En el presente texto analizaremos la categoría de pluralidad como componente indispensable para pensar en la construcción de una comunidad no totalitaria y como impedimento a ciertos modos contemporáneos de dejar fuera-de una comunidad a determinados grupos humanos. La cuestión de fondo, que no pretendemos resolver aquí, es la posibilidad de pensar un mundo en donde quepan muchos mundos. Propondremos la categoría de pluralidad para abordar esta cuestión tanto a partir del análisis realizado por Hannah Arendt, como por Jean-Luc Nancy. (...) En un primer momento nos detendremos en la figura de la exclusión del mundo a partir de las nociones de apátrida trabajada por Arendt, necropolítica por el filósofo camerunés Achille Mbembe y la idea de inmundicia elaborada por Nancy. Desde allí podremos tomar la perspectiva que buscamos para el análisis de la pluralidad, donde plantearemos, por una parte las infranqueables diferencias e incompatibilidades entre el análisis arendtiano y nancyano de la pluralidad como proponer algunas confluencias. Finalmente propondremos la exigencia de un momento de autoafirmación y vinculación de la pluralidad que es lo que hace que esta pueda constituir un mundo y muchos mundos a la vez, este momento es el nosotros, trabajado también por Arendt, Nancy y Roig. In the following text we will analyse the category of plurality as an essential element to think of the construction of a nontotalitarian community and as an impediment to particular contemporary modes of leaving certain specific human groups “out of” a community. The bottom line, which we do not intend to solve here, is the possibility to think a world in which many worlds fit. We will propose the category of plurality to approach this issue both from the analysis carried out by both Hannah Arendt and by Jean-Luc Nancy. At first we will consider the representation of exclusion from the world starting from the notions of stateless developed by Arendt, necropolitics by Cameroonian philosopher Achille Mbembe, and the idea of filth by Nancy. From there we can take the perspective that we seek for the analysis of plurality, posing on the one hand the insurmountable differences and incompatibilities between Arendt’s and Nancy’s analysis of plurality, and, on the other hand, some of their confluences. Finally, we will propose the necessity of a moment of self-assertion and connection of plurality that permits the constitution of this plurality as one and many worlds at the same time this moment is “us”, addressed also by Arendt, Nancy and Roig. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo realiza una precisión conceptual respecto a la idea de diferencia trabajada por algunos autores ligados al "pensamiento de la diferencia". Estas diferentes diferencias constituirán una trama en donde cada una se mostrará en su irreductibilidad y constitutiva vinculación a las otras; unas diferencias convergerán con otras o simplemente las desplazarán. La hipótesis es que la diferencia ontológica, la diferrance, la diferencia pura, la diferencia de los cuerpos y la diferencia colonial muestran que el problema de la diferencia, (...) llevado a ámbitos concretos como diferencias de género, diferencias étnicas, etc., ha de ser siempre trabajado desde el carácter irreductiblemente plural de la diferencia.: This article presents the idea of "difference" as discussed by some authors linked "difference thinking". These different differences constitute a drama where each one will be displayed in its irreducibility and its constitutive relationship to the others; some differences will converge with others or simply displace them. Ontological difference, difference, pure difference, the difference of bodies, and colonial difference, show that the problem of difference, when brought into specific areas such as gender, ethnicity, etc., must always be approached from the irreducibly plural nature of difference. (shrink)

En el presente texto proponemos realizar un primer trazado de una zona de correspondencia entre cuerpo y materialidad, para replantear esta materialidad a partir de ciertas categorías conceptuales. La hipótesis planteada es que hay determinadas concepciones del cuerpo en el pensamiento del siglo XX en adelante que suponen una materialidad no reductible a principios de determinación, una materialidad emparentada con la libertad, donde la necesidad se subsume a la contingencia concreta de los cuerpos. Nos proponemos bosquejar una construcción conceptual de (...) materialidad que pueda articular diferentes pensamientos que incluyen al cuerpo de un modo relevante, especialmente el de Jean-Luc Nancy. (shrink)

