El comentario se concentra en la práctica del voto como mecanismo de decisión y en las estrategias de disolución de las fuerzas antidemocráticas. El que las prácticas efectivas en ambos casos no difieran parece redundar en un déficit para el deliberacionismo, el cual, a diferencia del agonismo, no puede justificar claramente dichas prácticas. A su vez, se detiene en las diferencias epistemológicas que ambas posiciones presentan. The discussion concentrates on two aspects: the practice of voting as a decision mechanism and (...) the strategies for the dissolution of the anti-democratic forces. The fact that effective practices in both cases do not differ leads to a deficit for deliberationism, which, unlike agonism, seems to not be able to clearly justify such practices from its theoretical position. The discussion also pays attention to the differences between the epistemological assumptions that sustain both positions. (shrink)

[...] This paper aims, first of all, to recall the main features of hyle in Ideas I, both in its relation to the noema and as critical correction of the concept of sensation. It deals, secondly, with some conflicts arising from Husserl’s parallel characterizations of temporal datum, sensation fields, and hyletic background. In third place, it outlines two central directions in genetic analysis, which allow the hyle to expand to a more complex notion involving temporal- material syntheses whose flow is (...) governed by kinaesthesis (Genesis I), all of which shows a sedimented history due to the institution of habitualities (Genesis II). Finally, the conclusions advance some topics that should be considered in this connection from the standpoint of genetic phenomenology. (shrink)

En contraste con algunas concepciones muy difundidas acerca de la razón, los análisis de Husserl subrayan tanto sus múltiples maneras de darse, es decir, su multidimensionalidad, como su entrelazamiento con la vida, lo que significa que la razón está arraigada en la vida y la vida es racional desde sus raíces. La multidimensionalidad da cuenta de sus diferenciables aspectos teoréticos, prácticos y afectivo-valorativos, mientras que el arraigo se refiere al anclaje de esos aspectos en la experiencia “anónima” que es “previa” (...) al pensamiento. Esto significa que la experiencia es racional en la medida que despliega una estructura constitutiva interna organizada en un sistema de niveles y estratos mediante los cuales se orienta hacia la racionalidad activa. Siguiendo las líneas de una articulación tripartita de la reflexión fenomenológica en los niveles estático, genético y mundovital, este trabajo procura mostrar que tales análisis, junto con este apuntar a una teleología implícita que exige una continuidad entre la vida y la razón, ponen de manifiesto el papel necesario que juega el cuerpo animado en este arraigo. La razón está arraigada en la vida por medio de la experiencia corporal en virtud de la función de “puente” que posee el cuerpo en su condición de cosa material y “órgano” estratificado del sentir y el mover del yo. Así la razón teórica está relacionada con los estratos de la sensibilidad y la cinestesia, la razón práctica se vincula con los estratos cinestésicos y volitivos, y la razón axiológica se asocia con el doble estrato de afección y sentir que subyacen y motivan la valoración. La constitución adopta nuevas formas en el tránsito de la egología a la intersubjetividad y a la experiencia completa mundovital, mientras que el arraigo puede ser ilustrado adicionalmente con el caso de la Tierra como suelo para la experiencia corporal.In contrast with widespread reductionistic conceptions of reason, Husserl’s analyses stress both its multifarious manners of givenness, i.e. its multidimensionality, and its intertwining with life, such that reason is rooted in life and life is rational from its roots. Multidimensionality accounts for distinguishable theoretical, practical and affective-valuing aspects of reason, while rootedness refers to the anchoring of these aspects in ‘anonymous’ experience ‘prior’ to thinking. This means that experience is rational insofar as it displays an inner constitutive structure organized as a system of levels and strata, by means of which it points to active rationality. Following the lines of a threefold articulation of phenomenological reflection in static, genetic and life-wordly levels, this paper aims to show that, together with this pointing to an implicit teleology, which calls for a continuity between life and reason, such analyses also unveil the necessary role played by the Body in this rootedness. Reason is rooted in life by means of Bodily experience, in virtue of the ‘bridging’ function of the Body as a material thing and as the stratified ‘organ’ of the Ego’s sensing and moving. Thus theoretical reason is related to the strata of sensibility and kinaesthesia, practical reason is related to the kinaesthetical and volitional strata, and axiological reason is related to the twofold strata of affection and feeling, which underlie and motivate valuation. This constitution takes on new forms in the transit from egology to intersubjectivity and to the full-fledged life-worldly experience, whereas rootedness can be further illustrated with the case of the Earth as basis-place for Bodily experience. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to advance some considerations on the question of animism from a phenomenological perspective. Firstly, we deal with the problems of the access to the phenomenon, and of its interpretation on the part of contemporary anthropology. Both problems are connected with the gap which seems to exist between so-called primitive, animistic societies, and so-called civilized, scientific cultures. Secondly, since Husserl does not devote specific analyses to this issue, we address Dorion Cairns’ methodology and concrete (...) investigations. Our major claim is that his reflections, largely inspired by Husserl’s notion of sense-transfer, may provide a better understanding of the gap mentioned above and perhaps a way to overcome it by disclosing a genetic common root not only of animistic and modern mentalities, but also of pantheism and theism. A final section is devoted to Husserl’s scattered considerations on the subject which might throw additional light on Cairns’ claims. (shrink)

