Quine's relativism

Ratio 3 (2):142-149 (1990)
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Abstract

A doctrine that occurs intermittently in Quine’s work is that there is no extra-theoretic truth. This paper explores this doctrine, and argues that on its best interpretation it is inconsistent with three views Quine also accepts: bivalence, mathematical Platonism, and the disquotational account of truth.

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Author Profiles

Charles Sayward
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Philip Hugly
University of California, Berkeley (PhD)

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