Die 1993 verstorbene Lodzer Germanistin gehörte zu den besten Kennern der deutschsprachigen Literatur des 20. Jahrhunderts. Insbesondere ihre Studien zur österreichischen Literatur, u.a. das SchalTen von Lranz Theodor Csokor, haben ihr einen wissenschaftlichen Namen gesichert. Eine dem Aufsatz beigefügte Publikationsliste veranschaulicht die Fülle ihrer vertvollen Bücher und Aufsätze.

Der Beitrag besteht aus zwei Teilen: der erste ist eine kurze Einführung in das Leben und das Werk der bedeutenden österreichischen Mittlerin der polnischen Literatur. Der zweite ist ein Interview mit Prof. Dr. Gerda Leber-Hagenau, die - geboren in Lodz am 11. Dezember 1918 - sich an ihre Heimatstadt und deren Eigentüm1ichkeiten erinnert. Gerda Leber-Hagenau nimmt auch Stellung zur Aufnahme der polnischen Literatur in Österreich.

Der Aufsatz analysiert zwei Prosawerke von Gerhart Hauptmann, die in seinem gesamten Schaffen eine wichtige Position einnehmen und ein Schlüssel zugleich für seine Biographie sind. In der ausgewählten Bibliographie werden wichtigste polnische einschlägige Bücher und Studien angegeben.

Felix A. Voigt gehörte zu den bedeutendsten Gerhart-Hauptmann-Forschern. Er war mit dem schlesischen Nobelpreis-Träger freundschaftlich verbunden und ha tte einen freien Einblick in das Wiesenteiner Archiv des Dichters. Aus seiner Feder stammen viele grundlegende Arbeiten, die bis heute ihren hohen Wert nicht verloren haben. Zu seinen besonderen Verdiensten gehört u.a. die Mitherausgeberschaft der 17-bändigen Ausgabe der sog. Ausgabe letzter Hand. Er war Begründer der wissenschaftlichen Gerhart-Hauptmann-Forschung. Seine Publikationsliste weist ihn als einen ausgezeichneten Kenner und Interpreten des Werkes Gerhart Hauptmanns aus.

The main purpose of this article is to provide some new texts for studying the history of Catholic Church in XIX century. It is a small contribution to the history of Jesuits, but also the history of Poland, Greece and Turkey. The study concerns a very turbulent period in the history of the Society of Jesus, namely the rebirth of the Society in Europe and in the World. It was a very challenging time in the European history as Greece was (...) slowly regaining its independence, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was under the oppression of its occupying powers and was suffering the aftermath of its unsuccessful insurrections, and Turkey was trying to suppress the independence movements. Expelled from Russia and Prussia, the Jesuits arrived to the islands of the Aegean Sea, where they undertook the pastoral work of their fellow brethren from the times before the suppression of the Society in 1773. The research presented in this article was carried out in the Jesuit’s archive in Athens and deals primarily with “Polonica”. It is the first attempt to overview the archive under such aspect. During my research trip to Athens in 2018, Father Gabryel Marangos, the Director of Jesuit Archive in Athens, granted me the access to the collection of letters of the Polish Jesuits, which are preserved in the Athenian Archive of SJ. The method of this research was to check the files which directly regard the letters of Father Tadeusz Kuczyński. According to the Director of Athenian Archive there are more documents related to the subject, but they are dispersed among other files. The first part of the article is a brief overview of the history of Jesuits in Greece, whereas the second one is a presentation of some new sources, such as the letters of Father Tadeusz Kuczyński SJ. It is not the whole Polonica from the Athenian Archive and the remaining letters, the fragments of personal diaries, the Community Diary, Books of Charity, the Books of Bell Ringing will be presented in a coming book. The research has a pioneering character and has to be followed by further studies. In this place I would like to express my gratitude to the Greek and French Jesuits for gathering and preserving these documents. I also extend my gratitude to the governing body of the Ignatianum University for covering the costs of the research. (shrink)

Sixteen years ago, Prahalad and Hart introduced the possibility of both profitably serving the poor and alleviating poverty. This first iteration of the Bottom/Base of the Pyramid approach focused on selling to the poor. In 2008, after ethical criticisms leveled at it, the field moved to BoP 2.0, instead emphasizing business co-venturing. Since 2015, we have witnessed some calls for a new iteration, with the focus broadening to a more sustainable development approach to poverty alleviation. In this paper, we seek (...) to answer the question: How has the BoP approach evolved over the past 16 years, and has it delivered on its early promise? We conducted a systematic review of 276 papers published in journals in this period, utilizing a rigorous correspondence analysis method to map key trends, and then further examined the 22 empirical studies conducted on the BoP approach. Our results suggest that the field has evolved, passing through a number of trends and coming full circle—with our analysis pointing to more recent BoP literature emphasizing similar themes to those espoused in the initial BoP iteration, rather than reflecting the principles espoused in either BoP 2.0 or BoP 3.0. Our analysis also points to a lack of clear evidence that the BoP concept has delivered on its promise either to businesses or to BoP participants. (shrink)

