On the one hand, after Matteo d'Acquasparta's distinction between the three types of eternity and the temporal necessity of the past, Meyronnes radicalized Scotus's dynamic vision of duration, conceiving the modality as a relation of implication between predicate and existing subject, and time as relationship between Creator and creature. On the other hand, after Ockham denied the real simultaneity of opposed potencies, the Ochamist extension of temporal necessity to the present was denied by Gregory of Rimini, who was favourable, together (...) with Wodeham, to the mutability of the past in a divided sense. Mirecourt, strong on the English subtleties, appears to follow Gregory and tries to find a solution to the interaction between the two contingencies, from top to bottom, which had been formalized by Gregory: if I, performing or not performing X, can act as if God, as the supreme intellect from eternity, could have known or not known X to come, and, if God as agent, absolutely willing omnipotent and unimpeadable from eternity can act as if X happened or did not happen, then can I act as if X, which is from eternity, did not happen from eternity? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Le prime quattro Collationes Parisienses sulle tracce di Giovanni Duns ScotoFrancesco Fiorentino (bio)Come si è visto altrove, l'attribuzione delle Collationes è abbastanza dubbia, propriamente parlando: questa opera non può essere ricondotta a Giovanni Duns Scoto in quanto autore secondo i concetti moderni di proprietà intellettuale e di responsabilità privata, che non risultano pertinenti ai processi materiali di produzione del libro tardo-medievale in quanto opera collettiva, fondata sulla co-autorialità (...) distribuita tra maestro in quanto ideatore e apprendista in quanto compilatore. Questa impossibilità consegue al genere letterario delle Collationes in quanto esercitazioni baccellierali o studentesche, sotto la supervisione di un magister studentium.1 I contemporanei a Scoto non rispettavano i criteri filologici del Terzo Millennio al punto da includere, nel corpus scotiano, il primo libro del commento sentenziario di Enrico di Harclay secondo la redazione del ms. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 13687.2Tuttavia, la considerazione di questi fattori materiali non svaluta né le Collationes che attestano l'esistenza di un ambiente culturale, prossimo a Scoto, né lo stesso Scoto che ha probabilmente partecipato alle Collationes come moderatore o come interlocutore.3 Questa particolare natura delle Collationes ne condiziona l'attribuzione che non può essere associata con la ricerca dell'autore in senso stretto, ma con la considerazione di un plesso di opinioni concorrenti e risalenti all'insegnamento [End Page 115] di Scoto, non sempre in prima scena.4 Scoto, in cinque luoghi testuali dell'Ordinatio, si riferisce apertamente alle Collationes che sono incluse in un discreto numero di testimoni manoscritti del trecento e del quattrocento che tramandano opere sicuramente scotiane, e nella Tabula Scoti redatta da Giacomo d'Ascoli. Guglielmo di Alnwick si dichiara reportator di una collatio, presumibilmente di Parigi, sulla connessione delle virtù morali.5Queste evidenze consentono d'inserire le Collationes nel corpus scotiano, secondo un grado di autenticità significativo, ma non perfettamente conforme ai criteri filologici attuali. Ciò non significa de virtute sermonis che le Collationes sono di Scoto o che non sono di Scoto, ma, più precisamente, che le Collationes non possono essere attribuite a Scoto secondo i criteri filologici attuali, pur avendo avuto buona probabilità di essere attribuite a Scoto dai suoi contemporanei secondo i loro specifici criteri filologici. Infatti è la cornice che dà significato al quadro, è l'orizzonte che dà senso al paesaggio, è la forma che fa la sostanza. Queste ultime annotazioni apparentemente erudite potrebbero risultare scomode per un eventuale progetto di edizione critica che volesse sostenere una stretta autorialità scotiana delle Collationes. Sarebbe più saggio mantenere l'anonimato dell'opera nel rispetto del rigore scientifico sperimentale.A seconda del luogo in cui queste conferenze sono state svolte, ossia Parigi o Oxford, le Collationes sono state distinte in Parisienses e Oxonienses. Queste ultime sono state edite da Marina Fedeli e Guido Alliney.6 Alliney e Fedeli hanno messo in luce la natura, la tradizione, la datazione, l'attribuzione e i contenuti storico-dottrinali di tutte le Collationes, incluse quelle di Parigi.Le Collationes Parisienses sono conservate in sette testimoni manoscritti già descritti da Carlo Balic, Guido Alliney, Marina Fedeli e Franz Pelster7: [End Page 116]Cambridge, Peterhouse College, MS 241, fols. 1r–45r;London, British Library, Add MS 7696, fols. 2r–38v;Cittá Vaticana, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 876, fols. 311r–323v;Oxford, Balliol College, MS 209, fols. 114r–141v;Oxford, Magdalen College, MS 194, fols. 2v–20v;Oxford, Merton College, MS 65, fols. 90r–109v;Oxford, Merton College, MS 90, fols. 155r–199VQuesti testimoni sembrano essere distribuiti in due redazioni distinte: l'una completa e l'altra incompleta. La prima appare tramandata dai primi due testimoni, entrambi risalenti al secolo XV, mentre la seconda redazione si trova negli altri testimoni di cui solo il ms. Vat. lat. 876 data al secolo XIV. A questi testimoni occorre aggiungere altri due: il ms. Cittá Vaticana, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 890, fols. 4v–5v che contiene solo un estratto, e il ms. Barcelona, Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó, ms. Ripoll 95, ff. 35r–37r che custodisce solo la prima collatio di Parigi.8Le Collationes Parisienses si dividono almeno in quattro gruppi: il primo gruppo, dalla prima alla quarta collatio, verte sulle virtù morali... (shrink)

