Much of the fear and uncertainty around Zika epidemics stem from potential association between Zika virus complications on infected pregnant women and risk of their babies being born with microcephaly and other neurological abnormalities. However, much remains unknown about its mode of transmission, diagnosis and long-term pathogenesis. Worries of these unknowns necessitate the need for effective and efficient psychosocial programs and medical-legal strategies to alleviate and mitigate ZIKV related burdens. In this light, local and global efforts in maintaining fundamental health (...) principles of moral, medical and legal decision-making policies, and interventions to preserve and promote individual and collectiveHuman Rights, autonomy, protection of the most vulnerable, equity, dignity, integrity and beneficence that should not be confused and relegated by compassionate humanitarian assistance and support. This paper explores the potential medical and ethical-legal implications of ZIKV epidemics emergency response packages and strategies alongside optimizing reproductive and mental health policies, programs and best practice measures. Further long-term cross-borders operational research is required in elucidating Zika-related population-based epidemiology, ethical-medical and societal implications in guiding evidence-based local and global ZIKV maternal-child health complications related approaches and interventions. Core programs and interventions including future Zika safe and effective vaccines for global Zika immunization program in most vulnerable and affected countries and worldwide should be prioritized. (shrink)

Much of the fear and uncertainty around Zika epidemics stem from potential association between Zika virus complications on infected pregnant women and risk of their babies being born with microcephaly and other neurological abnormalities. However, much remains unknown about its mode of transmission, diagnosis and long-term pathogenesis. Worries of these unknowns necessitate the need for effective and efficient psychosocial programs and medical-legal strategies to alleviate and mitigate ZIKV related burdens. In this light, local and global efforts in maintaining fundamental health (...) principles of moral, medical and legal decision-making policies, and interventions to preserve and promote individual and collectiveHuman Rights, autonomy, protection of the most vulnerable, equity, dignity, integrity and beneficence that should not be confused and relegated by compassionate humanitarian assistance and support. This paper explores the potential medical and ethical-legal implications of ZIKV epidemics emergency response packages and strategies alongside optimizing reproductive and mental health policies, programs and best practice measures. Further long-term cross-borders operational research is required in elucidating Zika-related population-based epidemiology, ethical-medical and societal implications in guiding evidence-based local and global ZIKV maternal-child health complications related approaches and interventions. Core programs and interventions including future Zika safe and effective vaccines for global Zika immunization program in most vulnerable and affected countries and worldwide should be prioritized. (shrink)

This article deals with self-knowledge of beliefs. There are several mental states with their own peculiarities. Desires, judgments, feelings, emotions and beliefs. The focus of the article is on the know-ledge of one’s beliefs. Self-knowledge has characteristics, namely, first-person authority, aprioristic character, cognitive-discriminative capacity, infallibility, omniscience, asymmetry between the first and third person and impossibility of misuse of the pronoun “I” (SILVA FILHO, 2013, p. 33, n.2). In the everyday realm of common sense, there is no doubt about the self-attribution (...) of beliefs, but concepts are not always used correctly, that is, there is an incomplete unders-tanding of one’s beliefs. However, does attributing rationality to the agent require knowledge of one’s beliefs? According to Coliva (2016), there are dispositional beliefs and as commitment. With respect to the first type of belief, the agent has no epistemic responsibility, with the second yes. Therefore, self-knowledge of doxastic beliefs as commit-ment requires rationality of the epistemic agent, because there is the epistemic responsibility of the rational agent. (shrink)

This chapter takes up, in six sections, issues of realism and of ontological and conceptual relativity. Section 1 briefly lays out the kind of absolutist realism of interest in what follows. Section 2 considers arguments against ordinary commonsense entities such as bodies, and for the view that subjects enjoy a superior ontological position. No such argument is found persuasive. I find no good argument against ordinary bodies or other common-sense entities, nor any good argument that subjects enjoy any ontological superiority. (...) Section 3 lays out three options in ontology, opts for a kind of conceptual relativism, and takes up three problems for the proposed view. Section 4 then offers a compromise position based on a kind of existential relativity meant to accommodate our most settled beliefs about what there is, while retaining a fundamentally realist and objectivist ontology. The main argument of that section relies on a distinction between semantical relativity and ontological relativity. Section 5 defends my use of the semantical-ontological distinction against objections to it in the recent literature. Section 6, in conclusion, takes up arguments for the view that, as subjects of consciousness and thought, we must after all occupy a special ontological position in objective reality, one whose status remains mysterious. (shrink)

