Anti-materialist thought experiments as, e.g., zombie arguments, have posed some of the most vexing problems for materialist accounts of phenomenal consciousness. I doubt, however, that arguments of this kind can refute the core thesis of materialism. Although I do not question that there is something very special about an adequate explanation of phenomenal consciousness, and although I accept the epistemic irreducibility of phenomenal consciousness, I deny that modal arguments reach far enough to establish essentialism about consciousness. I will draw upon (...) a relativistic conception of modal space and suggest to strictly separate between varieties of metaphysical possibility - depending on which world is considered as actual, and depending on accessibility relations. It is shown that the modal argument cannot endanger the reductive explanation of the mind-brain relation if one distinguishes carefully between possibility according to primary intensions and possibility according to secondary intensions . Modal arguments are strong enough to make an epistemological point but not an ontological one. (shrink)

In Willensfreiheit Geert Keil seeks a better explanation of freedom of the will by investigating the connections between free will and determinism vs. indeterminism. Keil thinks that there is no freedom of the will without declaring determinism untrue. So, on the one hand freedom of the will seems to require indeterminism, but on the other hand, freely willed choices and decisions must be different from pure chance. The key, Keil thinks, is global indeterminism without local indeterminism — I doubt this.

The article is a reply to three reviews of my book Willensfreiheit (Berlin/New York 2007) which were published in a previous issue of this journal. In the book, I develop a libertarian account of free will that invokes neither uncaused events nor mind-body dualism nor agent causality. Against Bettina Walde’s criticism, I argue that a well-balanced libertarianism can evade the luck objection and that it should not be portrayed as positing tiny causal gaps in an otherwise deterministic world. (...) Against Marcus Willaschek’s Moorean compatibilism, I argue that our ordinary notion of agency commits us to genuine two-way abilities, i. e. to abilities to do otherwise given the same past and laws of nature. Against Christoph Jäger’s defence of van Inwagen’s consequence argument, I insist that this argument for incompati-bilism is seriously flawed and that libertarians are well-advised not to base their position upon it. (shrink)

The article is a reply to three reviews of my book Willensfreiheit which were published in a previous issue of this journal. In the book, I develop a libertarian account of free will that invokes neither uncaused events nor mind-body dualism nor agent causality. Against Bettina Walde′s criticism, I argue that a well-balanced libertarianism can evade the luck objection and that it should not be portrayed as positing tiny causal gaps in an otherwise deterministic world. Against Marcus Willaschek′s (...) Moorean compatibilism, I argue that our ordinary notion of agency commits us to genuine two-way abilities, i. e. to abilities to do otherwise given the same past and laws of nature. Against Christoph Jäger′s defence of van Inwagen′s consequence argument, I insist that this argument for incompatibilism is seriously flawed and that libertarians are well-advised not to base their position upon it. (shrink)

Epistemologists have recently debated how we should respond to apparent cases of rational disagreement. Is it possible for two people to disagree and have both people still be rational? Those involved in this debate make use of the idea of epistemic peers. Two people are epistemic peers if they share the same knowledge of a given topic and have similar epistemic virtues. My paper argues that we have different kinds of epistemic peers; close peers who think similarly to ourselves, and (...) remote peers who think very differently. I argue that remote peers are genuine peers, but that we should respond to disagreement from remote peers differently than disagreement from close peers. (shrink)

Pourquoi les philosophes pleurent-ils à l'écoute de la musique?

Beauchamp and Childress’ definition of autonomous decision‐making includes the conditions of intentionality, understanding, and non‐control. In genetics, however, a relational conception of autonomy has been increasingly recognized. This article aims to empirically assess aspects of social influence in genetic testing decision‐making and to connect these with principlist and relational theories of autonomy. We interviewed 18 adult genetic counsellees without capacity issues considering predictive genetic testing for cancer predisposition for themselves and two counselling physicians in Switzerland. We conducted a qualitative analysis, (...) building on a grounded theory study about predictive genetic testing decision‐making. We found that some participants agreed to predictive genetic testing predominantly because relatives wanted them to do it, with some even acting contrary to their own convictions. Others, in contrast, based their decision on purely individualistic reasons but expressed difficulties in explaining their decision to their social environment. Healthcare professionals had a critical influence on decision‐making in many cases without being manipulative, as perceived by counsellees. Still, cases of coercion and social pressure occurred within social relationships. In conclusion, predictive genetic testing decision‐making includes relational and individualistic aspects, and both are compatible with autonomous decision‐making. While the principlist and relational notions of autonomy compete on a theoretical level, they are two sides of the same coin when used as analytical lenses for genetic testing decision‐making. Social acceptance of refusal of testing should be improved to mitigate social pressure. Individuals should be encouraged to decide for themselves how much their social environment influences their decision regarding predictive genetic testing. (shrink)