La vita e le opere di Landolfo Caracciolo O.F.M. sono state descritte in modo sistematico da Salerno.1 Rispetto a questa descrizione, che ha posto il bacellierato sentenziario di Caracciolo intorno al 1320, va assunta la ricostruzione di Schabel, che ha spiegato come Caracciolo abbia letto le Sententiae a Parigi dopo Pietro Aureolo e prima di Francesco d’Ascoli e Francesco di Meyronnes.2 Successivamente Landolfo avrebbe ricevuto la prima cattedra in teologia dello Studium fran-cescano di Napoli, inaugurandovi la tradizione scotista.3Landolfo (...) fu ministro provinciale della Terra di Lavoro e svolse parecchie missioni diplomatiche per conto della regina Giovanna I di Napoli. Nel 1327 fu designato vescovo di.. (shrink)

M. Leone / L. Valente, Libertà e determinismo. Riflessioni medievali, Aracne, Roma 2017.

This article presents the recent edition which the research team, direct-ed by Olivier Bertrand, undertook in order to give back to the schol-arly community concerned with Augustine of Hippo the translation, in Middle French, by Raoul de Presles of De civitate Dei commissioned by Charles V, the Good, King of France, while he was involved in the recapture of Brittany after the Treaty of Bretigny dur-ing the Hundred Years’ War. This translation, which originally enjoyed an enormous market success, has finally (...) appeared in a critical edition consisting of five volumes. Until now, only the first two volumes have been available, containing, respectively, books I-III and IV-V. (shrink)

The fallen state of man is characterized by the disappearance of wisdom and the lack of freedom, according to Ugo and the anonymous author of Summa Sententiarum. Ugo assimilates this person to the insipid and stupid in the book of Job. Such a person should blend infused wisdom with the triple cognition of God, himself and the good to be done. This task follows a precise historical development, which is initiated by the weak in faith and which can be schematized (...) in five steps: 1) fear; 2) education; 3) wisdom; 4) history; 5) study of the Bible. Studying, man assimilates himself to God as the supreme exemplary form of wisdom and individualizes the works of condition and reparation. But whereas the anonymous author subdues the moral value of divine action to a social criterion, Ugo distinguishes three degrees of good and connects moral value to the activity or passivity of the divine will. (shrink)