The introspective devices framework proposed by Kammerer and Frankish (this issue) offers an attractive conceptual tool for evaluating and developing accounts of introspection. However, the framework assumes that different views about the nature of introspection can be easily evaluated against a set of common criteria. In this paper, I set out to test this assumption by analysing two formal models of introspection using the introspective device framework. The question I aim to answer is not only whether models developed outside of (...) philosophy can be successfully evaluated against the set of conceptual criteria proposed by Kammerer and Frankish, but also whether this kind of evaluation can reveal some limitations inherent to the framework. (shrink)

Porter and Kramer :78–92, 2006; Harv Bus Rev 89, 62–77, 2011) introduced ‘shared value’ as a ‘new conception of capitalism,’ claiming it is a powerful driver of economic growth and reconciliation between business and society. The idea has generated strong interest in business and academia; however, its theoretical precepts have not been rigorously assessed. In this paper, we provide a systematic and thorough analysis of shared value, focusing on its ontological and epistemological properties. Our review highlights that ‘shared value’ has (...) spread into the language of multiple disciplines, but that its current conceptualization is vague, and it presents important discrepancies in the way it is defined and operationalized, such that it is more of a buzzword than a substantive concept. It also overlaps with many other concepts and lacks empirical grounding. We offer recommendations for defining and measuring the concept, take a step toward disentangling it from related concepts, and identify relevant theories and research methods that would facilitate extending the knowledge frontier on shared value. (shrink)

In this target article by Morain and Largent (2023), the authors focus on an investigator’s duty to patient-subjects specifically regarding incidental or collateral findings within the context of e...

This article examines the question: How do local organizations deal with competing temporal dynamics when building and implementing base/bottom of the pyramid initiatives? Time has been neglected in the BoP literature to date, yet, addressing poverty in a developing country requires a complex perspective of time. An analysis of 21 semi-structured interviews with locally based organizations implementing BoP initiatives in the Philippines revealed that the organizations had an ambitemporal perspective. In particular, we discover that they harmonize multiple temporal pacers by (...) making strategic decisions about the best mechanism of entrainment to utilize to move their community and any stakeholders to a long-term temporal horizon. We find that organizations manage this process by generating what we term a “third time” via a process of push-and-pull entrainment between the communities, the business, and the different temporal pacers. This article develops a conceptual framework for helping organizations to harmonize competing temporal dynamics to generate a bespoke “third time” for each community they work with. (shrink)

This paper is obituary of Leszek Nowak, one of the greatest Polish philosophers of the XX century.

This chapter contains sections titled: Logical Positivism: Basic Information The Hempelian Model of Explanation in Historiography Popperian Critique of Historicism Conclusion Bibliography.

Weakly acyclic games form a natural generalization of the class of games that have the finite improvement property. In such games one stipulates that from any initial joint strategy some finite improvement path exists. We classify weakly acyclic games using the concept of a scheduler introduced in Simon and Apt. We also show that finite games that can be solved by the iterated elimination of never best response strategies are weakly acyclic. Finally, we explain how the schedulers allow us to (...) improve the bounds on finding a Nash equilibrium in a weakly acyclic game. (shrink)

The proposal that probabilistic inference and unconscious hypothesis testing are central to information processing in the brain has been steadily gaining ground in cognitive neuroscience and associated fields. One popular version of this proposal is the new theoretical framework of predictive processing or prediction error minimization, which couples unconscious hypothesis testing with the idea of ‘active inference’ and claims to offer a unified account of perception and action. Here we will consider one outstanding issue that still looms large at the (...) core of the PEM framework: the lack of a clear criterion for distinguishing conscious states from unconscious ones. In order to fulfill the promise of becoming a unifying framework for describing and modeling cognition, PEM needs to be able to differentiate between conscious and unconscious mental states or processes. We will argue that one currently popular view, that the contents of conscious experience are determined by the ‘winning hypothesis’, falls short of fully accounting for conscious experience. It ignores the possibility that some states of a system can control that system’s behavior even though they are apparently not conscious. What follows from this is that the ‘winning hypothesis’ view does not provide a complete account of the difference between conscious and unconscious states in the probabilistic brain. We show how this problem for the received view can be resolved by augmenting PEM with Daniel Dennett’s multiple drafts model of consciousness. This move is warranted by the similar roles that attention and internal competition play in both the PEM framework and the multiple drafts model. (shrink)

Zakład Kulturoznawstwa Wydział Pedagogiki i Psychologii Uniwersytet w Białymstoku.

