Paul Janssen, of the University of Cologne, has provided a new edition of the book Husserl published in 1929. The edition required no changes in the text of the work itself; the few additions or annotations that Husserl made later are placed in the critical notes. The volume follows the standard format of the Husserliana series. There is an introduction of some thirty pages, followed by the main text, and then supplementary texts and the critical notes and adjustments to the (...) texts. Janssen’s introduction gives the circumstances surrounding the composition of the book, many excerpts from letters of Husserl which reveal his attitude towards it, and an analysis of the work itself. The ten supplementary texts were written between 1920 and 1929 and explore in greater detail themes found in the main text. Among many interesting remarks are the examination of Sinn, noema, immanent and external perception, occasional expressions, and the study of vagueness, distinctness, and identity of judgment. (shrink)
This book, as its title indicates, is put forth as a criticism of our age. The author, who is especially known for his work in the tradition of Husserl and Heidegger, and who has written a book on Aristotle, has often mentioned elements of his own philosophical position in his many essays and books; this volume presents the complete view, of which the others gave only hints. Boehm defines "our age" as determined by science, a science which stems from the (...) Greek understanding of knowledge and contains theological elements from antiquity and the middle ages. Knowledge is taken to be an attempt to overcome the limits of the human condition, and Boehm says that this attempt in turn is based on a desire to escape dying. He examines Hesiod, the Bible, and Lao-Tse to find extra-philosophical statements of the interpretation of death as something that somehow might not be. After these analyses of classical and non-philosophical versions of this theme, Boehm has a chapter to show how the issue is developed in various modern ways: Pascal evades the issue of death by escaping into divertissement, and modern political and economic life becomes a process or a game of its own, cut loose from the ends it was contrived to serve; Fichte and Marx are used here, and so are the satires of Parkinson and Boorstin’s analysis of "image" as replacing real need. Boehm emphasizes the reversal of means and ends in contemporary life and sees it as the consequence of the ancient attempt to replace the human condition by knowledge; an inhuman existence results from the desire to avoid being human. In a final chapter, Boehm studies Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Kant, and others as thinkers who further develop the theme of man as "subject," in the sense of a being that subjects itself to necessity as its only way of surviving; this conception of subjectivity is a condition for the modern subjugation of human needs to the control of the "laws" of economics, production, science, bureaucracy, and the other manifestations of sheer rationality. Human needs are reduced to the needs of rationalistic order and thinking. In conclusion, Boehm observes that philosophy can only criticize the image of the age and its foundations; the return to being human must be accomplished by other means. Boehm’s book is very interesting and puts flesh and blood on many themes we have heard from Heidegger in more abstract form. The main weakness in the book is a failure to analyse virtue, phronesis, and action, which must be seen as a counterpoise even for the understanding of Aristotle’s notion of theory. His criticisms of rationalism, and of gnostic versions of religion which attempt to solve human problems purely by knowledge or by thinking, are accurate, although it is questionable whether he gives a satisfactory picture of Christianity and Judaism in the few passages he cites and interprets; for example, once again the dimension of performance in these religions is not included. Some of his historical remarks, like his interpretation of the events of the thirteenth century, are bold, and one is inclined to read them along with his own remarks on the writing of history. The short description of a conversation with a man of science is pointed and well done. The book is lively and vivid, especially in narrating the reversals of ends and means in our present world.—R.S. (shrink)
This volume has four parts; in Part I, dealing with the philosophical tradition, Francis M. Parker examines various senses of insight and discusses its goodness as an activity. Henry B. Veatch questions Wild's acceptance of the life-world and asks for a critical, explicitly transcendental justification of it. Robert Jordan reviews Anselm's ontological argument and its place in other proofs for God's existence, and in religious experience. John M. Anderson examines "Art and Philosophy" with the help of Plato and Hegel. Part (...) II examines the life-world; Robert R. Ehman writes on the phenomenon of world, and Calvin O. Schrag situates Husserl's notion of life-world within the tradition of Hegel, Dilthey and Heidegger as a theme in the problem of history. Enzo Paci has an essay relating the life-world to the Husserlian analysis of the body as a locus of mobility, life, sensation, and, ultimately thought. C. A. van Peursen's contribution examines the nature of structure in the life-world. Part III deals with the individual and society and includes a picturesque, sensitive and profound essay by Erwin Straus on "The