English summary: In its core, this book represents a defense of the thesis that we are essentially biological creatures of the species Homo sapiens - and not essentially persons. This thesis has consequences for the problem of personal identity. An important aspect of its defense - and the book's second central line of argumentation - is, therefore, to substantiate that ours are the diachronic identity conditions of biological beings. Attempting to reach both argumentation goals, one has to overcome some obstacles, (...) from motivating an appropriate ontological framework via explaining the concept of the animate being to demonstrating that essentialism is still a viable option today. In this way, a picture gradually emerges which places us humans, as living beings among other living beings, in a biological world, without, however, playing down that we are, at least typically, also persons with a rich spiritual life. German description: Das Buch ist im Kern eine Verteidigung der These, dass wir wesentlich biologische Lebewesen der Spezies Homo sapiens sind - und nicht etwa wesentlich Personen. Diese These hat Konsequenzen fur das Problem der personalen Identitat. Ein wichtiger Aspekt ihrer Verteidigung - und der zweite zentrale Argumentationsstrang des Buchs - liegt demnach darin, zu begrunden, dass wir die diachronen Identitatsbedingungen biologischer Lebewesen haben. Der Versuch, beide Argumentstationsziele zu erreichen, muss einige Hurden nehmen: angefangen von einer Motivierung eines passenden ontologischen Rahmens uber eine Erlauterung des Begriffs des Lebewesens bis hin zu dem Nachweis, dass ein Essentialismus heutzutage noch eine gangbare Option ist. Auf diese Weise entsteht nach und nach ein Bild, das uns Menschen, als Lebewesen unter anderen Lebewesen, in eine biologische Welt einordnet, ohne dabei aber kleinzureden, dass wir, zumindest typischerweise, auch Personen mit einem reichhaltigen geistigen Leben sind. (shrink)

Naturalistic understandings of the mind face certain hurdles. Many authors believe that some such hurdles are even insurmountable. A frequently used but rarely developed and tested argumentative move claims that, because they are made from the so-called observer perspective, naturalization efforts inevitably fail for reasons connected to our first-person perspective. We are not convinced. However, this article primarily attempts to gain a better understanding of the point and scope of this move by discussing an argument by Holm Tetens from which (...) the basic incompleteness of the observer perspective is supposed to follow. Depending on how one interprets the incompleteness in question, one gets different readings of the argument: ontological, semantic, epistemic, or explanatory. First, we will develop two ontological readings of this argument in more detail ‐ mainly because they are the most obvious challenges to naturalism. We will then systematically explore the prospects of the alternative readings. These considerations lead to a more fundamental discussion about the requirements for naturalistic explanations. As it turns out, to defend such an incompleteness argument, you face some inconvenient hurdles yourself. (shrink)

The widely held belief that classical instrumental music has some kind of content - whether it is supposed to be some language-like meaning or some distinctive and possibly untranslatable musical content - is notoriously difficult to defend. One of the probably rather few promising options of analysing our experiences of hearing ‘content in music’ starts with the assumption that we, the listeners of music, endow the heard musical sequences with content. In the paper, I defend this anti-realism concerning musical content (...) by spelling out the idea that due to the operation of our imagination we sometimes, in listening to music, undergo episodes of hearing-as - close relatives of the more familiar episodes of seeing-as. Drawing on Colin McGinn’s analysis of seeing-as, I develop the idea that an episode of hearing-as is a kind of hybrid mental phenomenon, a co-production of our imagination and our ‘plain hearing’ of musical parameters. (shrink)

Animalism is the view that we are primarily living beings of the species Homo sapiens. Being alive consists in the realization of biological processes. Accordingly, our conditions of existence and persistence have nothing to do with things like mental continuity. Hence, mental capabilities seem to be irrelevant to understanding the core of our nature as human beings. In recent years, the debate on animalism has focused on certain intractable ontological puzzles. However important these puzzles may be, they do not get (...) to the heart of the widespread reluctance to accept animalism. One crucial reason lies in the fact that this view does not seem to respect our deeply entrenched understanding of ourselves as mental beings. The aim of my paper is thus to provide a stronger conception of the ontological relevance of our mental capabilities – without giving up the cen- tral claims of animalism. In particular, I discuss three proposals: first, the idea that being a human being involves the potential to develop mental capabilities; second, the idea that it is an essential feature of human beings to have a brain with the natural function of developing mental capabilities; and third, the idea that the ontological relevance of mental capabilities may emerge in the context of specifying something like the general human form of life. (shrink)

