[...] This paper aims, first of all, to recall the main features of hyle in Ideas I, both in its relation to the noema and as critical correction of the concept of sensation. It deals, secondly, with some conflicts arising from Husserl’s parallel characterizations of temporal datum, sensation fields, and hyletic background. In third place, it outlines two central directions in genetic analysis, which allow the hyle to expand to a more complex notion involving temporal- material syntheses whose flow is (...) governed by kinaesthesis (Genesis I), all of which shows a sedimented history due to the institution of habitualities (Genesis II). Finally, the conclusions advance some topics that should be considered in this connection from the standpoint of genetic phenomenology. (shrink)

En contraste con algunas concepciones muy difundidas acerca de la razón, los análisis de Husserl subrayan tanto sus múltiples maneras de darse, es decir, su multidimensionalidad, como su entrelazamiento con la vida, lo que significa que la razón está arraigada en la vida y la vida es racional desde sus raíces. La multidimensionalidad da cuenta de sus diferenciables aspectos teoréticos, prácticos y afectivo-valorativos, mientras que el arraigo se refiere al anclaje de esos aspectos en la experiencia “anónima” que es “previa” (...) al pensamiento. Esto significa que la experiencia es racional en la medida que despliega una estructura constitutiva interna organizada en un sistema de niveles y estratos mediante los cuales se orienta hacia la racionalidad activa. Siguiendo las líneas de una articulación tripartita de la reflexión fenomenológica en los niveles estático, genético y mundovital, este trabajo procura mostrar que tales análisis, junto con este apuntar a una teleología implícita que exige una continuidad entre la vida y la razón, ponen de manifiesto el papel necesario que juega el cuerpo animado en este arraigo. La razón está arraigada en la vida por medio de la experiencia corporal en virtud de la función de “puente” que posee el cuerpo en su condición de cosa material y “órgano” estratificado del sentir y el mover del yo. Así la razón teórica está relacionada con los estratos de la sensibilidad y la cinestesia, la razón práctica se vincula con los estratos cinestésicos y volitivos, y la razón axiológica se asocia con el doble estrato de afección y sentir que subyacen y motivan la valoración. La constitución adopta nuevas formas en el tránsito de la egología a la intersubjetividad y a la experiencia completa mundovital, mientras que el arraigo puede ser ilustrado adicionalmente con el caso de la Tierra como suelo para la experiencia corporal.In contrast with widespread reductionistic conceptions of reason, Husserl’s analyses stress both its multifarious manners of givenness, i.e. its multidimensionality, and its intertwining with life, such that reason is rooted in life and life is rational from its roots. Multidimensionality accounts for distinguishable theoretical, practical and affective-valuing aspects of reason, while rootedness refers to the anchoring of these aspects in ‘anonymous’ experience ‘prior’ to thinking. This means that experience is rational insofar as it displays an inner constitutive structure organized as a system of levels and strata, by means of which it points to active rationality. Following the lines of a threefold articulation of phenomenological reflection in static, genetic and life-wordly levels, this paper aims to show that, together with this pointing to an implicit teleology, which calls for a continuity between life and reason, such analyses also unveil the necessary role played by the Body in this rootedness. Reason is rooted in life by means of Bodily experience, in virtue of the ‘bridging’ function of the Body as a material thing and as the stratified ‘organ’ of the Ego’s sensing and moving. Thus theoretical reason is related to the strata of sensibility and kinaesthesia, practical reason is related to the kinaesthetical and volitional strata, and axiological reason is related to the twofold strata of affection and feeling, which underlie and motivate valuation. This constitution takes on new forms in the transit from egology to intersubjectivity and to the full-fledged life-worldly experience, whereas rootedness can be further illustrated with the case of the Earth as basis-place for Bodily experience. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to advance some considerations on the question of animism from a phenomenological perspective. Firstly, we deal with the problems of the access to the phenomenon, and of its interpretation on the part of contemporary anthropology. Both problems are connected with the gap which seems to exist between so-called primitive, animistic societies, and so-called civilized, scientific cultures. Secondly, since Husserl does not devote specific analyses to this issue, we address Dorion Cairns’ methodology and concrete (...) investigations. Our major claim is that his reflections, largely inspired by Husserl’s notion of sense-transfer, may provide a better understanding of the gap mentioned above and perhaps a way to overcome it by disclosing a genetic common root not only of animistic and modern mentalities, but also of pantheism and theism. A final section is devoted to Husserl’s scattered considerations on the subject which might throw additional light on Cairns’ claims. (shrink)

