This paper develops an account of trustworthy AI. Its central idea is that whether AIs are trustworthy is a matter of whether they live up to their function-based obligations. We argue that this account serves to advance the literature in a couple of important ways. First, it serves to provide a rationale for why a range of properties that are widely assumed in the scientific literature, as well as in policy, to be required of trustworthy AI, such as safety, justice, (...) and explainability, are properties (often) instantiated by trustworthy AI. Second, we connect the discussion on trustworthy AI in policy, industry, and the sciences with the philosophical discussion of trustworthiness. We argue that extant accounts of trustworthiness in the philosophy literature cannot make proper sense of trustworthy AI and that our account compares favourably with its competitors on this front. (shrink)

One central debate in recent literature on epistemic normativity concerns the epistemic norm for action. This paper argues that this debate is afflicted by a category mistake: strictly speaking, there is no such thing as an epistemic norm for action. To this effect, I introduce a distinction between epistemic norms and norms with epistemic content; I argue that while it is plausible that norms of the latter type will govern action in general, epistemic norms will only govern actions characteristically associated (...) with delivering epistemic goods. (shrink)

Recent literature features an increased interest in the sufficiency claim involved in the knowledge norm of assertion. This paper looks at two prominent objections to KNA-Suff, due to Jessica Brown and Jennifer Lackey, and argues that they miss their target due to value-theoretic inaccuracies. It is argued that the intuitive need for more than knowledge in Brown’s high-stakes contexts does not come from the epistemic norm governing assertion, but from further norms stepping in and raising the bar, and Lackey’s purported (...) quality-driven case against KNA-Suff boils down to a quantitative objection. If that is the case, Lackey’s argument will be vulnerable to the same objections as Brown’s. (shrink)

Trust is a topic of longstanding philosophical interest. It is indispensable to every kind of coordinated human activity, from sport to scientific research. Even more, trust is necessary for the successful dissemination of knowledge, and by extension, for nearly any form of practical deliberation and planning. Without trust, we could achieve few of our goals and would know very little. Despite trust’s fundamental importance in human life, there is substantial philosophical disagreement about what trust is, and further, how trusting is (...) normatively constrained and best theorized about in relation to other things we value. This entry is divided into three sections, which explore key (and sometimes interconnected) ethical and epistemological themes in the philosophy of trust: (1) The Nature of Trust; (2) The Normativity of Trust, and (3) The Value of Trust. (shrink)

In recent literature, several authors attempt to naturalize epistemic normativity by employing an etiological account of functions. The thought is that epistemic entitlement consists in the normal functioning of our belief-acquisition systems, where the latter acquire the function to reliably deliver true beliefs through a history of biological benefit.

According to Jonathan Kvanvig, the practice of taking back one’s assertion when finding out that one has been mistaken or gettiered fails to speak in favour of a knowledge norm of assertion. To support this claim, he introduces a distinction between taking back the content of the assertion, and taking back the speech act itself. This paper argues that Kvanvig’s distinction does not successfully face close speech-act-theoretic scrutiny. Furthermore, I offer an alternative diagnosis of the target cases sourced in the (...) normativity of action. (shrink)

Where does entitlement to trust come from? When we trust someone to φ, do we need to have reason to trust them to φ or do we start out entitled to trust them to φ by default? Reductivists think that entitlement to trust always “reduces to” or is explained by the reasons that agents have to trust others. In contrast, anti-reductivists think that, in a broad range of circumstances, we just have entitlement to trust. even if we don’t have positive (...) reasons to do so. In this paper, we argue for a version of anti-reductivism. Roughly, we argue that we have default entitlement to trust someone to φ so long as there is an operative norm that requires S to φ. At least in such circumstances (and absent defeaters), we don’t need any positive reasons to trust S to φ. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper discusses the permissibility of exclusively relying on a procedural objectivity model for news reporting, from the perspective of the normativity of informative speech acts. It is argued that, with the exception of urgency situations, the paradigmatic application of procedural objectivity is in breach of the relevant norms.