A person with one dollar is poor. If a person with n dollars is poor, then so is a person with n + 1 dollars. Therefore, a person with a billion dollars is poor. True premises, valid reasoning, a false a conclusion. This is an instance of the Sorites-paradox. (There are infinitely many such paradoxes. A man with an IQ of 1 is unintelligent. If a man with an IQ of n is unintelligent, so is a man with an IQ (...) of n+1. Therefore a man with an IQ of 200 is unintelligent.) Most attempts to solve this paradox reject some law of classical logic, usually the law of bivalence. I show that this paradox can be solved while holding on to all the laws of classical logic. Given any predicate that generates a Sorites-paradox, significant use of that predicate is actually elliptical for a relational statement: a significant token of "Bob is poor" means that Bob is poor compared to x, for some value of x. Once a value of x is supplied, a definite cutoff line between having and not having the paradox-generating predicate is supplied. This neutralizes the inductive step in the associated Sorites argument, and the would-be paradox is avoided. (shrink)

Pomiędzy filozofią a resztą kultury rośnie przepaść. Podczas gdy filozofowie są całkowicie przekonani o ważności swojej dziedziny i doniosłości tego, co się w niej robi – jej pytań, jej argumentacji, jej odpowiedzi, jej wynalazków pojęciowych, jej błyskotliwych idei, to niefilozofowie coraz powszechniej ważność tę kwestionują, w doniosłość powątpiewają, argumentacji nie cenią, błyskotliwości nie dostrzegają i w ogóle nie pojmują o co cały ambaras. Wszak filozofia drwa nie narąbie, wirusów z komputera nie usunie, cen w sklepach nie obniży, w rubryce „patenty (...) i wdrożenia” napisze „brak”. Zapytajmy więc: po co naszej kulturze filozofowanie? Nie filozofowie i nie instytuty filozoficznych badań i kształcenia filozoficznego, ale właśnie – filozofowanie. Żeby odpowiedzieć na takie pytanie, potrzeba nie tylko filozofii, ale także dobrych narzędzi z innych dziedzin nauki. Trzeba zapytać, jakiego rodzaju grą kulturową jest filozofowanie? Ilu z nas w nią gra? I co się wtedy dzieje? Czy filozofujemy na co dzień, czy tylko od święta? Niniejsza książka ani nie popularyzuje, ani nie przybliża tego, co robią filozofowie. Zamiast tego prowadzi Czytelników od rozmów w pociągach do teorii czerpanych z filozofii i socjologii wiedzy, od lektury nagłówków prasowych do teorii kultury, od obrazów epidemii i biografii Spinozy do studiów nad nauką. Stara się przy tym na pytania wyżej postawione jak najogólniej odpowiedzieć, a przepaść zasypać, pokazać przy tym, że filozofia od swego kulturowego otoczenia nie jest i nigdy nie była odizolowana. Przeciwnie, filozofowanie tak bardzo i w tak licznych miejscach w tkankę kultury wrosło, że bez niego tkanka ta porozrywałaby się na strzępy, że dla kultury współczesnej filozofowanie w najrozmaitszych przejawach jest czymś koniecznym, jest warunkiem trwania, życia i rozwoju. (shrink)

In the paper we introduce two conditions and ) which are strengthenings of Birkhoff’s conditions. We prove that an upper continuous and strongly atomic lattice is distributive if and only if it satisfies and ). This result extends a theorem of R.P. Dilworth characterizing distributivity in terms of local distributivity and a theorem of M. Ward characterizing distributivity by means of covering diamonds.

Canaanite Scribes in the Amarna Letters. By Juan-Pablo Vita. Alter Orient und Altes Testament, vol. 406. Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 2015. Pp. xii + 179, 78 plates. €97.

