Epistemic norms and ‘he said/she said’ reporting

Episteme 14 (4):413-422 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

ABSTRACTThis paper discusses the permissibility of exclusively relying on a procedural objectivity model for news reporting, from the perspective of the normativity of informative speech acts. It is argued that, with the exception of urgency situations, the paradigmatic application of procedural objectivity is in breach of the relevant norms.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1017/epi.2016.11

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

No Epistemic Norm for Action.SImion Mona - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):231-238.
Epistemic normativity.Hilary Kornblith - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):357 - 376.
Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.
Why pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms don't work.Veli Mitova - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):139-150.
Epistemology without metaphysics.Hartry Field - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.
Assertion, Knowledge and Rational Credibility: The Scoreboard.Mona Simion - 2016 - In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 137-164.
Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement.Alvin I. Goldman - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-215.
Theorizing about the epistemic.Stewart Cohen - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):839-857.
Categorical Norms and Convention‐Relativism about Epistemic Discourse.Cameron Boult - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):85-99.
Re-reconciling the Epistemic and Ontic Views of Explanation.Benjamin Sheredos - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (5):919-949.
Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.
The Value of Epistemic Norms.Veli Mitova - 2005 - South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):65-76.
How Norms (Might) Guide Belief.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):396-409.
Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):94-110.
There Are Diachronic Norms of Rationality.Ulf Hlobil - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):38-45.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-04-05

Downloads
82 (#200,628)

6 months
17 (#141,290)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mona Simion
University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

Publishing without belief.Alexandra Plakias - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):638-646.
How to balance Balanced Reporting and Reliable Reporting.Mikkel Gerken - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3117-3142.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.

View all 32 references / Add more references