Purpose: So far, the work of Josef Mitterer has not been widely recognized in philosophy of education, even though it offers many points of contact not only for epistemological and methodological questions but also for empirical and educational issues. Among these points of contact there is an outstanding sentence (see motto), which can be taken as a starting point for conceptual considerations in philosophy of education. The article takes this sentence as a hub for some corresponding investigations. Method: The article (...) seeks to make progress in these investigations through reflecting on Mitterer's sentence in ten steps, beginning with translational aspects and ending with questions of power relations and inconsistency. The arguments are made through (a) reference to concepts that are currently being discussed in philosophy of education and constructivist discourses, (b) through contrasting various conceptualizations, and (c) through discussion of selected examples. Findings: The article proposes a translation of Mitterer's sentence that may be from Mitterer. It points out several similarities with and differences to positions related to (presumed) positions of Mitterer. Furthermore, it shows innovative options for argumentations in educational philosophy on that basis. Benefits: The contribution sounds out some interfaces between Mitterer's philosophy and current debates in philosophy of education. It contributes to differentiated understandings of Mitterer's sentence and it opens up a new field of discourse. (shrink)

Context: It is beyond doubt that RC has received a great deal of attention in educational studies and learning theory. But overall, the current situation seems to be rather ambivalent in view of the blurring of the various strands in constructivist discourses and the different ways of distinguishing and foregrounding constructivist positions. Correspondingly, there is a wide range of claims, from the claim that (radical) constructivism represents a mainstream endeavor to attributions of its being outdated, self-refuting or irrelevant. Purpose: The (...) paper seeks to sound out the ambivalent situation of (radical) constructivism between “all” and “nothing” by examples of attributions of meaning to constructivist positions in academic everyday life and by challenging both prevalent criticisms of systemic-constructivist pedagogy and widespread broad classifications in learning theory. Method: The article critically reflects on (1) one-sentence “destructions” of constructivist positions, (2) Pongratz’s criticism of systemic-constructivist pedagogy, and (3) the threefold classification of the world of learning, i.e., behaviorism, cognitivism, and constructivism. Results: Both the current criticism of constructivism as a mainstream endeavor and evolutionary suggestions provided by the threefold classification are criticized. Although some constructivist concepts and distinctions are widely accepted today, often these achievements are not recognized as being rooted in constructivist discourses. Implications: As far as mainstreaming constructivism might be related to power politics, selling the “real thing,” and joining the ranks of truth-oriented Isms, it would not appear to be a desirable endeavor for those who rely on viability, circular foundations, relativist philosophy, and relationalist approaches. Nevertheless, clarifications of power relations and the interplay between constructivist analyses of politics and the politics of constructivism might contribute to overcoming the diffuse popularity of constructivist thought towards a better understanding of constructivist contributions to solution oriented, meaningful ways of dealing with urgent problems. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Constructing Constructivism” by Hugh Gash. Upshot: Hugh Gash’s paper on constructing constructivism is inspiring, insightful, and important in many respects. However, and for that reason, I want to reflect on some critical aspects in terms of metaphorical uses of expressions and ongoing processes of medialization and digitization. Lastly, I am going to point out critical potentials of constructivist thinking as related to education.

Open peer commentary on the article “Amusement, Delight, and Whimsy: Humor Has Its Reasons that Reason Cannot Ignore” by Edith K. Ackermann. Upshot: Ackermann’s target article strikes a chord by thinking together oblique and rational aspects of knowing in constructivism. Her target article points out uses of humor and various ways of making sense of our experience that have been underestimated in constructivist discourse. While I can agree on the main lines of her argument, I want to argue for further (...) differentiation and clarification with respect to some historic and systematic aspects. (shrink)

Excerpt: There is the difficulty in allowing for personal items when focussing on academic interests and in allowing for rational aspects when focussing on personal items for someone who has had the chance to get to know Ernst personally. At least for me the search for apposite words in English is not easy in view of the successful interplay between his philosophical ideas, his handling of everyday problems of life and his ability to cope with difficult situations. But let's give (...) it a try and look back at one of the most striking experiences we have had together. (shrink)

As a way of dealing with the semantical paradoxes Quine has suggested: that semantical expressions such as ‘true’ and ‘true of’ be used with numerical subscripts; that when a truth locution T is applied to a sentence S, the subscript on T is greater than any within S; otherwise, the result of applying T to S is ill formed. A problem is that this introduces infinitely many semantical primitives. The paper suggests a way around the problem. The paper raises a (...) further problem, leaving it open whether this further problem has a satisfactory solution. (shrink)

