The new phenomenological and aesthetic paradigm of atmospheres, conceived as feelings spread out in the external space and not as private moods, is tested here from different points of view and different disciplines in the context of a full valorization of the so-called "affective turn" in Humanities.

This paper aims to offer an innovative reading of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein by reflecting on the cultural horizon that influenced the composition of the novel, namely the Naturphilosophie of the Romantic period, characterized by the interpenetration of matter and spirit, visible and invisible. Its major development occurred in German aesthetics of the 18th century, where the union of sensibility and imagination was harmonically realized through a special fusion of philosophy and literature. Thanks to this encounter, philosophy regained its link with (...) the universal and literature became capable of “telling” the invisible without falling into arbitrariness. From this theoretical perspective, the monster created by Shelley is not a creative failure, but something enormous that terrifies because it transcends both our sensitive faculty and our imaginative capacity. Monster is described here as the place of interaction between visible and invisible, which only the artist – by placing himself in the middle of this relationship – is able to narrate. (shrink)

In this paper the author reconstructs the Klagesian positions that, according to him, have possibly inspired Walter Benjamin in his reflection on “aura”. Ludwig Klages’ thought, in fact, and especially the notion of “Nimbus-Aura”, had an interesting resonance in the work of Walter Benjamin. The author shows that Benjamin has probably shared with Klages the idea that human history is indeed rooted in what we might call “myth”, differently from Theodor Adorno, who intends to criticize Klages’ influence in Benjamin’s notion (...) of “aura”, dialectilizing the mythical “origin” and characterizing it as fiction. In the author’s view, moreover, if in Klages this root receives nourishment from the universal symbolism of matter, that Klages intends as originally “auratic”, in Benjamin this root becomes the starting point through which, by means of artistic reproducibility, the human pattern moves away from the myth. (shrink)

In this paper the author reconstructs the Klagesian positions that, according to him, have possibly inspired Walter Benjamin in his reflection on “aura”. Ludwig Klages’ thought, in fact, and especially the notion of “Nimbus-Aura”, had an interesting resonance in the work of Walter Benjamin. The author shows that Benjamin has probably shared with Klages the idea that human history is indeed rooted in what we might call “myth”, differently from Theodor Adorno, who intends to criticize Klages’ influence in Benjamin’s notion (...) of “aura”, dialectilizing the mythical “origin” and characterizing it as fiction. In the author’s view, moreover, if in Klages this root receives nourishment from the universal symbolism of matter, that Klages intends as originally “auratic”, in Benjamin this root becomes the starting point through which, by means of artistic reproducibility, the human pattern moves away from the myth. (shrink)

This book addresses selected central questions in phenomenological psychology, a discipline that investigates the experience of self that emerges over the course of an individual’s life, while also outlining a new method, the formal indication, as a means of accessing personal experience while remaining faithful to its uniqueness. In phenomenological psychology, the psyche no longer refers to an isolated self that remains unchanged by life’s changing situations, but is rather a phenomenon which manifests itself and constantly takes form over the (...) course of a person’s unique existence. Thus, the formal indication allows us to study the way in which ipseity relates to the world in different situations, in a way that holds different meanings for different people. Based on this new approach, phenomenological psychotherapy marks a transition from a mode of grasping the truth about oneself through reflection, to a mode of accessing the disclosure of self through a work of self-transformation that requires the person to actually change her position on herself. By putting forward this method, the authors shed new light on the dynamic interplay between a person’s historicity and uniqueness on the one hand, and the related physiopathological mechanisms on the other, providing evidence from the fields of genetics, cardiology, the neurosciences and psychiatry. The book will appeal to a broad readership, from psychiatrists, psychologist and psychotherapists, to researchers in these fields. (shrink)

- Tutti i movimenti spirituali che sembrano oggi riscuotere successo nella nostra societÀ prevedono un coinvolgimento della corporeitÀ, propongono una risacralizzazione del corpo. Fra questi nuovi movimenti sono emersi ormai da anni con una certa forza quelli di derivazione orientale, che propongono la pratica della meditazione quale via salvifica e per il corpo e per la mente. La meditazione, infatti, lungi dall'essere un'attivitÀ eminentemente riflessiva, si presenta sempre come una pratica esperienziale totalizzante, che implica un coinvolgimento pieno non solo della (...) mente, ma anche dell'emotivitÀ e della corporeitÀ. (shrink)

In this monograph we contrast two prominent models of education, Competence-Based Education (CBE), more recent and currently dominant in most school systems of the world, and Bildung-Oriented Education (BOE), once the basis of school systems of Northern Europe. CBE interprets learning as the acquisition of clearly definable and allegedly measurable competences, and is supported by supranational organisations, such as the OECD, which approach education from the perspective of the human capital theory. BOE instead characterises learning holistically as aimed at the (...) progressive articulation of a meaningful ‘big picture’ in the student’s mind. Emerged in Northern Europe under the influence of the ideals of the Enlightenment and Neo-Humanism of individual and collective autonomy and responsibility, BOE was subsequently enriched with a hermeneutical approach to teaching and socio-political objectives of emancipation and solidarity originating within Critical Theory. We argue that, in spite of its celebrated ‘scientificity’, CBE is internally incoherent and unreliable, contributes to structural forms of oppression and injustice, fosters social pathologies, and fails to provide students with the kind of intellectual autonomy they need as both human beings and citizens of our complex post-industrial societies. We also defend BOE from objections made by critical theorists, poststructuralists and postcolonial thinkers, and argue that it is a coherent and flexible model of education that endows students with autonomy and responsibility, and can help heal social pathologies. (shrink)