We are used to describe instrumental music in semantic terms. Many of our judgements about music – at least if taken literally – seem to implicate that music is capable of expressing thoughts and emotions, for example. Moreover, in the course of listening to music, we actually seem to hear that music has such (and similar) contents. The main aim of the paper consists in presenting reasons for being skeptical towards such claims. Not only are these claims less plausible than (...) one might think at first glance. What is more, at least some of these ways of talking about music are dispensable: we can give them up without any actual loss. The paper is not solely critical, though. It introduces two ideas aiming to show that some claims which are deeply anchored in our practice of articulating musical experiences can be understood without presupposing that the perceived music has some kind of content. (shrink)

One of the central claims in Ansgar Beckermann’s Gehirn, Ich, Freiheit is that we are biological beings. Somewhat strikingly, the book manages to convey the impression that this is a rather uncontroversial claim. Actually, the opposite is closer to the truth – or so I will try to argue. That it is a controversial claim can be shown by pointing out some of its problematic and seemingly implausible consequences. These consequences come into view by attempting to answer the questions, what (...) biological beings exactly are, and which conditions of diachronic identity they have. Highlighting these problems, I do not try to argue against the claim that we are biological beings, though. In the first place, it shall simply gain profile. Secondly, some options for solving these problems are discussed. In this way, the paper contributes to a defense of the claim that we are biological beings. For although this claim raises serious theoretical problems, it is most likely true. (shrink)

Certainly, we sometimes use language creatively and think really new thoughts. However, can we think and speak regardless of the manner in which we have spoken and thought in the past? This seems to be highly improbable. Consequently, nobody would assert something like this. But that being a given, what are the exact reasons that prevent us from radically detaching ourselves from our past practices of thinking and speaking? What roles do past facts play in determining what we are able (...) to think and speak today? This essay looks at the motivation for examining and determining the impact of ‘our history’ on semantics. If possible, these ideas should appeal independently of special or contentious theoretical presuppositions. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 63 Heft: 3 Seiten: 584-589.

This article is a reply to the comments on my book Gehirn, Ich, Freiheit by Geert Keil, Jasper Liptow and Gerson Reuter. My main concern is to show that we humans may be free and responsible even if we are thoroughly natural beings. But what exactly is a thoroughly natural being? In section 1, I try to answer this question by elaborating in more detail what, in my view, naturalism amounts to. In sections 2 and 5, I address (...) the question what it may mean for natural beings to be able to act or decide otherwise. In section 3, I distinguish two versions of libertarianism which I call,standard‘ and,non-standard libertarianism‘; furthermore I explain some of the main problems non-standard libertarians are confronted with. Section 4 is devoted to Geert Keil’s version of non-standard libertarianism. My main objection to this theory is that Keil has so far given no answer to the questions why a process of deliberation ends when it ends and what it may mean that a person is able to continue deliberating. (shrink)

Knowing Persons is an original study of Plato's account of personhood. For Plato, embodied persons are images of a disembodied ideal. The ideal person is a knower. Hence, the lives of embodied persons need to be understood according to Plato's metaphysics of imagery. For Gerson, Plato's account of embodied personhood is not accurately conflated with Cartesian dualism. Plato's dualism is more appropriately seen in the contrast between the ideal disembodied person and the embodied one than in the contrast between (...) mind or soul and body. (shrink)

