Alexander of Aphrodisias

Alexander of Aphrodisias picks up Aristotle’s insufficient treatment of simultaneous perception and develops an adequate solution for the problem, thereby offering an account of the unity of perceptual consciousness—the single mental activity of a single subject with complex content. I show the adequacy of the solution by using as criteria the requirements that have been identified by Aristotle and approved (and explained) by Alexander. I analyze Alexander’s solution in two turns. First, with respect to heterogeneous perceptibles, Alexander adopts and reformulates (...) Aristotle’s metaphorical account invoking the analogy with a point. Second, with respect to homogeneous opposites, accordingly, perception is judgement, but it involves physical changes in diverse parts of the primary sense-organ. By this account Alexander resolves the issue of the unity of the subject on the level of the capacity of the soul, and coordinates the complexity of content with the complexity on the physical level. In addition to being adequate, the solution is faithful to Aristotle. I suggest that the interpretative decisions Alexander makes (the clarification of the analogy; the reference he finds to the analogy; the two components of the solution, judgement and parts of the organ) form an ingenious extension of Aristotle’s treatment. Interestingly, even though many elements in Alexander’s interpretation are taken up by modern commentators, no one has followed it in its entirety, nor even treated it in its own right. (shrink)

A fairly long (~15,000 word) overview of ancient theories of freedom and determinism. It covers the supposed threat of causal determinism to "free will," i.e., the sort of control we need to have in order to be rightly held responsible for our actions. But it also discusses fatalistic arguments that proceed from the Principle of Bivalence, what responsibility we have for our own characters, and god and fate. Philosophers discussed include Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, Carneades, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Plotinus. (...) Plato is mentioned in passing a few times in connection with other philosophers. (shrink)

En este artículo se toma en consideración la noción de providencia en Alejandro de Afrodisias, como hito principal de los esfuerzos del aristotelismo para responder a la noción estoica de “destino” o “hado”. Se tienen en cuenta los precedentes aristotélicos sobre este tema, sobre todo el tratado _De mundo_. El aristotelismo siempre ha recalcado la mayor sujeción al poder divino de los cielos respecto del mundo sublunar, pero será Alejandro quien convierta esta providencia primariamente concentrada en el cielo en una (...) “providencia general” en sentido estricto. Ahora bien, si los dioses sólo conocen las especies y no los particulares, entonces es preciso rechazar la interpretación de Sharples. Según él, la concepción de providencia sostenida por Alejandro pretendía responder a una línea de crítica como la de Ático; pero, de acuerdo con Alejandro, los dioses seguirían sin saber la calidad de la conducta humana, luego no se daría satisfacción a las objeciones de Ático. Se finaliza atendiendo al parentesco de la concepción de Alejandro con el medioplatonismo, una semejanza que podría justificar este viraje adoptado por el filósofo peripatético. (shrink)

To study the influence of divinity on cosmos, Alexander uses the notions of ‘fate’ and ‘providence,’ which were common in the philosophy of his time. In this way, he provides an Aristotelian interpretation of the problems related to such concepts. In the context of this discussion, he offers a description of ‘nature’ different from the one that he usually regards as the standard Aristotelian notion of nature, i.e. the intrinsic principle of motion and rest. The new coined concept is a (...) ‘cosmic’ nature that can be identified with both ‘fate’ and ‘divine power,’ which are the immediate effect of providence upon the world. In the paper it is exposed how the conception of providence defended by Alexander means a rejection of the divine care of the particulars, since the divinities are only provident for species. Several texts belonging to the Middle Platonic philosophers will convince us that such thinkers (and not directly Aristotle) are the origin of the thesis that will be understood as the conventional Aristotelian position, namely that divinity only orders species but not individuals. (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

Aristotle sometimes claims that the perception of special perceptibles by their proper sense is unerring. This claim is striking, since it might seem that we quite often misperceive things like colours, sounds and smells. Aristotle also claims that the perception of common perceptibles is more prone to error than the perception of special perceptibles. This is puzzling in its own right, and also places constraints on the interpretation of. I argue that reading Alexander of Aphrodisias on perceptual error can help (...) to make good sense of both of Aristotle’s claims. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentaries on Aristotle’s Organon are valuable sources for both Stoic and early Peripatetic logic, and have often been used as such – in particular for early Peripatetic hypothetical syllogistic and Stoic propositional logic. By contrast, this paper explores the role Alexander himself played in the development and transmission of those theories. There are three areas in particular where he seems to have made a difference: First, he drew a connection between certain passages from Aristotle’s Topics and (...) Prior Analytics and the Stoic indemonstrable arguments, and, based on this connection, appropriated at least four kinds of Stoic indemonstrables as Aristotelian. Second, he developed and made use of a specifically Peripatetic terminology in which to describe and discuss those arguments – which facilitated the integration of the indemonstrables into Peripatetic logic. Third, he made some progress towards a solution to the problem of what place and interpretation the Stoic third indemonstrables should be given in a Peripatetic and Platonist setting. Overall, the picture emerges that Alexander persistently (if not always consistently) presented passages from Aristotle’s logical œuvre in a light that makes it appear as if Aristotle was in the possession of a Peripatetic correlate to the Stoic theory of indemonstrables. (shrink)