In a cultural setting in which the imitation of nature continues to be regulated by the ambitious project to cancel the dividing line between the natural and the artificial, man continues to find space for his replicative fantasies, even at the cost of breaking cultural boundaries and taboos. On the other hand, as shown in the historical analogy, this ambition, aimed not only at a partial reproduction but a true replication, seems to exhibit developmental contours that lead to the same (...) final results in terms of disillusionment and subsequent abandonment. (shrink)

Although robots are largely designed with industrial, scientific or military aims in mind, many designers seek to endow them with anthropomorphic forms, even at the risk of compromising their functionality. Why do they not content themselves with constructing useful machines, rather than also incorporating human-like features? What drives them to cover their machines with a latex coating to simulate human skin? The utopia of the creation of a double appears also in the world of art, the history of which shows, (...) above all, an outcome that coincides with the abandonment of the naturalistic imperative, and the inauguration of various periods of exploration and innovation. That is why a possible roboaesthetics—i.e. robotics and aesthetics combined could give rise to a new scenario. This view would acknowledges the radical novelty of these ‘species’ and induce the adoption of a new observation level, constructed on the basis of a common project. (shrink)

The role of cultural models in the process of adaptation to the new technologies is very different according to different civilizations. Some basic cultural items seem to be particularly crucial, such as, for example, the levels of pragmatism or rationalism which characterize a civilization or some periods of its history. This paper presents a sketch aimed at setting up a comparison between Western and Eastern cultures facing the problem of adapting to new technologies. The concept ofcold utilitarianism is introduced. It (...) allows a way of defining adaptation which is only partial and contradictory in Western culture, while it completely describes, though perhaps provisionally, the Eastern way of making and using technology. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo nos proponemos trazar la distinción entre la subjetividad preteórica y el sujeto cognoscente en las lecciones tempranas de Friburgo de Martin Heidegger desde el punto de vista de la función metodológica y el carácter ontológico de la reflexión, en vistas a pensar si se puede hablar de una noción de subjetividad no egológica en el planteo heideggeriano. Entendemos por «subjetividad no egológica», el dominio subjetivo originario de la existencia humana, previo a la constitución del ego. Para (...) nuestro propósito abordamos, en una primera instancia, las nociones de discurso originario y discurso derivado para, en un segundo momento, distinguir la subjetividad preteórica de la subjetividad originaria y analizar, finalmente, si se puede hablar de la presencia de una subjetividad no egológica en Heidegger a partir del análisis del estatus metodológico y ontológico de la reflexión. (shrink)

El artículo ofrece un análisis, desde la epistemología feminista, del Juicio a la Justicia Patriarcal, proceso feminista y latinoamericano llevado adelante por la organización Feministas de Abya Yala. La hipótesis es que esta experiencia constituyó un foco de resistencia epistémica al conjunto de injusticias epistémicas que padecen las mujeres, lesbianas, travestis y trans de América Latina, y que actúan como barreras de acceso a la justicia.

Ofrecemos un análisis de los aspectos ontoepistemológicos de los debates actuales sobre el cuerpo sexogenerizado en Argentina. Con herramientas teóricas de la fenomenología feminista, la epistemología feminista y los nuevos materialismos feministas analizamos, por un lado, la manera en que el Estado argentino comprende el cuerpo sexogenerizado y, por el otro, una serie de afirmaciones en los discursos transexcluyentes que conflictúan estas discusiones. Buscamos despejar el terreno conceptual del debate feminista para determinar qué posturas nos permiten avanzar y cuáles nos (...) hacen retroceder. Concluimos que, mientras que las nociones en la ley de identidad de género están amparadas por el conocimiento feminista actual, los discursos transexcluyentes que cuestionan su contenido representan un marco de comprensión ontoepistemológico patriarcal. (shrink)

