Phenomenology since Husserl has always had a problematic relationship with empirical science. In its early articulations, there was Husserl's rejection of ‘the scientific attitude’, Merleau-Ponty's distancing of the scientifically-objectified self, and Heidegger's critique of modern science. These suggest an antipathy to science and to its methods of explaining the natural world. Recent developments in neuroscience have opened new opportunities for an engagement between phenomenology and cognitive science and through this, a re-thinking of science and its hidden assumptions more generally. This (...) is so partly because of the shortcomings of conventional mechanistically-conceived science in dealing with complex and dynamic phenomena such as climate change, brain plasticity, the behaviour of collectives, the dynamics of various microbiological processes, etc. But it is also due to recent phenomenological scholarship focussed on the ‘embodied’ phenomenology of Husserl's Ideen II and Merleau Ponty's later ontology of nature which have helped to extend the insights of phenomenology beyond the narrowly ‘human’ to an understanding of nature (which includes the human) more generally. Thus recontextualised, phenomenology is well placed to examine some of the assumptions that give rise to the reductionism and associated scientism which has characterised conventional science in its approach to the study of natural processes. In light of this, it might be suggested that the ‘anti-science’ of early articulations of phenomenology is more a hostility to the underlying assumptions of science as conventionally understood than to science itself e that it is scientism rather than science that is targeted. In this paper, I aim to show how a phenomenological naturalism might be seen as a necessary step towards the development of a non-reductionist and non-scientistic approach to scientific inquiry. A key to this is a reconceptualization of nature as inclusive of meanings and of mind. It is a conception developed by Merleau-Ponty, especially in his later ontology of nature, and one that is shared by American pragmatist philosopher of science, C.S. Peirce (1839e1914). For both philosophers, meaning must be understood in terms of an ontology which is relational rather than atomistic, and dynamic or processual rather than static and substance-based. For Merleau-Ponty this is an experientially-derived ontology; for Peirce it is a more conceptually-based one. In this paper, I explore this connection between these two philosophers in two stages. The first is by reference to Peirce's theory of signs or semiotics. More specifically, I look at the application of this theory to the study of biological processes as developed in Peirce-inspired biosemiotics. In the light of this, I suggest that Merleau-Ponty's account of intentional relations in nature might be articulated as semiotic relations, and can serve as a philosophical basis for a non-reductive biological science. I then turn to questions relating to the ontology of nature. I explore Merleau-Ponty's experientially-based “ontology of flesh” and Peirce's distinctive form of naturalism to show affinities at this ontological level. These affinities consist in commitments to a reality that includes possibility, meaning, temporality, and final causation e that is, an ontology which is far more inclusive than that of conventional positivistic science. Peirce's broader scientific metaphysics enables us to extend Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological naturalism beyond the biological to the physical sciences. Whilst Merleau-Ponty's ontology of nature provides the experiential basis necessary for a critique of scientism, Peirce establishes the relevance of that ontology for a re-conceived empirical science. (shrink)

Established at the annual meeting of the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies on July 3rd 2014, in conjunction with Springer Publishing, publishers of the Society’s official journal, Biosemiotics, the Annual Biosemiotic Achievement Award seeks to recognize those papers published in the journal that present novel and potentially important contributions to the ongoing project of biosemiotic research, its scientific impact, and its future prospects. Here the winner of the Biosemiotics Achievement Award for 2019 is announced: the award goes to Y.H. Hendlin (...) for the article ‘I Am a Fake Loop: the Effects of Advertising-Based Artificial Selection’. (shrink)

Established at the annual meeting of the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies on July3rd 2014, in conjunction with Springer Publishing, publishers of the Society’s official journal, Biosemiotics,the Annual Biosemiotic Achievement Award seeks to recognize those papers published in the journal thatpresent novel and potentially important contributions to the ongoing project of biosemiotic research, itsscientific impact, and its future prospects. Here the winner of the Biosemiotics Achievement Award for 2018is announced: the award goes to Mirko Cerrone for his article ‘Umwelt and (...) Ape Language Experiments: onthe Role of Iconicity in the Human-Ape Pidgin Language’. (shrink)

If there is a common theme through the rich diversity of Max Charlesworth’s academic life and works, it is the quest to understand human action as meaningful, significant and subject to interpretation rather than reducible to the explanatory techniques of positivistic science. This orientation is summed up in the philosophical concept of intentionality. Intentionality is a key notion for continental philosophers whose ideas formed the subject-matter of Max’s legendary course in ‘Contemporary European Philosophy’ at Melbourne University and later, of the (...) foundation philosophy programs at Deakin University. The origins of the concept of intentionality are to be found in mediaeval philosophy – another of Max’s teaching areas, and a commitment to intentionality is deeply implicit in his engagement with the religious and the spiritual as well as with ethics.In this essay I trace the changing conceptions of intentionality in recent philosophy and in doing so, indicate developments within the continental philosophical tradition and its shifting relations with the analytical tradition in Australian philosophy. (shrink)

In this opinion piece, I briefly argue, against certain recent claims, that the Non-Identity Problem is indeed a significant problem for any comparative personal view – views on which the moral status of an act (at least partly) depends on the comparative relation between a property F of some person P as a consequence of that act and F of P as a consequence of the relevant alternative(s).