Come ho osservato altrove2, il ms. Oxford, Merton, 284 è composito: consiste di 117 fogli prevalentemente cartacei, tranne i primi quattro di guardia e i ff. 112–113, che sono pergamenacei. Esso misura mediamente 287 × 223 mm3. L’esame della filigrana attesta la produzione delle carte a Siena intorno al 13404. Sul verso della terza carta di guardia si trova una nota marginale che denuncia l’origine e il possesso del codice, ossia «Liber Iohannis Bloxham ex legat’ M. Symonis Lamborne / Iste (...) liber datur domui scolarium de Merton’ in Oxon’ ad iacendum in libraria incatenatum quamdiu durare poterit ad usum et utilitatem sociorum eiusdem domus et dabatur dicto Iohanni superius nominato per magistrum Symonum... (shrink)

Pietro Pomponazzi.--Simnoe Porzio.--Maria d'Aragona marchesa del Vasto.--Andrea Cesalpino.--Giovan Battista de la Porta.--Giordano Bruno.--Tommaso Campanella.--Giulio Cesare Vanini.--Trajano Boccalini.

Alnwick distances himself from Scotus, as he appears in Lectura Oxoniensis and the commentary on Metaphysics, though the natural propensity of the will is affirmed in q. 9 d. 49 of Book Four of Reportata Parisiensia. However, this question could be spurious, or else more susceptible to the Parisian influence of teaching of Henry of Ghent, with whom Alnwick aligns himself when he sanctions without any doubt the fact that man desires to pass from a lesser good, guaranteed by philosophical (...) speculation of an Aristotelian- Averroist matrix, to a supreme good, which coincides with the clear vision of divine essence, because man knows that essence both naturaliter and supernaturaliter. Alnwick tenaciously debates natural knowledge in the prologue to the Commentary on the Sentences, thanks to the use of discursus, which serves to set up a chain of syllogistic deductions in order to arrive at quidditative concepts of divinity in both an affirmative and negative sense. These concepts assure the wayfarer a general k... (shrink)

Questo Congresso è nato in occasione del Settimo Centenario della morte del beato Giovanni Duns Scoto, uno dei pensatori più infleunti ed innovativi della Grande Scolastica. Il Congresso conmdensa molti studi ed edizioni di importanti studiosi nazionali ed internazionali, che vertono sulle principali tematiche del pensiero scotista es sull'erdità di scoto. Questa eridità è alquanto complessa e meritvole di approfondimento, perché riserva sorprese inaspettate. Essa è considerata secondo due criteri: uno temporale e l'altro spaziale. Secondo il criterio temporale il Congresso (...) spazia dal secolo XIV all'epoca contemporanea, mentre il criterio spaziale restringe il Congresso al Mezzogiorno d'Italia. (shrink)

This volume contains the Latin-Italian translation of the Ordinatio Prologue of John Duns Scotus. It is the second volume in the series 'Traditiones: Testi del pensiero tardo-antico, medieval e umanistico', directed by Armando Bisogno. While it is not the first Italian translation of the Ordinatio Prologue, it does offer a rich and detailed introduction that situates Scotus's text in the more general context of his historical milieu, including the effects of the Condemnation of 1277. After a general overview of the (...) life and works of Scotus, including his major positions, the author aids the reader in understanding the significance of Scotus's predecessors... (shrink)

Moving from a behavioral definition of intelligence, which describes it as the ability to adapt to the surrounding environment and deal effectively with new situations (Anastasi, 1986), this paper explains to what extent the performance obtained by ChatGPT in the linguistic domain can be considered as intelligent behavior and to what extent they cannot. It also explains in what sense the hypothesis of decoupling between cognitive and problem-solving abilities, proposed by Floridi (2017) and Floridi and Chiriatti (2020) should be interpreted. (...) The problem of symbolic grounding (Harnad, 1990) is then addressed to show the problematic relationship between ChatGPT and the natural environment, and thus the impossibility for it to understand the symbols it manipulates. To explain the reasons why ChatGPT does not succeed in this task, an investigation is carried out and a possible solution to the problem in the artificial domain is proposed by making a comparison with the natural ability of living beings to ground their own meanings from some basic cognitive-sensory aspects, which, it is explained, are directly related to the emergence of self-awareness in humans. Thus, the question is raised whether a possible and concrete solution to the Symbol Grounding Problem would involve in the artificial domain the development of cognitive abilities fully comparable to those of humans. Finally, I explain the difficulties that would have to be overcome before such a level could be reached, since human cognitive capacities are intimately linked to intersubjectivity and intercorporeality. (shrink)