At the beginning of his Isagoge, Porphyry establishes a famous set of questions concerning genera and species, which is the origin of the medieval “Quarrel of universals”. But this text gave rise to difficulty for interpreters: does Porphyry, when elaborating this set of questions, refer to historical positions or does he offer these alternatives in a lingua franca, which would be neutral from a doctrinal point of view? This article focusing on the first of the three alternatives raised by Porphyry (...) aims to show that replacing Porphyry's text in its historical and philosophical background can shed light on the meaning of this alternative. During the Post-Hellenistic period (100 B.C.–200 A.D.), the different schools discussed the ontological status of universals. Therefore, not only does Porphyry use the terminology shaped by former philosophers, but he also alludes to the debate between Stoics, Middle Platonists and Peripatetics. Alexander of Aphrodisias constitutes a precious help to reconstruct this dispute, which this article tries to depict. (shrink)

This article is about the terms used in the works traditionally ascribed to Alexander of Aphrodisias to mean the process of abstraction through which intellect separates form and matter. The passages are studied in order to identify what nouns and verbs are used. Since in two works of dubious authorship aphaireô and aphairesis are found, the usage of these terms in the works that can be ascribed with certainty to Alexander is studied. The results obtained are examined in the light (...) of the hypotheses about the authorship and chronology of the cited works formulated by scholars so far. (shrink)

The Opening Chapter of De Anima II, in which Aristotle outlines an extremely general and universally applicable characterization of the soul (κοινότατος λόγος), closes with a perplexing comparison, which seems to contradict the general drift of that definiens1. After carefully arguing that the body-soul relation is a token of the hylomorphic model, which accounts for the substantial unity of every natural compound, Aristotle writes, “[F]urther, it remains unclear [ἄδηλον] whether the soul may not be the actuality of its body in (...) the sense in which the sailor is the actuality of the ship” (413a8–9).2 Far from being found in the body as the functional organization of its matter, this remark suggests that the soul .. (shrink)

In view of Alexander of Aphrodisias’s and Porphyry’s respective positions on the issue, I discuss whether logos apophantikos is to be defined, as DI 4 seems to imply, by its being true or false or rather, as DI 5 seems to imply, by its representing the ontological combination/separation of substrate and attribute through the logical combination/separation of subject and predicate.

This piece of work intends to shed light on Alexander of Aphrodisias from the second-century Aristotle commentator through the history of Aristotelian psychology up to the sixteenth century's clandestine prompter of the new philosophy of nature. In the millennium after his death the head of the Peripatetic school in Athens served as the authority on Aristotle in the Neo-Platonic school, survived the Arabic centuries of philosophy as Averroes' exemplary exponent of the mortality of the soul and as such was not (...) considered worthy of translation by the Latin Scholastics. This attitude changed only in the Late Middle Ages, when the resistance against Averroes grew fierce and Alexander emerged as the only Aristotelian alternative to him. In 1495 his account of Aristotle's psychology was translated and published and the underlying principles of a natural philosophy, based on sense perception and exempt from metaphysics, became accessible. The prompt reception and widespread endorsement of Alexander's teaching testify to his impact throughout the sixteenth century. (shrink)

This piece of work intends to shed light on Alexander of Aphrodisias from the second-century Aristotle commentator through the history of Aristotelian psychology up to the sixteenth century's clandestine prompter of the new philosophy of nature. In the millennium after his death the head of the Peripatetic school in Athens served as the authority on Aristotle in the Neo-Platonic school, survived the Arabic centuries of philosophy as Averroes' exemplary exponent of the mortality of the soul and as such was not (...) considered worthy of translation by the Latin Scholastics. This attitude changed only in the Late Middle Ages, when the resistance against Averroes grew fierce and Alexander emerged as the only Aristotelian alternative to him. In 1495 his account of Aristotle's psychology was translated and published and the underlying principles of a natural philosophy, based on sense perception and exempt from metaphysics, became accessible. The prompt reception and widespread endorsement of Alexander's teaching testify to his impact throughout the sixteenth century. (shrink)

