This book provides a current review of Medical Research Ethics on a global basis. The book contains chapters that are historically and philosophically reflective and aimed to promote a discussion about controversial and foundational aspects in the field. An elaborate group of chapters concentrates on key areas of medical research where there are core ethical issues that arise both in theory and practice: genetics, neuroscience, surgery, palliative care, diagnostics, risk and prediction, security, pandemic threats, finances, technology, and public policy.This book (...) is suitable for use from the most basic introductory courses to the highest levels of expertise in multidisciplinary contexts. The insights and research by this group of top scholars in the field of bioethics is an indispensable read for medical students in bioethics seminars and courses as well as for philosophy of bioethics classes in departments of philosophy, nursing faculties, law schools where bioethics is linked to medical law, experts in comparative law and public health, international human rights, and is equally useful for policy planning in pharmaceutical companies. (shrink)

En este breve comentario discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación de la epistemología de Davidson que sugiere Willian Duica en su reciente libro. Luego de una presentación somera del libro me centro en tres asuntos centrales de la interpretación de Duica. En primer lugar, argumento que su lectura de la crítica de Davidson al dualismo esquema/contenido es muy restrictiva y deja abierta la posibilidad de un realismo directo empirista. En segundo lugar, argumento que en su lectura el propio Duica se (...) compromete inadvertidamente con un empirismo de este tipo y, de este modo, su interpretación entra en tensión con el coherentismo de Davidson. Finalmente, discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación que hace Duica de la tesis davidsoniana de la triangulación. In this short comment I discuss some aspects of William Duica's interpretation of Davidson's epistemology in a recent book. After a brief review of the book, I focus on three central issues of Duica's interpretation. First, I argue that his reading of Davidson's criticism of the scheme/content dualism is too restrictive and leaves open the possibility of an empiricist direct realism. Second, I argue in his reading Duica inadvertently commits himself to an empiricism of this sort and, as a result, his interpretation is in tension with Davidson's own coherentism. Finally, I discuss some aspects of Duica's interpretation of Davidsonian triangulation. (shrink)

Research examining firm and industry effects on performance has primarily focused on the financial aspects of firm performance. Corporate social performance is a major aspect of firm performance that has been under-examined empirically in the literature to date. Adding to the fundamental debate regarding firm versus industry effects on performance, this study uses data drawn from the Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini Co. database to examine the degree to which CSP is related to firm, industry, and temporal factors. The results of (...) these analyses suggest that CSP tends to change in a linear manner over time; however, the slope of this line varies across firms and industries. These findings are supported by several robustness checks accounting for autocorrelation, alternative measures of industry, different samples commonly used when using KLD data to measure CSP, and alternative measures of CSP when using the KLD database. The authors also directly compare firm, industry, and temporal effects between CSP and financial performance. (shrink)

"A runaway trolley is speeding down a track" So begins what is perhaps the most fecund thought experiment of the past several decades since its invention by Philippa Foot. Since then, moral philosophers have applied the "trolley problem" as a thought experiment to study many different ethical conflicts - and chief among them is the programming of autonomous vehicles. Nowadays, however, very few philosophers accept that the trolley problem is a perfect analogy for driverless cars or that the situations autonomous (...) vehicles face will resemble the forced choice of the unlucky bystander in the original thought experiment. This book represents a substantial and purposeful effort to move the academic discussion beyond the trolley problem to the broader ethical, legal, and social implications that autonomous vehicles present. There are still urgent questions waiting to be addressed, for example: how AVs might interact with human drivers in mixed or "hybrid" traffic environments; how AVs might reshape our urban landscapes; what unique security or privacy concerns are raised by AVs as connected devices in the "Internet of Things"; how the benefits and burdens of this new technology, including mobility, traffic congestion, and pollution, will be distributed throughout society; and more. An attempt to map the landscape of these next-generation questions and to suggest preliminary answers, this volume draws on the disciplines of philosophy, sociology, economics, urban planning and transportation engineering, business ethics and more, and represents a global range of perspectives. (shrink)