Nel Tesoro del Duomo di Monza si conservano tre celebri dittici eburnei relativi alla dotazione di suppellettili liturgiche di Berengario del Friuli (inizi X secolo): il dittico di Stilicone e quello del Poeta e della Musa, entrambi tardo antichi; il dittico di re Davide e san Gregorio Magno, di datazione e lettura più controverse (VI secolo ed età carolingia). Primo editore dei pezzi è Anton Francesco Gori nel secondo volume del Thesaurus veterum diptychorum consularium et ecclesiasticorum (1759), corredato di (...) tre tavole di Andrea Scacciati. Pur non avendo mai visionato i manufatti, l’erudito fiorentino dedica ad essi un’ampia disamina critica basandosi essenzialmente sugli acquerelli del pittore Girolamo Ferroni, reclutato dal marchese milanese e prezioso intermediario Alessandro Teodoro Trivulzio. Nel 1794 il padre della storiografia monzese, il canonico Anton Francesco Frisi, risolve di rieditare i dittici in apertura del terzo tomo delle sue Memorie storiche di Monza e sua corte. Consigliato da quel don Carlo Trivulzio erudito e proprietario di un ricco nucleo di avori antichi, supportato dalle modeste incisioni di Giulio Cesare Bianchi, offre una rilettura che puntualizza ed emenda in parte quanto scritto dal Gori, condita da una vena polemica contro «chi non ha esaminati personalmente i Monumenti, sui quali ragiona». Sullo sfondo del contesto culturale dell’epoca e delle personalità che vi presero parte, con l’ausilio della documentazione divisa tra la Veneranda Biblioteca Ambrosiana di Milano, l’Archivio della Fondazione Trivulzio e la Biblioteca Marucelliana di Firenze, il contributo intende proporre una ricostruzione degli avvenimenti con attenzione al rapporto tra originale (i dittici monzesi) e copia (disegni e incisioni che ne scaturirono). (shrink)

This paper examines the role and power of the state in modernity and its transformation throughout it and into the present. First, it recognizes the centrality of the role of information control for the modern state constitution, which allows sovereign power to extend to the national level. Secondly, it discusses the shift of state power from a purely informational power to an informational and bargaining power, as well as the gradual transformation of sovereignty into governmentality. Finally, it analyzes the transformations (...) that have led to a critical loss of both powers by the state and have enabled their acquisition by tech corporations. It examines the implications of this shift in power and the consequent disempowerment of the state, defining the mode of operation of the power embodied by tech corporations as a regime of performativity, rephrasing the Foucauldian regime of truth, which presided over the ways in which governmental power was performed. Such a regime bases its power not on the ability to order discourse and knowledge, but on the ability to automate it, and to predict and manipulate human behaviors. In this way, it has disintermediated not only the state in its role as the primary informational agent, but also, to some extent, the ability of individuals to assert rights through their actions. (shrink)

A counterpossible conditional is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Common sense delivers the view that some such conditionals are true, and some are false. In recent publications, Timothy Williamson has defended the view that all are true. In this paper we defend the common sense view against Williamson’s objections.

The Humean view that conceivability entails possibility can be criticized via input from cognitive psychology. A mainstream view here has it that there are two candidate codings for mental representations (one of them being, according to some, reducible to the other): the linguistic and the pictorial, the difference between the two consisting in the degree of arbitrariness of the representation relation. If the conceivability of P at issue for Humeans involves the having of a linguistic mental representation, then it is (...) easy to show that we can conceive the impossible, for impossibilities can be represented by meaningful bits of language. If the conceivability of P amounts to the pictorial imaginability of a situation verifying P, then the question is whether the imagination at issue works purely qualitatively, that is, only by phenomenological resemblance with the imagined scenario. If so, the range of situations imaginable in this way is too limited to have a significant role in modal epistemology. If not, imagination will involve some arbitrary labeling component, which turns out to be sufficient for imagining the impossible. And if the relevant imagination is neither linguistic nor pictorial, Humeans will appear to resort to some representational magic, until they come up with a theory of a ‘third code’ for mental representations. (shrink)

We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.