Miser." George Schrader writes on "Monetary Value and Personal Value," W. L. McBride on "Individualisms," and Wilfrid Desan on "Sartre the Individualist." Part IV, "Subjectivity and Objectivity," includes Paul Ric£ur distinguishing three types of philosophical discourse about the will, and claiming that a hermeneutic of symbols must supplement both discourse which is phenomenological and that which proposes meaningful action. Mikel Dufrenne writes on "Structuralism and Humanism," Nathaniel Lawrence on "The Illusion of Monolinear Time," and Samuel J. Todes and Hubert L. Dreyfus on "The Existentialist Critique of Objectivity." James Edie has an important essay on Husserl's notion of "the grammatical" and the a priori in grammar; he relates it to Chomsky's theory of grammatical structures. The volume ends with a bibliography of Wild's works, reviews of them, and essays devoted to his thought.--R. S. (shrink)
Carr examines whether Husserl’s later recognition of the importance of history, and the historical situation in which philosophy is carried out, destroys his earlier conception of philosophy as "transcendental," as the analysis of changeless, trans-historical structures of reason and experience. In the first nine chapters he discusses texts from different periods of Husserl’s development and surmises that some evidence exists for an affirmative answer: Husserl does seem to imply, especially in the Crisis and parts of Experience and Judgment, that cultural (...) concepts so permeate our life-world that it is impossible to isolate structures which go beyond our situation. (shrink)
The author claims that parts of the De Caelo comprise a distinct work of Aristotle and can be taken as an early composition, earlier than the De Philosophia. The book is a careful philological and philosophical analysis of this text, and takes a position in regard to the authors who have commented on it. The doctrine of the text is contrasted to Plato’s cosmology, especially concerning the concepts of physics and aether. The text is also compared to Aristotle’s later teaching (...) and many differences are noted: hylomorphism, entelechy, and the unmoved mover, are conspicuously absent. Besides analyzing the relevant parts of De Caelo, the author has remarks about such works as the Protreptic, De Philosophia, and Physics I and II.—R.S. (shrink)
Ulrich Claesges, author of an important book on Husserl’s theory of the constitution of space, has edited the famous lectures of 1907 in which Husserl examines the phenomena of "thing" and "space." The introduction to this course has already been published as Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Claesges includes supplementary texts dating from 1906-1917, with one from 1926. It is in the introduction to this course that Husserl uses the transcendental reduction for the first time, and quite appropriately; for the reduction (...) is motivated by the peculiarities inherent in our experience of things. Husserl is persuaded by his analysis of this experience that he must turn to another kind of experience as the basis for philosophy. The reduction is mentioned only a few times in this volume, however. (shrink)
This book is a good example of Husserl’s phenomenology at work. It contains three parts, each filled with interesting analyses. Part One examines prepredicative experience and describes how certain aspects come to prominence against others, how similarities arise, how a prepredicative sense of attribution occurs. It discusses the difference between the ego’s being affected and his act of attention, explores prepredicative modalities, and the elementary state of relations in experience. In Part Two Husserl moves to explicit predication as his theme, (...) shows how it differs from the passivity that underlies it, explores relations, predicates and sets, and several dimensions to be found in categorial objectivities: states of affairs, propositions, core-forms, modalities, and affair-complexes. The theme of temporality is often mentioned in Parts One and Two. In Part Three the problem of different kinds of generalities is examined. Husserl distinguishes associative similarities, empirical essences, and pure essences. He describes the different kinds of subsumptions or relations to individuals that such generalities permit. In this book Husserl fills out some of the terse analyses of Formal and Transcendental Logic. It was edited for style by Ludwig Landgrebe, and so is more relaxed in expression than Husserl’s other works. The translation is easy to read and proved accurate in places where I compared it to the German. However on page 208, line 13, "this synthesis" should, I think, be "this unity," and on line 16, "they" should be "it." The emendation made on page 325 seems incorrect. Evidenz is translated by "self-evidence," but perhaps "evidence" would be better if it is understood that Husserl gives a special meaning to the term. In his Afterword, Eley uses themes from Kant, Hegel, Heidegger and Lorenzen to criticize Husserl’s attempt to get beyond language in the description of experience.—R.S. (shrink)
In the current mood of disenchantment with Marxism, why is it that one-day headliners like the French "new philosophers" receive instant popularization and translation abroad? These men, B.-H. Levy and A. Glucksmann, say little that is new and are hardly philosophers. And why is it that Henri Lefebvre, who since World War II has sorted out what is alive in Marxism from what is dead, remains all but unknown in this country?
