Implicit comparatives and the Sorites

History and Philosophy of Logic 27 (1):1-8 (2006)
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Abstract

A person with one dollar is poor. If a person with n dollars is poor, then so is a person with n + 1 dollars. Therefore, a person with a billion dollars is poor. True premises, valid reasoning, a false a conclusion. This is an instance of the Sorites-paradox. (There are infinitely many such paradoxes. A man with an IQ of 1 is unintelligent. If a man with an IQ of n is unintelligent, so is a man with an IQ of n+1. Therefore a man with an IQ of 200 is unintelligent.) Most attempts to solve this paradox reject some law of classical logic, usually the law of bivalence. I show that this paradox can be solved while holding on to all the laws of classical logic. Given any predicate that generates a Sorites-paradox, significant use of that predicate is actually elliptical for a relational statement: a significant token of "Bob is poor" means that Bob is poor compared to x, for some value of x. Once a value of x is supplied, a definite cutoff line between having and not having the paradox-generating predicate is supplied. This neutralizes the inductive step in the associated Sorites argument, and the would-be paradox is avoided.

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John-Michael Kuczynski
University of California, Santa Barbara (PhD)

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References found in this work

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - New York: Routledge.
Truth and other enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1978 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Wang's paradox.Michael Dummett - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):201--32.

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