Este artículo explora el concepto de trauma colectivo y su aplicación en el contexto histórico y social de las sociedades latinoamericanas. La transferencia del término «trauma colectivo» desde el campo del conocimiento psicológico a la esfera social e histórica plantea preguntas sobre su legitimidad y marco conceptual. El estudio examina la fidelidad de esta transferencia conceptual y su relación con la comprensión psicoanalítica temprana de los fenómenos traumáticos. El contexto cultural europeo de finales del siglo xix y principios del siglo (...) xx proporcionó la base para teorizar las consecuencias de experiencias intensas y violentas, lo que resultó en el concepto de «neurosis traumática», influenciado significativamente por el trabajo de Freud. El artículo discute la apropiación de herramientas psicoanalíticas en la crítica histórica y cultural para comprender eventos que desafían marcos tradicionales y la inteligibilidad social, como el Holocausto. La noción del trauma como una fuerza enigmática y recurrente en la experiencia histórica se explora a través del enfoque de los estudios del trauma. El artículo pone de relieve a destacados y destacadas académicas en este campo y su uso de conceptos psicoanalíticos, demostrando la preservación y aplicación significativa de estas nociones en la comprensión de fenómenos históricos y colectivos. Al acortar la brecha entre las experiencias psicológicas individuales y los traumas colectivos, los estudios del trauma ofrecen un enfoque único para interpretar y representar eventos que resisten las narrativas históricas tradicionales. (shrink)

AimThe functional prognosis of patients after coma following either cardiac arrest or acute structural brain injury is often uncertain. These patients are associated with high mortality and disability. N20 and N70 somatosensory evoked potentials are used to predict prognosis. We evaluated the utility of SSEP as an early indicator of long-term prognosis in these patients.MethodsThis was a retrospective cohort study of patients admitted to the intensive care unit with a diagnosis of coma after CA or ABI. An SSEP study was (...) performed, including N20 and N70 at 24–72 h, after coma onset. Functional recovery was assessed 6–12 months later using the modified Glasgow scale. The study was approved by our local research ethics committee.ResultsIn the CA and ABI groups, the absence of N20 or N70 was a strong indicator of poor outcome. Conversely, the presence of N70 was an indicator of a good outcome.ConclusionSomatosensory evoked potentials are useful early prognostic markers with high specificity and sensitivity. Moreover, N70 has additional potential value for improving the prediction of good long-term functional outcomes.Clinical Trial Registration:[https://clinicaltrials.gov/], identifier [2018/01/001]. (shrink)

Olympic combat sports are unconventional physical activity strategies to train middle-aged and older people with and without health problems. This systematic review aimed to assess the available body of published peer-reviewed articles related to the effects of Olympic combat sports interventions on health-related quality of life in adults aged 45 and older. The search was carried out in five generic databases until July 2021 and the protocol was registered in PROSPERO. The PRISMA guidelines were followed and the Downs and Black (...) checklist was used to assessed the methodological quality of the studies. After reviewing 1,151 records, only seven studies met the inclusion criteria, adding 212 participants with a mean age of 63.7 years. Six studies provided data to calculate the effect size in the Olympic combat sports groups. Three studies reported beneficial changes with a small ES for the total score of the health-related quality of life. Two studies reported a beneficial change with a small ES and strong ES for physical health. One study reported improvements with a small ES for emotional and functional well-being. In conclusion, interventions based on Olympic combat sports produce beneficial effects with a small and moderate ES on health-related quality of life in male and female aged 45 and older who are healthy participants, participants with Parkinson's disease, and participants with breast cancer.Systematic Review Registration:https://www.crd.york.ac.uk/prospero/, PROSPERO: CRD42021244161. (shrink)

