Building on the strengths of the first edition, the second edition of the Irwin Nicomachean Ethics features a revised translation (with little editorial intervention), expanded notes (including a summary of the argument of each chapter), an expanded Introduction, and a revised glossary.

Exploring Aristotle's philosophical method and the merits of his conclusions, Irwin here shows how Aristotle defends dialectic against the objection that it cannot justify a metaphysical realist's claims. He focuses particularly on Aristotle's metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and ethics, stressing the connections between doctrines that are often discussed separately.

This exceptional book examines and explains Plato's answer to the normative question, "How ought we to live?" It discusses Plato's conception of the virtues; his views about the connection between the virtues and happiness; and the account of reason, desire, and motivation that underlies his arguments about the virtues. Plato's answer to the epistemological question, "How can we know how we ought to live?" is also discussed. His views on knowledge, belief, and inquiry, and his theory of Forms, are examined, (...) insofar as they are relevant to his ethical view. Terence Irwin traces the development of Plato's moral philosophy, from the Socratic dialogues to its fullest exposition in the Republic. Plato's Ethics discusses Plato's reasons for abandoning or modifying some aspects of Socratic ethics, and for believing that he preserves Socrates' essential insights. A brief and selective discussion of the Statesmen, Philebus, and Laws is included. Replacing Irwin's earlier Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford, 1977), this book gives a clearer and fuller account of the main questions and discusses some recent controversies in the interpretation of Plato's ethics. It does not presuppose any knowledge of Greek or any extensive knowledge of Plato. (shrink)

Terence Irwin presents a historical and critical study of the development of moral philosophy over two thousand years, from ancient Greece to the Reformation. Starting with the seminal ideas of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, he guides the reader through the centuries that follow, introducing each of the thinkers he discusses with generous quotations from their works. He offers not only careful interpretation but critical evaluation of what they have to offer philosophically. This is the first of three volumes which will (...) examine the history of ethics in the Socratic tradition, up to the late 20th century. (shrink)

Editor's IntroductionWhen Oxford University Press sent us the three enormous volumes of Irwin's The Development of Ethics, we had two thoughts: First, the book is very important and demands a review; second, since human sacrifice is abolished in North America, it will be very difficult to find a reviewer. We handed the volumes to several interested persons, who in the end returned the books saying the task was beyond them. Then, my wife, a lifetime worker at that center of communal (...) thought, the United Nations, suggested that we form a team to review the book. We put an announcement out on the Web, asking for reviewers to do a chapter each, at 250 words a review. We got several hundred volunteers, and chose 82 to review the 96 chapters of Irwin. We got 81 of 82 reviews, 75 before the deadline, six slightly later. For purposes of completeness, I filled in the sole missing review. Would that the students in my seminars were so punctual! I would like to thank Elyse Turr at Oxford University Press for the PDFs, and my 82 reviewers for their expertise and diligence. I am grateful to all the volunteers who showed an interest in this strange and perhaps unprecedented project, and who patiently endured the vetting process. Special thanks is due to Laura di Summa, who coordinated all the pieces of this incredible puzzle. Did we accomplish something, something new, by mobilizing 82 minds to review one book? I hope so, but I can now only say what they say on television: “America, it's up to you.”. (shrink)

Covering over 1000 years of classical philosophy from Homer to Saint Augustine, this accessible, comprehensive study details the major philosophies and philosophers of the period--the Pre-Socratics, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Neoplatonism. Though the emphasis is on questions of philosophical interest, particularly ethics, the theory of knowledge, philosophy of mind, and philosophical theology, Irwin includes discussions of the literary and historical background to classical philosophy as well as the work of other important thinkers--Greek tragedians, historians, medical writers, and early (...) Christian writers. The most complete one-volume introduction to ancient philosophy available, the book will be an invaluable survey for students of philosophy and classics and general readers. (shrink)