Die vorliegende Studie empfiehlt, Leistungsansprüche für Personen mit interventionsfordernden Risiken anhand einer neuen Rechtskategorie, der ‚risikoadaptieren Prävention‘, abzubilden. Spätestens seit dem bioinformatischen Innovationsschub kann eine risikoadaptierte Anwendung von prophylaktischen Maßnahmen umfassend gewährleistet werden. Jedoch können die gegebenen Rechtskategorien das medizinische Anwendungsfeld nicht adäquat steuern. Die Autoren Friedhelm Meier, Anke Harney, Kerstin Rhiem, Anja Neumann, Silke Neusser, Matthias Braun, Jürgen Wasem, Rita Schmutzler, Stefan Huster und Peter Dabrock haben zusammen im BMBF geförderten Projekt SYSKON. Re-Konfiguration von Gesundheit und Krankheit. Ethische, (...) psychosoziale, rechtliche und gesundheitsökonomische Herausforderungen der Systemmedizin die vorliegende Governance Perspective erarbeitet. This book is published open access under a CC BY 4.0 license. (shrink)

Aujourd’hui, il n’est pas possible de vivre autrement que par conspiration. Mais, aujourd’hui, il n’est pas non plus possible de vivre par complot. Pour vivre maintenant, pour créer des modes de vie, des formes de vie, nous devons chercher une conspiration sans complot, une conspiration qui soit sa propre fin, une conspiration qui soit en vue d’elle-même. Cet article déplie quelques implications de cette proposition, à travers les notions de sous-communs, d’étude, de police, de soin et de complicité.

Particular persons have claims against being made worse off than they could have been. The literature, however, has focused primarily on only two-option cases; yet, these cases fail to capture all of the morally relevant factors, especially when a person’s existence is in question. This paper explores how to assess claims in multiple-option choice sets. We scrutinize the only extant proposal, offered by Michael Otsuka, which we call the Weakening View. In light of its problems, we develop an alternative: the (...) Combining View. The Weakening View holds that a person’s claim against a loss of well-being relative to one distribution is weakened by the availability of further alternatives relative to which the person gains well-being. By contrast, our view holds that a person has an overall claim for or against a certain distribution relative to the whole option set, where overall claims are second-order functions of the different pairwise claims. Finally, we defend the Combining View by exploring its implications for the impact of a person’s possible non-existence on their overall claims, and we develop a proposal for how the number of distributions relative to which a person gains or loses welfare influences the strength of their overall claims. (shrink)

According to the person-affecting view, the ethics of welfare should be cashed out in terms of how the individuals are affected. While the narrow version fails to solve the non-identity problem, the wide version is subject to the repugnant conclusion. A middle view promises to do better – the Interpersonal Comparative View of Welfare (ICV). It modifies the narrow view by abstracting away from individuals’ identities to account for interpersonal gains and losses. The paper assesses ICV’s merits and flaws. ICV (...) solves the non-identity problem, avoids the repugnant conclusion, and seems to accommodate the person-affecting intuition. But it cuts too many things along the way: ICV obstructs the advantage of the wide view to account for all future individuals’ welfare, abandons the intuitions that underlie the narrow view, and even violates its own presuppositions by turning out to be merely pseudo person-affecting. (shrink)

This article considers the role of meritocracy in the ruling ideology of Singapore. It argues that meritocracy, far from being a system for the management of scarce resources, is in fact the imposi...

Parfit (2017) proposed a novel principle for outcome betterness in different people and different number choices. It is claimed to solve the Non-Identity Problem while avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion, and it shall do so in person-affecting rather than in impersonal terms. According to this Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle, one of two outcomes would be (i) in one way better if this outcome would together benefit people more, and (ii) in another way better if this outcome would benefit each person more. (...) I argue that a plausible construal of this principle has two features that make it vulnerable to objections. First, the most plausible interpretation of the second part of the principle turns out to incorporate an average function. Although this helps to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, it implausibly implies that it can be better to add further people with less bad but still miserable lives to populations consisting only of lives full of suffering. Second, the principle is not based on a comparative but on an intrinsic notion of benefit. This allows to solve the Non-Identity Problem, yet it accounts only for a weak sense of person-affecting rather than for the more substantive person-affecting intuition that it is morally significant that particular people are made better (or worse) off. Eventually, I highlight what we can, nevertheless, learn from Parfit’s idea of combining different ways in which outcomes might be better. (shrink)

A collection of photographs taken at Comiskey Park before and during Chicago White Sox baseball games, from 1973 to the final home game on September 30, 1990.

Cet article propose une sélection de bonnes feuilles du livre de 2013 The Undercommons, actuellement en voie de traduction pour une publication française en 2021. Y sont abordés les thèmes de la politique « encerclée » ( surrounded ), de la gouvernance, du planning et de la policy, de la logistique, ainsi que de ce qui fait de l’étude consacrée aux undercommons une philosophie du toucher.

„Medizinische Notwendigkeit“ (MedN) ist der zentrale Steuerungsbegriff für die Finanzierung medizinischer Versorgung in der deutschen Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung. Trotz seiner scheinbaren Objektivität und Bestimmtheit durch ärztliche Expertise ist der Begriff alles andere als eindeutig definiert. In diesem ersten von fünf geplanten Aufsätzen zur Begriffsklärung von MedN aus medizintheoretischer, -ethischer, rechtlicher und (sozial)medizinischer Perspektive geht es um eine Systematisierung der aktuellen Kontroversen. Damit soll eine Fundierung für Detaildebatten gelegt werden, die bisher fehlt. Geklärt werden sollen die begriffliche Struktur, Funktion, Kontextualität und Missverständlichkeit (...) von MedN sowie die grundsätzlichen Grenzen einer Begriffsanalyse für die anstehenden normativen Fragen medizinischer Leistungssteuerung. (shrink)