The author explores Aristotle’s theory of signification by contrasting it to Plato’s theory of language, which is interpreted, rather uncritically, as a theory of "natural" signification. She discusses Aristotle’s position on the meaning of sentences and sentential parts, and his theory of reference. She then considers Aristotle’s concept of philosophical language as the language of demonstration, in contrast to the saying of myths, and compares apodeixis to rhetoric and poetry. "Clarity" is required in philosophical discourse, and is defined by contrast (...) with equivocation, ambiguity and metaphor. It is good to have a collection of Aristotle’s remarks on these important items, but the author seems not to draw much philosophical capital from them: "clarity" seems to be taken as little more than "careful writing." Finally some passages from the Metaphysics are examined to give an example of how Aristotle uses language in philosophy. The book contains interesting remarks, but the general problem seems misplaced: we are to be shown that Aristotle is "not concerned solely with linguistic clarification but with positive knowledge of nonlinguistic reality", but such a dichotomy is certainly not Aristotelian. Neither is the problem raised in this sentence, "It is difficult to say whether Aristotle thinks men are social because they have the power of speech or the converse". Again, the author says "poetry is the imitation of things" when she means tragedy is the imitation of action.—R. S. (shrink)
This monograph introduces a new series with an inquiry into certain functions and limits of language. Tiles's immediate subject for examination is Strawson's claim that the use of language does not require a user who can recognize the identity and diversity of events. This suggests to the author that "language" stands for a whole family of systems of communication, possibly based on different kinds and degrees of cognitive activity. A brilliant investigation of successive "models" of the experience of users of (...) language leads from simple to subtle structure and content. The starting point is an agent who is a mere "feature-placer"--he can only recognize and distinguish specific individual sense reports. Such a being can report isolated items of input, but that is about all, and it is not very serviceable. As the models become more complex, the author assumes that the sort of "language" we presuppose in our analyses is one able to function to guide human action in a cooperative social community. The kinds and numbers of different abilities this presupposed requirement brings with it-including the ability to recognize the identity of a recurrence of the same event--is developed. On the level a Kantian would consider that of "forms of intuition," insight is sharpened by a use of abstract logical tools to specify the formal conditions presupposed by the assumed psychological behavior of the language user. In some ways, the redirection from the structure and logic of language to the intentions and psychological capacities of its users may be reminiscent of an earlier development in Scottish philosophy. Readers of Whitehead, at any rate, may see some analogy to the redirection by Scottish realists from Hume's focus on presentational immediacy to the wider world of causal efficacy. (shrink)
The texts collected in this volume deal with a topic that is especially important in phenomenology. The subtitle of the book is, "Towards a Phenomenology of Intuitive Representations." Perhaps the most decisive philosophical move Husserl made was his restoration to philosophical legitimacy of the intuition or the direct presentation of an object; this he did through his treatment of intentionality. Husserl overcame the long tradition of both British Empiricism and continental Cartesianism, the tradition in which the perceiver is said never (...) to deal directly with an object but only with a mental representation of it. But if Husserl restores presentation, then he must give a new account of representation as well. He claims that in many forms of representation we enjoy again the same object we once perceived, but now in ways that must be distinguished from perception. In such forms of awareness we do not have something that only suggests or only resembles the object, we have the object itself, but not immediately perceived. Hence we deal with "intuitive representation," a term that would be contradictory in the philosophical tradition Husserl works against. The texts included in this volume are thus important for the definition of phenomenology, crucial in the criticism Husserl makes of other philosophical traditions, and interesting simply as analyses of the forms in which things are presented and represented to us. The texts are carefully edited and splendidly introduced by Eduard Marbach, whose book, Das Problem des Ich in der Phaenomenologie Husserls develops the themes found in the present volume, and whose current research in developmental psychology shows the impact Husserl's thought can have in related fields. (shrink)
