Testimonial contractarianism: A knowledge‐first social epistemology

Noûs 55 (4):891-916 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to anti‐reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, testimonial entitlement is easy to come by: all you need to do is listen to what you are being told. Say you like anti‐reductionism; one question that you will need to answer is how come testimonial entitlement comes so cheap; after all, people are free to lie.This paper has two aims: first, it looks at the main anti‐reductionist answers to this question and argues that they remain unsatisfactory. Second, it goes on a rescue mission on behalf of anti‐reductionism. I put forth a novel, knowledge‐first anti‐reductionist account, which I dub ‘Testimonial Contractarianism’. According to the view defended here, in virtue of the social contract in play, compliance with the norms governing speech acts is the default position for speakers. Insofar as norm compliance is the default for speakers, I argue, all else equal, entitlement to believe is the default for hearers.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Recent Work on Testimonial Knowledge.John Greco - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):15-28.
What is transmission*?John Greco - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):481-498.
Testimonial Knowledge and the Flow of Information.John Greco - 2015 - In David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
Virtue epistemology, testimony, and trust.Benjamin W. McCraw - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (1):95-102.
suggestions and Challenges for a Social Account of Sensitivity.Leonie Smith - 2016 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6 (5):18-26.
Testimonial Knowledge-How.Andrew Peet - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):895-912.
Testimony and the transmission of religious knowledge.John Greco - 2017 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 53 (3):19-47.
Sincerity and Transmission.Stephen Wright - 2016 - Ratio 29 (1):42-56.
A Critical Introduction to Testimony.Axel Gelfert - 2014 - New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
Testimony and A Priori Knowledge.Albert Casullo - 2007 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4 (3):322-334.
Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of what is Said.Andrew Peet - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):65-81.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-06-06

Downloads
82 (#197,729)

6 months
13 (#165,103)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mona Simion
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Assertion remains strong.Peter van Elswyk & Matthew A. Benton - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):27-50.
Hedged testimony.Peter van Elswyk - 2023 - Noûs 57 (2):341-369.
Trust in Medical Artificial Intelligence: A Discretionary Account.Philip J. Nickel - 2022 - Ethics and Information Technology 24 (1):1-10.
Hedging and the Norm of Belief.Peter van Elswyk & Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Knowledge and Disinformation.Mona Simion - forthcoming - Episteme:1-12.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Trust and antitrust.Annette Baier - 1986 - Ethics 96 (2):231-260.

View all 55 references / Add more references