My essay will take as its point of departure the paragraph from Gershom Scholem’s “Reflections on Jewish Theology,” in which he depicts the modern religious experience as the one of the "void of God" or as "pious atheism". I will first argue that the "void of God" cannot be reduced to atheistic non-belief in the presence of God. Then, I will demonstrate the further development of the Scholemian notion of the ‘pious atheism’ in Derrida, especially in his Lurianic treatment of (...) Angelus Silesius, whose modern mysticism emerges in Derrida’s reading as the ‘almost-atheism’. The interesting feature of this development is that, while for Scholem, the ‘void of God’ is a predominantly negative experience, for Derrida, it becomes an affirmative model of modern – not just Jewish, but more generally, Abrahamic – religiosity which, on the one hand, touches upon atheistic non-belief in the divine presence here and now, yet, on the other, still insists on commemorating the ‘withdrawn God’ through his ‘traces.’ What, therefore, for Scholem, constitutes the ultimate cry of despair, best embodied in Kafka’s work – for Derrida, reveals the more positive face of the modern predicament in which God has absented himself in order to make room for the creaturely reality. And while Scholem envisages redemption as the full restoration of the divine presence – Derrida redefines redemption as the ‘pious’ work of deconstruction to be undertaken in the ‘almost-atheistic’ condition of irreversible separation between God and the world. (shrink)

Esej ten kreśli nową strategię uniwersalizacji historii, która wyłania się z analizy żydowskiejpraktyki filozofowania w erze nowożytnej. Nazywam ją „strategią marańską”, budując analogięmiędzy sytuacją conversos, którzy zostali zmuszeni do przyjęcia chrześcijaństwa, przechowującprzy tym judaizm „utajony”, a filozoficzną interwencją nowoczesnych myślicieli żydowskich,którzy wkroczyli w idiom zachodniej filozofii, jednocześnie nasycając go motywami wywiedzionymiz ich „partykularnego” kontekstu: nie po to jednak, by podważyć perspektywęuniwersalistyczną, lecz po to, by ją przekształcić. Dla Waltera Benjamina i Jacques’a Derridywłaściwy uniwersalizm okazuje się równoznaczny z „zadaniem tłumacza”: projektem (...) sklejaniarozbitej całości od środka, horyzontalnie, przez wysiłek wielojęzyczności, czyli bez przyjmowaniawyniosłej pozycji ogólnego metajęzyka, który mógłby uzurpować pozycję hegemona. (shrink)

In my essay, I analyze Schelling’s and Rosenzweig’s commitment to the narrative philosophy as a unique method of telling a philosophical story. I want to understand what such “philosophical story” means and how it differs from the conceptual approach, here represented by Hegel. I also want to see how it connects with Schelling’s another project continued by Rosenzweig, of doing “positive philosophy”: in what way does positivity imply narrativity? Is this a necessary implication? And, last but not least, I want (...) to explore the theological dimension of the narrative project. I perceive Schelling’s, and then Rosenzweig’s goal as an attempt to oppose Hegel’s double manoeuvre of sublation – of temporal contingency and religion – by returning to the narrative which recovers the actuality of both elements and sees the necessary connection between them. The living experience of history is strictly linked to the religious stories telling the life of the “living God,” who is emphatically not the “God of the system.” Theosophy and its narrative way of creating a suspense and then inscribing it into a metaphysical drama which plays itself out on the arena of history reveals the deep connection between living historical temporality and religious imagery. (shrink)