En el pensar heideggeriano, tanto en su época temprana como tardía, ha habitado la idea una "máscara" respecto a una "figura originaria", ya sea como propiedad e impropiedad, o como el abandono del ser en el inicio del pensar occidental respecto a un despliegue originario del ser como Ereignis; la principal labor filosófica de Heidegger se ha abocado a remover las capas y así deconstruir el camino trazado por la metafísica; un pensamiento vivo que "piensa para atrás". Sin embargo este (...) no es el único modo en que Heidegger "ejerce" pensamiento, pues junto al "paso atrás", Heidegger nos indica a veces y de un modo siempre sugerente, la posibilidad del salto. Ambos movimientos del pensar están configurados desde experiencias afectivas concretas, las que no son subjetivas sino el trazo mismo de cada figura epocal del pensamiento-ser, del Ereignis. Atenderé en este escrito únicamente al temple fundamental sugerido por Heidegger para el segundo inicio en los Beiträge zur Philosophie: la reserva , para luego indicar desde ella hacia lo que en sus escritos últimos llamará desasimiento . In Heidegger's thinking, both in its earlier as in its later stages, the idea lives under a "mask" which stands to an "original figure" either as the improper in relation to what is proper, or as the defection from being at the beginning of Western thought in relation to the original desplay of being as Ereignis. Heidegger's main philosophical job was to remove the masking layers and thereby to deconstruct the route travelled by metaphysics: his is a living thought that "thinks backwards". However, this is not the only way in which Heidegger "practices" thinking: together with "stepping back", Heidegger often suggests the possibility of "jumping". Both motions of thought start from concretely experienced moods, which are not subjective but constitute the very trail of each epochal figure of thought-being, of Ereignis. In this essay I only pay attention to the fundamental mood proposed by Heidegger for the second beginning in Beiträge zur Philosophie: namely, reticence ; but I point thence to what in his last writings he called detachment. (shrink)

El propósito de este ensayo es bosquejar la concepción heideggeriana de los temples fundamentales. Aunque en un completo rigor no son temples del tránsito, pues en ellos no se juega la configuración del Ereignis en cuanto tal, incluiremos aquí (aunque sólo analizaremos dos de ellos), junto al espanto (das Erschrecken) y a la angustia (die Angst), al duelo sagrado (die heilige Trauer) y el aburrimiento (die Langeweile), no obstante, corresponden también al modo actual del despliegue del ser: el fin o (...) de-cadencia del primer inicio y, en este sentido, sí son temples del tránsito. Luego analizaremos el temple fundamental del segundo inicio: Gelassenheit, porque indica una unidad primaria, que sólo podemos describir desde distintos respectos, pero que configuran un único momento fundador del Ser en copertenencia al pensar, la fundación del Dasein y Ereignis. Finalmente, a partir de lo anterior, intentaremos establecer qué es el temple de ánimo, para lo cual analizaremos su relación con el destello del Ser, lo trasponedor, el fundamento, y el pensar. (shrink)

The current text seeks to complement the concept of social outbreak referring to the political events of October 2019 in Chile with an idea of harmonization and utopian updating in affective-political terms. To do this, in the first place it will be established that it is possible to make a political-affective reading of the social outbreak, taking a detour through what would be the function of the affects in their political dimension, as articulators of communities, to later specify the affective (...) political sense in the context of our social outbreak. Secondly, it will be affirmed that, without denying the very idea of an explosion, at least in part there is also a decantation of a process of utopian harmonization and updating. To deploy these two statements, we will rely mainly on a 19th century author, Charles Fourier, who builds a materialist-affective theory that can provide important insights into our contingency. We will also carry out a reading of the RENACE intervention by Delight Lab to illustrate our thesis. (shrink)

Part I: Building blocks. 1. Folk convictions -- 2. Doubts about libertarianism -- 3. Nihilism and revisionism -- 4. Building a better theory -- Part II. A theory of moral responsibility. 5. The primacy of reasons -- 6. Justifying the practice -- 7. Responsible agency -- 8. Blame and desert -- 9. History and manipulation --10. Some conclusions.