Some of these essays are attempts to describe areas of human experience. Edward Ballard analyzes some essentials of our experience of a visual object and its distance from us; Don Ihde explores auditory imagination, with interesting comments on the difference between perception and imagination and the role of inner speech in such imagining; Richard Zaner cites many novels and poems in his description of one's coming to experience one's own self; José Huertas-Jourda warns us to beware of verbal formulas in (...) ethical education and distinguishes levels of communication in regard to ethics ; and W. J. Stein writes about interpersonal relations. Other essays are more exegetical: Manfred Frings on Scheler; Joseph Kockelmans on language in Heidegger; and F. J. Smith on being and subjectivity in Heidegger and Husserl. Thomas Langan and Herbert Spiegelberg write on phenomenology as a humane and philosophical discipline. There is a long essay by Jacques Derrida, "Ousia and grammë," which, starting with Heidegger and moving through Aristotle and Hegel, criticizes the present--in both senses of time and manifestation--as not ultimate, but derivative upon that from which both the present and absent emerge.--R. S. (shrink)
This is an interesting intellectual biography of the early years of Merleau-Ponty's philosophical life. The author claims a clear change of thinking took place in 1939, when Merleau-Ponty began to read some of Husserl's manuscripts, and attempts to sketch his thought up to that point. He gives biographical data on his early life; analyzes his first two publications, on Scheler and Marcel; and describes his relationship with Sartre and other major figures of the time. He claims that the philosophical problem (...) bothering Merleau-Ponty at the time of La structure du comportement was that of reconciling a reflective approach to man with the scientific, objective approach. This dilemma was resolved in the philosophy of perceptual experience, in which the perceiver is taken as both a part of the world and the bodily subject that enjoys the world. Geraets observes that Merleau-Ponty tries to avoid the classical transcendental philosophy, and finds the foundation of philosophy not in a pure subject but in the process of experiencing; in this he differs even from Husserl, who provided him with the key to avoid the nagging objectivism of his early works by showing that the true transcendentals were concrete ingredients like the world, perception, the body, and place, and not the forms of scientific thinking or pure intellect. Geraets gives a long commentary on La structure du comportement; shows the influence of Bergson and the psychologists on Merleau-Ponty; and traces in detail the influence of essays by Fink and Landgrebe, with their Heideggerian dimensions. There is a preface by Emmanuel Levinas, and a ten-page bibliography of the publications of Merleau-Ponty, listed chronologically in order of appearance.--R. S. (shrink)
José Mena tackles no small subject. His title, "From Myth to Ontology," designates that transition in Western history "at which the Greek spirit began to break the circle of autonomy of the spoken word and opened up to history". This book, then, is about the origin of our civilization conceived as the shift from an oral to a written tradition. Mena describes that threshold, "the renaissance of the eighth century B.C.," with a twofold gaze, looking backward to the proto-Hellenic civilizations (...) and forward to archaic Greece. (shrink)
A provocative and original interpretation of the Parmenides as constructive, positive metaphysics. By bringing together the speculative enthusiasm of the continental tradition with the more patient analysis of English scholarship Lynch has opened up a new line of inquiry and discussion.--R. S. B.