This article proposes an exposition and analysis of perceptions intrinsic to rituals carried out with the use of the jurema plant, especially when mixed with Syrian rue (juremahuasca) in contexts of contemporary esoteric re-actualizations in Brazil. These rituals are conducted by people who look at jurema as a spiritual path, once acquainted with its psychedelic properties. We highlight the mystical attributes and the cultural bricolage elaborated by these individuals, who conduct ceremonies in ritual spaces in which participants experience altered states (...) of perception and consciousness. Considered as an entheogen, jurema leads to states of mystical transformation in people. Such personal changes are often considered by users as the rhetoric of healing. Life stories and ethnographic contexts form the background of the article, which seeks to advance understandings about jurema based on speculations around the intertwining of the themes of consciousness, mysticism, and healing. (shrink)

It is frequently claimed that we can learn very little, if anything, about the aesthetic character of an artwork on the basis of testimony. Such disparaging assessments of the epistemic value of aesthetic testimony contrast markedly with our acceptance of testimony as an important source of knowledge in many other areas. There have, however, been a number of challenges to this orthodoxy of late; from those who seek to deny that such a contrast exists as well as attempts by those (...) who accept the distinction to provide an explanation and defence of the contrast. In Section I, I outline a little of the nature and history of the debate over aesthetic testimony. Section II, focuses on the opposing positions on aesthetic testimony, optimism and pessimism, and takes steps to clarify what exactly is at issue between them. In Section III, I survey considerations which have been adduced in favour of pessimism ranging from brute appeal to intuition to complex argumentation before turning in Section IV, to look at motivations for optimism. Finally, in Section V, I consider some alternative views which claim that, for a variety of reasons, it is a mistake to construe the debate over aesthetic testimony as concerned with the epistemic standing of aesthetic beliefs formed on the basis of testimony. (shrink)

A Virtue Epistemology presents a new approach to some of the oldest and most gripping problems of philosophy, those of knowledge and scepticism. Ernest Sosa argues for two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective, each viewed as a distinctive human accomplishment. By adopting a kind of virtue epistemology in line with the tradition found in Aristotle, Aquinas, Reid, and especially Descartes, he presents an account of knowledge which can be used to shed light on different varieties of (...) scepticism, the nature and status of intuitions, and epistemic normativity. (shrink)

How do we form aesthetic judgements? And how should we do so? According to a very prominent tradition in aesthetics it would be wrong to form our aesthetic judgements about a particular object on the basis of anything other than first-hand acquaintance with the object itself (or some very close surrogate) and, in particular, it would be wrong to form such judgements merely on the basis of testimony. Further this tradition presupposes that our actual practice of forming aesthetic judgements typically (...) meets, or at least approximates, this ideal. In this paper I target this descriptive claim and argue—by appeal to some empirical work concerning belief polarization and echo chambers in aesthetics—that our actual practice of forming aesthetic judgements is heavily dependent on social sources such as testimony. I then briefly consider what normative implications this descriptive claim may have. (shrink)

This essay is an attempt to analyze an important decision Brzozowski took at the end of his life, i.e. his late turn towards Catholicism, which, despite his own objections, we should nonetheless call a religious conversion. The main reason why Brzozowski resisted the traditional rhetoric of conversion lies in his often repeated conviction that faith cannot invalidate life, because “what is not biographical, does not exist at all.” Brzozowski, therefore, rejects conversion understood as a radical and abrupt revolution of the (...) soul, which annuls everything that happened before, and turns to a model of religiosity (“Catholicism, undoubtedly”) which preserves his entire biographical past. In this manner, Brzozowski seeks his own formula of faith, more adequate to the “situation” of the modern man who lives in and through History. I argue that the model of “conversion without conversion” Brzozowski chose as representative of modern man is typically, though avant la lettre , post-secular: closer to the Jewish sources of past-oriented tschuva than to the mystical timelessness of traditionally Christian metanoia . The idea that redemption consists not in a liberation of a pure spirit but in a patient working-through of the universal history of creation is an implicit credo of the whole modern age, first fully articulated by Brzozowski and only later in the writings of Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, and Walter Benjamin. Brzozowski emerges as a relatively early precursor of the future post-secular option whose advocates, like the author of The Diary , will not allow themselves to “lose a single moment,” either of their lives or the world’s history. (shrink)