This article identifies a novel challenge to standard understandings of responsibility practices, animated by experimental studies of biases and heuristics. It goes on to argue that this challenge illustrates a general methodological challenge for theorizing about responsibility. That is, it is difficult for a theory to give us both guidance in real world contexts and an account of the metaphysical and normative foundations of responsibility without treating wide swaths of ordinary practice as defective. The general upshot is that theories must (...) either hew more closely to actual practice than they appear to, or they must provide some normative foundation for responsibility that does not go through actual practice. (shrink)

Constitutive instrumentalism is the view that responsibility practices arise from and are justified by our being prosocial creatures who need responsibility practices to secure specific kinds of social goods. In particular, responsibility practices shape agency in ways that disposes adherence to norms that enable goods of shared cooperative life. The mechanics of everyday responsibility practices operate, in part, via costly signaling about the suitability of agents for coordination and cooperation under conditions of shared cooperative life. So, there are a range (...) of identifiable conditions where the ordinary operation of responsibility practices—and thus, the usual normative force of the practices—is disrupted. Even so, these conditions are not so widespread as to favor a more thoroughgoing abandonment of responsibility practices. (shrink)

There are two standard theoretical responses to putative errors in ordinary thinking about some given target property: eliminativism or revisionism. Roughly, eliminativism is the denial that the target property exists, and revisionism is the view that the property exists, but that people tend to have false beliefs about it. Recently, Shaun Nichols has proposed a third option: discretionism. Discretionism is the idea that some terms have multiple reference conventions, so that it may be true to say with eliminativists that the (...) property does not exist, and true to say with revisionists that the property does exist. This article explores the viability of discretionism, and argues that it faces serious difficulties. Even if the difficulties faced by discretionism can be overcome, it is unclear that discretionism secures anything beyond what is already available to standard revisionist views. The article concludes with some reflections about Nichols’ account of the bare retributive norm. (shrink)

Explicitly fictional armchair reconstructions of the past are sometimes taken to be informative about philosophical issues. What appeal a counterfactual genealogy has depends on its speculative accuracy, that is, its accuracy in identifying relevant causal, functional, or explanatory particulars. However, even when speculatively accurate, counterfactual genealogies rarely secure more than proofs of possibility. For more ambitious deployments of genealogy – for example, efforts to show what properties the target concept in fact predicates – genealogies are hamstrung by the possibility of (...) predicative drift, or changes over time in what the concept predicates. Still, even when counterfactual genealogies fail to tell us about our current practices or concepts, they may identify appealing successors. Pettit's (2018 Pettit, Philip. 2018. The Birth of Ethics: Reconstructing the Role and Nature of Morality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.[Crossref], [Google Scholar]) innovative defense of moral realism and his employment of a counterfactual genealogy provides an illuminating instance of the promise and challenges facing accounts employing counterfactual genealogies. (shrink)

Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moral responsibility, and determinism, this text represents the most up-to-date account of the four major positions in the free will debate. Four serious and well-known philosophers explore the opposing viewpoints of libertarianism, compatibilism, hard incompatibilism, and revisionism The first half of the book contains each philosopher’s explanation of his particular view; the second half allows them to directly respond to each other’s arguments, in a lively and engaging conversation Offers the reader (...) a one of a kind, interactive discussion Forms part of the acclaimed Great Debates in Philosophy series. (shrink)

Casi todo lo que nos rodea implica riesgos de algún tipo, aunque no obstante es la cultura del riesgo la que ha coadyuvado al progreso y el desarrollo de la sociedad. El principio de precaución que no es ajeno a esta realidad, responde a la incertidumbre del riesgo, sin limitarse a expresar una actitud subjetiva del miedo. Es, un medio eficaz para la protección, en todo momento y de manera oportuna, de los recursos naturales, para así alcanzar el fin de (...) las normas ambientales. Este libro colectivo constituye a través de una juiciosa recopilación de experiencias de derecho comparado, y de un diálogo en torno a las tensiones que se dan, un llamado de atención para repensar el principio de precaución. El tratamiento de estas cuestiones por parte de los autores, tuvo por norte el equilibrio entre el desarrollo de la sociedad y la salvaguarda de los derechos que podrían afectarse por una situación de riesgo inminente; siempre de cara a la rigurosidad exigida por la ciencia. Esta obra permite al lector contar con valiosas herramientas para realizar una evaluación amplia del alcance actual del principio de precaución, tema que debe tener continuidad en pro de un mejor entendimiento de la gestión del riesgo y de las complejas circunstancias de la invocación y aplicación del principio que debe estar presente en la formulación de las políticas ambientales, dado que las autoridades y los particulares ante la falta de certeza científica absoluta, para impedir la degradación ambiental, deberán darle aplicación cuando exista peligro de daño grave e irreversible como lo establece la legislación colombiana (artículo 1 Ley 99 de 1993). (shrink)