I propose a comprehensive account of negation as a modal operator, vindicating a moderate logical pluralism. Negation is taken as a quantifier on worlds, restricted by an accessibility relation encoding the basic concept of compatibility. This latter captures the core meaning of the operator. While some candidate negations are then ruled out as violating plausible constraints on compatibility, different specifications of the notion of world support different logical conducts for negations. The approach unifies in a philosophically motivated picture the following (...) results: nothing can be called a negation properly if it does not satisfy Contraposition and Double Negation Introduction; the pair consisting of two split or Galois negations encodes a distinction without a difference; some paraconsistent negations also fail to count as real negations, but others may; intuitionistic negation qualifies as real negation, and classical Boolean negation does as well, to the extent that constructivist and paraconsistent doubts on it do not turn on the basic concept of compatibility but rather on the interpretation of worlds. (shrink)

_Framing effects_ concern the having of different attitudes towards logically or necessarily equivalent contents. Framing is of crucial importance for cognitive science, behavioral economics, decision theory, and the social sciences at large. We model a typical kind of framing, grounded in (i) the structural distinction between beliefs activated in working memory and beliefs left inactive in long term memory, and (ii) the topic- or subject matter-sensitivity of belief: a feature of propositional attitudes which is attracting growing research attention. We introduce (...) a class of models featuring (i) and (ii) to represent, and reason about, agents whose belief states can be subject to framing effects. We axiomatize a logic which we prove to be sound and complete with respect to the class. (shrink)

I want to model a finite, fallible cognitive agent who imagines that p in the sense of mentally representing a scenario—a configuration of objects and properties—correctly described by p. I propose to capture imagination, so understood, via variably strict world quantifiers, in a modal framework including both possible and so-called impossible worlds. The latter secure lack of classical logical closure for the relevant mental states, while the variability of strictness captures how the agent imports information from actuality in the imagined (...) non-actual scenarios. Imagination turns out to be highly hyperintensional, but not logically anarchic. Section 1 sets the stage and impossible worlds are quickly introduced in Sect. 2. Section 3 proposes to model imagination via variably strict world quantifiers. Section 4 introduces the formal semantics. Section 5 argues that imagination has a minimal mereological structure validating some logical inferences. Section 6 deals with how imagination under-determines the represented contents. Section 7 proposes additional constraints on the semantics, validating further inferences. Section 8 describes some welcome invalidities. Section 9 examines the effects of importing false beliefs into the imagined scenarios. Finally, Sect. 10 hints at possible developments of the theory in the direction of two-dimensional semantics. (shrink)

We present and defend the Australian Plan semantics for negation. This is a comprehensive account, suitable for a variety of different logics. It is based on two ideas. The first is that negation is an exclusion-expressing device: we utter negations to express incompatibilities. The second is that, because incompatibility is modal, negation is a modal operator as well. It can, then, be modelled as a quantifier over points in frames, restricted by accessibility relations representing compatibilities and incompatibilities between such points. (...) We defuse a number of objections to this Plan, raised by supporters of the American Plan for negation, in which negation is handled via a many-valued semantics. We show that the Australian Plan has substantial advantages over the American Plan. (shrink)

Research indicates that religious values and ethical behavior are closely associated, yet, at a firm level, the processes by which this association occurs are poorly understood. Family firms are known to exhibit values-based behavior, which in turn can lead to specific firm-level outcomes. It is also known that one’s family is an important incubator, enabler, and perpetuator of religious values across successive generations. Our study examines the experiences of a single, multigenerational business family that successfully enacted their religious values in (...) their business. Drawing upon intergenerational solidarity and values-based leadership theory, and by way of an interpretive, qualitative analysis, we find that the family’s religious values enhanced their cohesion and were manifested in their leadership style, which, in turn, led to outcomes for the business. Our findings highlight the processes that underlie the relationship between religious values and organizational outcomes in family firms and offer insights into the role of solidarity in values-based leadership. (shrink)