This paper presents the results of two corpus studies investigating the discourse surrounding conspiracy theories and genuine theories. The results of these studies show that conspiracy theories lack the epistemic and scientific standing characteristic of theories more generally. Instead, our findings indicate that conspiracy theories are spread in a manner that resembles the dissemination of rumors and falsehoods. Based on these empirical results, we argue that it is time for both re-engineering conspiracy theory and for relabeling "conspiracy theory". We propose (...) relabelling conspiracy theories as either "conspiracy stories" or "conspiracy narratives" to more accurately convey their true nature. (shrink)

Assertions are the centre of gravity in social epistemology. They are the vehicles we use to exchange information within scientific groups and society as a whole. It is therefore essential to determine under which conditions we are permitted to make an assertion. In this paper we argue and provide empirical evidence for the view that the norm of assertion is justified belief: truth or even knowledge are not required. Our results challenge the knowledge account advocated by, e.g. Williamson (1996), in (...) general, and more specifically, put into question several studies conducted by Turri (2013, 2016) that support a knowledge norm of assertion. Instead, the justified belief account championed by, e.g. Douven (2006), seems to prevail. (shrink)

This paper details the content and structure of the folk concept of life, and discusses its relevance for scientific research on life. In four empirical studies, we investigate which features of life are considered salient, universal, central, and necessary. Functionings, such as nutrition and reproduction, but not material composition, turn out to be salient features commonly associated with living beings (Study 1). By contrast, being made of cells is considered a universal feature of living species (Study 2), a central aspect (...) of life (Study 3), and our best candidate for being necessary for life (Study 4). These results are best explained by the hypothesis that people take life to be a natural kind subject to scientific scrutiny. (shrink)

The standard interpretation of quantum mechanics and a standard interpretation of the awareness of pain have a common feature: Both postulate the existence of an irresolvable duality. Whereas many physicists claim that all particles exhibit particle and wave properties, many philosophers working on pain argue that our awareness of pain is paradoxical, exhibiting both perceptual and introspective characteristics. In this chapter, we offer a pessimistic take on the putative paradox of pain. Specifically, we attempt to resolve the supposed paradox by (...) undermining the reasons offered for accepting the introspective side of the dualism. (shrink)

Generic statements (‘Tigers have stripes’) are pervasive and early-emerging modes of generalization with a distinctive linguistic profile. Previous experimental work found that generics display a unique asymmetry between their acceptance conditions and the implications that are typically drawn from them. This paper presents evidence against the hypothesis that only generics display an asymmetry. Correcting for limitations of previous designs, we found a generalized asymmetry effect across generics, various kinds of explicitly quantified statements (‘most’, ‘some’, ‘typically’, ‘usually’), and variations in types (...) of predicated properties (striking vs. neutral). We discuss implications of these results for our understanding of the source of asymmetry effects and whether and in which ways these effects might introduce biased beliefs into social networks. (shrink)

In the past few decades, liberal and democratic thought has been subjected to attacks from the adherents of nationalism, populism, and social radicalism. Much of these attacks involve suspicions about liberalism’s association with the contents and purveyors of structured knowledge, scientific and humanistic alike. I suggest that an examination of the history of liberal beliefs may add to our understanding of what is at stake. Such an examination may reveal how liberal thought in the twentieth century shifted away from its (...) earlier individualist and constitutional position towards the pluralist position that grants a special place to educated knowledge, to experts and professionals, and thus invites allegations of elitism. In particular, I focus on the differences between the ideas that conventional liberal authors elaborated during early modernity and the nineteenth century, on the one hand, and the version of liberal values and the polity based on them that were tacitly adopted during the mid-twentieth century, on the other hand. The examination involves highlighting the common denominators of mid-century authors on right, left, and centre, such as Laski, Popper and Hayek, as well as asking what in their shared worldview could attract allegations of elitism from later generations. (shrink)

THE PRE-SOCRATIC ORIGINS OF NATURAL THEOLOGY § INTRODUCTION St Augustine informs us that pagan philosophers divided theology into three parts: () civic ...