The philosophical problem of universals is traditionally framed as the problem about the ontological status of universals. It is often said that the ontological status of universals is a post-Aristotelian problem that was bequeathed to the Middle Ages by a famous sentence in Porphyry's Isagoge. 1 Porphyry raises but then refuses to answer three questions about the ontological status of genera and species, saying that they are too "deep" for the present investigation. 2 Although Porphyry is the first to announce (...) the problem, it was Boethius's commentary on Porphyry, rather than the Isagoge itself, that made this sentence famous and that is therefore responsible for the problem of universals in .. (shrink)

According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, our potential intellect is a purely receptive capacity. Alexander also claims that, in order for us to actualise our intellectual potentiality, the intellect needs to abstract what is intelligible from enmattered perceptible objects. Now a problem emerges: How is it possible for a purely receptive capacity to perform such an abstraction? It will be argued that even though Alexander's reaction to this question causes some tension in his theory, the philosophical motivation for it is a (...) sound one. Rather than a calculation of actualities and potentialities, the doctrine of receptivity is supposed to explain how human beings come to grasp universal aspects of reality in an accurate manner. (shrink)

The Prior and Posterior Analytics were entitled Ta Analutika by Aristotle himself. But it is not at all clear what Aristotle had in mind in grouping these two works together and in giving them this common title. This question was discussed at length by the ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle. Two main possibilities emerged. The first is that taken by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ammonius, and Philoponus in his commentary on APr. According to this line of thought, Aristotle has in mind (...) the analysis that shows how a complex arises out of simple entities; both Analytics show us how to subject all lines of syllogistic reasoning (including demonstration) to such analysis. According to the second approach, found in the commentary on APo., 2 attributed to Philoponus, in giving APo., 2 the title 'Analytics' Aristotle has in mind the analysis that reasons from effects to causes. Demonstrations reveal the causes of things, and APo., 2 shows how this is the case. In this paper, the two approaches are compared, and a third approach, which builds on the second, but allows 'Analytics' to have a continuity of sense in its use as a title, is proposed. (shrink)

Résumé — En Enn., VI, 3 [44], 5, Plotin fait usage de doctrines péripatéticiennes concernant la substance, l’inhérence et la prédication. Ces doctrines correspondent de manière frappante à l’interprétation anti-extensionaliste de la substance physique développée par Alexandre d’Aphrodise contre les thèses des commentateurs plus anciens . Le parallèle entre Plotin et Alexandre ne doit cependant pas conduire à penser que Plotin se borne à suivre les thèses du commentateur, et que leurs doctrines soient donc identiques. Plotin vise plutôt à transposer (...) les principes de l’hylémorphisme d’Alexandre dans un contexte philosophique différent, fondé sur des prémisses métaphysiques qui portent sur la causalité des substances intelligibles. Comme Plotin le montre en VI, 3 [44], la forme hylémorphique n’est en effet pas substance : elle s’identifie à un amas de qualités accidentelles qui dépendent d’une essence véritable et extra-physique, le logos. On parvient à des conclusions analogues si l’on aborde la discussion de la causalité démiurgique chez Alexandre et Plotin. Les deux auteurs adressent des critiques approfondies au modèle artisanal de la causalité . Il n’est pas invraisemblable que les thèses d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise aient joué un rôle dans la genèse de la doctrine plotinienne de la causalité. Il faut cependant remarquer, encore une fois, que le cadre conceptuel dans lequel s’inscrivent les critiques de la causalité démiurgique chez Alexandre et chez Plotin est très différent. Pour Alexandre, la causalité démiurgique est rejetée en faveur d’une doctrine cosmologique de la finalité, qui rattache les récurrences naturelles aux mouvements cycliques des astres. Pour Plotin, en revanche, l’ordre naturel s’explique par l’action de principes extra-physiques et sa critique de la causalité démiurgique ne se comprend qu’à l’intérieur de la doctrine de la causalité des êtres intelligibles.Hylémorphisme et causalité des intelligibles.— In Enn., VI, 3 [44], 5 Plotinus outlines some doctrines regarding substance, inherence and predication. Such doctrines are similar to the anti-extensionalist reading of Aristotle’s physical substance that was developed by Alexander of Aphrodisias against previous Aristotelian commentators . The parallel between Plotinus and Alexander is striking : it can safely be inferred that Plotinus’ discussion is based on that of the commentator. This, however, should not lead to assume that Plotinus simply follows Alexander, so that their theories of physical substance are identical. Instead, Plotinus aims to transpose the philosophical principles of Alexander’s Peripatetic hylomorphism into a different doctrinal framework, where metaphysical premises involving the intelligible substances and their causality play a prominent role. As Plotinus shows in VI, 3 [44], the hylomorphic form is not a substance, but a bundle of accidental properties depending on an extra-physical substantial principle, i.e. the logos. The analysis of Alexander’s and Plotinus’ discussions of demiurgic causality lead to the same conclusions. Both philosophers criticize the demiurgic scheme of causality . It can reasonably be assumed that Alexander of Aphrodisias’ treatment played a role in the genesis of Plotinus’ view of causality. However, it is worth noting that the criticism of demiurgic causality has a quite different position within the systems of the two philosophers. Alexander rejects the presence of a demiurgic cause in favour of a cosmological conception of finalism, where natural recurrences are regarded as depending on the cyclical motions of the stars. According to Plotinus, instead, the order of nature is completely caused by extra-physical principles ; his criticism of demiurgic causality points to his doctrine of intelligible causes. (shrink)