There is some consensus on the claim that imagination as suppositional thinking can have epistemic value insofar as it’s constrained by a principle of minimal alteration of how we know or believe reality to be – compatibly with the need to accommodate the supposition initiating the imaginative exercise. But in the philosophy of imagination there is no formally precise account of how exactly such minimal alteration is to work. I propose one. I focus on counterfactual imagination, arguing that this can (...) be modeled as simulated belief revision governed by Laplacian imaging. So understood, it can be rationally justified by accuracy considerations: it minimizes expected belief inaccuracy, as measured by the Brier score. (shrink)

A complex brain network, centered on the hippocampus, supports episodic memories throughout their lifetimes. Classically, upon memory encoding during active behavior, hippocampal activity is dominated by theta oscillations (6-10Hz). During inactivity, hippocampal neurons burst synchronously, constituting sharp waves, which can propagate to other structures, theoretically supporting memory consolidation. This 'two-stage' model has been updated by new data from high-density electrophysiological recordings in animals that shed light on how information is encoded and exchanged between hippocampus, neocortex and subcortical structures such as (...) the striatum. Cell assemblies (tightly related groups of cells) discharge together and synchronize across brain structures orchestrated by theta, sharp waves and slow oscillations, to encode information. This evolving dynamical schema is key to extending our understanding of memory processes. (shrink)

We outline a neo-Meinongian framework labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM) to account for the ontology and semantics of fictional discourse. Several competing accounts of fictional objects are originated by the fact that our talking of them mirrors incoherent intuitions: mainstream theories of fiction privilege some such intuitions, but are forced to account for others via complicated paraphrases of the relevant sentences. An ideal theory should resort to as few paraphrases as possible. In Sect. 1, we make this explicit via (...) two methodological principles, called the Minimal Revision and the Acceptability Constraint. In Sect. 2, we introduce the standard distinction between internal and external fictional discourse. In Sects. 3–5, we discuss the approaches of (traditional) Meinongianism, Fictionalism, and Realism—and their main troubles. In Sect. 6 we propose our MMM approach. This is based upon (1) a modal semantics including impossible worlds (Subsect. 6.1); (2) a qualified Comprehension Principle for objects (Subsect. 6.2); (3) a notion of existence-entailment for properties (Subsect. 6.3). In Sect. 7 we present a formal semantics for MMM based upon a representation operator. And in Sect. 8 we have a look at how MMM solves the problems of the three aforementioned theories. (shrink)

I present an approach to our conceiving absolute impossibilities—things which obtain at no possible world—in terms of ceteris paribus intentional operators: variably restricted quantifiers on possible and impossible worlds based on world similarity. The explicit content of a representation plays a role similar in some respects to the one of a ceteris paribus conditional antecedent. I discuss how such operators invalidate logical closure for conceivability, and how similarity works when impossible worlds are around. Unlike what happens with ceteris paribus counterfactual (...) conditionals, the closest worlds are relevantly closest belief-worlds: closest to how things are believed to be, rather than to how they are. Also, closeness takes into account apriority and the opacity of intentional contexts. (shrink)

Objective correlates—behavioral, functional, and neural—provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the ‘fallacy of misplaced objectivity’: the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically— its subjective properties—not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical (...) rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do. (shrink)

Understanding Institutions proposes a new unified theory of social institutions that combines the best insights of philosophers and social scientists who have written on this topic. Francesco Guala presents a theory that combines the features of three influential views of institutions: as equilibria of strategic games, as regulative rules, and as constitutive rules. -/- Guala explains key institutions like money, private property, and marriage, and develops a much-needed unification of equilibrium- and rules-based approaches. Although he uses game theory concepts, (...) the theory is presented in a simple, clear style that is accessible to a wide audience of scholars working in different fields. Outlining and discussing various implications of the unified theory, Guala addresses venerable issues such as reflexivity, realism, Verstehen, and fallibilism in the social sciences. He also critically analyses the theory of “looping effects” and “interactive kinds” defended by Ian Hacking, and asks whether it is possible to draw a demarcation between social and natural science using the criteria of causal and ontological dependence. Focusing on current debates about the definition of marriage, Guala shows how these abstract philosophical issues have important practical and political consequences. -/- Moving beyond specific cases to general models and principles, Understanding Institutions offers new perspectives on what institutions are, how they work, and what they can do for us. (shrink)