We are aware of truths (e.g. the truth that the shoes I'm now wearing are uncomfortably tight) and also of states of affairs (e.g. the uncomfortable tightness of said shoes). My awareness of the tightness of my shoes---not, be it emphasized, of the corresponding truth, but of the shoe-related mass-energy-distribution underlying that truth---is an instance, not of truth-awareness, but of fact-awareness or, as I prefer to put, object-awareness. The aforementioned truth-awareness corresponding to that object-awareness is the result of my conceptualizing (...) that object-awareness. The distinction between truth-awareness, which is conceptual, and object-awareness, which is non-conceptual, is often overlooked. Because self-knowledge originally consists of object-awarenesses, only later taking the form of truth-awarenesses, a failure to distinguish between object- and truth-awareness has led many to advocate the false contention that self-conscious creatures, such as ourselves, can be categorically mistaken as to what it is that they are consciously experiencing. In this paper, it is argued that, once the distinction between object- and truth-awareness is taken into account, the mistaken judgments that people make as to their conscious conditions embody erroneous conceptualizations of veridical awarenesses of said conditions. (shrink)

This essay attempts to solve the so‐called paradox of analysis: if one is to have any questions about x, one must know x; but if one knows x, one has no questions about x. The obvious solution is this: one can inquire into x if one knows some, but not all, of x's parts. But this solution is erroneous. Let x′ be those parts of x with which one is acquainted, and let S be the percipient in question. As with (...) x, either S knows x′, in which case he has no questions about it; or S does not know x′, in which case he has no questions about it. My solution is this. Perception and cognition give us, not the thing‐in‐itself, but a certain analogue of the thing‐in‐itself. To inquire into x, it is necessary to know not x, but only some analogue of x; and to learn more about x is to become acquainted with increasingly precise analogues of x. (shrink)

This paper puts forth two reasons to hold that at least some mental entities are not physical entities. First argument: Some mental entities (namely, pains and other qualia) cannot possibly differ from how they seem to be, and since this cannot possibly be true of any non-mental entity, it follows that some mental entities are not physical. Second argument: It is necessarily on theoretical grounds, as opposed to strictly experiential grounds, that mental entities are identified with physical entities. Water is (...) legitimately believed to consist of microparticles of a certain kind because there is independent reason to believe that entities relevantly similar to such particles, supposing them to exist, are relevantly similar to water, so far as the latter can be directly observed. It is not, nor could it possibly be, on the basis of some directly observed concomitance between molecule-activity and water-activity that we believe the former to constitute the latter. It obviously isn't on the basis of any directly observed concomitance between brain-activity and mental-activity that the former is believed to mediate the latter. At the same time, there cannot possibly be any other legitimate basis for that belief. The reason for this is that nothing relevantly similar to mental activity can possibly be observed to accompany anything relevantly similar to brain activity. And the reason for the latter fact is that, even if brain-activity and mental-activity occur in the same physical space, they occur in different data-spaces: when you experience a pain, it is not given to you as occurring in the same spatial manifold as the falling of a stone or any other physical event. In general, mental events, whether or not they in fact have spatial coordinates, cannot possibly be observed (experienced) as having such coordinates, and for this reason they cannot be observed as having the same coordinates as brain-events. Thus, there can be no reason to grant the existence of the concomitances whose existence is needed to legitimate the bridge principles on the basis of which the mental could legitimately be identified with the physical. Note on the second argument: This argument doesn't show that the mental is non-physical; it shows only that there cannot possibly be any justification for the belief that the mental to be physical or, at any rate, that, if there is such a justification, it isn't comparable to the justification for the belief that water consists of molecules. (shrink)

This book offers an original approach to avant-garde art and its transformative force. Presenting an alternative to the approaches to art developed in postmodern theory or cultural studies, Ziarek sees art's significance in its critique of power and the increasing technologization of social relations. Re-examining avant-garde art and literature, from Italian and Russian Futurism and Dadaism, to Language poetry, video and projection art, as well as transgenic and Internet art, this book argues that art's importance today cannot be explained simply (...) in aesthetic or cultural terms but has to take into consideration how artworks question the technological character of modern power. To emphasize the transformative character of art, the book redefines art as a force field, in which forces drawn from historical and social reality come be to formed into an alternative relationality. Through discussions of such key avant-garde figures as Marinetti, Duchamp, Khlebnikov, and Vertov, and innovative contemporary artists like Viola, Wodiczko and Kac, The Force of Art counters the pessimism about art's social function by recovering and redefining art's transformative role in modernity. (shrink)