The first [age] is in the servitude of slavery, the second in the servitude of sons, the third in freedom. The first in fear, the second in faith, the third in love. The first is the status of bondsmen, the second of freemen, the third of friends.What a violent, all-consuming, impetuous love! It thinks only of itself, lacks interest in anything else, despises all, is satisfied with itself! It confuses stations, disregards manners, knows no bounds. Proprieties, reason, decency, prudence, judgment (...) are defeated and reduced to slavery.It may seem strange for someone who delivered the keynote at a conference of the Utopian Studies Society to critique utopia. Yet this is precisely what I am going to do: I will criticize... (shrink)

Ernest Sosa presents a new approach to the problems of knowledge and scepticism. He argues for two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective, each viewed as a distinctive human accomplishment. Sosa's virtue epistemology illuminates different varieties of scepticism, the nature and status of intuitions, and epistemic normativity.

Are the circumstances in which moral testimony serves as evidence that our judgement-forming processes are unreliable the same circumstances in which mundane testimony serves as evidence that our mundane judgement-forming processes are unreliable? In answering this question, we distinguish two possible roles for testimony: (i) providing a legitimate basis for a judgement, (ii) providing (‘higher-order’) evidence that a judgement-forming process is unreliable. We explore the possibilities for a view according to which moral testimony does not, in contrast to mundane testimony (...) play role (i), but can play role (ii). We argue that standard motivations for rejecting this hybrid position are unpersuasive but suggest that a more compelling reason might be found in considering the social nature of morality. (shrink)

Unusability pessimism has recently emerged as an appealing new option for pessimists about aesthetic testimony—those who deny the legitimacy of forming aesthetic beliefs on the basis of testimony. Unusability pessimists argue that we should reject the traditional pessimistic stance that knowledge of aesthetic matters is unavailable via testimony in favour of the view that while such knowledge is available to us, it is unusable. This unusability stems from the fact that accepting such testimony would violate an important non-epistemic norm of (...) belief formation. In this article I present an objection to unusability pessimism and argue that Robert Hopkins, the view's most prominent defender, fails to motivate adequately the claim that there are such non-epistemic belief norms. The cases which putatively legitimize usability norms can be explained by appeal to more familiar norm types: epistemic norms of belief formation, and non-epistemic norms which govern action other than belief formation. The intent of this article is not primarily negative, however, and I will also argue that understanding why the unusability position fails helps us to identify a promising new direction for the pessimist's opponents who wish to defend the legitimacy of forming aesthetic beliefs on the basis of testimony. (shrink)

What is the relationship between acquaintance and aesthetic judgement? Wollheim’s acquaintance principle (AP) is one answer. Amir Konigsberg—the most recent critic of AP—has produced a number of examples which he claims will require us to restrict AP even further than has previously been suggested. I argue that Konigsberg is mistaken and that his examples do not necessitate any further restrictions on AP. This failure, however, is not the result of some specific flaw in Konigsberg’s argument; rather it is an artefact (...) of a deeper problem at the heart of the current debate over AP (and its successors). I conclude by arguing that this problem—the absence of any satisfactory reformulation of AP itself—has far-reaching consequences for our theorizing in aesthetics. (shrink)

Different inferences in probabilistic logics of conditionals 'preserve' the probabilities of their premisses to different degrees. Some preserve certainty, some high probability, some positive probability, and some minimum probability. In the first case conclusions must have probability I when premisses have probability 1, though they might have probability 0 when their premisses have any lower probability. In the second case, roughly speaking, if premisses are highly probable though not certain then conclusions must also be highly probable. In the third case (...) conclusions must have positive probability when premisses do, and in the last case conclusions must be at least as probable as their least probable premisses. Precise definitions and well known examples are given for each of these properties, characteristic principles are shown to be valid and complete for deriving conclusions of each of these kinds, and simple trivalent truthtable 'tests' are described for determining which properties are possessed by any given inference. Brief comments are made on the application of these results to certain modal inferences such as "Jones may own a car, and if he does he will have a driver's license. Therefore, he may have a driver's license.". (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the growing block theory of time has rather surprising, and hitherto unexplored, explanatory benefits when it comes to certain enduring philosophical puzzles concerning death. In particular, I claim the growing block theorist has readily available and convincing answers to the following questions: Why is it an evil to be dead but not an evil to be not yet born? How can death be an evil for the dead if they no longer exist to suffer (...) it? When is death an evil for the one who dies? The ability to give such answers is a significant, but by no means decisive, advantage for the growing block view of time. (shrink)