The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity comprises over forty specially commissioned essays by experts on the philosophy of the period 200–800 CE. Designed as a successor to The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (edited by A. H. Armstrong), it takes into account some forty years of scholarship since the publication of that volume. The contributors examine philosophy as it entered literature, science and religion, and offer new and extensive assessments of philosophers who until recently (...) have been mostly ignored. The volume also includes a complete digest of all philosophical works known to have been written during this period. It will be an invaluable resource for all those interested in this rich and still emerging field. (shrink)

The literature suggests that in sensory imagination we focus on the imagined objects, not on the imaginative states themselves, and that therefore imagination is not introspective. It is claimed that the introspection of imaginative states is an additional cognitive ability. However, there seem to be counterexamples to this claim. In many cases in which we sensorily imagine a certain object in front of us, we are aware that this object is not really where we imagine it to be. So it (...) looks as if in these cases of imagination, we are aware of the mere appearance of the imagined object, and hence introspection is a constitutive part of imagination. In this article, I address this contradictory state of affairs and argue that we should classify at least some forms of sensory imagination as introspective. For this purpose I use the appearance-reality distinction as a central notion for introspection. I also defend the thesis of introspective imagination against the objection that young children imagine without yet understanding the concept of experience. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 10, Issue 1, pp 65 - 94 In his highly influential 1928 article ‘The _Parmenides_ of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic “One”,’ E.R. Dodds argued, _inter alia_, that among the so-called Neoplatonists Plotinus was the first to interpret Plato’s _Parmenides_ in terms of the distinctive three ‘hypostases’, One, Intellect, and Soul. Dodds argued that this interpretation was embraced and extensively developed by Proclus, among others. In this paper, I argue that although Plotinus took _Parmenides_ to (...) contain a sort of outline of the true metaphysical principles, he understood the One of the first hypothesis of the second part of the dialogue in a way importantly different from the way that Proclus understood it. The characterization of this One, especially its identity with the Idea of the Good of _Republic_, has significant ramification for Plotinus’ philosophy that set it apart from Proclus’ philosophy in ways hitherto infrequently noted. The widely accepted reasons for rejecting Proclus’ interpretation do not apply to the interpretation of Plotinus. The two different interpretations help explain why Proclus’ notorious proliferation of entities in the intelligible realm is not found in Plotinus. (shrink)

The concepts expressed by social role terms such as artist and scientist are unique in that they seem to allow two independent criteria for categorization, one of which is inherently normative. This study presents and tests an account of the content and structure of the normative dimension of these “dual character concepts.” Experiment 1 suggests that the normative dimension of a social role concept represents the commitment to fulfill the idealized basic function associated with the role. Background information can affect (...) which basic function is associated with each social role. However, Experiment 2 indicates that the normative dimension always represents the relevant commitment as an end in itself. We argue that social role concepts represent the commitments to basic functions because that information is crucial to predict the future social roles and role-dependent behavior of others. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that emotion concepts are purely descriptive. However, recent investigations suggest that the concept of happiness includes information about the morality of the agent's life. In this study, we argue that normative influences on emotion concepts are not restricted to happiness and are not about moral norms. In a series of studies, we show that emotion attribution is influenced by whether the agent's psychological and bodily states fit the situation in which they are experienced. People consider that (...) emotions are not just about feeling in certain ways, but also about feeling the right way. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the practice of revising concepts to improve how people talk and think. Its ability to improve talk and thought ultimately hinges on the successful dissemination of desired conceptual changes. Unfortunately, the field has been slow to develop methods to directly test what barriers stand in the way of propagation and what methods will most effectively propagate desired conceptual change. In order to test such questions, this paper introduces the masked time-lagged method. The masked time-lagged method tests people's (...) conceptual understanding at two different points in time without their knowledge of being tested, allowing us to measure conceptual revision in action. Using a masked time-lagged design on a content internalist framework, we attempted to revise PLANET and DINOSAUR in online participants to match experts' concepts. We successfully revised PLANET but not DINOSAUR, demonstrating some of the difficulties conceptual engineers face. Nonetheless, this paper provides conceptual engineers, regardless of framework, with the tools to tackle questions related to implementation empirically and head-on. (shrink)