Although lie detection procedures have been fundamentally criticized since their inception at the beginning of the 20th century, they are still in use around the world. In addition, they have created some remarkable appeal in the context of counterterrorism policies. Thereby, the links between science and fiction in this topic are quite tight and by no means arbitrary: In the progressive narrative of the lie detection devices, there is a promise of changing society for the better, which is entangled in (...) a fictional narrative provided by many cinematic and literary examples. By drawing on the concept of “diegetic technologies” formulated by David Kirby, we want to highlight the role of science fictional narratives in the historical development and current application of lie detection procedures. We therefore aim to use this conceptual frame to analyze the role of prevention-oriented mind reading procedures, which are developed for or already used in the “war on terror” with reference to their fictional predecessors. One virulent factor has to be highlighted in this context: The fictional engagement with possible new lie detection practices is in itself creating a legitimating ground for future security technologies. (shrink)

Die globalen Veränderungen fordern unser Wissen über die Welt und über uns selbst heraus. Der Klimawandel, die globale Covid-19-Pandemie und Konflikte um die Bedeutung wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse führen uns unweigerlich zu einer Vielzahl komplexer philosophischer Fragen. Dabei rücken verstärkt Themen der theoretischen Philosophie in den Vordergrund: Was ist eigentlich Wissen? Auf welche Informationen können wir uns verlassen? Ist die Wahrheit relativ? Was macht ExpertInnen aus? Was ist gute wissenschaftliche Praxis? Was bedeutet 'evidenzbasiert'? Welchen sozialen und globalen Einflüssen ist unser Wissenserwerb ausgesetzt? (...) In der Ausbildung von Philosophie- und Ethikstudierenden gibt es oft eine große Scheu, Disziplinen wie Erkenntnistheorie und Wissenschaftsphilosophie zu erlernen und zu unterrichten. Zu abstrakt und lebensweltlich irrelevant, sagen viele. Dieses Buch soll diese Berührungsängste beseitigen helfen, indem die theoretischen Grundlagen auf die Probleme der Gegenwart angewendet und mit vielseitigen Methoden erschlossen werden. Zwei Ziele stehen im Vordergrund: Zum einen soll deutlich werden, dass die Beschäftigung mit theoretischer Philosophie für das persönliche und das gesellschaftliche Zusammenleben von zentraler Bedeutung ist. Zum anderen zeigen eine Reihe didaktischer Tools, wie man Lernende dabei aktiv in den Lernprozess miteinbezieht. (shrink)

The representation of history continues to evolve in the domain of museum exhibitions. This evolution is informed in part by the creation of new display methods—many of which depart from the traditional conventions used to achieve the “museum effect”—in part by an increased attention to the museum–visitor relationship. In this context the ethical force of bearing witness, at times a crucial aspect of the museum experience, has emerged as a particularly compelling issue. In seeking to represent and address atrocity, injustice, (...) and the abrogation of human rights, museums have the potential to become “sites of conscience” and to encourage “historical consciousness.” Through a series of three exhibitions devoted to slavery, the New-York Historical Society demonstrated how such sites can be constructed and how objects can be deployed to represent extreme or “limit cases.” In this review/essay I investigate and interrogate these exhibitions, looking closely at the use of objects as a source of “indirect testimony” and at the “dialogical situation” that might arise in an encounter among objects, exhibit narratives, and visitors. Thinking in terms of point of view, I look at the variety of rhetorical platforms from which objects speak in these exhibitions; thinking in terms of syntax, I look at the effects of ordering and of the radical juxtaposition of objects; thinking in terms of irony, I look at the provocations of double-voiced narratives and at how objects are used to support those historical sentences. (shrink)

The differences between the "habits of the heart" in German and U.S.-American corporations can be described by analyzing the way corporations deal with norms and values within their organizations. Whereas many U.S. corporations have introduced formal business ethics programs, German companies are very reluctant to address normative questions publicly. This can be explained by the different cultural backgrounds in both countries. By defining these different "habits of the heart" underlying German and American business ethics it is possible to show the (...) problems and questions within the intercultural management of values, but also the possible solutions. (shrink)

Positive and negative feelings were central to the development of economics, especially in utility theory in classical economics. While neoclassical utility theory ignored feelings, behavioral economics more recently reintroduced feelings in utility theory. Beyond feelings, economic theorists use full-fledged specific emotions to explain behavior that otherwise could not be understood or they study emotions out of interest for the emotion itself. While some analyses display a strong overlap between psychological thinking and economic modelling, in most cases there is still a (...) large gap between economic and psychological approaches to emotion research. Ways how to reduce this gap are discussed. (shrink)