Emerging from the disruption of the First World War, surrealism confronted the resulting ‘crisis of consciousness’ in a way that was arguably more profound than any other cultural movement of the time._ _The past few decades have seen an expansion of interest in surrealist writers, whose contribution to the history of ideas in the twentieth-century is only now being recognised._ Surrealism: Key Concepts_ is the first book in English to present an overview of surrealism through the central ideas motivating the (...) popular movement. An international team of contributors provide an accessible examination of the key concepts, emphasising their relevance to current debates in social and cultural theory. This book will be an invaluable guide for students studying a range of disciplines, including Philosophy, Anthropology, Sociology and Cultural Studies, and anyone who wishes to engage critically with surrealism for the first time. _Contributors:_ Dawn Ades, Joyce Cheng, Jonathan P. Eburne, Krzysztof Fijalkowski, Guy Girard, Raihan Kadri, Michael Löwy, Jean-Michel Rabaté, Michael Richardson, Donna Roberts, Bertrand Schmitt, Georges Sebbag, Raymond Spiteri, and Michael Stone-Richards. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is an interpretation of the social and political thought of the Solidarity movement in the light of the political philosophy of communitarianism. In the first part of the paper, the controversies between liberalism and communitarianism are characterized in order to outline the communitarian response toward the authoritarian/totalitarian challenge. In the second part, the programme of a self-governing republic created by Solidarity is interpreted in the spirit of communitarianism. I reconstruct the ideal vision of human being (...) expressed in of ficial trade union’s documents and essays of Solidarity’s advisers e.g., Stefan Kurowski and Jozef Tischner, and the efforts of the movement for telling the truth about history and its vision of Polish history. Also, I interpret the programme of Self-Governing Republic adopted during the First National Convention of Delegates of Solidarity. In these programmatic documents of Solidarity, one may find ideas characteristic both of the communitarian and liberal political philosophy. However, the liberal ones—including, primarily, the guarantee of human and citizens’ rights, and of individual liberties—were subordinated to the postulate of reconstructing the national and social community. In the course of transformation after 1989, these communitarian elements of Solidarity programme, incompatible with liberal ideological agenda, have been erased. (shrink)

The free energy principle, an influential framework in computational neuroscience and theoretical neurobiology, starts from the assumption that living systems ensure adaptive exchanges with their environment by minimizing the objective function of variational free energy. Following this premise, it claims to deliver a promising integration of the life sciences. In recent work, Markov blankets, one of the central constructs of the free energy principle, have been applied to resolve debates central to philosophy (such as demarcating the boundaries of the mind). (...) The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we trace the development of Markov blankets starting from their standard application in Bayesian networks, via variational inference, to their use in the literature on active inference. We then identify a persistent confusion in the literature between the formal use of Markov blankets as an epistemic tool for Bayesian inference, and their novel metaphysical use in the free energy framework to demarcate the physical boundary between an agent and its environment. Consequently, we propose to distinguish between “Pearl blankets” to refer to the original epistemic use of Markov blankets and “Friston blankets” to refer to the new metaphysical construct. Second, we use this distinction to critically assess claims resting on the application of Markov blankets to philosophical problems. We suggest that this literature would do well in differentiating between two different research programmes: “inference with a model” and “inference within a model.” Only the latter is capable of doing metaphysical work with Markov blankets, but requires additional philosophical premises and cannot be justified by an appeal to the success of the mathematical framework alone. (shrink)

Hobson & Friston (2014) outline a synthesis of Hobson's work on dreaming and consciousness with Friston’s work on the free energy principle and predictive coding. Whilst we are sympathetic with their claims about the function of dreaming and its relationship to consciousness, we argue that their endorsement of the Cartesian theatre metaphor is neither necessary nor desirable. Furthermore, if it were necessary then this endorsement would undermine their positive claims, as the Cartesian theatre metaphor is widely regarded as unsustainable. We (...) demonstrate this point and then develop an alternative formulation of their position that does not require the Cartesian theatre metaphor. Our positive goal is to clarify Hobson & Friston’s confusing usage of philosophical terminology, replacing it where possible with the more transparent language of the forward models framework. This will require some modifications to their account, which as it stands is philosophically and empirically unsustainable. (shrink)

Choć teorie C.G. Junga i J. Hillmana były już dogłębnie analizowane w licznych tekstach, prezentowany artykuł ma na celu wprowadzenie nowego spojrzenia na genealogię ich koncepcji. Śledząc historię pojęć obrazu psychicznego oraz archetypu, tekst rekonstruuje ewolucję ich myśli na kanwie dwóch jakościowych podejść psychologii: freudowskiej Metapsychologii (pierwotnie rozumianej jako psychoanalityczną naukę skoncentrowaną na zastąpieniu metafizyki) oraz diltheyowskiej Psychologii Realnej (deskryptywnej psychologii badającej aktywność duszy). Prezentowane studium skupia się na okresie 1912-1979 rozciągającym się od ustanowienia integralnej szkoły jungowskiej do ustanowienia przez (...) J. Hillmana Psychologii Archetypowej. Tak też niniejszy test ma na celu przedstawienie krytycznego i historycznego podejścia do psychologii głębi oraz psychologii obrazu. (shrink)