Redundant truth

&
Ratio 5 (1):24-37 (1992)
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Abstract

A strong and weak version of the redundancy theory of truth are distinguished. An argument put forth by Michael Dummett concludes that the weak version is vitiated by truth-value gaps. The weak version is defended against this argument. The strong version, however, is vitiated by truth-value gaps.

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2006

DOI

10.1111/j.1467-9329.1992.tb00132.x

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Author Profiles

Philip Hugly
University of California, Berkeley (PhD)
Charles Sayward
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

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