[What It’s Like, or What It’s About? The Place of Consciousness in the Material World] Summary: The book is both a survey of the contemporary debate and a defense of a distinctive position. Most philosophers nowadays assume that the focus of the philosophy of consciousness, its shared explanandum, is a certain property of experience variously called “phenomenal character,” “qualitative character,” “qualia” or “phenomenology,” understood in terms of what it is like to undergo the experience in question. Consciousness as defined in (...) terms of its phenomenal aspect is often called “phenomenal consciousness.” The major issue that occupies most thinkers is whether this phenomenal character happens to be a physical property, or whether it is rather sui generis. Those who believe the former are materialists; those who conclude the latter are dualists. As the currently dominant metaphysic is materialism – also sometimes called physicalism – the challenge appears to be to slot phenomenal properties among the physical properties that ultimately make up the world. David Chalmers argued powerfully that we can go very far in situating many mental properties in the physical world – namely, the properties that can be understood in functional terms – but that phenomenal properties resist such a treatment. Chalmers calls this “the hard problem” of consciousness. But there are also some quite powerful positive arguments for dualism. The two most influential ones are the modal argument, also offered by Chalmers, and the knowledge argument invented by Frank Jackson. Chalmers invites us to conceive of creatures that are exactly like human beings – physically, functionally, behaviorally – only bereft of phenomenal consciousness. If such creatures are conceivable, says Chalmers, they are metaphysically possible. And if they are metaphysically possible, materialism is false. Jackson, for his part, suggests we imagine Mary who has spent her entire life inside a black-and-white room and has seen the world through a black-and-white TV screen. But she also happens to know everything there is to know about the physics of color. And yet, Jackson suggests that once Mary is finally released from her room and sees a lawn outside, she learns something new: that this is what it is like to experience green color. The current work on consciousness is by and large characterized by attempts to answer these two dualistic arguments. I try to make sense of the positions within the domain of philosophy of consciousness by means of two major distinctions that mutually intersect. First, there is a distinction between dualism and materialism. An apparent third alternative currently on offer, the so-called Russellian monism, is unstable, collapsing into either dualism (panpsychism) or materialism (Russellian physicalism). Materialism comes in two main flavors: either the a posteriori physicalism, which detects an epistemic gap between phenomenal and physical truths, hence denying that the former could be derived from the latter; or the a priori physicalism, which does not acknowledge any such obstacle. The second major distinction is between phenomenism and representationalism. It’s true that Ned Block, who introduced this contrast, meant to distinguish between two kinds of materialism. But I believe that the distinction actually intersects the one between materialism and dualism. We thus arrive at a table with six slots, representing six main positions in the philosophy of consciousness: (1) dualist phenomenism (Chalmers, the early Jackson, and Tyler Burge); (2) dualist representationalism (René Descartes); (3) aposteriori materialist phenomenism (Block); (4) a posteriori materialist representationalism (Michael Tye, Fred Dretske, David Rosenthal); (5) a priori materialist phenomenism (David Lewis); and (6) a priori materialist representationalism (Daniel Dennett, Derk Pereboom). However, this scheme is in fact somewhat misleading. It is true that Dennett is usually classified as an apriori materialist (or, more precisely an apriori materialist representationalist), but I believe that needs to be corrected. In order to understand why, I first analyze varieties of materialist representationalism in detail, in particular various construals of phenomenal character in terms of representation, or intentionality, which includes a discussion of the identity of its content (the issue of externalism). By contrast, Dennett rejects the concept of phenomenal character. Consciousness has no intrinsic, publicly inaccessible properties. On that ground, Dennett builds an empirical, fully functionalist theory of consciousness, which he also tries to integrate within a general Darwinian framework. From that point of view, one can contrast Dennettian and representationalist views on the issue of animal consciousness. In addition to his rejection of phenomenal character, Dennett also abstains from the regular metaphysical departure point of regular materialism. He does not so much ask how an enigmatic property of consciousness fits an antecedently characterized world, but rather how far we can investigate all aspects of the world, including consciousness, using the scientific method. He is thus a methodological naturalist, rather than a metaphysical materialist. While this approach removes obstacles to the science of consciousness, it does not solve what might be called “the hardest problem” – of intentionality, not phenomenal consciousness. The hardest problem consists in the fact that our intentional discourse involves conflicting commitments that prevent a coherent metaphysic of representational states. However, it does not follow that we should give up on this discourse as a theoretical means of reduction as well as a practical tool of explanation. But it might be that intentional discourse is a somewhat pseudo one. (shrink)

In this research, a sliding mode regulator with sine mapping is suggested for the stabilization of electricity generators being affected by magnet interaction nonlinearities and generator nonlinearities. To reach this goal, our suggested regulator has the following contributions: it starts from the sliding mode regulator with the modifications that the saturation mapping is used to reach a smoother performance instead of the signum mapping, and the sine mapping is applied to reach an upper bound in the proportional gain error, it (...) is used to reach some chosen constant behaviors for the angle position, angle speed, and current in the electricity generators, and its stabilization is ensured based on the Lyapunov approach. We show the simulation of the suggested regulator in two electricity generators. (shrink)