This book brings together previously unpublished work which looks at issues concerning the foundations and applications of a prominent branch of virtue epistemology: “performance-based epistemology”. The chapters in Part I examine some foundational issues in the conceptual framework of PBE: the relations between apt success and luck; the connection between aptness and a safety condition for knowledge; the fallibility of competences; the kind of reliability needed for knowledge and justification; the nature of epistemic agency; and some ways of enriching the (...) basic conceptual framework of PBE. The chapters in Part II discuss the application of PBE to outstanding problems in contemporary epistemology, such as the nature of a priori intuition; internalist objections to epistemic externalism; the roles that epistemic agency is meant to play in the acquisition of knowledge; the value of second-order reflection; the nature of some epistemic incompetences; and the problem of epistemic circularity. (shrink)

This critical appraisal of Juan Comesaña’s Being Rational and Being Right is divided into three sections: Section I describes the fundamental features of “Experientialism,” the theory of basic rationality developed and defended in the book; Section II briefly indicates how the chapters of the book unfold; and Section III describes and examines one problematic issue concerning how Experientialism interacts with the liberalism/conservatism debate in the theory of justification.

Our focus in this article concerns Leibniz’s views on evil. Our goal is to examine which are the consequences of his conception of moral agency for the moral psychology of the genuinely evil person. For Leibniz, moral failure is an epistemic error since it involves some false practical judgement. Moral maxims may be represented in blind or symbolic cognitions, but then moral agents can misrepresent the evil consequences of their behaviour. Finally, we discuss Leibniz’s view on habits that may help (...) virtuous persons strive for perfection but also enable evil persons to continue sinning. (shrink)

Autistic individuals are commonly said – and also consider themselves – to be excessively literalist, in the sense that they tend to prefer literal interpretations of words and utterances. This literalist bias seems to be fairly specific to autism and still lacks a convincing explanation. In this paper we explore a novel hypothesis that has the potential to account for the literalist bias in autism. We argue that literalism results from an atypical functioning of the predictive system: specifically, an atypical (...) balance between predictions and error signals in language processing may make individuals more uncertain about their own predictions. Such uncertainty is then often resolved by resorting to the safest interpretation, that is, the literal one. We start by reviewing existing explanations of other autistic traits that appeal to predictive processing. We then apply these insights to language, by showing that predictions play a key role in everyday comprehension and that a low level of confidence in one’s own predictions is likely to escalate comprehension difficulties. Finally, we take a deeper look at non-literal uses of language by discussing the case of metaphors, to illustrate how a predictive processing account offers a promising explanation of the literalist bias in autism. (shrink)

connection to the action, or alternately, the idea that an agent must be in some sense responsive to reasons.1 Indeed, we might even understand much of the past couple of decades of philosophical work on moral responsibility as concerned with investigating which of these two approaches offers the most viable account of moral responsibility. Here, I wish to revisit an idea basic to all of this work. That is, I consider whether there is even a fundamental distinction between these approaches. (...) I will argue that the relationship between these two approaches to moral responsibility is much more complicated than is ordinarily assumed. I shall argue that there are reasons to think that one of these views may ultimately collapse into the other, and if not, that there is nevertheless reason to think one of these views has misidentified the features of agency relevant to moral responsibility. The view that follows is one that we might call the primacy of reasons. In the second half of the article I consider whether recent experimental work speaks in favor of the alternative to the primacy of reasons. Its proponents argue that it does. I argue that it does not. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Are They Blameworthy for What They Do? The Puzzle On the Virtues of Philosophy Interruptus What You Don't Know About Psychopathic Serial Killers Back to Philosophy Psychopathic Serial Killing and Evil.

