Confronted Developments that Royce Fostered The Chief Significance of Royce's Mature Work.

Josiah Royce (1855-1916), philosopher of community, taught that social consciousness arises from ego-alter contrasts and is guided by taboos and, before George H. Mead, by reciprocal gestures. A major Roycean contribution was his five conditions for coexperiencing consciousness of genuine community. Related to Freud (via Putnam), Royce did early work on “identification theory” and helped midwife psychotherapy’s birth in America. Contrasting with William James’s basic differentiation of consciousness according to the quality of its contents (feeling, thought, and conduct), Royce preferred (...) a norm of increasing self-agency (shown in sensitivity, docility, and initiative). The temperaments of James as artist and of Royce as rational interpreter differentiated their approaches to psychology. (shrink)