El artículo presenta una reconstrucción del método del psicoanálisis existencial sartriano especificando su finalidad, campo de aplicación, y provee un análisis interpretativo de su necesidad dentro del desarrollo de la ontología sartriana. Se defenderá que la meta del psicoanálisis existencial es el acaecimiento de la reflexión pura, la cual abre la posibilidad del reconocimiento del proyecto fundamental y la conversión existencial. El análisis se basa en una lectura de El ser y la nada que toma como concepto central a la (...) noción de “deseo”. (shrink)

This article develops and defends a full account of the nature and normativity of resistance to evidence, according to which resistance to evidence is an instance of input-level epistemic malfunctioning. At the core of this epistemic normative picture lies the notion of knowledge indicators, as evidential probability increasing facts that one is in a position to know; resistance to evidence is construed as a failure to uptake knowledge indicators.

This work is a manifesto for epistemic independence: the independence of good thinking from practical considerations. It presents a functionalist account of the normativity of assertion in conjunction with an integrated view of the normativity of constative speech acts.

Can we engineer conceptual change? While a positive answer to this question would be exciting news for philosophy, there has been a growing number of pessimistic voices in the literature. This paper resists this trend. Its central aim is to argue not only that conceptual engineering is possible but also that it is not even distinctively hard. In order to achieve this, we will develop a novel approach to conceptual engineering that has two key components. First, it proposes a reorientation (...) of the conceptual engineering project away from fixing conceptual defects and towards bringing about conceptual innovation. Second, it offers a new account of when conceptual engineering is successful in terms of etiological functions. We then turn to the reasons that have motivated various forms of pessimism about conceptual engineering and show that, on our novel approach, none of them stands up to scrutiny. (shrink)

Assertion is the central vehicle for the sharing of knowledge. Whether knowledge is shared successfully often depends on the quality of assertions: good assertions lead to successful knowledge sharing, while bad ones don't. In Sharing Knowledge, Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion investigate the relation between knowledge sharing and assertion, and develop an account of what it is to assert well. More specifically, they argue that the function of assertion is to share knowledge with others. It is this function that (...) supports a central norm of assertion according to which a good assertion is one that has the disposition to generate knowledge in others. The book uses this functionalist approach to motivate further norms of assertion on both the speaker and the hearer side and investigates ramifications of this view for other questions about assertion. (shrink)

This paper has two aims. The first is critical: it argues that our mainstream epistemology of disagreement does not have the resources to explain what goes wrong in cases of group-level epistemic injustice. The second is positive: we argue that a functionalist account of group belief and group justification delivers (1) an account of the epistemic peerhood relation between groups that accommodates minority and oppressed groups, and (2), furthermore, diagnoses the epistemic injustice cases correctly as cases of unwarranted belief on (...) the part of the oppressor group. (shrink)

ABSTRACTSeveral philosophers have inquired into the metaphysical limits of conceptual engineering: ‘Can we engineer? And if so, to what extent?’. This paper is not concerned with answering these questions. It does concern itself, however, with the limits of conceptual engineering, albeit in a largely unexplored sense: it cares about the normative, rather than about the metaphysical limits thereof. I first defend an optimistic claim: I argue that the ameliorative project has, so far, been too modest; there is little value theoretic (...) reason to restrict the project to remedying deficient representational devices, rather than go on a more ambitious quest: conceptual improvement. That being said, I also identify a limitation to the optimistic claim: I show that the ‘should’ in ameliorative projects suffers from a ‘wrong-kind-of-reasons’ problem. Last but not least, I sketch a proposal of normative constraining meant to address both the above results. The proposal gives primacy to epistemic constraints: accordingly, a concept should be ameliorated only insofar as this does not translate into epistemic loss. (shrink)