In this paper I attempt a moral justification of protecting wild species, ecosystems, and landscapes, a justification not directly grounded in appeals to human benefit. I begin with a description of anthropocentric and ecosystemic approaches to the valuing of nature and offer some empirical arguments in support of the ecosystemic view. I suggest that human beings have a genetic need for natural environments, and that the direct experience of wild nature is an intrinsic good. Theoretical coherence and scope is another (...) advantage of the ecological perspective over the anthropocentric view. Turning to moral psychology, I argue that human beings have a fundamental need to care for things outside themselves and that this need is suitably met, and human life enriched, by a transcending concern for the well-being of natural species, habitats, and ecosystems . These considerations are joined with the ecological point of view to yield the conclusion that a self-transcending concern for the welfare of wild species and their habitats enriches the quality of moral life. Persons with genuine reverence and respect for wild creatures and their habitats will enjoy greater fulfilment in their own lives and be better neighbors toeach other. (shrink)

My own serious study of Max Scheler began in 1958 when I pre sented a Master's thesis to St. Louis University under the direction of Professor Vernon]. Bourke on Scheler's value-theory. Three years later when I returned to complete my doctorate work at St. Louis University I returned also to the study of Max Scheler. In the meantime, several more volumes of the Gesammelte Werke had appeared, several new translations of Scheler were published and the whole area ofphenome nology began (...) to be more favorably accepted by the American intel lectual community. My doctoral dissertation was on Scheler's theory of community under the expert and careful direction of Professor James Collins. The bulk of the present work is a direct result of my work at St. Louis University. I have never regretted the time and effort spent on the study of Scheler. He can be classified as nothing short of a genius, not only in the breadth of his interests but also in the vitality, unity and depth of his thought. Most students of Scheler criticize his lack of unity; I claim to find strong lines of inner consistency throughout his writings. In the second place, my study of Scheler has put me into contact with many of the most dominant intellectual influences of the day. (shrink)

You're not as clever as you think you are. Nor for that matter are you as good a driver, teacher or romantic partner as you take yourself to be and, as if that wasn't bad enough, you are also considerably less popular than you have hitherto believed. Finally – and crucially for the argument of this paper – I contend that your abilities as an aesthetic judge are considerably less impressive than you take them to be. To avoid descending into (...) name calling it's worth pointing out that such claims apply to the vast majority of people – myself, somewhat paradoxically, included. (shrink)

The second part of the book presents an alternative beyond the historical positions of Part I, one that defends a virtue epistemology combined with epistemic ...

Ernest Sosa's A Virtue Epistemology, Vol. I is arguably the single-most important monograph to be published in analytic epistemology in the last ten years. Sosa, the first in the field to employ the notion of intellectual virtue – in his ground-breaking ‘The Raft and the Pyramid’– is the leading proponent of reliabilist versions of virtue epistemology. In A Virtue Epistemology, he deftly defends an externalist account of animal knowledge as apt belief, argues for a distinction between animal and reflective (...) knowledge, contends that rational intuition is an intellectual virtue ; and offers responses to dream scepticism, the problem of the criterion and the value problem. Nearly all of these arguments are new, albeit consistent with Sosa's earlier work; that is, consistent with two notable exceptions. First, c ontra Sosa's ‘Replies’ in Ernest Sosa and His Critics, A Virtue Epistemology explicitly contends that safety is not required for animal knowledge. Second, unlike Sosa's Knowledge in Perspective, which arguably construes the intellectual virtues as merely instrumentally valuable, A Virtue Epistemology explicitly contends that the intellectual virtues are instrumentally and constitutively valuable. Best read in conjunction with the above monographs and Epistemic Justification, A Virtue Epistemology is mandatory reading for epistemologists and graduate students in the field. It will rightly set the standard for debates in analytic epistemology for years to come.I will summarize and raise objections to two key conclusions that are unique to A Virtue Epistemology: the ‘kaleidoscope-perceiver’ has animal knowledge but lacks reflective knowledge; unlike the k-perceiver, the ordinary perceiver has reflective knowledge. My objections …. (shrink)