The paper critically examines C.A.J. Coady's analysis of testimony, concentrating on his interpretation of the views of David Hume. The author tries to show that not only is Coady's interpretation of Hume inadequate, but that Hume's conception of testimony is in fact superior to that of Coady. Coady sees Hume as the originator of the individualistic, first-person, view of testimony, according to which the reports of other people must be confirmed on the basis of an individualistically interpreted perception. Coady (...) argues against the first-person view that it undermines the very possibility of communication. Drawing on the ideas of Davidson and Wittgenstein, he argues that a good many beliefs must be true for the communication to be possible. The author provides evidence that Hume was a third-person theorist himself, even if he did not think that the truth of the majority of beliefs must be presupposed. Moreover, Wittgenstein and perhaps Davidson are also Humean in their belief that it suffices for beliefs to be generally correct rather than true. (shrink)

[Materialism and Hylomorphism] The author disputes the view, expressed recently by Tomáš Machula a David Peroutka, that materialism, dominant in contemporary philosophy of mind, should be substituted by Thomist hylomorphism. The critique focuses on two aspects of Machula and Peroutka’s argument. Firstly, on their assumption that the contemporary preference for materialism is the result of chance (ignorance of the fact that in addition to materialism and dualism the position of hylomorphism is also available). This assumption fails to take into (...) account the fact that dualism was already the subject of criticism in the 17th century, but materialism only became properly established in the mid-twentieth century. Secondly, the author argues that Thomist hylomorphism can be updated in a more fruitful way than that proposed by Machula and Peroutka. This updating requires us, however, to sacrifice certain metaphysically unsustainable ideas – in particular the idea that the soul is a non-material substance independent of the body. (shrink)

Este artículo apunta varios temas éticos en los cuales el análisis de Tomásde Aquino emplea la noción de voluntad, mientras que el de Aristóteles no lo hace. Se sostiene que las explicaciones de Aquino son más completas precisamente porque introduce la voluntad en la discusión. Esta introducción de la voluntad representa un mayor énfasis en la libertad de los actos morales.

Se presenta una visión de la epistemología como lógica del pensar y se la lleva a una elaboración de la práctica clínica como una lógica del padecimiento psíquico. Esto basado en los planteamientos de Deleuze y Guattari. Para ello se toma como punto de partida la noción de los movimientos aberrantes que, leyendo la obra de Deleuze, elaboró David Lapoujade entendiéndolos como movimientos que se producen en la relación entre distintos términos heterogéneos, pero manteniendo su heterogeneidad. Esto es vinculado (...) con la invitación que hace el mismo Lapoujade a entender la obra deleuzeana como el desarrollo de lógicas irracionales, intentando pensar desde ahí una lógica de la locura y del padecimiento mental con base en, a su vez, una lógica de las obras literarias de Proust y Kafka, tal como las leen los mismos Deleuze y Guattari. En relación con ello destacamos, por un lado, cierta lógica de conjuntos abiertos y no totalizables que estos últimos autores encuentran en la obra de Proust y, por otro lado, una lógica de la contigüidad que encuentran en la obra de Kafka. Al mismo tiempo, se establecen puntos en común entre estas dos lecturas a propósito de lo esquizoide como algo que excede a la significación del discurso, así como a la normatividad de la conducta. Asimismo, en distintos puntos del escrito se extraerán las implicaciones que estos modos de pensar tienen para una práctica clínica en relación con modos de existencia subjetivos que se escapan a lo que está establecido en el campo social. De esa manera, ponemos en conjunción una aproximación epistemológica con una política. (shrink)

En nuestra cultura actual, se promete igualdad en un sistema donde nadie es rechazado, ya que se supondría que todos tienen las mismas capacidades. El problema surge cuando, dejando de lado estas posturas superficiales enfocadas a tareas sencillas y básicas del intelecto, se toma consciencia de las diferencias que existen entre nosotros y se empieza a cuestionar esta idea tergiversada de una igualdad entre los ciudadanos.