I claim that the significance of comic works to influence our attitudes is limited by the conditions under which we find things funny. I argue that we can only find something funny if we regard it as norm-violating in a way that doesn’t make certain cognitive or pragmatic demands upon us. It is compatible with these conditions that humour reinforces our attitude that something is norm-violating. However, it is not compatible with these conditions that, on the basis of finding it (...) funny, we come to reject some existing attitude. Such a rejection would require that we recognize our attitude as norm-violating in a way that has pragmatic force. Thus if a humorous work reveals the absurdity of something, we can either find it funny and not have our attitudes significantly influenced, or else be significantly influenced but not find it funny. (shrink)

What counts as human rationality: reasoning processes that embody content-independent formal theories, such as propositional logic, or reasoning processes that are well designed for solving important adaptive problems? Most theories of human reasoning have been based on content-independent formal rationality, whereas adaptive reasoning, ecological or evolutionary, has been little explored. We elaborate and test an evolutionary approach, Cosmides' social contract theory, using the Wason selection task. In the first part, we disentangle the theoretical concept of a “social contract” from that (...) of a “cheater-detection algorithm”. We demonstrate that the fact that a rule is perceived as a social contract — or a conditional permission or obligation, as Cheng and Holyoak proposed — is not sufficient to elicit Cosmides' striking results, which we replicated. The crucial issue is not semantic, but pragmatic: whether a person is cued into the perspective of a party who can be cheated. In the second part, we distinguish between social contracts with bilateral and unilateral cheating options. Perspective change in contracts with bilateral cheating options turns P & not-Q responses into not-P & Q responses. The results strongly support social contract theory, contradict availability theory, and cannot be accounted for by pragmatic reasoning schema theory, which lacks the pragmatic concepts of perspectives and cheating detection. (shrink)

The idea underlying the Begriffsschrift account of identities was that the content of a sentence is a function of the things it is about. If so, then if an identity a=b is about the content of its contained terms and is true, then a=a and a=b have the same content. But they do not have the same content; so, Frege concluded, identities are not about the contents of their contained terms. The way Frege regarded the matter is that in an (...) identity the terms flanking the symbol for identity do not have their ordinary contents, but instead have themselves as their contents. In ?Uber Sinn und Bedeutung? Frege became convinced that if an identity a=bis about the signs aand b, then it expresses no proper knowledge. So, since it is evident that many such identities do express proper knowledge, Frege concluded that identities are not about their contained signs. So he became convinced that his Begriffsschrift account was incorrect. What was the error in the argument that led Frege to that account? It was thinking that the content of a sentence is a function of the contents of its constituent signs, that is, the things it is about. (shrink)

We here establish two theorems which refute a pair of what we believe to be plausible assumptions about differences between objectual and substitutional quantification. The assumptions (roughly stated) are as follows: (1) there is at least one set d and denumerable first order language L such that d is the domain set of no interpretation of L in which objectual and substitutional quantification coincide. (2) There exist interpreted, denumerable, first order languages K with indenumerable domains such that substitutional quantification deviates (...) from objectual quantification in K and this deviance remains for all name extensions I of K. We show these assumptions have actually been made, and then prove the refuting theorems. (shrink)

It may be that all that matters for the modalities, possibility and necessity, is the object named by the proper name, not which proper name names it. An influential defender of this view is Saul Kripke. Kripke’s defense is criticized in the paper.

Here we give a semantical account of propositional quantification that is intended to formally represent Russell’s view that one cannot express a proposition about "all" propositions. According to the account the authors give, Russell’s view bears an interesting relation to the view that there are no sets which are members of themselves.

A common assumption among philosophers is that every language has at most denumerably many expressions. This assumption plays a prominent role in many philosophical arguments. Recently formal systems with indenumerably many elements have been developed. These systems are similar to the more familiar denumerable first-order languages. This similarity makes it appear that the assumption is false. We argue that the assumption is true.

An account of the logic of bivalent languages with truth-value gaps is given. This account is keyed to the use of tables introduced by S. C. Kleene. The account has two guiding ideas. First, that the bivalence property insures that the language satisfies classical logic. Second, that the general concepts of a valid sentence and an inconsistent sentence are, respectively, as sentences which are not false in any model and sentences which are not true in any model. What recommends this (...) approach is (1) its relative simplicity, and (2) the fact that it leaves the fundamental features of classical logic intact. (shrink)

Anderson and Belnap devise a model theory for entailment on which propositional identity equals proposional coentailment. This feature can be reasonably questioned. The authors devise two extensions of Anderson and Belnap’s model theory. Both systems preserve Anderson and Belnap’s results for entailment, but distinguish coentailment from identity.

