Assume that the class of partial automorphisms of the monster model of a complete theory has the amalgamation property. The beautiful automorphisms are the automorphisms of models ofT which: 1. are strong, i.e. leave the algebraic closure (inT eq) of the empty set pointwise fixed, 2. are obtained by the Fraïsse construction using the amalgamation property that we have just mentioned. We show that all the beautiful automorphisms have the same theory (in the language ofT plus one unary function symbol (...) for the automorphism), and we study this theory. In particular, we examine the question of the saturation of the beautiful automorphisms. We also prove that in some cases (in particular if the theory is ω-stable andG-trivial), almost all (in the sense of Baire categoricity) automorphisms of the saturated countable model are beautiful and conjugate. (shrink)

We give a characterisation of forking in the context of simple theories in terms of the fundamental order.

We associate with every first order structure [Formula: see text] a family of invariant, locally Noetherian topologies. The structure is almost determined by the topologies, and properties of the structure are reflected by topological properties. We study these topologies in particular for stable structures. In nice cases, we get a behaviour similar to the Zariski topology in algebraically closed fields.

Let M be a countable saturated structure, and assume that D(ν) is a strongly minimal formula (without parameter) such that M is the algebraic closure of D(M). We will prove the two following theorems: Theorem 1. If G is a subgroup of $\operatorname{Aut}(\mathfrak{M})$ of countable index, there exists a finite set A in M such that every A-strong automorphism is in G. Theorem 2. Assume that G is a normal subgroup of $\operatorname{Aut}(\mathfrak{M})$ containing an element g such that for all (...) n there exists $X \subseteq D(\mathfrak{M})$ such that $\operatorname{Dim}(g(X)/X) > n$. Then every strong automorphism is in G. (shrink)

The 1996 European Summer Meeting of the Association of Symbolic Logic was held held the University of the Basque Country, at Donostia (San Se bastian) Spain, on July 9-15, 1996. It was organised by the Institute for Logic, Cognition, Language and Information (ILCLI) and the Department of Logic and Philosophy of Sciences of the University of the Basque Coun try. It was supported by: the University of Pais Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unib ertsitatea, the Ministerio de Education y Ciencia (DGCYT), Hezkuntza Saila (...) (Eusko Jaurlaritza), Gipuzkoako Foru Aldundia, and Kuxta Fun dazioa. The main topics of the meeting were Model Theory, Proof Theory, Re cursion and Complexity Theory, Models of Arithmetic, Logic for Artifi cial Intelligence, Formal Semantics of Natural Language and Philosophy of Contemporary Logic. The Program Committee consisted of K. Ambos Spies (Heidelberg), J.L. Balcazar (Barcelona), J.E. Fenstad (Oslo), D. Israel (Stanford), H. Kamp (Stuttgart), R. Kaye (Birmingham), J.M. Larrazabal (San Sebastian), D. Lascar (Paris, chairman), A. Marcja (Firenze), G. Mints (Stanford), M. Otero (Madrid), S. Ronchi della Rocca (Torino), K. Segerberg (Uppsala) and L. Vega (Madrid). The organizing Committee consisted of X. Arrazola (San Sebastian), A. Arrieta (San Sebastian), R. Beneyeto (Valencia), B. Carrascal (San Se bastian), K. Korta (San Sebastian), J.M. Larrazabal (San Sebastian, chair man), J.C. Martinez (Barcelona), J.M. Mendez (Salamanca), F. Migura (Victoria) and J. Perez (Victoria). (shrink)

We prove that has no proper superstable expansions of finite Lascar rank. Nevertheless, this structure equipped with a predicate defining powers of a given natural number is superstable of Lascar rank ω. Additionally, our methods yield other superstable expansions such as equipped with the set of factorial elements.

It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief 's aim explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief 's aim using the notion of truth. In this article, by considering whether they can account for belief 's standard of correctness and the epistemic (...) norms governing belief, I argue against certain prominent specifications of belief 's aim given in terms of truth, and advance a neglected alternative. (shrink)

The _Physics_ is a foundational work of western philosophy, and the crucial one for understanding Aristotle's views on matter, form, essence, causation, movement, space, and time. This richly annotated, scrupulously accurate, and consistent translation makes it available to a contemporary English reader as no other does—in part because it fits together seamlessly with other closely associated works in the New Hackett Aristotle series, such as the _Metaphysics_, _De Anima_, and forthcoming _De Caelo_ and _On Coming to Be and Passing Away_. (...) Eventually the series will include all of Aristotle's works. Sequentially numbered endnotes provide the information most needed at each juncture, while a detailed Index of Terms indicates places where focused discussion of key notions occurs. An illuminating general Introduction describes the book that lies ahead, explaining what sort of work it is and what sorts of evidence it relies on. (shrink)

In the international bestseller, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman, the renowned psychologist and winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, takes us on a groundbreaking tour of the mind and explains the two systems that drive the way we think. System 1 is fast, intuitive, and emotional; System 2 is slower, more deliberative, and more logical. The impact of overconfidence on corporate strategies, the difficulties of predicting what will make us happy in the future, the profound effect of (...) cognitive biases on everything from playing the stock market to planning our next vacation—each of these can be understood only by knowing how the two systems shape our judgments and decisions. -/- Engaging the reader in a lively conversation about how we think, Kahneman reveals where we can and cannot trust our intuitions and how we can tap into the benefits of slow thinking. He offers practical and enlightening insights into how choices are made in both our business and our personal lives—and how we can use different techniques to guard against the mental glitches that often get us into trouble. Winner of the National Academy of Sciences Best Book Award and the Los Angeles Times Book Prize and selected by The New York Times Book Review as one of the ten best books of 2011, Thinking, Fast and Slow is destined to be a classic. (shrink)