The work presents the concept of a structural universal and the criticisms that have been leveled against it. A structural universal is a property had by an individual due to the nature of its proper parts and due to the relations obtaining between those parts. Mellor has argued that there is no reason to accept such universal in addition to the basic universals that compose them. David Lewis has argued –on the other hand– that it has not been satisfactorily (...) explained how universals are composed by other universals. The composition by which a structural universal is given cannot be a set-theoretical construction or a mereological sum. Several proposals to explain the nature of structural universals are discussed. Finally it is argued that a structural universal should be understood as a complexion of higher-order universals. (shrink)

Este trabajo discute qué razones tenemos para pensar que existe un espacio ontológico modal y por qué debemos pensar que este espacio está constituido por una pluralidad de mundos posibles. Después se presentan tres teorías metafísicas sobre la naturaleza de los mundos posibles: la concepción realista extrema de David Lewis, la concepción realista moderada de Alvin Plantinga y la concepción de los mundos posibles como universales estructurales máximos. Un breve examen comparativo tratará de mostrar por qué la tercea opción (...) es la más prometedora o, al menos, parece serlo. El trabajo finalmente considera el panorama que tiene por delante una defensa plenamente desarrollada de la teoría modal basada en universales. (shrink)

This paper presents the Spanish translation of the only two texts of Franz Brentano which deal specifically with St. Thomas Aquinas. The first text is a section about St. Albert the Great and Aquinas in an article published during Brentano’s youth, “The History of Ecclesiastical Sciences” (1867). The second text is an article, “Thomas Aquinas” (1908), written at the end of his life. Both texts reveal the immense value that Brentano saw in Aquinas. They also show that he regarded Aquinas (...) mainly as an important interpreter of Aristotle rather than as a philosopher in his own right. Brentano’s approach here also gives us some insight into his own conception of philosophical hermeneutics. The differences between the two texts are evident; for instance, in the second one, there is a Brentano’s manipulation of Aquinas’ thought to justify his leaving the Catholic Faith. The texts are also preceded by a little introduction of mine. Original titles: «Geschichte der kirchlichen Wissenschaften», in: Johann Adam Möhler (ed.), 'Kirchengeschichte', Band 2 (Regensburg: Manz, 1867), pp. 550-556 and «Thomas von Aquin», 'Neue Freie Presse' 15683 (18/4/1908): 1-5. (shrink)

According to Aquinas, divine omniscience, omnipotence and providence, do not contradict the existence of either true contingency in the natural world or freedom but, on the contrary, they support them. In short, the two peculiarities of the doctrine of providence in St. Thomas here exposed are: first, that God's will is the ultimate foundation of all contingency (and not merely the deficiency of secondary causes); second, that the divine causality cannot be reduced to any of the two groups of created (...) causes (necessary or contingent) but it is only known to us by analogy. (shrink)

This article intends to offer a general presentation of the way in which Saint Thomas Aquinas proceeded in his exegesis of sacred texts. The author concentrates on one of Aquinas’ most estimated biblical commentaries, his Lectura on the Gospel according to St. John. Aquinas combines great theological insight with an incipient development of some literary techniques. In his hermeneutics, he emphasizes the priority of the literal sense of Scripture, although this thesis does not lead him to present a purely natural (...) interpretation. The supernatural mystery of God belongs to the literal sense of Scripture. This is why God, as the principal author of Scripture, might have intended to express different truths even within a single passage. (shrink)

Alexander of Aphrodisias understood the Aristotle´s Unmoved Mover as efficient cause only to the extent that it is the final cause of heaven, which by moving strives to imitate the divine rest. Aquinas seems to agree with him. However his interpretation is original and philosophically more satisfactory: God is the efficient cause of the world, not only as creator, but also as it´s ruler. In this way God is also the final cause.