The standard response is illustrated by E, J. Lemmon's claim that if all objects in a given universe had names and there were only finitely many of them, then we could always replace a universal proposition about that universe by a complex proposition. It is because these two requirements are not always met that we need universal quantification. This paper is partly in agreement with Lemmon and partly in disagreement. From the point of view of syntax and semantics we can (...) replace a universal proposition about any universe (finite or infinite, countable or uncountable) by a complex proposition (= sentence built up from atomic sentences and the connectives). But from the point of view of communication such a replacement is not possible if the universe is infinite. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a nondenotational semantics for first-order languages which will match one for one each distribution of truth-values available in terms of a denotational semantics.

A doctrine that occurs intermittently in Quine’s work is that there is no extra-theoretic truth. This paper explores this doctrine, and argues that on its best interpretation it is inconsistent with three views Quine also accepts: bivalence, mathematical Platonism, and the disquotational account of truth.

A strong and weak version of the redundancy theory of truth are distinguished. An argument put forth by Michael Dummett concludes that the weak version is vitiated by truth-value gaps. The weak version is defended against this argument. The strong version, however, is vitiated by truth-value gaps.

We contribute to the empirical debate on whether we understand and predict mental states by using simulation (simulation theory) or by relying on a folk psychological theory (theory theory). To decide between these two fundamental positions, it has been argued that failure to predict other people’s choices would be challenging evidence against the simulation view. We test the specific claim that people prefer the rightmost position in choosing among equally valued objects, and whether or not this position bias can be (...) correctly predicted. A series of experiments shows that the bias appears only in a specific spatial arrangement and that it can be correctly predicted given adequate imaginative input. In concert with other recent findings on the correct prediction of choices these findings do actually strengthen, rather than challenge, the simulation account on the prediction of mental states. (shrink)

Despite the recognized importance of bodily movements in spatial audition, few studies have integrated action-based protocols with spatial hearing in the peripersonal space. Recent work shows that tactile feedback and active exploration allow participants to improve performance in auditory distance perception tasks. However, the role of the different aspects involved in the learning phase, such as voluntary control of movement, proprioceptive cues, and the possibility of self-correcting errors, is still unclear. We study the effect of guided reaching exploration on perceptual (...) learning of auditory distance in peripersonal space. We implemented a pretest-posttest experimental design in which blindfolded participants must reach for a sound source located in this region. They were divided into three groups that were differentiated by the intermediate training phase: Guided, an experimenter guides the participant’s arm to contact the sound source; Active, the participant freely explores the space until contacting the source; and Control, without tactile feedback. The effects of exploration feedback on auditory distance perception in the peripersonal space are heterogeneous. Both the Guided and Active groups change their performance. However, participants in the Guided group tended to overestimate distances more than those in the Active group. The response error of the Guided group corresponds to a generalized calibration criterion over the entire range of reachable distances. Whereas the Active group made different adjustments for proximal and distal positions. The results suggest that guided exploration can induce changes on the boundary of the auditory reachable space. We postulate that aspects of agency such as initiation, control, and monitoring of movement, assume different degrees of involvement in both guided and active tasks, reinforcing a non-binary approach to the question of activity-passivity in perceptual learning and supporting a complex view of the phenomena involved in action-based learning. (shrink)

BackgroundFrontal brain dysfunction is a major challenge in neurorehabilitation. Neurofeedback (NF), as an EEG-based brain training method, is currently applied in a wide spectrum of mental health conditions, including traumatic brain injury.ObjectiveThis study aimed to explore the capacity of Infra-Low Frequency Neurofeedback (ILF-NF) to promote the recovery of brain function in patients with frontal brain injury.Materials and methodsTwenty patients hospitalized at a neurorehabilitation clinic in Switzerland with recently acquired, frontal and optionally other brain lesions were randomized to either receive NF (...) or sham-NF. Cognitive improvement was assessed using the Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB) and the Test of Attentional Performance (TAP) tasks regarding intrinsic alertness, phasic alertness and impulse control.ResultsWith respect to cognitive improvements, there was no significant difference between the two groups after 20 sessions of either NF or sham-NF. However, in a subgroup of patients with predominantly frontal brain lesions, the improvements measured by the FAB and intrinsic alertness were significantly higher in the NF-group.ConclusionThis is the first double-blind controlled study using NF in recovery from brain injury, and thus also the first such study of ILF NF. Although the result of the subgroup has limited significance because of the small number of participants, it accentuates the trend seen in the whole group regarding the FAB and intrinsic alertness (p = 0.068, p = 0.079, respectively). We therefore conclude that NF could be a promising candidate promoting the recoveryfrom frontal brain lesions. Further studies with larger numbers of patients and less lesion heterogeneity are needed to verify the usefulness of NF in the neurorehabilitation of patients with frontal brain injury (NCT02957695 ClinicalTrials.gov). (shrink)