El artículo intenta establecer un paralelo entre el concepto de la máscara carnavalesca concebida por Mijaíl Bajtín en Rabelais y su mundo, y también en otros escritos, y la máscara del teatro Grotesco criollo en Buenos Aires, en las primeras décadas del siglo XX. El artículo comienza por definir semejanzas y diferencias en el uso de estas dos máscaras. En el caso medieval, la máscara es utilizada como herramienta de ecualización y de catarsis social y en el caso del grotesco (...) criollo, la máscara es articulada como una herramienta de conformación y adaptación social. Es así como las funciones prácticas y estéticas de ambas máscaras, aunque son complementarias en términos de sus ingredientes, son opuestas en cuanto a su implementación y valencia comunitaria. La máscara del carnaval es una máscara que intenta romper de forma momentánea el orden establecido para poder mantenerlo en el largo plazo. En cambio, la máscara grotesca es una máscara que opera desde adentro del individuo y la familia, obligándolo a estabilizar costumbres, valores o expectativas nacionales, en la comunidad inmigrante -extranjera y campesina avecindada en la periferia de Buenos Aires-, con el objeto de autoasegurar su subsistencia física, a contramano de la sanidad emocional y social creada por esta acción en estos sujetos marginales desplazados. This article attempts to establish a parallel between Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of carnival’s mask in Rabelais and His World and other writings, and the mask in Grotesco Criollo Theater in Buenos Aires, during the first decades of the twentieth century. The article begins by defining similarities and differences in the use of these two masks. In the medieval case, the mask is used as a tool of equalization and social catharsis, and in the Grotesco Criollo, the mask is articulated as a shaping tool for conformity and social adaptation. Thus, the practical and aesthetic functions of both masks, though complementary in terms of their ingredients, are opposites in their implementation and community values. The carnival mask is a mask trying to break the established order momentarily, simply to keep it in the end. Instead, the grotesque mask is a mask that operates from within the individual and the family forcing him/ her to stabilize national customs, values, expectations for the suburban immigrant community displaced to Buenos Aires’ periphery to self-ensure their physical survival. However, such insurance often comes at the cost of emotional and social wellbeing of these displaced marginal subjects. (shrink)

Sometimes, learning about the origins of a belief can make it irrational to continue to hold that belief—a phenomenon we call ‘genealogical defeat’. According to explanationist accounts, genealogical defeat occurs when one learns that there is no appropriate explanatory connection between one’s belief and the truth. Flatfooted versions of explanationism have been widely and rightly rejected on the grounds that they would disallow beliefs about the future and other inductively-formed beliefs. After motivating the need for some explanationist account, we raise (...) some problems for recent versions of explanationism. Learning from their failures, we then produce and defend a more resilient explanationism. (shrink)

Examines the lived experience of social encounters drawing on phenomenological insights.

Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can be transferred (...) to an accidentally true belief; if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then it can be warranted and accidentally true. We argue that each of these is either false or no more plausible than its denial. Along the way, we offer a solution to the Gettier Problem that is compatible with fallibilism. (shrink)

Supererogatory acts—good deeds “beyond the call of duty”—are a part of moral common sense, but conceptually puzzling. I propose a unified solution to three of the most infamous puzzles: the classic Paradox of Supererogation (if it’s so good, why isn’t it just obligatory?), Horton’s All or Nothing Problem, and Kamm’s Intransitivity Paradox. I conclude that supererogation makes sense if, and only if, the grounds of rightness are multi-dimensional and comparative.

In Lukács: Praxis and the Absolute, Daniel Andrés López reassembles Lukács’s philosophy of praxis on a Hegelian basis, as a conceptual-historical totality, both defending him and proposing an unprecedented, immanent critique that raises problems for Marxian philosophy as a whole.

" Qualia " is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the (...) moment. The way the milk tastes to you then is another, gustatory quale, and how it sounds to you as you swallow is an auditory quale; These various "properties of conscious experience" are prime examples of qualia. Nothing, it seems, could you know more intimately than your own qualia ; let the entire universe be some vast illusion, some mere figment of Descartes' evil demon, and yet what the figment is made of will be the qualia of your hallucinatory experiences. Descartes claimed to doubt everything that could be doubted, but he never doubted that his conscious experiences had qualia, the properties by which he knew or apprehended them. (shrink)

The social sciences playa variety of multifaceted roles in the policymaking process. So varied are these roles, indeed, that it is futile to talk in the singular about the use of social science in policymaking, as if there were one constant relationship between two fixed and stable entities. Instead, to address this issue sensibly one must talk in the plural about uses of dif ferent modes of social scientific inquiry for different kinds of policies under various circumstances. In some cases, (...) the influence of social scientific research is direct and tangible, and the connection between the find ings and the policy is easy to see. In other cases, perhaps most, its influence is indirect-one small piece in a larger mosaic of politics, bargaining, and compromise. Occasionally the findings of social scientific studies are explicitly drawn upon by policymakers in the formation, implementation, or evaluation of particular policies. More often, the categories and theoretical models of social science provide a general background orientation within which policymakers concep tualize problems and frame policy options. At times, the in fluence of social scientific work is cognitive and informational in nature; in other instances, policymakers use social science primarily for symbolic and political purposes in order to le gitimate preestablished goals and strategies. Nonetheless, amid this diversity and variety, troubling general questions persistently arise. (shrink)