This piece, included in the drift special issue of continent. , was created as one step in a thread of inquiry. While each of the contributions to drift stand on their own, the project was an attempt to follow a line of theoretical inquiry as it passed through time and the postal service(s) from October 2012 until May 2013. This issue hosts two threads: between space & place and between intention & attention . The editors recommend that to experience the (...) drifiting thought that attention be paid to the contributions as they entered into conversation one after another. This particular piece is from the BETWEEN INTENTION & ATTENTION thread: Jeremy Fernando, Sitting in the Dock of the bay, watching... * R.H. Jackson, Reading Eyes * Gina Rae Foster, Nyctoleptic Nomadism: The Drift/Swerve of Knowing * Bronwyn Lay, Driftwood * Patricia Reed, Sentences on Drifitng * David Prater, drift: a way * * * * * ‘Kraftledningarna / spända i köldens rike / norr om all musik.’ TOMAS TRANSTRÖMER Attention! You are not dreaming, you are drifting into sleep. You are feeling veeeerrry sleepy now. The curvature of the earth is causing you to shift away from the pinpoint that you circled yesterday on a map, your eyes hazed. That was also a today, in a novel fashion—the today of days long gone, of clouds long transformed into rain, or else snow drifts. That’s okay, you know this: in cathedrals of bone we find arcs that keep us warm. In drift- wood we find the puzzles that madden us all night, Tetris dreaming. In from our past, deriving steam, straight lines, axes, branches, kindling. Attention! Does anyone here speak Spanish? Si? Bueno! Dream with me. Cry out in your sleep. Step fearfully out onto the ice and drift awhile, inside a massive Perspex speech-bubble dream. A massive bubble longing to become detergent. The louvres of a ribcage snapping shut. Awe. Curvature of the earth is a con job: ask a dervish. Hail an imaginary cab in a hail-struck avenue and wait for the popcorn to drop. Stop, drifter! In the pharmacies and in the alleys, popping rocks while money men drift by in stockings, purling and unfurling their ways, their means. Attention, people!ion hurts. Reading too much into things I know nothing about, the niceness of the void or else a philosopher’s mouth sewn shut. I know about that, at least: the madness of seeking asylum in antipodean dreams, drifting for weeks at a time on a boat more abstract than surreal. Oh, fuck Life of Pi! Heaven basks like a warm, square meal but I can’t get there from here. There is no shark travelling at speed X while I zoom at speed Y in the opposite direction. I can’t use a lasso. I no longer have fits. I am no, mad. Too bad. Attention! Ambient doom slash moon. Over! The curvature of a yawn, a dream sewn shut. This skin, that knows my dreams, forgets me. Fruit tingles, wet on the tongue: get me some analogue hits, expressways to frozen, lakeside moon-dream voiceovers. The narrator’s cues infuse the afternoon, the canoes, with nostalgia. Somewhere, out there, we become driftories. We lie down in atoms and the clinamina bore. We fight against our own handwritten lies, type marching letters into files and save. Awe. Fidelity is a kind of surveillance. Current A. Attention! It was never my intention to score cheap points at the expense of polar bears, of driftwood, shores. The cockatoos roar. Their explosive chatter could strip a pine tree raw. Implant in me some destructive grace, to drift. Planetoid lamps all along the turnpike’s busy arcs. Extreme emissions of things. Drift-rings. The target of my gaze, sewn shut. Your eyes rising slower than a star from what you read, condensed into steam, here, north of all music. Driftories, signal fires, smoke: disappear. Go back to sleep now. No, we were never here. (shrink)

_L’Action_ de Maurice Blondel presenta un método filosófico que pretende el acceso a la totalidad desde lo concreto, sustentado sobre la praxis como mediación dinámico-concreta y sintético-universal. Se ofrece un método cuya rigurosidad no depende de una secuencia lógica abstracta o sistemática inmanente al propio método, sino de una concatenación necesaria inmanente al dinamismo vital concreto. La filosofía es propuesta como la toma de conciencia de la vida ante sí misma. En un horizonte de sentido totalizante, los fenómenos son secundados (...) tal como se donan al sujeto en una apertura a la posibilidad de asumir la totalidad de sus factores sin exclusión, parcialidad o contradicción. (shrink)

Resumen El artículo muestra la relación estructural entre el testimonio y el juicio estético, y cómo la mentira estructural se implica irreductiblemente como la posibilidad de la verdad. Se explica la necesaria imposibilidad del testimonio como condición de su posibilidad, argumento anticipado por J. L. Borges: “No hay una sola hermosa palabra, con la excepción dudosa de testigo, que no sea una abstracción”. La argumentación se apoya en la teoría husserliana del syncategorema y en los deícticos ; asimismo, se toma (...) de I. Kant el papel de la imaginación y los efectos del “como si”.This essay demonstrates the structural relationship between testimony and aesthetic judgment. The implications of this discovery are several, the most important being the relationship between the lie and truth, implicating that lie indicates the irreducible possibility of truth. The essay explains the necessary impossibility of the testimony as a condition of its possibility, an argument anticipated in Jorge Luis Borges’ beautiful phrase, “There is not a single beautiful word, with the dubious exception of witness, that is not an abstraction”. The argument is based on Husserl’s theory of the syncategorem and on deictic words ; as well, it takes from Kant, the role of the imagination and the effects of the “as if”. (shrink)