A indagação que motiva o diálogo Protágoras sobre a possibilidade ou não de se ensinar a virtude, perpassa também diversos outros diálogos platônicos. Na verdade, virtude e conhecimento são temas centrais para se pensar o ânthropos, a pólis, a ética, o ser e a razão, no contexto do corpus platônico. Em As Leis, última obra escrita pelo fundador da Academia, a relação conhecimento/virtude volta a ganhar destaque no processo de reelaboração de um novo projeto para salvar o homem e a (...) cidade de suas mazelas. A arte/ciência da justa medida indicada no Protágoras (357 b) será a chave para a viabilização do projeto legislativo, ético e político em As Leis. Será pela correta educação dos sentidos e da razão que se alcançará a virtude responsável pela condução da cidade livre, amiga de si e ponderada (Leis, 701 d). Por sua vez, a educação virtuosa é fruto do conhecimento assimilado pelos costumes, pelo aprendizado, pelo discernimento racional e pelo domínio das paixões, o que assegurará o devido equilíbrio mediante o amparo das leis e das instituições da pólis. Isto se pode constatar, especialmente, na leitura dos livros I, II,VI e VII de As Leis, embora tais questões estejam entrelaçadas no conjunto da obra. (shrink)

A passagem 140e-141d do diálogo Parmênides nos remete a uma das conseqüências lógicas em relação ao “um”, isto é, estar fora do tempo, como parte da demonstração argumentativa do filósofo eleata ao admitir a primeira hipótese de que “o um é” e as conseqüências disso para si mesmo. Aceitar a existência do “um” implica, segundo o método de análise utilizado por Parmênides, verificar cada uma das hipóteses possíveis nesses casos, em relação às suas predicações, para si e para outras coisas. (...) Igualmente, o mesmo exercício deve ser feito se a hipótese for oposta, “se o um não é”. Como podemos identificar na estrutura do diálogo nesta parte, duas hipóteses são levantadas em que “o um é” e suas nove consequências; no primeiro movimento, as possíveis predicações para este são negadas, e no segundo movimento tais predicações e seus desdobramentos são reconhecidos. É a partir desse posicionamento que desenvolvemos nossa análise sobre a questão da temporalidade presente no diálogo e suas implicações metodológicas e teóricas. (shrink)

Querer investigar, num curto ensaio, as diversas facetas das situações-limite, bem como suas consequências para a existência humana, revelaria uma pretensão descabida. O que intencionamos aqui é simplesmente explorar, a partir de indicações fornecidas por Karl Jaspers, alguns momentos que as constituem. Optamos por nos aproximar do tema a partir de cinco perspectivas: o limite, o sentido, o nada, o sofrimento e a finitude. Em o sofrimento, empreenderemos uma breve crítica textual de passagens de duas obras centrais de Karl Jaspers: (...) Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, de 1919, e Philosophie, de 1932. Perceberemos aí uma modificação no modo como o sofrimento é apresentado. Embora sutil, essa alteração leva-nos não somente a precisar o papel das situações-limite na filosofia da existência jaspersiana, mas também a vislumbrar uma tensão entre situações-limite e experiências com situações-limite. (shrink)