L’epistemologia (detta anche filosofia della conoscenza o gnoseologia) è la disciplina filosofica che studia come gli esseri umani si rapportano da un punto di vista cognitivo alla realtà che li circonda. Le questioni fondamentali che la interessano sono principalmente di natura normativa. Riguardano il modo in cui dovremmo regolare le nostre credenze alla luce dell’informazione in nostro possesso, e la natura della conoscenza umana ed i suoi limiti. Questo capitolo è organizzato in modo corrispondente. La prima sezione tratta della nozione (...) di giustificazione epistemica, la seconda quella di conoscenza, e la terza introduce il problema filosofico dello scetticismo. (shrink)

We focus on issues of learning assessment from the point of view of an investigation of philosophical elements in teaching. We contend that assessment of concept possession at school based on ordinary multiple-choice tests might be ineffective because it overlooks aspects of human rationality illuminated by Robert Brandom’s inferentialism––the view that conceptual content largely coincides with the inferential role of linguistic expressions used in public discourse. More particularly, we argue that multiple-choice tests at schools might fail to accurately assess the (...) possession of a concept or the lack of it, for they only check the written outputs of the pupils who take them, without detecting the inferences actually endorsed or used by them. We suggest that school tests would acquire reliability if they enabled pupils to make the reasons of their answers or the inferences they use explicit, so as to contribute to what Brandom calls the game of giving and asking for reasons. We explore the possibility to put this suggestion into practice by deploying two-tier multiple-choice tests. (shrink)

This paper proves that it is possible to build a Lagrangian for quantum electrodynamics which makes it explicit that the photon mass is eventually set to zero in the physical part on observational ground. Gauge independence is achieved upon considering the joint effect of gauge-averaging term and ghost fields. It remains possible to obtain a counterterm Lagrangian where the only non-gauge-invariant term is proportional to the squared divergence of the potential, while the photon propagator in momentum space falls off like (...) k −2 at large k which indeed agrees with perturbative renormalizability. The resulting radiative corrections to the Coulomb potential in QED are also shown to be gauge-independent. The experience acquired with quantum electrodynamics is used to investigate properties and problems of the extension of such ideas to non-Abelian gauge theories. (shrink)

Phenomenal Conservatism (the view that an appearance that p gives one prima facie justification for believing that p) is a promising, and popular, internalist theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity, it faces numerous objections and challenges. For instance, epistemologists have argued that Phenomenal Conservatism is incompatible with Bayesianism, is afflicted by bootstrapping and cognitive penetration problems, does not guarantee that epistemic justification is a stable property, does not provide an account of defeat, and is not a complete theory of (...) epistemic justification. This book shows that Phenomenal Conservatism is actually immune to some of these problems, though not all of them. Accordingly, it explores the prospects of integrating Phenomenal Conservatism with Explanationism (the view that epistemic justification is a matter of explanatory relations between one’s evidence and propositions supported by that evidence). The resulting theory, Phenomenal Explanationism, has advantages over Phenomenal Conservatism and Explanationism taken on their own. Phenomenal Explanationism is a highly unified, comprehensive internalist theory of epistemic justification that delivers on the promises of Phenomenal Conservatism while avoiding its pitfalls. (shrink)

Perceptual experience is one of our fundamental sources of epistemic justification—roughly, justification for believing that a proposition is true. The ability of perceptual experience to justify beliefs can nevertheless be questioned. This article focuses on an important challenge that arises from countenancing that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable. -/- The thesis of cognitive penetrability of perception states that the content of perceptual experience can be influenced by prior or concurrent psychological factors, such as beliefs, fears and desires. Advocates of this (...) thesis could for instance claim that your desire of having a tall daughter might influence your perception, so that she appears to you to be taller than she is. Although cognitive penetrability of perception is a controversial empirical hypothesis, it does not appear implausible. The possibility of its veracity has been adduced to challenge positions that maintain that perceptual experience has inherent justifying power. -/- This article presents some of the most influential positions in contemporary literature about whether cognitive penetration would undermine perceptual justification and why it would or would not do so. -/- Some sections of this article focus on phenomenal conservatism, a popular conception of epistemic justification that more than any other has been targeted with objections that adduce the cognitive penetrability of experience. (shrink)

Philosophers have claimed that education aims at fostering disparate epistemic goals. In this paper we focus on an important segment of this debate involving conversation between Alvin Goldman and Harvey Siegel. Goldman claims that education is essentially aimed at producing true beliefs. Siegel contends that education is essentially aimed at fostering both true beliefs and, independently, critical thinking and rational belief. Although we find Siegel’s position intuitively more plausible than Goldman’s, we also find Siegel’s defence of it wanting. We suggest (...) novel argumentative strategies that draw on Siegel’s own arguments but look to us more promising. (shrink)