Aristotle''s account of vice presents a puzzle: (1) Viciouspeople must be guided by reason, since they act on decision(prohairesis), not on their non-rational desires. (2) And yet theycannot be guided by reason, since they are said to pay attention totheir non-rational part and not to live in accordance with reason. Wecan understand the conception of vice the reconciles these two claims,once we examine Aristotle''s account of (a) the pursuit of the fine andof the expedient; (b) the connexion between vice and (...) the pursuit ofpleasure; (c) the particular kind of regret to which the vicious personis subject. (shrink)

Terence Irwin presents a historical and critical study of the entire development of Western moral philosophy. The first volume covers ancient and medieval thought; the second the early modern period; the third goes from the late 18th to the late 20th century. Irwin offers illuminating discussion of every important thinker in the history of ethics.

Terence Irwin presents a historical and critical study of the development of moral philosophy over two thousand years, from ancient Greece to the Reformation. Starting with the seminal ideas of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, he guides the reader through the centuries that follow, introducing each of the thinkers he discusses with generous quotations from their works. He offers not only careful interpretation but critical evaluation of what they have to offer philosophically. This is the first of three volumes which will (...) examine the history of ethics in the Socratic tradition, up to the late 20th century. (shrink)

Kant takes autonomy to be recognizably valuable. In claiming that non-Kantian views of morality treat the morally good will as heteronomous, he intends to present an objection to these views. He expects proponents of these views to recognize that the implication of heteronomy is a serious objection; his task is not to convince them that heteronomy is bad, but to convince them that their views imply heteronomy.

This Oxford Reader seeks to introduce some of the main philosophical questions raised by the Greek and Roman philosophers of classical antiquity. Selections from the writings of ancient philosophers are interspersed with Terence Irwin's incisive commentary, and sometimes with contributions from modern philosophers expounding relevant philosophical positions or discussing particular aspects of classical philosophy. The arrangement of the book is thematic, rather than chronological, allowing the reader to focus on philosophical problems and ideas, but a general introduction places philosophers and (...) schools within their historical context. Irwin brings together contributions which shaped debates about knowledge, freedom, ethics, politics, and religious belief - debates which continue to be contested today, 2500 years from their conception. (shrink)

Scotus believes it is clear that the pursuit of happiness is not psychologically supreme. If the will necessarily pursued happiness, it follows that whenever both x and y are open, x rather than y promotes happiness. But Scotus replies that sometimes we are aware that x rather than y promotes happiness, but we can simply choose to pursue neither x nor y. If we suspend further action, we choose to be indifferent toward happiness. Scotus agrees with Anselm's argument from responsibility. (...) In his view, the affection for justice is nobler than the affection for advantage, because it causes us to will something that is not directed toward ourselves. It manifests freedom in the will, because an agent who is capable of choosing the just rather than the advantageous is not necessitated by nature to pursue only his own advantage. (shrink)

According to G.E.M Anscombe’s paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, modern moral philosophy has introduced a spurious concept of moral obligation, and has therefore made a mistake that the Greeks, and Aristotle in particular, avoided. Anscombe argues that the modern concepts of obligation, duty, and the moral ‘ought’ are the remnants of an earlier, but post-Aristotelian conception of ethics, and that they ought to be abandoned. An examination of Anscombe’s historical and philosophical claims shows that we have no reason to take them (...) seriously. In particular, they rest on a misinterpretation of Scholastic views on ‘ought’ and obligation. (shrink)

This is the second of three volumes which together comprise a selective historical and critical study of the development of moral philosophy. This volume covers ethics from the 16th to the 18th century, and features illuminating discussion of such great thinkers as Suarez, Grotius, Hobbes, Hutcheson, Hume, Reid, Butler, and Rousseau.

v. 1. Philosophy before Socrates -- v. 2. Socrates and his contemporaries -- v. 3. Plato's ethics -- v. 4. Plato's metaphysics and epistemology -- v. 5. Aristotle's ethics -- v. 6. Aristotle: substance, form, and matter -- v. 7. Aristotle: metaphysics, epistemology, natural philosophy -- v. 8. Hellenistic philosophy.