Background The European Union aims to optimize patient protection and efficiency of health-care research by harmonizing procedures across Member States. Nonetheless, further improvements are required to increase multicenter research efficiency. We investigated IRB procedures in a large prospective European multicenter study on traumatic brain injury, aiming to inform and stimulate initiatives to improve efficiency. Methods We reviewed relevant documents regarding IRB submission and IRB approval from European neurotrauma centers participating in the Collaborative European NeuroTrauma Effectiveness Research in Traumatic Brain Injury. (...) Documents included detailed information on IRB procedures and the duration from IRB submission until approval. They were translated and analyzed to determine the level of harmonization of IRB procedures within Europe. Results From 18 countries, 66 centers provided the requested documents. The primary IRB review was conducted centrally or locally and primary IRB approval was obtained after one, two or three review rounds with a median duration of respectively 50 and 98 days until primary IRB approval. Additional IRB approval was required in 55% of countries and could increase duration to 535 days. Total duration from submission until required IRB approval was obtained was 114 days and appeared to be shorter after submission to local IRBs compared to central IRBs. Conclusion We found variation in IRB procedures between and within European countries. There were differences in submission and approval requirements, number of review rounds and total duration. Research collaborations could benefit from the implementation of more uniform legislation and regulation while acknowledging local cultural habits and moral values between countries. (shrink)

In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.

I suppose that 'ravens are black' is an inexact generalization having a degree of truth measured by the proportion of ravens that are black, and a probability measured by its expected degree of truth in different 'possible worlds.' Given this, 'ravens are black' differs in truth, probability, and confirmation from 'non-black things are not ravens', and this suggests a new approach to Hempel's Paradox as well as to other aspects of confirmation. Basic concepts of a formal theory developing this approach (...) are described, and some of its fundamental laws are given, together with sketches of applications. (shrink)

RESUMO No Curso de Inverno de 1928/29, Heidegger afirmou que a matematização irrestrita no conhecimento dos seres vivos resultaria numa falha no propósito de elaborar a ontologia da vida orgânica. No presente artigo, examino as razões que justificam essa concepção. Com base em interpretações das investigações de biólogos como Hans Driesch J. v. Uexküll e Hans Spemann, o argumento de Heidegger integra quatro passos: 1) uma abordagem mereológica do corpo orgânico, concebido como uma unidade funcional de aptidões e intrinsecamente relacionado (...) a um ambiente; 2) uma análise formal da constituição dinâmica das aptidões, cuja estrutura pulsional consiste no atravessamento regulatório de uma dimensão; 3) uma interpretação do princípio de unificação das aptidões em termos da aptidão para comportar-se com algo em um ambiente. Esta argumentação leva a duas conclusões gerais: a matematização irrestrita implica uma descrição mecânica que supõe a desconsideração da determinação modal dos organismos; a estrutura dimensional, regulatória e protointencional das aptidões orgânicas é o fator limitante da matematização da vida. ABSTRACT In the Winter Course of 1928/29, Heidegger declared that an unrestricted mathematical determination in the knowledge of living beings would imply a failure in the purpose of developing the ontology for organic life. In this paper, I examine the reasons that justify this idea. Based on interpretations of biological researches carried by Hans Driesch, J. v. Uexküll and Hans Spemann, Heidegger’s argument has three steps 1) a mereological account of the organic body, which is conceived both as a functional unity of capabilities and as intrinsically related to an environment; 2) a formal analysis of the dynamic constitution of capabilities, which instinctually driven structure is a regulatory traversing of a dimension; 3) an interpretation of the unification principle of capabilities, which is conceived as a capability of behaving towards something within an environment. This argument entails two general conclusions: first, the unrestricted mathematical determination implies a mechanical description that presupposes the neglect of the modal structure of organisms; second, the dimensional, regulatory and proto-intentional structure of the organic capabilities is the limiting factor of the mathematical determination of living organisms. (shrink)