El artículo comienza con una consideración general en torno a la traducción inspirada en las reflexiones de Hans-Georg Gadamer. Se enfatiza el hecho de que la traducción no es simplemente un reflejo especular del texto original sino una sobreiluminación que oscila entre la participación en la cosa que se discute y la traición al sentido traducido. Una segunda sección está dedicada a la obra de Julia Iribarne como traductora de artículos y libros filosóficos. Se subrayan tanto su carácter de experta (...) en lenguas y cuestiones filosóficas como su condición de pensadora original preocupada por los mismos temas que traduce. Por último, se listan brevemente sus traducciones y se ofrece un comentario más detallado de su última gran realización, la traducción de la Crisis de Edmund Husserl, completada en el añoThe paper begins with a general consideration on translation inspired by Hans-Georg Gadamer’s reflections. The fact is stressed that no translation is simply a mirroring of the original text, but rather a highlighting that fluctuates between participation in the subject under discussion and betrayal of the translated sense. A second section is devoted to Julia Iribarne’s work as translator of philosophical papers and books. Her expertise in languages and philosophical issues, as well as her status as an original thinker engaged in the very topics she translates, are underlined. Finally, her translations are briefly listed, and a rather detailed commentary on her last major achievement, the translation of Edmund Husserl’s Crisis completed in 2008, is provided. (shrink)

Nuestra familiaridad con los dinosaurios proviene del cine, pero comienza con los manuales escolares y los museos de ciencia natural, gracias a los cuales sabemos que, a diferencia de otros seres fantásticos de la pantalla grande y de la literatura de ficción, se trata de seres reales que sin embargo no pueden darse en carne y hueso. ¿Cómo se constituye fenomenológicamente el dinosaurio como animal anterior a toda criatura de la que podemos tener experiencia? Procuraremos esbozar una respuesta en tres (...) eta-pas, siguiendo los análisis constitutivos de Husserl. En primer lugar, respecto del darse del otro mediante la corporalidad y la empatía. En segundo lugar, respecto del darse de los animales vivientes. Por último, respecto del darse del fósil como cuerpo cultural que permite exhibirlo como animal de los tiempos jurásicos.Our acquaintance with dinosaurs comes from the movies, but it begins with school handbooks and natural science museums, whereby we know that, unlike other fantastic be-ings displayed on the screen or in fairy-tales, they are real but not actually given beings. How does the dinosaur phenomenologically constitute itself as an animal which predates any creature we can have experience of? Following Husserl’s constitutive analyses, we shall try to sketch an answer in three stages. First, with regard to the givenness of the Other through empathy and the Body. Second, with regard to the giveness of liv-ing animals. Finally, with regard to the givenness of fossils as cultural bodies which make the ap-pearance of Jurassic animals possible. (shrink)

El comentario se concentra en la práctica del voto como mecanismo de decisión y en las estrategias de disolución de las fuerzas antidemocráticas. El que las prácticas efectivas en ambos casos no difieran parece redundar en un déficit para el deliberacionismo, el cual, a diferencia del agonismo, no puede justificar claramente dichas prácticas. A su vez, se detiene en las diferencias epistemológicas que ambas posiciones presentan. The discussion concentrates on two aspects: the practice of voting as a decision mechanism and (...) the strategies for the dissolution of the anti-democratic forces. The fact that effective practices in both cases do not differ leads to a deficit for deliberationism, which, unlike agonism, seems to not be able to clearly justify such practices from its theoretical position. The discussion also pays attention to the differences between the epistemological assumptions that sustain both positions. (shrink)

Static phenomenological analysis discloses a tension between judgement and perception as a result of the way intentionality was developed in Husserl’s early thought: 1) The apprehension-content schema determines the way noesis is understood as sense-giving, 2) Sensuous perception models the way noema is conceived of as correlative sense. Both directions conflict with regard to the question of the ideality of their noemata. After describing this conflict, this paper aims to lay bare the static relation between judgement and perception in order (...) to follow up its transformation in genetic phenomenology. This may then help to outline a stratification of noematic ideality grounded on the intentional continuity between passive and active syntheses. (shrink)

Saulius Geniusas’ work on the origins of the horizon is arguably the first book that specifically addresses this fundamental, yet frequently neglected, issue in Husserl’s phenomenology. It attempts to fill this gap in philosophical inquiry by highlighting the elementary fact of the irreducible horizonal givenness of both world and subjectivity, and he does so by taking as a clue the question of the horizon’s origins. The horizon’s unique feature consists in being a “peculiar figure of intentionality” whose problematic “unfolds as (...) inseparably tied to the question of origins” (p. 9). The book is structured in 13 chapters arranged in three major Parts. The first chapter is a general introduction. Part I deals with the problem of the emergence of the horizon. Part II is concerned with the horizons of transcendental subjectivity, and Part III discusses the world-horizon.The inquiry into the emergence of the notion of horizon begins in Chap. 2 of Part I by addressing Husserl’s remark that th. (shrink)