This book is open access, which means that you have free and unlimited access. This book analyses and discusses the recent developments for assessing research quality in the humanities and related fields in the social sciences. Research assessments in the humanities are highly controversial and the evaluation of humanities research is delicate. While citation-based research performance indicators are widely used in the natural and life sciences, quantitative measures for research performance meet strong opposition in the humanities. This volume combines the (...) presentation of state-of-the-art projects on research assessments in the humanities by humanities scholars themselves with a description of the evaluation of humanities research in practice presented by research funders. Bibliometric issues concerning humanities research complete the exhaustive analysis of humanities research assessment. The selection of authors is well-balanced between humanities scholars, research funders, and researchers on higher education. Hence, the edited volume succeeds in painting a comprehensive picture of research evaluation in the humanities. This book is valuable to university and science policy makers, university administrators, research evaluators, bibliometricians as well as humanities scholars who seek expert knowledge in research evaluation in the humanities. (shrink)

This book says Prior claims: (1) that a sentence never names; (2) what a sentence says cannot be otherwise signified; and (3) that a sentence says what it says whatever the type of its occurrence; (4) and that quantifications binding sentential variables are neither eliminable, substitutional, nor referential. The book develops and defends (1)-(3). It also defends (4) against the sorts of strictures on quantification of such philosophers as Quine and Davidson.

The purpose of this paper is to uncover and correct several confusions about expressions, tokens and the relations between them that crop up in even highly sophisticated writing about language and logic.

We give a semantical account of propositional identity which is stronger than mutual entailment. That is, according to our account: (1) if A = B is true in a model, so are A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A. (2) There exist models m such that A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A are true in m but A = B is not true in m. According to our account the following rule is sound: (3) from (.. A..) = (.. (...) B..) infer A = B. The paper respondes to a criticism of an earlier paper by James Freeman . (shrink)

Conversational implicatures are easy to grasp for the most part. But it is another matter to give a rational reconstruction of how they are grasped. We argue that Grice's attempt to do this fails. We distinguish two sorts of cases: (1) those in which we grasp the implicature by asking ourselves what would the speaker have to believe given that what he said is such as is required by the talk exchange; (2) those in which we grasp the implicature by (...) asking ourselves why it is that what the speaker said is so obviously not such as is required by the talk exchange. We argue that Grice's account does not fit those cases falling under (2). (shrink)

A Greek English Lexicon of the New Testament, being Grimm's Wilke's Clavis Novi Testamenti. Translated, Revised and Enlarged by Joseph Henry Thayer, D.D., Bussey Professor of New Testament Criticism and Interpretation in the Divinity School of Harvard University. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 1886. 4to. pp. 726. 36s.Biblico Theological Lexicon to New Testament Greek. by Hermann Cremer, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Greifswald. Third English Edition. With Supplement. Translated from the latest German Edition by William Uewick, M.A. (...) Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 1886. 4to. pp. 943. 38s. (shrink)

The significance of the semantical paradoxes for natural languages is examined. If Tarski’s reflections on the issue are correct, English is inconsistent. Paul Ziff responds to Tarskian reflections by arguing to the conclusion that no natural language is or can be inconsistent. The authors reject Ziff’s argument, but they defend something similar to its conclusion: no language, natural or otherwise, is or can be inconsistent in the way that Tarski holds languages capable of formulating the Epimenides are inconsistent.

In Tractatus, Wittgenstein held that there are null sentences – prominently including logical truths and the truths of mathematics. He says that such sentences are without sense (sinnlos), that they say nothing; he also denies that they are nonsensical (unsinning). Surely it is what a sentence says which is true or false. So if a sentence says nothing, how can it be true or false? The paper discusses the issue.

For Rudolf Carnap the question ‘Do numbers exist?’ does not have just one sense. Asked from within mathematics, it has a trivial answer that could not possibly divide philosophers of mathematics. Asked from outside of mathematics, it lacks meaning. This paper discusses Carnap ’s distinction and defends much of what he has to say.