Attention to the details of putatively obvious examples of philosophy-as-worldview within Latin America give us reasons to be skeptical about the taxonomy that gives us the category of philosophy-as-worldview. Among the examples that suggest difficulties for this way of thinking about the philosophical enterprise are 19th century Mexican ethnolinguistics, contemporary efforts to reconstruct historical and contemporary Indigenous thought, and 20th century efforts to articulate regional ontologies within Latin America. However, reflection on these cases also point to a different project worth (...) considering, namely, a taxonomy of wisdom- and knowledge-focused practices that might allow a different way of drawing distinctions between kinds of “philosophies”. (shrink)

In terms of my own first-personal narrative, the most obvious proximal cause of my theorizing about agency was a graduate seminar on free will taught by Peter van Inwagen. It was my first semester of graduate school, and van Inwagen’s forceful presentation of incompatibilism made a big impression on me. I left that course thinking incompatibilism was both obvious and irrefutable. The only problem was that I didn’t stay at Notre Dame. I transferred to Stanford in the following year, where (...) I discovered the truth of a remark John Fischer once made: Indiana is for Incompatibilists and California is for Compatibilists. Some of the folks there who most influenced me, especially Michael Bratman and Ken Taylor, are thoroughgoing compatibilists. I was really struck by the fact that both of these smart, thoughtful guys seemed genuinely puzzled by the impulse to incompatibilism. I wasn’t entirely ready to give up on my incompatibilism (which was by then shifting from libertarianism to hard incompatibilism), but I felt a need to be able to find some way to reconcile it with an appreciation for the appeal that compatibilism clearly seemed to have for some otherwise compelling philosophers. And, so my interest in thinking about free agency and free action began to take root. So, that’s the intellectualized part of the story. But there is also the fact of my local conditions when all of this was going on. For good or ill, I kept taking seminars where the problem of free will would crop up in the course of things. Out of sheer laziness (or, as I like to think about it, out of a dimly sensed need to conserve my energies for later), I kept seizing on the topic as a subject matter for seminar papers, whether the course was on Hume, Aristotle, Nietzsche, philosophy of mind, or philosophy action. Thus, when it came time to write a dissertation, free will seemed like an obvious choice.. (shrink)

The notion of “bounded rationality” was introduced by Simon as an appropriate framework for explaining how agents reason and make decisions in accordance with their computational limitations and the characteristics of the environments in which they exist (seen metaphorically as two complementary scissor blades).We elaborate on how bounded rationality is usually conceived in psychology and on its relationship with logic. We focus on the relationship between heuristics and some non-monotonic logical systems. These two categories of cognitive tools share fundamental features. (...) As a step further, we show that in some cases heuristics themselves can be formalized from this logic perspective. We have therefore two main aims: on the one hand, to demonstrate the relationship between the bounded rationality programme and logic, understood in a broad sense; on the other hand, to provide logical tools of analysis of already known heuristics. This may lead to results such as the characterization of fast and frugal binary trees in terms of their associated logic program here provided. (shrink)

Este artigo problematiza a concepção de mathesis universalis na filosofia de Edmund Husserl a partir de uma discussão sobre a noção de Mannigfaltigkeitslehre. Inicialmente, retoma-se a questão dos números “imaginários” e depois é repassado o contexto matemático que influenciou o desenvolvimento filosófico husserliano. Finalmente, a concepção de mathesis universalis é enquadrada nas referências históricas de Descartes e Leibniz para, finalmente, mostrar as implicações fenomenológicas próprias do pensamento de Husserl.

