Abstract
I hope to show how Plato’s doctrines in these dialogues are meant to resolve questions in moral theory, by contrasting the theory of recollection, and the theory of desire, with Socratic theories of moral knowledge and motivation. These views of Socrates are parts of his general conception of virtue and moral knowledge as a craft ; I will outline the doctrines which belong to this general conception, and suggest some reasons why one of these doctrines leads Socrates to another. First I will point to an important conflict between the theory of recollection in the Meno and Socratic views on moral knowledge, and to a further conflict between the account of desire in the Symposium and Socratic views on motivation. We will find that these two points of conflict are connected, and that Plato connects them in the Phaedrus. My aim is to present a plausible way of understanding certain Platonic doctrines; in the space available here I cannot argue for all the claims I make, but I hope the general picture will seem interesting enough to deserve more detailed defense or refutation.