Este artigo visa apresentar a pesquisa bibliográfica, descritiva com abordagem qualitativa diante do contexto educacional dos anos de 1960 a 1970, com o objetivo de estabelecer as relações entre a democratização do ensino em Anísio Teixeira e as experiências dos Ginásios Vocacionais do estado de São Paulo. Busca-se a interpretação das ações de Anísio Teixeira no âmbito da educação escolar e no projeto pedagógico dos Ginásios Vocacionais, em seu ambiente e contexto social, como resposta aos desafios educacionais. O texto está (...) estruturado em duas partes: primeira apresenta um breve histórico de Anísio Teixeira e do surgimento dos Ginásios Vocacionais e na segunda parte desenvolve-se as ideias do pensamento educacional de Teixeira e as possíveis semelhanças com a filosofia educacional dos Vocacionais. As correlações entre os vocacionais e Teixeira estão fundamentadas na pesquisa bibliográfica de autores como: Daniel Chiozzini ; Clarice Nunes; Anísio Spínola Teixeira e Maria Nilde Mascellani. Os resultados apontam que, embora os ginásios vocacionais não tenham sido explicitamente concebidos por Anísio Teixeira, é possível relacionar possíveis semelhanças entre ambos, as quais residem na: valorização e participação ativa dos alunos no processo de ensino-aprendizagem; prática de ensino participativa e colaborativa; e na formação social e politica dos discentes. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this work we argue for relevant logics as a basis for paraconsistent epistemic logics. In order to do so, a paraconsistent nonmonotonic multi-agent epistemic logic, MDR (for Modal Defeasible Relevant), is briefly introduced. In MDR each agent has two kinds of belief: an absolute belief that P, represented by AiP, and a defeasible belief that P, represented by DiP. Therefore, an agent can reason with his own absolute and defeasible beliefs about the world and also reason about his (...) beliefs about other agents' beliefs both absolute and defeasible. A theorem is presented showing some patterns of reasoning in MDR. Avron's relevant logic RMI? s compared proof theoretically with Anderson and Belnap's relevant logics R and RM and also with Da Costa's paraconsistent logic CI, with respect to some desired properties of absolute and defeasible beliefs. Then we can understand why RMI was chosen to be the underlying logic for the monotonie part (the absolute beliefs) of MDR, and had to be modified and integrated with a nonmonotonic logic in order to be the underlying logic for the nonmonotonic part (defeasible beliefs). (shrink)

Knowing Persons is an original study of Plato's account of personhood. For Plato, embodied persons are images of a disembodied ideal. The ideal person is a knower. Hence, the lives of embodied persons need to be understood according to Plato's metaphysics of imagery.For Gerson, Plato's account of embodied personhood is not accurately conflated with Cartesian dualism. Plato's dualism is more appropriately seen in the contrast between the ideal disembodied person and the embodied one than in the contrast between mind (...) or soul and body.This study argues that Plato's analysis of personhood is intended to cohere with his two-world metaphysics as well as a radical separation of knowledge and belief. Gerson demonstrates that Plato's account of persons plays a key role not just in his theory of mind, but in his theory of knowledge, his metaphysics, and his ethics. A proper understanding of Plato's account of persons must therefore place it in the context of his doctrines in these areas. Knowing Persons fills a significant gap by showing the way to such an understanding. (shrink)

The most common approach to understanding the semantics of the concept of pain is third-person thought experiments. By contrast, the most frequent and most relevant uses of the folk concept of pain are from a first-person perspective in conversational settings. In this paper, we use a set of linguistic tools to systematically explore the semantics of what people communicate when reporting pain from a first-person perspective. Our results suggest that only a pluralistic view can do justice to the way we (...) talk about pain from a first-person perspective: The semantic content of the folk concept of pain consists of information about both an unpleasant feeling and a disruptive bodily state. Pain linguistics thus provides new insights into ordinary pain language and poses an interesting challenge to the dominant unitary views of pain. (shrink)

Social and environmental shocks associated with freshwater management are inherently tied with the lives and well-being of all global citizens. Thus, exploring key actors’ roles is a critical element of this grand challenge. Utilizing an inductive multiple case study, we explore sustainability leadership and subsequent organizational perspective-taking behaviours initiated by actors within freshwater management in response to the grand challenge. A vibrant inductive model elicited three main themes: identifying conditions for organizational perspective-taking, modifying organizational frames of reference and emergence of (...) multi-level influence. The discussion extracts critical insights for sustainability leadership and highlights complexities involved in facilitating effective decision-making among diverse actors. Fundamentally, this article contributes a distinct multi-level systems framework for sustainability leadership drawing from social–ecological systems theory and organizational resilience. We conclude by offering future research opportunities within sustainability leadership designed to bridge the gap between grand challenges and our abilities to solve them. (shrink)

This compact essay aims at promoting an approaching of some core aspects related to the Idea of communication of existence philosophy of Karl Jaspers and some extracts of the exposition of the philia that Aristotle presents in his Nicomachean Ethics. It does not convey an accurate and detailed exegesis, but a daring attempt of conceiving a possible dialog between mentioned philosophers comprising various facets of this phenomenon: friendship.