Definition of the problemThe Shared Decision Making model is becoming increasingly popular also in the German-speaking context, but it only considers values of patients to be relevant for medical decisions. Nevertheless, studies show that the values of physicians are also influential in medical decisions. Moreover, physicians are often unaware of this influence, which makes it impossible to control it.ArgumentsThe influence of both patients’ and physicians’ values is examined from an empirical and normative perspective. The review about the empirical data provides (...) a necessary overview about the status quo, whereas I deduct rules for value-influenced behaviour in the decision making process in the normative approach. Therefore, different scenarios are taken into account to explore in which situations it is acceptable for physicians to let their values be part of the decision making process. The conscious use of values is only possible, when physicians are aware of their influence. To raise awareness, the best option would be to educate future physicians about it in their training. Therefore, this article provides a teaching concept for a unit that could be part of an ethics class for physicians in training. Furthermore, patient’s rights and responsibilities in the decision making process are discussed.ConclusionI conclude that it is necessary to take the influence of values into account and include this knowledge into the training of physicians. Conclusively, recommendations for patients and physicians and their dealing with values in shared decision making processes are suggested. (shrink)

Definition of the problemThe Shared Decision Making model is becoming increasingly popular also in the German-speaking context, but it only considers values of patients to be relevant for medical decisions. Nevertheless, studies show that the values of physicians are also influential in medical decisions. Moreover, physicians are often unaware of this influence, which makes it impossible to control it.ArgumentsThe influence of both patients’ and physicians’ values is examined from an empirical and normative perspective. The review about the empirical data provides (...) a necessary overview about the status quo, whereas I deduct rules for value-influenced behaviour in the decision making process in the normative approach. Therefore, different scenarios are taken into account to explore in which situations it is acceptable for physicians to let their values be part of the decision making process. The conscious use of values is only possible, when physicians are aware of their influence. To raise awareness, the best option would be to educate future physicians about it in their training. Therefore, this article provides a teaching concept for a unit that could be part of an ethics class for physicians in training. Furthermore, patient’s rights and responsibilities in the decision making process are discussed.ConclusionI conclude that it is necessary to take the influence of values into account and include this knowledge into the training of physicians. Conclusively, recommendations for patients and physicians and their dealing with values in shared decision making processes are suggested. (shrink)

Definition of the problemThe Shared Decision Making model is becoming increasingly popular also in the German-speaking context, but it only considers values of patients to be relevant for medical decisions. Nevertheless, studies show that the values of physicians are also influential in medical decisions. Moreover, physicians are often unaware of this influence, which makes it impossible to control it.ArgumentsThe influence of both patients’ and physicians’ values is examined from an empirical and normative perspective. The review about the empirical data provides (...) a necessary overview about the status quo, whereas I deduct rules for value-influenced behaviour in the decision making process in the normative approach. Therefore, different scenarios are taken into account to explore in which situations it is acceptable for physicians to let their values be part of the decision making process. The conscious use of values is only possible, when physicians are aware of their influence. To raise awareness, the best option would be to educate future physicians about it in their training. Therefore, this article provides a teaching concept for a unit that could be part of an ethics class for physicians in training. Furthermore, patient’s rights and responsibilities in the decision making process are discussed.ConclusionI conclude that it is necessary to take the influence of values into account and include this knowledge into the training of physicians. Conclusively, recommendations for patients and physicians and their dealing with values in shared decision making processes are suggested. (shrink)

Contributed research papers presented at seminar.

Recent commentaries on the relation between Deleuze and Foucault often operate with an implicit idea of compatibility or consistency that postulates systematic harmony as the decisive criterion for the affinity between them. Accordingly, the predominant question is whether Deleuze and Foucault are “true” friends philosophically and politically. Although the assessments differ, they share a likewise implicit notion of the friend as familiar that excludes any form of ambivalence in amicable relations and consequently cannot fully account for the dynamics and variability (...) of the relation between Deleuze and Foucault. This article tries to address this problem by suspending the notion of the friend-as-familiar, effectively posing the question of what concept of friendship we would have if the ambivalent relation between Deleuze and Foucault would be the model. For this, the reconstruction begins with the early encounters and follows their relationship until the supposed split in the context of the desire-pleasure-debate. What becomes apparent is the dialogical structure of the philosophical friendship between Deleuze and Foucault that entails convergences as well as divergences, which will eventually be related to their own and fundamentally different concepts of friendship. Deleuze and Foucault, as will be argued, are neither “vrais amis” nor “faux amis” but simply amis that practised a form of philosophical friendship, lasting for more than 15 years. (shrink)