Se presentan dos variantes principales de la semántica actual (1990) que hace del concepto de condiciones veritativas de una oración la clave para desarrollar las ideas de significado y comprensión. Se examinan algunas críticas y se sostiene que no afectan esencialmente el programa. Se distingue entre las versiones al modo de Davidson de aquellas que siguen ideas de Montague y se sostiene que, cuando el fin teórico primario es explicar la comprensión lingüística, hay razones para dar preferencia a las variantes (...) del primer tipo, y que también las hay cuando se busque una semántica apropiada para caracterizar posiciones ontológicas dependientes de restricciones epistémicas; aunque las preferencias se invierten si la ontología que se quiere expresar va a formularse prescindiendo de consideraciones gnoseológicas. (shrink)

The role of academic satisfaction on persistence and successful academic behavior has been the focus of research for decades. Nevertheless, driven by positive educational psychology, subjective well-being has been highlighted as another central feature in the academic path of students. Studies aimed at identifying the variables that contribute to explain different aspects of academic performance have been widely investigated, although studies aimed at identifying the determinants of subjective well-being are still limited. The present paper examined the contribution of AS judgments (...) on subjective well-being. To this end, it was hypothesized that SWB levels depend on the balance between positive/negative emotions and life satisfaction judgments. Furthermore, it was stipulated that AS has an indirect contribution on SWB, through life satisfaction, whereas the balance of emotions influences both AS judgments and life satisfaction. Using an analysis strategy based on structural equation modeling, the results indicated that the model fitted satisfactorily, explaining 32% of the variance of SWB. Particularly, it was observed that AS judgments contributed to life satisfaction judgments. Although no direct contribution of AS on SWB was reported, a total contribution partially mediated by life satisfaction judgments was revealed. These findings support the importance of academic satisfaction judgments, not only because of their importance in academic terms, but also because of their impact on university students’ subjective well-being and health. (shrink)

In this paper, we identify a new and mathematically well-defined sense in which the coherence of a set of hypotheses can be truth-conducive. Our focus is not, as usual, on the probability but on the confirmation of a coherent set and its members. We show that, if evidence confirms a hypothesis, confirmation is “transmitted” to any hypotheses that are sufficiently coherent with the former hypothesis, according to some appropriate probabilistic coherence measure such as Olsson’s or Fitelson’s measure. Our findings have (...) implications for scientific methodology, as they provide a formal rationale for the method of indirect confirmation and the method of confirming theories by confirming their parts. (shrink)

This is the introduction to Moretti, Luca and Nikolaj Pedersen (eds), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill. Contributors: N. Ashton, A. Coliva, J. Kim, K. McCain, A. Meylan, L. Moretti, S. Moruzzi, J. Ohlorst, N. Pedersen, T. Piazza, L. Zanetti.

According to Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), if a subject S has an appearance that P, in the absence of defeaters, S has justification for believing P by virtue of her appearance's inherent justifying power. McCain and Moretti (2021) have argued that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness: if S becomes reflectively aware of an appearance, the appearance loses its inherent justifying power. This limits the explanatory power of PC and reduces its antisceptical bite. This paper provides a (...) novel argument to the same conclusion and contends that it does not apply to Phenomenal Explanationism, the appearance-based account of justification alternative to PC defended by McCain and Moretti (2021). (shrink)

Matthew McGrath has recently challenged all theories that allow for immediate perceptual justification. This challenge comes by way of arguing for what he calls the “Looks View” of visual justification, which entails that our visual beliefs that are allegedly immediately justified are in fact mediately justified based on our independent beliefs about the looks of things. This paper shows that McGrath’s arguments are unsound or, at the very least, that they do not cause genuine concern for the species of dogmatism (...) called “Phenomenal Explanationism”, recently introduced and defended by Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti. (shrink)

Åsa Burman has recently introduced the important notion of telic power and differentiated it from deontic power in an attempt to build a bridge between ideal and non-ideal social ontology. We find Burman’s project promising but we argue that more is to be done to make it entirely successful. First, there is a palpable tension between Burman’s claim that telic power can be ontologically independent of deontic power and her examples, which suggest that these forms of power share the same (...) basis. Second, it is not completely clear how telic power helps non-ideal social ontologists explain oppression, since Burman thinks that both forms of power are transparent to social agents. We offer solutions to both problems. First, we question the thesis that telic power can exist without deontic power. Burman contends that this is possible because some social roles involving telic power can exist independently of institutions, which are––in her opinion––the source of deontic power. Against Burman, we suggest that all social roles involve deontic power, whether or not they are institutional. Second, we argue that while the exercise of deontic power requires a mutual recognition of the social roles of the interacting agents and, therefore, an acceptance of the associated norms, the exercise of telic power does not require acceptance of the relevant norms. This is why invoking telic power is useful in explaining how oppression and injustice can arise. Lastly, we suggest that the relation between teleological normativity and telic power has not been fully clarified by Burman and requires a deeper analysis. (shrink)