An anthology, in German translation with brief historical and mathematical notes, of selected theorems and proofs which the author has chosen as perfect specimens of the mode of mathematical thinking reflected in the development of pure mathematics in Greece. Both the scholarship and the selection are excellent.--R. S. B.
Truth is a fundamental objective of adjudicative processes; ideally, `substantive' as distinct from `formal legal' truth. But problems of evidence, for example, may frustrate finding of substantive truth; other values may lead to exclusions of probative evidence, e.g., for the sake of fairness. `Jury nullification' and `jury equity'. Limits of time, and definitiveness of decision, require allocation of burden of proof. Degree of truth-formality is variable within a system and across systems.
Brand begins his book with a statement of the philosophical and cultural crisis of contemporary life, a crisis brought about by science. The idealizing methods and technology of contemporary science lead to a loss of self-understanding, and to a replacement of ordinary lived experience by scientific constructs; science in its turn has lost its human and philosophical meaning. An exploration of the life-world that provides the basis for science may help remedy this situation. Brand then explores the theme of a (...) concrete, lived world in Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. In these sections he examines themes appropriate to each author: essence, intuition, evidence and intentionality in Husserl; hermeneutics, world, sensibility and authenticity in Heidegger; en soi, pour soi, and negativity in Sartre; the body, science, and dialectics in Merleau-Ponty. These are not just introductory analyses; in each case Brand comes to terms with major interpretations and critics, and is able to show the unity of philosophic inspiration behind each man. In the second section of the book he presents his own analysis of the life-world. He begins with a long study of the nature of philosophical reflection. This includes a treatment of the formal process of distinguishing and reuniting into wholes. He analyzes conceptualization, the experience of wonder, meaning and expression, metaphor, communication, sensibility and the body. Action, value, need, choice, scarcity, and motives are among the themes treated next, and also social dimensions like the family, authority, conflict and friends. Finally he examines private dimensions like personal mythos, one's personal career, sex, eros and love, and the inner life. Throughout these pages Brand uses not only the four philosophers analyzed in Part One, but also such figures as Gadamer, Derrida, Habermas, Wittgenstein, and many others. His writing is a guide not only to philosophical problems, but also to vast areas of current literature; long quotations abound. The original problem of the life-world comes from Husserl, but Brand is especially aware of the dimension of action, choice and work, so his interpretation of the life-world is able to illuminate aspects that Husserl touched only lightly. Brand's independent mind is able to cut across philosophical schools and uncover common elements in them, such as his excellent comparison of Wittgenstein and phenomenology on the irreducible character of insight as the beginning of philosophy. He considers the life-world as not the final ground of experience; rather the process of distinguishing is more basic, and is the final term beyond which we cannot move. Brand claims Husserl does not go beyond the life-world to this, and that only the late Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein appreciate it; but are not Husserl's doctrines of parts and wholes and empty and filled intentions a treatment of the process of distinguishing and identifying? And don't these themes take Husserl beyond the life-world? The wide range and multitudinous sources of this book make exhaustive treatment of each area impossible, and on some points Brand merely gives sketches of what might be done. Other themes are very thoroughly analyzed, and all sections are interesting and provocative. This book should be not only an important contribution to phenomenology, but also one of the most helpful volumes in the philosophical discussions of the years to come.--R. S. (shrink)
A first-rate speculative interpretation. Wyller's sympathies are with the Neo-Platonic tradition, supplemented by insights from Heidegger. His study, however, extends to details of the Parmenides architectonic, and establishes significant parallels of structure between its form and that of other dialogues. It is a work that all students of the Parmenides should examine.--R. S. B.