El artículo comienza con una consideración general en torno a la traducción inspirada en las reflexiones de Hans-Georg Gadamer. Se enfatiza el hecho de que la traducción no es simplemente un reflejo especular del texto original sino una sobreiluminación que oscila entre la participación en la cosa que se discute y la traición al sentido traducido. Una segunda sección está dedicada a la obra de Julia Iribarne como traductora de artículos y libros filosóficos. Se subrayan tanto su carácter de experta (...) en lenguas y cuestiones filosóficas como su condición de pensadora original preocupada por los mismos temas que traduce. Por último, se listan brevemente sus traducciones y se ofrece un comentario más detallado de su última gran realización, la traducción de la Crisis de Edmund Husserl, completada en el añoThe paper begins with a general consideration on translation inspired by Hans-Georg Gadamer’s reflections. The fact is stressed that no translation is simply a mirroring of the original text, but rather a highlighting that fluctuates between participation in the subject under discussion and betrayal of the translated sense. A second section is devoted to Julia Iribarne’s work as translator of philosophical papers and books. Her expertise in languages and philosophical issues, as well as her status as an original thinker engaged in the very topics she translates, are underlined. Finally, her translations are briefly listed, and a rather detailed commentary on her last major achievement, the translation of Edmund Husserl’s Crisis completed in 2008, is provided. (shrink)

Nuestra familiaridad con los dinosaurios proviene del cine, pero comienza con los manuales escolares y los museos de ciencia natural, gracias a los cuales sabemos que, a diferencia de otros seres fantásticos de la pantalla grande y de la literatura de ficción, se trata de seres reales que sin embargo no pueden darse en carne y hueso. ¿Cómo se constituye fenomenológicamente el dinosaurio como animal anterior a toda criatura de la que podemos tener experiencia? Procuraremos esbozar una respuesta en tres (...) eta-pas, siguiendo los análisis constitutivos de Husserl. En primer lugar, respecto del darse del otro mediante la corporalidad y la empatía. En segundo lugar, respecto del darse de los animales vivientes. Por último, respecto del darse del fósil como cuerpo cultural que permite exhibirlo como animal de los tiempos jurásicos.Our acquaintance with dinosaurs comes from the movies, but it begins with school handbooks and natural science museums, whereby we know that, unlike other fantastic be-ings displayed on the screen or in fairy-tales, they are real but not actually given beings. How does the dinosaur phenomenologically constitute itself as an animal which predates any creature we can have experience of? Following Husserl’s constitutive analyses, we shall try to sketch an answer in three stages. First, with regard to the givenness of the Other through empathy and the Body. Second, with regard to the giveness of liv-ing animals. Finally, with regard to the givenness of fossils as cultural bodies which make the ap-pearance of Jurassic animals possible. (shrink)

Static phenomenological analysis discloses a tension between judgement and perception as a result of the way intentionality was developed in Husserl’s early thought: 1) The apprehension-content schema determines the way noesis is understood as sense-giving, 2) Sensuous perception models the way noema is conceived of as correlative sense. Both directions conflict with regard to the question of the ideality of their noemata. After describing this conflict, this paper aims to lay bare the static relation between judgement and perception in order (...) to follow up its transformation in genetic phenomenology. This may then help to outline a stratification of noematic ideality grounded on the intentional continuity between passive and active syntheses. (shrink)