Plato's Euthyrphro, Apology, andCrito portray Socrates' words and deeds during his trial for disbelieving in the Gods of Athens and corrupting the Athenian youth, and constitute a defense of the man Socrates and of his way of life, the philosophic life. The twelve essays in the volume, written by leading classical philosophers, investigate various aspects of these works of Plato, including the significance of Plato's characters, Socrates's revolutionary religious ideas, and the relationship between historical events and Plato's texts.

I hope to show how Plato’s doctrines in these dialogues are meant to resolve questions in moral theory, by contrasting the theory of recollection, and the theory of desire, with Socratic theories of moral knowledge and motivation. These views of Socrates are parts of his general conception of virtue and moral knowledge as a craft ; I will outline the doctrines which belong to this general conception, and suggest some reasons why one of these doctrines leads Socrates to another. First (...) I will point to an important conflict between the theory of recollection in the Meno and Socratic views on moral knowledge, and to a further conflict between the account of desire in the Symposium and Socratic views on motivation. We will find that these two points of conflict are connected, and that Plato connects them in the Phaedrus. My aim is to present a plausible way of understanding certain Platonic doctrines; in the space available here I cannot argue for all the claims I make, but I hope the general picture will seem interesting enough to deserve more detailed defense or refutation. (shrink)

The partition of the soul is used extensively, both in Book iv and in Books viii-ix of the Republic, to describe and to explain the structure, growth, and decay, of just and unjust cities and souls. Plato has in mind a single conception of the three parts of the soul, and he expounds it gradually. He recognizes different grades of rationality in desire. These grades help us to understand the roles of the partition of the soul in Plato’s argument.

The Gorgias is a vivid introduction to the central problems of moral and political philosophy. In the notes to his translation, Professor Irwin discusses the historical and social context of the dialogue, expounds and criticises the arguments, and tries above all to suggest the questions a modern reader ought to raise about Plato's doctrines. No knowledge of Greek is necessary.

Aristotle claims that the soul in animals is defined by two faculties: the discriminative belonging to sense and thought, and the faculty of initiating movement. He insists that the part which initiates movement, the desiring part, is not separable from the other parts and faculties of the soul; to think of this as a separable part is to conceal its essential connexions with other psychic states in a teleological explanation of behaviour. His reasons for insisting on this indicate his guiding (...) assumptions about the nature of psychic states. (shrink)

The Aristotelian Corpus contains two extended treatments of justice as a virtue of character: Magna Moralia i 33 and Nicomachean Ethics Book V (or Eudemian Ethics Book IV). Differences between the two treatments include these: (1) MM denies, but EN V affirms, that natural justice is part of political justice; (2) MM denies, but EN V affirms, that general (or ‘universal’) justice is an other-directed virtue that should concern us in the treatment of justice as a virtue; (3) MM does (...) not discuss the relation between equity (epieikeia) and justice, while EN V affirms that equity and justice do not conflict. Are these differences connected? How are they to be explained? Might they help us to answer questions about (a) the relation of MM to the other two ethical treatises, and (b) the relation of EN V to the EE and to the EN? (shrink)

This chapter discusses some of the central Aristotelian doctrines founded on dialectical argument. It focuses on the Topics and Categories, which deal at length with some of the central problems classified as ‘logical’ as opposed to physical or ethical. In the Topics, Aristotle shows how to argue about the four predicables: coincident, proprium, genus, and definition. The categories or ‘kinds of predicates’ are introduced as a tenfold division of each of the four predicables, the four possible types of properties predicted (...) in a dialectical proposition or discussed in a dialectical problem. The distinctions underlying this tenfold division are presented at greater length in the Categories. (shrink)

The Posterior Analytics describes the structure of a science and of the content of scientific propositions. Aristotle sees the weaknesses observed in his methods, and his views on justification support and explain some of his demands on scientific knowledge. However, these same views seem to imply demands that he cannot meet within any plausible conception of justification.