In his De anima, Alexander of Aphrodisias identifies the active intellect with the first mover and describes this “first cause” as an immaterial and separate form. In this article, we try to explain the differences between Aristotle and Alexander on this point. Aristotle never defines the first mover as a form but claims that its being is actuality. How is it possible for Alexander, well known for being “the Commentator par excellence”, to assert such a thesis which seems dangerously close (...) to platonism ? We want to show that this description of first mover as a pure face (eidos) is not accidental in Alexander's work and is linked up with his epistemological conceptions as much as his metaphysics. (shrink)

Italian translation with facing Greek text of Alexander's commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics I-V, and of pseudo-Alexander's commentary on the remaining books of the Metaphysics.

This book is the first study of the ontological system of Alexander of Aphrodisias (floruit c. 200 AD), famous for his commentaries on the works of Aristotle.

In the second half of Book One of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle reflects on the application of the formalized logic has developed in the first half, focusing particularly on the non-modal or assertoric syllogistic developed in the first seven chapters. These reflections lead Alexander of Aphrodisias, who was a great exponent of Aristotelianism in the late second century, to explain and sometimes argue against subsequent developments of Aristotle's logic and alternatives and objections to it, ideas associated mainly with his colleague (...) Theophrastus and with the Stoics. The other main topic of this part of the Prior Analytics is the specification of a method for discovering true premises needed to prove a given proposition. Aristotle's presentation is sometimes difficult to follow, and Alexander's discussion is extremely helpful to the uninitiated reader. In his commentary on the final chapter translated in this volume, Alexander provides an insightful account of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's method of division. (shrink)

Aristotle's account of place in terms of an innermost limit of a containing body was to generate serious discussion and controvery among Aristotle's later commentators, especially when it was applied to the cosmos as a whole. The problem was that since there is nothing outside of the cosmos that could contain it, the cosmos apparently could not have a place according to Aristotle's definition; however, if the cosmos does not have a place, then it is not clear that it could (...) move, but it was thought to move, namely, in its daily revolution, which was viewed as a kind of natural locomotion and so required the cosmos to have a place. The study briefly outlines Aristotle's account of place and then considers its fate, particularly with respect to the cosmos and its motion, at the hands of later commentators. To this end, it begins with Theophrastus' puzzles concerning Aristotle's account of place, and how later Greek commentators, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and others, attempted to address these problems in what can only be described as ad hoc ways. It then considers Philoponus' exploitation of these problems as a means to replace Aristotle's account of place with his own account of place understood in terms of extension. The study concludes with the Arabic Neoplatonizing Aristotelian Avicenna and his novel introduction of a new category of motion, namely, motion in the category of position. Briefly, Avicenna denies that the cosmos has a place, and so claims that it moves not with respect to place, but with respect to position. (shrink)

The "Supplement" transmitted as the second book of "On the Soul" by Alexander of Aphrodisias is a collection of short texts on a wide range of topics from psychology, including the general hylomorphic account of soul and its faculties, and the theory of vision; questions in ethics ; and issues relating to responsibility, chance and fate. One of the texts in the collection, "On Intellect", had a major influence on medieval Arabic and Western thought, greater than that of Alexander's "On (...) the Soul" itself. The treatises may all be by Alexander himself; certainly the majority of them are closely connected with his other works. Many of them, however, consist of collections of arguments on particular issues, collections which probably incorporate material from earlier in the history of the Peripatetic school. This translation is from a new edition of the Greek text based on a collation of all known manuscripts and comparison with medieval Arabic and Latin translations. (shrink)

This volume contains the Arabic translations of a lost treatise by Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. AD 200) "On the Principles of the Universe" with English translation, introduction and commentary. It also includes an Arabic and Syriac glossary. The introduction and commentary deal in detail with the manuscripts, the translators and the exegetical tendencies of the text, as well as with its reception in Arabic philosophy. The main theme of the work is the motion of the heavenly bodies and their influence (...) on the physical world. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: At the turn of the second century AD there existed two different views on the ordering of the figures of the (wholly) hypothetical syllogisms. One goes back to Theophrastus, whereas the other (adopted e.g. by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Alcinous) seems to have been the result of a later change. This reversal of the order of figures has so far not received a satisfactory explanation. In this paper I show how it came about.