Assertion: Just One Way to Take It Back

Logos and Episteme 7 (3):385-391 (2016)
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Abstract

According to Jonathan Kvanvig, the practice of taking back one’s assertion when finding out that one has been mistaken or gettiered fails to speak in favour of a knowledge norm of assertion. To support this claim, he introduces a distinction between taking back the content of the assertion, and taking back the speech act itself. This paper argues that Kvanvig’s distinction does not successfully face close speech-act-theoretic scrutiny. Furthermore, I offer an alternative diagnosis of the target cases sourced in the normativity of action.

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Mona Simion
University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

Is there an epistemic norm of practical reasoning?Davide Fassio - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2137-2166.
Two accounts of assertion.Martin Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.
Reply to Simion.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):113-116.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.

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