This paper has two aims. The first is critical: it argues that our mainstream epistemology of disagreement does not have the resources to explain what goes wrong in cases of group-level epistemic injustice. The second is positive: we argue that a functionalist account of group belief and group justification delivers an account of the epistemic peerhood relation between groups that accommodates minority and oppressed groups, and diagnoses the epistemic injustice cases correctly as cases of unwarranted belief on the part of (...) the oppressor group. (shrink)

This paper has two aims. The first is critical: I identify a set of normative desiderata for accounts of justified belief and I argue that prominent knowledge first views have difficulties meeting them. Second, I argue that my preferred account, knowledge first functionalism, is preferable to its extant competitors on normative grounds. This account takes epistemically justified belief to be belief generated by properly functioning cognitive processes that have generating knowledge as their epistemic function.

When in the business of offering an account of the epistemic normativity of belief, one is faced with the following dilemma: strongly externalist norms fail to account for the intuition of justification in radical deception scenarios, while milder norms are incapable to explain what is epistemically wrong with false beliefs. This paper has two main aims; we first look at one way out of the dilemma, defended by Timothy Williamson and Clayton Littlejohn, and argue that it fails. Second, we identify (...) what we take to be the problematic assumption that underlies their account and offer an alternative way out. We put forth a knowledge-first friendly normative framework for belief which grants justification to radically deceived subjects while at the same time acknowledging that their false beliefs are not epistemically good beliefs. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop a general normative framework for criticisability, blamelessness and blameworthiness in action. We then turn to the debate on norms of assertion. We show that an application of this framework enables champions of the so-called knowledge rule of assertion to offer a theoretically motivated response to a number of putative counterexamples in terms of blamelessness. Finally, we argue that, on closer inspection, the putative counterexamples serve to confirm the knowledge rule and disconfirm rival views.

According to anti‐reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, testimonial entitlement is easy to come by: all you need to do is listen to what you are being told. Say you like anti‐reductionism; one question that you will need to answer is how come testimonial entitlement comes so cheap; after all, people are free to lie.This paper has two aims: first, it looks at the main anti‐reductionist answers to this question and argues that they remain unsatisfactory. Second, it goes on a (...) rescue mission on behalf of anti‐reductionism. I put forth a novel, knowledge‐first anti‐reductionist account, which I dub ‘Testimonial Contractarianism’. According to the view defended here, in virtue of the social contract in play, compliance with the norms governing speech acts is the default position for speakers. Insofar as norm compliance is the default for speakers, I argue, all else equal, entitlement to believe is the default for hearers. (shrink)

This paper develops a novel, bifocal account of trustworthiness according to which both trustworthinesssimpliciter(as in ‘Ann is trustworthy’) and trustworthiness tophi(as in ‘Ann is trustworthy when it comes to keeping your secrets’) are analysed in terms of dispositions to fulfil one's obligations. We also offer a systematic account of the relation between the two types of trustworthiness, an account of degrees of trustworthiness and comparative trustworthiness, as well as a view of permissible trustworthiness attribution.

One popular view in recent years takes the source of testimonial entitlement to reside in the intrinsically social character of testimonial exchanges. This paper looks at two extant incarnations of this view, what we dub ‘weak’ and ‘modest’ social anti-reductionism, and questions the rationales behind their central claims. Furthermore, we put forth an alternative, strong social anti-reductionist account, and show how it does better than the competition on both theoretical and empirical grounds.

В учебном пособии изложены методы расчета различных средств непрерывного транспорта, основанные на рассмотрении напряженно-деформированного состояния сыпучих грузов с позиций статистической теории предельного равновесия Кулона – Мора, а напряженно-деформированного состояния конвейерных лент – по теории первоначально-напряженных движущихся ортотропных оболочек.Книга рассчитана на студентов и аспирантов вузов, обучающихся по специальности «Подъемно-транспортные, строительные, дорожные машины и оборудование». Может быть использована научными и инженерно-техническими работниками горнодобывающей, машиностроительной, химической и других отраслей промышленности.

