11 found
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  1. Detecting awareness in the conscious state.Adrian M. Owen, Martin R. Coleman, Melanie Boly, Matthew H. Davis, Steven Laureys, Dietsje Jolles & John D. Pickard - 2006 - Science 313:1402.
  2. Consciousness and the Fallacy of Misplaced Objectivity.Francesco Ellia, Jeremiah Hendren, Matteo Grasso, Csaba Kozma, Garrett Mindt, Jonathan Lang, Andrew Haun, Larissa Albantakis, Melanie Boly & Giulio Tononi - 2021 - Neuroscience of Consciousness 7 (2):1-12.
    Objective correlates—behavioral, functional, and neural—provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the ‘fallacy of misplaced objectivity’: the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically— its subjective properties—not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical (...)
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    IIT, half masked and half disfigured.Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Matteo Grasso, Jeremiah Hendren, Bjorn E. Juel, William G. P. Mayner, William Marshall & Christof Koch - 2022 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45.
    The target article misrepresents the foundations of integrated information theory and ignores many essential publications. It, thus, falls to this lead commentary to outline the axioms and postulates of IIT and correct major misconceptions. The commentary also explains why IIT starts from phenomenology and why it predicts that only select physical substrates can support consciousness. Finally, it highlights that IIT's account of experience – a cause–effect structure quantified by integrated information – has nothing to do with “information transfer.”.
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  4. Auditory processing in severely brain injured patients: Differences between the minimally conscious state and the persistent vegetative state.Melanie Boly, Marie-Elisabeth E. Faymonville & Philippe Peigneux - 2004 - Archives of Neurology 61 (2):233-238.
  5. Human cognition during Rem sleep and the activity profile within frontal and parietal cortices. A reappraisal of functional neuroimaging data.Pierre Maquet, P. Ruby, A. Maudoux, G. Albouy, V. Sterpenich, T. Dan-Vu, M. Desseilles, Melanie Boly, Fabien Perrin, Philippe Peigneux & Steven Laureys - 2006 - In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.
  6.  69
    Response to comments on "detecting awareness in the vegetative state".Adrian M. Owen, Martin R. Coleman, Melanie Boly, Matthew H. Davis, Steven Laureys, Dietsje Jolles & John D. Pickard - 2007 - Science 315 (5816).
  7. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging to detect Covert awareness in the vegetative state.Adrian M. Owen, Martin R. Coleman, Melanie Boly, Matthew H. Davis, Steven Laureys & John D. Pickard - 2007 - Archives of Neurology 64 (8):1098-1102.
  8.  49
    Does the FOUR score correctly diagnose the vegetative and minimally conscious states?Caroline Schnakers, Joseph Giacino, Kathleen Kalmar, Sonia Piret, Eduardo Lopez, Mélanie Boly, Richard Malone & Steven Laureys - 2006 - Annals of Neurology 60 (6):744-745.
  9. Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms.Larissa Albantakis, Leonardo Barbosa, Graham Findlay, Matteo Grasso, Andrew Haun, William Marshall, William G. P. Mayner, Alireza Zaeemzadeh, Melanie Boly, Bjørn Juel, Shuntaro Sasai, Keiko Fujii, Isaac David, Jeremiah Hendren, Jonathan Lang & Giulio Tononi - 2022 - Arxiv.
    This paper presents Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0. IIT aims to account for the properties of experience in physical (operational) terms. It identifies the essential properties of experience (axioms), infers the necessary and sufficient properties that its substrate must satisfy (postulates), and expresses them in mathematical terms. In principle, the postulates can be applied to any system of units in a state to determine whether it is conscious, to what degree, and in what way. IIT offers a parsimonious explanation of (...)
     
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    Episodic thought distinguishes spontaneous cognition in waking from REM and NREM sleep.Benjamin Baird, Mariel Kalkach Aparicio, Tariq Alauddin, Brady Riedner, Melanie Boly & Giulio Tononi - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 97 (C):103247.
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  11. Hypnotic regulation of consciousness and the pain neuromatrix.Melanie Boly, Marie-Elisabeth Faymonville, Brent A. Vogt, Pierre Maquet & Laureys & Steven - 2007 - In Graham Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.