A Virtue Epistemology

Philosophical Studies 143 (3):427-440 (2009)
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Abstract

In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.

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Ernest Sosa
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.
Fake Barns and false dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):369-389.
Skill.Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):713-726.
Modal Virtue Epistemology.Bob Beddor & Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):61-79.
The legend of the justified true belief analysis.Julien Dutant - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145.

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