A Associação Brasileira de Famílias Homotransafetivas (Abrafh) é uma entidade que luta pelo reconhecimento das populações cujo núcleo é formado por sujeitos LGBTQIA+. A instituição busca representar os anseios e expectativas dessas famílias em diferentes âmbitos sociais, assim como combater os desrespeitos e preconceitos advindos de um sistema heterossexista. Este trabalho busca compreender como a Abrafh mobiliza as dimensões do afeto e da solidariedade na luta política. Para isso, entrevistamos quatro representantes do primeiro conselho diretor. Por meio de uma análise (...) qualitativa de conteúdo discursivo, pudemos compreender que a Abrafh, segundo os diretores, surge para acolher, defender e representar as famílias homoafetivas no sentido de tornar estes cidadãos emancipados e com direitos reconhecidos. Conclui-se que a instituição atua principalmente a partir da possibilidade de responder satisfatoriamente à necessidade que os sujeitos têm de desenvolverem conexões baseadas na confiança afetiva na continuidade da dedicação mútua. (shrink)

According to what Williamson labels ‘the C account of assertion’, there is one and only one rule that is constitutive of assertion. This rule, the so-called ‘C Rule’, states that one must assert p only if p has property C. This paper argues that the C account of assertion is incompatible with any live proposal for C in the literature.

This paper develops a novel account of the nature of disinformation that challenges several widely spread theoretical assumptions, such as that disinformation is a species of information, a species of misinformation, essentially false or misleading, essentially intended/aimed/having the function of generating false beliefs in/misleading hearers. The paper defends a view of disinformation as ignorance generating content: on this account, X is disinformation in a context C iff X is a content unit communicated at C that has a disposition to generate (...) ignorance at C in normal conditions. I also offer a taxonomy of disinformation, and a view of what it is for a signal to constitute disinformation for a particular agent in a particular context. The account, if correct, carries high stakes upshots, both theoretically and practically: disinformation tracking will need to go well beyond mere fact checking. (shrink)

In recent years, much attention has been given to the epistemic credentials of belief based on moral testimony. Some people think pure moral deference is wrong, others disagree. It comes as a surprise, however, that while the epistemic responsibilities of the receiver of moral testimony have been closely scrutinized, little to no discussion has focused on the epistemic duties of the speaker. This paper aims to supply this lack: it defends a function-first account of the normativity of moral assertion. According (...) to this view, in virtue of its function of reliably generating understanding in the audience, a moral assertion that p needs be knowledgeable and accompanied by a contextually appropriate explanation why p. (shrink)

Two important philosophical questions about assertion concern its nature and normativity. This article defends the optimism about the constitutive norm account of assertion and sets out a constitutivity thesis that is much more modest than that proposed by Timothy Williamson. It starts by looking at the extant objections to Williamson’s Knowledge Account of Assertion and argues that they fail to hit their target in virtue of imposing implausible conditions on engaging in norm-constituted activities. Second, it makes a similar proposal and (...) shows how it does better than the competition. It suggests that Knowledge Norm of Assertion is not constitutive of the speech act of assertion in the same way in which rules of games are constitutive, and thus KAA comes out as too strong. The final section embarks on a rescue mission on behalf of KAA; it puts forth a weaker, functionalist constitutivity thesis. On this view, KNA is etiologically constitutively associated with the speech act of assertion, in virtue of its function of generating knowledge in hearers. (shrink)

This paper defends a novel view of hermeneutical epistemic injustice. To this effect, it starts by arguing that Miranda Fricker’s account is too restrictive: hermeneutical epistemic injustice is more ubiquitous than her account allows. That is because, contra Fricker, conceptual ignorance is not necessary for HEI: hermeneutical epistemic injustice essentially involves a failure in concept application rather than in concept possession. Further on, I unpack hermeneutical epistemic injustice as unjustly brought about basing failure. Last, I show that, if this view (...) right, HEI is a form of distributive injustice, and affords the corresponding traditional normative theorising. (shrink)