Saulius Geniusas’ work on the origins of the horizon is arguably the first book that specifically addresses this fundamental, yet frequently neglected, issue in Husserl’s phenomenology. It attempts to fill this gap in philosophical inquiry by highlighting the elementary fact of the irreducible horizonal givenness of both world and subjectivity, and he does so by taking as a clue the question of the horizon’s origins. The horizon’s unique feature consists in being a “peculiar figure of intentionality” whose problematic “unfolds as (...) inseparably tied to the question of origins” (p. 9). The book is structured in 13 chapters arranged in three major Parts. The first chapter is a general introduction. Part I deals with the problem of the emergence of the horizon. Part II is concerned with the horizons of transcendental subjectivity, and Part III discusses the world-horizon.The inquiry into the emergence of the notion of horizon begins in Chap. 2 of Part I by addressing Husserl’s remark that th. (shrink)

There are many ways in which a speaker can confuse their audience. In this paper, I will focus on one such way, namely, a way of talking that seems to manifest a cross-level kind of cognitive dissonance on the part of the speaker. The goal of the paper is to explain why such ways of talking sound so twisted. The explanation is two-pronged, since their twisted nature may come either from the very mental states that the speaker thereby makes manifest, (...) or from how the speaker chooses to express themselves (even if there is nothing wrong with their mental states). So-called ‘Moore-paradoxical’ utterances are but one example of the phenomenon, and the explanation of what is wrong about them is subsumed under a more general explanation here—one that captures also the twisted-ness of utterances whereby questions are raised or intentions expressed. (shrink)

In this paper I present reasons for us to accept the hypothesis that suspended judgment has correctness conditions, just like beliefs do. Roughly put, the idea is that suspended judgment about p is correct when both p and ¬p might be true in view of certain facts that characterize the subject’s situation. The reasons to accept that hypothesis are broadly theoretical ones: it adds unifying power to our epistemological theories, it delivers good and conservative consequences, and it allows us to (...) assess processes of reasoning involving attitudes of suspended judgment. (shrink)

Um alinhamento responsável à alguma versão do naturalismo filosófico requer a articulação explicita e cuidadosa de um argumento em sua defesa. Em quatro passos, o texto que segue abaixo expande e examina a validade de um argumento que é frequentemente rascunhado em favor do naturalismo. Como veremos, contudo, a versão do naturalismo que esse argumento nos permite é um pouco diferente dos naturalismos filosóficos mais populares.

What I call the Doxastic Puzzle, is the impression that while each of these claims seems true, at least one of them must be false: (a) Claims of the form ‘S ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p at t’ are sometimes true at t, (b) If Φ-ing at t is not within S’s effective control at t, then it is false, at t, that ‘S ought to Φ at t’, (c) For all S, p, and t, having doxastic (...) attitude D towards p at t is not within S’s effective control at t. All three natural replies to the puzzle have been pursued. Some have claimed that doxastic attitudes like believing that p are, in fact, within our effective control, or sufficiently so. Others have claimed that doxastic ought-claims, strictly speaking, are always false. And some have denied that effective control is required for the adequacy of doxastic ought-claims in general. I here pursue and examine a different strategy. In the first part of this paper, I argue that these claims are not only each true but actually not in tension with each other in the first place. Instead of attempting to dispel the puzzle, this solution proposes to evade it instead: to solve it by properly understanding, and by thereby accepting without contradiction, all of its constitutive claims. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the evasive strategy forces us to re-think our understanding of the place of normative reasons in epistemology. More exactly, it seems to come at the cost of one central way of thinking about our reasons for having doxastic attitudes, one where such reasons are good-standing exemplars of normative reasons in general. The evasive strategy, that is, threatens to lead us very quickly to a deflationary picture of epistemic normativity: it rescues normative talk, but sacrifices normative substance. I conclude by explaining why I think this is more consequential than some have made it out to be, and by suggesting that these consequences are welcome nonetheless. (shrink)

My starting point is what I call the Normative Authority Conception of justification, where S is justified in their belief that p at t (to some degree n) if and only if their believing that p at t is not ruled out by epistemic norms that have normative authority over S at t. With this in mind, this paper develops an account of doxastic justification by first developing an account of the normative authority of epistemic norms. Drawing from work in (...) political philosophy, I argue that (a) the cognitive and evaluative commitments and concerns behind our actual practices of holding each other and ourselves accountable for our beliefs reveal which epistemic norms we have consented to be under, and that (b) it is because we have consented to be under the authority of these norms – by actually holding ourselves and others accountable to them – that they in turn have normative authority over us. By connecting the authority of epistemic norms to the authority we have over ourselves in this way, the resulting account of doxastic justification (i) explains why it can be appropriate to criticize, resent, or sanction someone for having unjustified beliefs, (ii) avoids the phenomena of normative alienation and normative parochialism, and (iii) respects the social and collective nature of epistemic justification. (shrink)