Esse artigo pretende aproximar-se do fenômeno da técnica, a partir de uma discussão do texto “A questão da técnica”, de Martin Heidegger. Após uma breve introdução que apresenta diversos momentos de concepções antropológicas da técnica, a discussão analisará passagens centrais da proposta heideggeriana em que a essência da técnica é compreendida como um acontecimento da verdade. Finalmente, o artigo tecerá algumas reflexões, inspiradas em um trabalho de Alfred Nordmann, sobre os limites que o pensamento de Heidegger nos impõe quando pretendemos (...) pensar outras possibilidades de uma filosofia da técnica. (shrink)

O artigo analisa a finalidade interna da arte, ou seja, como ela se estrutura, que tipo de relação há entre suas partes e sua origem comum com a forma geral do ajuizamento estético. O argumento principal, seguindo as teses expostas na Crítica da Faculdade do Juízo de Kant, é que as características do juízo sobre o belo encontram na arte um “caso de aplicação” compatível uma vez que as estruturas formais de ambos coincidem. Na produção da arte, quem realiza tal (...) coincidência, na peculiar definição de Kant, é o gênio. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of prominent scientists have argued that free will is an illusion, appealing to evidence demonstrating that information about brain activity can be used to predict behavior before people are aware of having made a decision. These scientists claim that the possibility of perfect prediction based on neural information challenges the ordinary understanding of free will. In this paper we provide evidence suggesting that most people do not view the possibility of neuro-prediction as a threat to (...) free will unless it also raises concerns about manipulation of the agent’s behavior. In Experiment 1 two scenarios described future brain imaging technology that allows perfect prediction of decisions and actions based on earlier neural activity, and this possibility did not undermine most people’s attributions of free will or responsibility, except in the scenario that also allowed manipulation. In Experiment 2 the scenarios increased the salience of the physicalist implications of neuro-prediction, while in Experiment 3 the scenarios suggested dualism, with perfect prediction by mindreaders. The patterns of results for these two experiments were similar to the results in Experiment 1, suggesting that participants do not understand free will to require specific metaphysical conditions regarding the mind–body relation. Most people seem to understand free will in a way that is not threatened by perfect prediction based on neural information, suggesting that they believe that just because “my brain made me do it,” that does not mean that I didn’t do it of my own free will. (shrink)

O artigo examina o papel das emoções na experiência com a música (instrumental), desenvolvendo três teses básicas: 1) a música pode ser considerada como um “texto narrativo”, que realiza um modo específico de engajamento; 2) as emoções aparecem na experiência musical basicamente de duas formas: como expressão (ou “clarificação”), onde o agente psicológico portador de tais emoções é a persona musical, e como algo que deve constituir a experiência do ouvinte; 3) as respostas emocionais do ouvinte constituem um processo ativo (...) e necessário para o preenchimento das “lacunas” da narrativa musical e compõem decisivamente o processo de compreensão da obra musical. (shrink)

Lives of the stoics (Zeno, Aristo, Herillus, Cleanthes, Sphaerus, Chrysippus) on philosophy -- Logic and theory of knowledge -- Perception, knowledge, and sceptical attack -- The stoic-academic debate and Cicero's testimony -- Conceptions and rationality -- Physics -- Theology -- Bodily and non-bodily realities -- Structures and powers -- The soul -- Fate -- Ethics -- The general account in Diogenes Lartius -- The account preserved by Stobaeus -- The account in Cicero on goals -- Other evidence for stoic ethics (...) -- Passions and the goal : criticism within the stoic school and the evidence of Galen -- A critique from the academic-peripatetic point of view -- Pyrrhonist critique of basic ethical concepts -- Later stoic ethics : a sampler -- Musonius Rufus -- Seneca -- Epictetus. (shrink)