Naturalistic understandings of the mind face certain hurdles. Many authors believe that some such hurdles are even insurmountable. A frequently used but rarely developed and tested argumentative move claims that, because they are made from the so-called observer perspective, naturalization efforts inevitably fail for reasons connected to our first-person perspective. We are not convinced. However, this article primarily attempts to gain a better understanding of the point and scope of this move by discussing an argument by Holm Tetens from which (...) the basic incompleteness of the observer perspective is supposed to follow. Depending on how one interprets the incompleteness in question, one gets different readings of the argument: ontological, semantic, epistemic, or explanatory. First, we will develop two ontological readings of this argument in more detail ‐ mainly because they are the most obvious challenges to naturalism. We will then systematically explore the prospects of the alternative readings. These considerations lead to a more fundamental discussion about the requirements for naturalistic explanations. As it turns out, to defend such an incompleteness argument, you face some inconvenient hurdles yourself. (shrink)

The widely held belief that classical instrumental music has some kind of content - whether it is supposed to be some language-like meaning or some distinctive and possibly untranslatable musical content - is notoriously difficult to defend. One of the probably rather few promising options of analysing our experiences of hearing ‘content in music’ starts with the assumption that we, the listeners of music, endow the heard musical sequences with content. In the paper, I defend this anti-realism concerning musical content (...) by spelling out the idea that due to the operation of our imagination we sometimes, in listening to music, undergo episodes of hearing-as - close relatives of the more familiar episodes of seeing-as. Drawing on Colin McGinn’s analysis of seeing-as, I develop the idea that an episode of hearing-as is a kind of hybrid mental phenomenon, a co-production of our imagination and our ‘plain hearing’ of musical parameters. (shrink)

Animalism is the view that we are primarily living beings of the species Homo sapiens. Being alive consists in the realization of biological processes. Accordingly, our conditions of existence and persistence have nothing to do with things like mental continuity. Hence, mental capabilities seem to be irrelevant to understanding the core of our nature as human beings. In recent years, the debate on animalism has focused on certain intractable ontological puzzles. However important these puzzles may be, they do not get (...) to the heart of the widespread reluctance to accept animalism. One crucial reason lies in the fact that this view does not seem to respect our deeply entrenched understanding of ourselves as mental beings. The aim of my paper is thus to provide a stronger conception of the ontological relevance of our mental capabilities – without giving up the cen- tral claims of animalism. In particular, I discuss three proposals: first, the idea that being a human being involves the potential to develop mental capabilities; second, the idea that it is an essential feature of human beings to have a brain with the natural function of developing mental capabilities; and third, the idea that the ontological relevance of mental capabilities may emerge in the context of specifying something like the general human form of life. (shrink)

We are used to describe instrumental music in semantic terms. Many of our judgements about music – at least if taken literally – seem to implicate that music is capable of expressing thoughts and emotions, for example. Moreover, in the course of listening to music, we actually seem to hear that music has such (and similar) contents. The main aim of the paper consists in presenting reasons for being skeptical towards such claims. Not only are these claims less plausible than (...) one might think at first glance. What is more, at least some of these ways of talking about music are dispensable: we can give them up without any actual loss. The paper is not solely critical, though. It introduces two ideas aiming to show that some claims which are deeply anchored in our practice of articulating musical experiences can be understood without presupposing that the perceived music has some kind of content. (shrink)

One of the central claims in Ansgar Beckermann’s Gehirn, Ich, Freiheit is that we are biological beings. Somewhat strikingly, the book manages to convey the impression that this is a rather uncontroversial claim. Actually, the opposite is closer to the truth – or so I will try to argue. That it is a controversial claim can be shown by pointing out some of its problematic and seemingly implausible consequences. These consequences come into view by attempting to answer the questions, what (...) biological beings exactly are, and which conditions of diachronic identity they have. Highlighting these problems, I do not try to argue against the claim that we are biological beings, though. In the first place, it shall simply gain profile. Secondly, some options for solving these problems are discussed. In this way, the paper contributes to a defense of the claim that we are biological beings. For although this claim raises serious theoretical problems, it is most likely true. (shrink)

Certainly, we sometimes use language creatively and think really new thoughts. However, can we think and speak regardless of the manner in which we have spoken and thought in the past? This seems to be highly improbable. Consequently, nobody would assert something like this. But that being a given, what are the exact reasons that prevent us from radically detaching ourselves from our past practices of thinking and speaking? What roles do past facts play in determining what we are able (...) to think and speak today? This essay looks at the motivation for examining and determining the impact of ‘our history’ on semantics. If possible, these ideas should appeal independently of special or contentious theoretical presuppositions. (shrink)

English summary: In its core, this book represents a defense of the thesis that we are essentially biological creatures of the species Homo sapiens - and not essentially persons. This thesis has consequences for the problem of personal identity. An important aspect of its defense - and the book's second central line of argumentation - is, therefore, to substantiate that ours are the diachronic identity conditions of biological beings. Attempting to reach both argumentation goals, one has to overcome some obstacles, (...) from motivating an appropriate ontological framework via explaining the concept of the animate being to demonstrating that essentialism is still a viable option today. In this way, a picture gradually emerges which places us humans, as living beings among other living beings, in a biological world, without, however, playing down that we are, at least typically, also persons with a rich spiritual life. German description: Das Buch ist im Kern eine Verteidigung der These, dass wir wesentlich biologische Lebewesen der Spezies Homo sapiens sind - und nicht etwa wesentlich Personen. Diese These hat Konsequenzen fur das Problem der personalen Identitat. Ein wichtiger Aspekt ihrer Verteidigung - und der zweite zentrale Argumentationsstrang des Buchs - liegt demnach darin, zu begrunden, dass wir die diachronen Identitatsbedingungen biologischer Lebewesen haben. Der Versuch, beide Argumentstationsziele zu erreichen, muss einige Hurden nehmen: angefangen von einer Motivierung eines passenden ontologischen Rahmens uber eine Erlauterung des Begriffs des Lebewesens bis hin zu dem Nachweis, dass ein Essentialismus heutzutage noch eine gangbare Option ist. Auf diese Weise entsteht nach und nach ein Bild, das uns Menschen, als Lebewesen unter anderen Lebewesen, in eine biologische Welt einordnet, ohne dabei aber kleinzureden, dass wir, zumindest typischerweise, auch Personen mit einem reichhaltigen geistigen Leben sind. (shrink)