More than a school of philosophy with a defined set of beliefs and convictions, classical Cynicism represents an unconventional sect of philosophers and a way of life. This is a complete account of classical Cynicism from its beginnings in the Socratic circle to its extinction in late Roman times. In this thoroughly documented study, Navia explores various issues related to the sources of information about the Cynics, the development of Cynicism, and the principal representatives of classical Cynicism. Exploring the relationship (...) between classical Cynicism and cynicism as understood in its ordinary modern sense, the author argues that despite their common designation, they represent significantly different philosophical attitudes. This book explicates the main ideas associated with classical Cynicism and argues that, its shortcomings notwithstanding, classical Cynicism furnishes us with a wealthy source of philosophical enlightenment. Individual chapters are devoted to Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates, the three principal classical Cynics. Attention is given to the development and application of certain fundamental Cynic ideas and to the transformation of these ideas throughout the eight centuries during which Cynicism was an influential philosophical movement. The book provides abundant references to primary and secondary sources and includes a bibliography of over five hundred entries. (shrink)

-- 2. Sujetos, referencia y reflexión.

In this novel account of global citizenship, Luis Cabrera argues that all individuals have a global duty to contribute directly to human rights protections and to promote rights-enhancing political integration between states. The Practice of Global Citizenship blends careful moral argument with compelling narratives from field research among unauthorized immigrants, activists seeking to protect their rights, and the 'Minuteman' activists striving to keep them out. Immigrant-rights activists, especially those conducting humanitarian patrols for border-crossers stranded in the brutal Arizona desert, (...) are shown as embodying aspects of global citizenship. Unauthorized immigrants themselves are shown to be enacting a form of global 'civil' disobedience, claiming the economic rights central to the emerging global normative charter while challenging the restrictive membership regimes that are the norm in the current global system. Cabrera also examines the European Union, seeing it as a crucial laboratory for studying the challenges inherent in expanding citizen membership. (shrink)

Could global government be the answer to global poverty and starvation? Cosmopolitan thinkers challenge the widely held belief that we owe more to our co-citizens than to those in other countries. This book offers a moral argument for world government, claiming that not only do we have strong obligations to people elsewhere, but that accountable integration among nation-states will help ensure that all persons can lead a decent life. Cabrera considers both the views of those political philosophers who say we (...) have much stronger obligations to help our co-citizens than foreigners and those cosmopolitans who say our duties are equally strong to each but resist restructuring. He then outlines his own position, using the European Union as a partial model for the integrated alternative and advocating instituting EU-style supranational government, development aid, and free movement of persons in the Americas and other regions. Over time, Cabrera argues that the transformation of the global system into a cohesive network of democratic institutions would help ensure that anyone born anywhere could lead a decent life. This book will appeal to all those interested in political philosophy and the processes and potential of globalization. (shrink)

Contemporary studies in unconscious cognition are essentially founded on dissociation, i.e., on how it dissociates with respect to conscious mental processes and representations. This is claimed to be in so many and diverse ways that one is often lost in dissociation. In order to reduce this state of confusion we here carry out two major tasks: based on the central distinction between cognitive processes and representations, we identify and isolate the main dissociation paradigms; we then critically analyze their key tenets (...) and reported findings. (shrink)

“Literature and the Right to Death” is probably the most quoted of French thinker Maurice Blanchot’s texts. For decades it has been discussed by such important figures as Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, or even the writer Paul Auster. Its importance is twofold: on the one hand, it is often considered an important gateway to Blanchot’s literary thought. On the other hand, it constitutes a substantial example of the new reception of Hegel in France after the Second World War. Although there (...) is no doubt about its Kojèvo-Hegelian inspiration and its center in what we could call “literary experience”, this article intends to explore another of its layers: its relation to the discussion around humanism and the Terror, as forgotten as it was central in France at the end of the 1940’s. We will thus try to lay the foundations for a new reading of this fundamental piece in Blanchot’s production. (shrink)