Two formative forces for Greek philosophers remain undertheorized: polytheism as a metaphysical position and myth as a source of intelligibility. Heidegger’s work is perhaps exemplary in this regard: he both runs together Greek Metaphysics and Monotheism as well as fell prey to the power of myths. In this paper I introduce and translate the 1953 essay “Mythology and the Tropic Experience of Being” by the Brazilian philosopher Vicente Ferreira da Silva, where he proposed an openly polytheistic Heideggerian metaphysics and philosophy (...) of mythology. Vicente Ferreira da Silva thereby developed a phenomenological approach to myth that can dialogue fruitfully with ancient philosophy in its fullness and also reflect critically about contemporary myths. (shrink)

This paper proposes an analysis of the anti-metaphysical and anti-philosophical posture of the poetry of Alberto Caeiro, in order to show how the philosophical question for Truth is displaced by an awareness of the impossibility of signs to tell the truth, which leads to a theory of lie that allows to create a possible world, real from within. Caeiro proposes a return to the realm of the no-semiotics, the pre-logical, but uses the material he refuses: language, signs, poetry. Thus, he (...) stands on the edge of language and “embodies” the semiological project of recognize himself as a lie, a sign, a footprint without trace. By contradiction and paradox as tools of language, Fernando Pessoa, through his main heteronymous, combines philosophy and poetry, renounces the question for Truth –putting an end to the philosophical question– and deviates the unsolvable metaphysical opposition. (shrink)

In this article, it is proposed to track various figures of the spectator that are often not directly read but are found between the lines. It is through the aesthetics of reception that the figure of the spectator, specifically that of a receiver, gains prominence, this being the backbone of this work. It is proposed that any work to be completed needs a spectator who is in front of the work or next to the artist. Through the various figures of (...) spectators we will generate a route on the relationship that they have with the author of the work. On the one hand, the hermenetic spectator and, on the other, the emancipated spectator as extremes of understanding of a work and of the relationship that the authors generate with their spectator; what do they expect to happen? All this through authors who have different perspectives such as: Jauss, Gadamer and Rancière, among others. (shrink)

Não é anódino que Adam Smith, em célebre carta para a Edinburgh Review, tenha ressaltado passagens relativas a problemas de filosofia moral do Discurso sobre a desigualdade. Chegando a aproximar Rousseau de Mandeville, distancia-os, contudo, por meio de um conceito fundamental: a piedade. Nesse artigo, examinaremos as consequências dessa leitura, analisando-a, no entanto, sob a luz de Emílio. Mais precisamente, pretendemos desenvolver a seguinte hipótese: enquanto o Segundo Discurso apresenta-se como um diagnóstico crítico da moral do “sistema dos políticos modernos”, (...) no Emílio encontramos uma solução possível, através da educação do homem no percurso da formação do juízo, para os problemas morais impostos aos indivíduos da sociedade comercial. Examinaremos detidamente esse segundo momento, ou seja, verificaremos se as noções desenvolvidas de amor de si, identificação e piedade, podem indicar a posição do pensamento rousseauniano em relação ao debate filosófico-moral ligado à economia política de seu tempo. (shrink)

Two formative forces for Greek philosophers remain undertheorized: polytheism as a metaphysical position and myth as a source of intelligibility. Heidegger’s work is perhaps exemplary in this regard: he both runs together Greek Metaphysics and Monotheism as well as fell prey to the power of myths. In this paper I introduce and translate the 1953 essay “Mythology and the Tropic Experience of Being” by the Brazilian philosopher Vicente Ferreira da Silva, where he proposed an openly polytheistic Heideggerian metaphysics and philosophy (...) of mythology. Vicente Ferreira da Silva thereby developed a phenomenological approach to myth that can dialogue fruitfully with ancient philosophy in its fullness and also reflect critically about contemporary myths. (shrink)

En este artículo realizamos una aproximación investigativa-teórico-reflexiva sobre los efectos del postmodernismo y la postmodernidad en la sociedad actual y en el ámbito educativo en particular (centrándonos en el papel del maestro/profesor). Bajo la apariencia del bien común: mayor igualdad, ecologismo, atención a la diversidad, respeto a las diferencias…, una de las visiones del postmodernismo lo convierte en el chivo expiatorio del capitalismo, propiciando que este siga fagocitándose, generando de manera implícita una visión unívoca y poco propiciadora de críticas por (...) parte del grueso de la sociedad, que la acepta como parte de ese bien común. Ante esto ¿qué podemos hacer desde nuestro papel educativo? (shrink)

Esta bibliograf a compila la extensa obra publicada de Leopoldo Zea: monograf as, cap tulos en libros, art culos period sticos y pr logos e introducciones. Incluye tambi n una bibliograf a sobre Zea.