This is Werner S. Pluhar's translation of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgment (Kritik der Urtheilskraft) for Hackett Publications (Indianapolis, Indiana). ISBN 9780872200258 (paperback).

In this paper the author argues that nonnaturalism, the theory which holds that ethical judgments and deliberations are, respectively, assertions of and searches for some supposed "non-natural" ethical facts accessible only to some supposed non-sensuous kind of perception ("intuition"), has been abandoned by philosophers prematurely. For, once construed properly as its rivals have been all along, the theory does not itself make these suppositions as its opponents allege; it merely attributes them by implication to the users of ethical language. The (...) author argues that even if these suppositions implicit in ethical language were to be mistaken, there would still be a way of justifying ethical judgments. (shrink)

In this paper the author argues that nonnaturalism, the theory which holds that ethical judgments and deliberations are, respectively, assertions of and searches for some supposed "non-natural" ethical facts accessible only to some supposed non-sensuous kind of perception ("intuition"), has been abandoned by philosophers prematurely. For, once construed properly as its rivals have been all along, the theory does not itself make these suppositions as its opponents allege; it merely attributes them by implication to the users of ethical language. The (...) author argues that even if these suppositions implicit in ethical language were to be mistaken, there would still be a way of justifying ethical judgments. (shrink)

Plato's dialogues frequently criticize traditional Greek myth, yet Plato also integrates myth with his writing. Daniel S. Werner confronts this paradox through an in-depth analysis of the Phaedrus, Plato's most mythical dialogue. Werner argues that the myths of the Phaedrus serve several complex functions: they bring nonphilosophers into the philosophical life; they offer a starting point for philosophical inquiry; they unify the dialogue as a literary and dramatic whole; they draw attention to the limits of language and the (...) limits of knowledge; and they allow Plato to co-opt cultural authority as a way of defining and legitimating the practice of philosophy. Platonic myth, as a species of traditional tale, is thus both distinct from philosophical dialectic and similar to it. Ultimately, the most powerful effect of Platonic myth is the way in which it leads readers to participate in Plato's dialogues and to engage in a process of self-examination. (shrink)

According to an optimistic view, affective empathy is a route to knowledge of what it is like to be in the target person’s state (“phenomenal knowledge”). Roughly, the idea is that the empathizer gains this knowledge by means of empathically experiencing the target’s emotional state. The literature on affective empathy, however, often draws a simplified picture according to which the target feels only a single emotion at a time. Co-occurring emotions (“concurrent emotions”) are rarely considered. This is problematic, because concurring (...) emotions seem to support a sceptical view according to which we cannot gain phenomenal knowledge of the target person’s state by means of affective empathy. The sceptic concludes that attaining the epistemic goal of affective empathy is difficult, in practice often impossible. I accept the sceptic’s premises, but reject the conclusion, because of the argument’s unjustified, hidden premise: that the epistemic goal of affective empathy is phenomenal knowledge. I argue that the epistemic goal of affective empathy is phenomenal understanding, not knowledge. Attention to the under-explored phenomenon of concurring emotions clarifies why this is important. I argue that this is the decisive epistemic progress in everyday cases of phenomenal understanding of another person. (shrink)

Der Band vereinigt 20 Studien zu Nietzsche von Werner Stegmaier, der in den vergangenen drei Jahrzehnten der internationalen Nietzsche-Forschung starke Impulse gegeben und zuletzt achtzehn Jahre lang, zusammen mit Günter Abel, die Nietzsche-Studien, das international führende Organ der Nietzsche-Forschung, geleitet und die Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung herausgegeben hat. Die Studien handeln von Grundfragen der Philosophie Nietzsches. Sie setzen ein (I) mit seiner Neubestimmung der Wahrheit und der Philosophie und (II) seiner Verzeitlichung des Denkens unter (III) Verzicht auf, die (...) Vernunft' bei der Bestimmung des Menschen, interpretieren von hier aus (IV) die Anti-Lehren von Nietzsches Zarathustra, umreissen (V) Nietzsches Ethik für, gute Europäer' und schliessen (VI) mit der Interpretation von Nietzsches Selbsteinschätzung als Schicksal der Philosophie und der Menschheit (Ecce homo, Warum ich ein Schicksal bin 1) und einer Einschätzung von Nietzsches Zukunft, die schon seit über einem Jahrhundert begonnen hat. Werner Stegmaier, Jahrgang 1946, war Gründungsdirektor des Instituts für Philosophie der Universität Greifswald nach dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion und baute das Nord- und osteuropäische Forum für Philosophie auf, das Institute für Philosophie rund um die Ostsee neu miteinander ins Gespräch brachte und dort zu philosophischen Neuorientierungen beitrug. Er hat auf vielfältigen Gebieten gearbeitet, unter anderem zur Metaphysik und ihrem Grundbegriff der Substanz, zu grossen Philosophen von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, zur philosophischen Aktualität der jüdischen Tradition, vor allem aber zur Philosophie Nietzsches. Dabei ging es ihm stets um Fragen der Ersten Philosophie, insbesondere die, was unsere Realität ausmacht, wie sie durch Zeichen und Kommunikation vermittelt wird, wie Begriffe in der Zeit existieren und womit man es beim Denken zu tun hat. Er führte den Begriff der Orientierung als elementaren Begriff der Philosophie ein und entwickelte eine umfassende Philosophie der Orientierung."--Publisher's website. (shrink)