Since Freud and his co-author Breuer spoke of dissociation in 1895, a scientific paradigm was painstakingly established in the field of unconscious cognition. This is the dissociation paradigm. However, recent critical analysis of the many and various reported dissociations reveals their blurred, or unveridical, character. Moreover, we remain ignorant with respect to the ways cognitive phenomena transition from consciousness to an unconscious mode. This hinders us from filling in the puzzle of the unified mind. We conclude that we have reached (...) a Kuhnian crisis in the field of unconscious cognition, and we predict that new models, incorporating partly the relevant findings of the dissociation paradigm—but also of dynamic psychology—, will soon be established. We further predict that some of these models will be largely based on the pairs representation–process and analog–digital. (shrink)

Cosmopolitanism is said by many critics to be arrogant. In emphasizing universal principles and granting no fundamental moral significance to national or other group belonging, it wrongly treats those making non-universalist claims as not authorized to speak, while treating those in non-Western societies as not qualified. This book works to address such objections. It does so in part by engaging the work of B.R. Ambedkar, architect of India's 1950 Constitution and revered champion of the country's Dalits (formerly "untouchables"). Ambedkar cited (...) universal principles of equality and rights in confronting domestic exclusions and the "arrogance" of caste. He sought to advance forms of political humility, or the affirmation of equal standing within political institutions and openness to input and challenge within them. This book examines how an "institutional global citizenship" approach to cosmopolitanism could similarly advance political humility, in supporting the development of input and challenge mechanisms beyond the state. It employs a grounded normative theory method, taking insights for the model from field research among Dalit activists pressing for domestic reforms through the UN human rights regime, and from their critics in the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party. Insights also are taken from Turkish protesters challenging a rising domestic authoritarianism, and from UK Independence Party members demanding "Brexit" from the European Union-in part because of possibilities that predominantly Muslim Turkey will join. Overall, it is shown, an appropriately configured institutional cosmopolitanism should orient fundamentally to political humility rather than arrogance, while holding significant potential for advancing global rights protections and more equitable rights specifications. (shrink)

Viruses and related infectious genetic parasites are the most abundant biological agents on this planet. They invade all cellular organisms, are key agents in the generation of adaptive and innate immune systems, and drive nearly all regulatory processes within living cells.

Foundational ontologies, central constructs in ontological investigations and engineering alike, are based on ontological categories. Firstly proposed by Aristotle as the very ur- elements from which the whole of reality can be derived, they are not easy to identify, let alone partition and/or hierarchize; in particular, the question of their number poses serious challenges. The late medieval philosopher Dietrich of Freiberg wrote around 1286 a tutorial that can help us today with this exceedingly difficult task. In this paper, I discuss (...) ontological categories and their importance for foundational ontologies from both the contemporary perspective and the original Aristotelian viewpoint, I provide the translation from the Latin into English of Dietrich's De origine II with an introductory elaboration, and I extract a foundational ontology–that is in fact a single-category one–from this text rooted in Dietrich's specification of types of subjecthood and his conception of intentionality as causal operation. (shrink)

¿Cuándo se fundan los conocimientos en razones objetivas? ¿Cómo influyen deseos e intereses? Villoro analiza sistemáticamente los conceptos epistemológicos fundamentales: creencia, certeza, saber, conocimiento, y establece sus relaciones con las razones que justifican la verdad de las creencias y con los motivos que pueden distorsionarlas. El libro desemboca en un estudio de las relaciones de creencias y conocimientos con los preceptos que rigen la vida práctica en sociedad. Las condiciones de racionalidad de las creencias aparecen entonces como condiciones de realización (...) de una vida racional y libre. (shrink)

Ontologies are some of the most central constructs in today's large plethora of knowledge technologies, namely in the context of the semantic web. As their coinage indicates, they are direct heirs to the ontological investigations in the long Western philosophical tradition, but it is not easy to make bridges between them. Contemporary ontological commitments often take causality as a central aspect for the ur-segregation of entities, especially in scientific upper ontologies; theories of causality and philosophical ontological investigations often go hand-in-hand, (...) and were essentially inseparable in medieval thought. This constitutes the foundation for a bridge, and this article analyzes the causality-based ontology of the late medieval philosopher Dietrich of Freiberg from the viewpoint of today's upper-ontology engineering. In this bridging attempt, it offers a translation into English of the first part of Dietrich's De origine (abbreviated title) that is a compromise between traditional scholarly translations of medieval Latin philosophical texts and contemporary ontology. (shrink)

Las respuestas de la Ética a los grandes retos del nuevo humanismo: la manipulación genética, el uso de la technología, la bioética y la ética ecológica, la ética política, los derechos de los animales, la sostenibilidad y el sistema económico globalizado.--Back cover.