The core of the fifth chapter is the study of the problems that appear to be involved in Socrates’ prospective. After a consideration of the difficulties that seem to emerge from Socrates’ instrumentalist approach to happiness, attention is devoted to the role played by the craft analogy. According to this analogy, virtue is similar to a craft since a knowledge of the means is necessary for a separate end. This doctrine is illustrated making reference to Aristotle because, although used by (...) Socrates, the craft analogy is never defined in the dialogues. (shrink)

In Metaphysics vii 1-6, Aristotle argues for the coincidence of the subject-criterion and the essence-criterion, and for the identification of substances with primary subjects. He suggests that form is substance; if the two criteria coincide, form must be both a particular basic subject and a primary essence. In viii-ix, Aristotle defends the identification of matter with potentiality and form with actuality. If this defence is examined prior to a discussion on the rest of the argument in vii, an important part (...) of the argument for identifying form with essence, and hence with substance, can be seen. (shrink)

What is the human good? What makes an action right? How can we know what is good or right? Is morality a matter of virtues or consequences? Can morality be rationally justified? Ethics Through History tells the story of how great philosophers have tried to answer the key questions of moral thought, from Socrates to the twentieth century.

Aristotle draws more than one contrast between form and compound, and that being a form and being a compound is not always mutually exclusive. By speaking of form and compound to mark two different contrasts, Aristotle makes his claims more obscure, but not necessarily inconsistent; each contrast is intelligible in its own right, if we can combine the two, we can understand his views on particulars. Aristotle is justified in speaking of particular forms that are compounds of form and particular (...) bits of matter. (shrink)

Aristotle describes two methods of inquiry that begin from our initial beliefs and the things we intuitively recognise, the ‘things known to us’, and claim to reach principles ‘known by nature’. Empirical inquiry begins from perception, proceeds by induction and generalisation, and tests theories by appeal to experience. Dialectic inquiry begins from common beliefs, proceeds by raising and solving puzzles, and tests theories against common beliefs. Distinguishing these two methods is useful since they suggest two ways of passing the metaphysical (...) realist test for genuine first principles. (shrink)

Chapter 8 contains a detailed discussion of the consequences that may be inferred by the doctrines discussed in the Gorgias. The position of the Gorgias recalls that of the Protagoras. Then, it is claimed that, although the Gorgias tries to refute the earlier dialogue’s hedonist view, Plato nevertheless still holds that happiness is the state in which all desires are fulfilled. Consequently, virtues are considered valuable only because they are means to attain a further end. Finally, it may be suggested (...) that the Gorgias makes a sort of transition from the early dialogues to the mature position of the Republic. (shrink)

Aristotle views justice as the important virtue in the ideal state, since it aims for the common interest of a community. He argues for two distinct virtues: general and special justice. General justice is concerned with the good of others, specifically the common good of the political community. Special justice is concerned with equality and fairness, and the avoidance of pleonexia — greedy encroachment of the goods justly assigned to others.

Les stoïciens ont joué un rôle essentiel dans le développement de la casuistique. Selon eux, une conduite morale réfléchie suppose une théorie morale, et ils s’efforcent d’appliquer la théorie morale à l’analyse de cas particuliers. Nous pouvons saisir l’importance de leur contribution en considérant la façon dont elle sous-tend le système de casuistique issu de la philosophie morale scolastique qui apparaît au xvie siècle. Ma présentation des différentes étapes de l’histoire de la ca­suistique comporte de nombreuses lacunes, à la fois (...) parce que j’ai négligé plusieurs sources importantes et parce que j’ai laissé de côté des aspects significatifs de celles que j’examine. Peut-être cependant, réduite comme elle l’est à l’essentiel, l’esquisse que je présente aidera-t-elle à mettre en lumière l’importance des stoïciens. (shrink)