Buena parte del nervio metafísico radica en el esfuerzo, en ocasiones ímprobo, de remontarse al plano de lo quoad se (lo que es «en sí») sin dejarse eclipsar por la seductora inmediatez de lo quoad nos (lo que es «para nosotros», anclados en nuestra propia perspectiva), aun cuando, como en el caso del conocimiento, el objeto tematizado nos toque tan de cerca. De hecho, no se logra abordar satisfactoriamente la realidad del conocimiento en su taleidad, si se parte, en exclusiva, (...) de un primado indiscutible en la línea de lo receptivo, puesto que en tal caso sólo cabe entender el proprium del conocimiento como mero mecanismo «ordenador», entregado sin residuos a la tarea de interconectar y desmadejar una serie de impresiones o datos de conciencia que ya siempre aparecen en él en calidad de «huellas», presumiblemente procedentes desde un «afuera» nouménico que resulta ignoto por principio. Por esto mismo, desde el tomismo, el estudio del conocimiento humano no se puede realizar a espaldas de la íntegra y fundamental constitución metafísica de la persona humana, en cuanto acto de ser esencializado humanamente y singularizado por una materia signada, cuyo fundamento último descansa en la participación ontológica por la que Dios, Ser y Entender subsistente, da el ser a las creaturas. (shrink)

Spanish translation of Cajetan’s commentary on quaestiones 22 and 116 of the first part of the 'Summa'. The translator precedes the text of Cajetan with a broad introduction in which he compares the views of the author with the interpretation of the same problems by Báñez in the context of the 'De Auxiliis' controversy. According to the translator, Báñez would have been more faithful to the thought of Saint Thomas than Cajetan. However, the core of the contribution of this great (...) commentator will also be assumed by Báñez; it was so important for him that he implicitly quoted it in his last words. (shrink)

Barrero, Tomás Andrés. “Aserción, expresión y acción. Una lectura de J. L. Austin.” Dianoia 60.74 (2015): 81-107.

El presente artículo toma como excusa un análisis de la película Doce hombres en punga para introducir, con ánimo propedéutico, tres cuestiones: i) el núcleo conceptual de la retórica, ii) el razonamiento abductivo, y iii) la relación entre argumentación y emociones. Sobre la primera cuestión se proponen tres discusiones: el puesto del logos, el pathos y el ethos en la retórica, la relación entre retórica y dialéctica, y la idea de persuasión. Sobre la segunda se exponen las tres dimensiones de (...) la abducción para una compresión adecuada: la inferencial, la metodológica y la intuitiva. La tercera cuestión queda perfilada con algunas sugerencias sobre el papel de las emociones en la argumentación y la exigencia de una ética mínima para el ejercicio retórico. Esas tres cuestiones no son neutras y suponen profundas discusiones. (shrink)

In these pages the author intends to examine the idea, quite widespread among Aristotle’s recent scholars, that the method of metaphysics were mainly dialectical. This problem is investigated in Aquinas, who decidedly denies that metaphysics uses dialectics because it just provides probability. Metaphysics, unlike dialectics, is not only based on the being of reason but also on the natural being. Therefore, it does not simply constitute a rational game about quiddities, but it studies things in their real actuality and must (...) therefore be supported by evidence. Although Aquinas agrees with Aristotle in affirming that not every science enjoys the same certainty, this fact is due to different reasons. First, all things do not possess the same stability and constancy. Secondly, there is not always a perfect match between the studied matter and the human faculty to ascertain. This match between the object and the subject is the most decisive factor for the certainty of sciences. (shrink)

Arne Naess introduced the notion of ?concrete contents? to posit that the qualities we perceive in nature are intrinsic to the things themselves, and not just projections of our senses on to the world. This gives environmentalism more credence than if secondary qualities about the environment are considered subjective in a pejorative sense. But the concrete contents position pushes philosophy toward poetry because it suggests that felt qualities are as primary as logic. For a philosophy to justify itself, it sometimes (...) needs to find resonance with qualities outside its borders. Examples are presented from Italian writer Italo Calvino, the music of the Kahuli people of New Guinea, a film by John Sayles, and a poem by Tomas Tranströmer. The concrete philosophical contents of the world are found in the relationships between philosophy and experience, never inside philosophy alone. (shrink)

This article deals with the action of the Divine Word in the history of salvation by studying the Lectura super Ioannem. The Divine Word expresses perfectly the essence of God by way of intellect. When the Father intends to manifest Himself ad extra, He speaks through His Word. Creatures represent a very imperfect likeness of God. In the prophetic word the Son speaks with human words; however, the only voice entirely united to the Divine Word is the humanity of Jesus. (...) Christ, especially in His paschal mystery, constitutes the culmination of God’s revelation. Even in the beatific vision, the Word will be the mediator of our knowledge of the Father. (shrink)

El pensamiento cristiano, para el cual la gracia perfecciona la naturaleza y no la destruye, no impide la fundamentación laica-racional, es decir, sin presupuestos teológicos de la libertad. En este sentido, queremos retomar la lección de Tomás de Aquino sobre el acto libre que puede constituir un aporte para este propósito. En el presente trabajo se expondrán las inferencias laicas que se pueden extraer de la génesis y desarrollo de la naturaleza jurídica y económica del acto libre, así como las (...) presenta Tomás. El desarrollo del estudio no repite, sino que prolonga la filosofía de Tomás y, aunque no usa el lenguaje habitual de los estudios tomistas, se mantiene fiel a su lógica y pensamiento. (shrink)

En este artículo se toma en consideración la noción de providencia en Alejandro de Afrodisias, como hito principal de los esfuerzos del aristotelismo para responder a la noción estoica de “destino” o “hado”. Se tienen en cuenta los precedentes aristotélicos sobre este tema, sobre todo el tratado _De mundo_. El aristotelismo siempre ha recalcado la mayor sujeción al poder divino de los cielos respecto del mundo sublunar, pero será Alejandro quien convierta esta providencia primariamente concentrada en el cielo en una (...) “providencia general” en sentido estricto. Ahora bien, si los dioses sólo conocen las especies y no los particulares, entonces es preciso rechazar la interpretación de Sharples. Según él, la concepción de providencia sostenida por Alejandro pretendía responder a una línea de crítica como la de Ático; pero, de acuerdo con Alejandro, los dioses seguirían sin saber la calidad de la conducta humana, luego no se daría satisfacción a las objeciones de Ático. Se finaliza atendiendo al parentesco de la concepción de Alejandro con el medioplatonismo, una semejanza que podría justificar este viraje adoptado por el filósofo peripatético. (shrink)

Albert the Great understands wisdom principally as a characteristic of human science, not principally as a feature of revealed theology. The article deals with the texts of his comments on Nicomachean Ethics and Metaphysics in order to know how he understands this knowledge.

Resumen La mayoría de los comentarios y estudios tradicionales sobre Tomás de Aquino, como los que han predominado en la escolástica y la neoescolástica, se han caracte rizado por el intelectualismo de su pensamiento basado principalmente, aunque no exclusivamente, en la primacía ontológica del intelecto sobre la voluntad; en la afir mación de la ignorancia como una de las causas primordiales del mal actuar, y en la existencia de una facultad como la voluntad que tiende a seguir el juicio de (...) la razón. En los últimos cincuenta años, sin embargo, esta interpretación ha sido revisada crí ticamente poniendo a la luz de los textos el valor de la voluntad en la antropología y la ética de Tomás de Aquino. Sin tratar de negar la presencia de elementos intelec- tualistas en su obra, el objetivo de este trabajo es reflexionar en torno a la existencia de cierto voluntarismo psicológico de santo Tomás con base en el papel que ejerce la voluntad en la realización del mal moral.Most of the studies and commentaries on Thomas Aquinas such as those made from the scholastic and neo-scholastic perspective have emphasized the intelectualism of his thought. This intelectualism is based mainly but non exclusively on the ontologicalprimacy of the intellect over the will, on the affirmation that the ignorance is one of the pivotal causes of evil actions, and on the fact that the will tends to follow the judgment of reason. Over the last fifty years, however, this reading has been the object of a critical revision by bringing to light in the texts the value of the will in Ethics and Philosophical Anthropology of Thomas Aquinas. Without the least intention of questioning the presence of intelectualist elements in his works, the aim of this paper is to reflect on some kind of psychological voluntarism in Thomas Aquinas, grounded on the role of the will in realiging the moral evil. (shrink)