The aim of the paper is to show and document the husserlian concern to validate a position of ontological realism, and the inappropriateness of his method to this task. It is precisley the scientific charachter of his philosophy that drew Husserl to idealism and solipsism, despite his original intentions and motivations.

I review ornithological literature in order to demonstrate that conventions of description and illustration, as well as some aspects of biological theory relating to birds, put a strong focus on male birds. I criticize the sexist aspects of ornithology from the standpoint of recent feminist philosophy of science, establishing connections between the ways in which we view animals and the ways in which we viewourselves and arguing that it is costly to humans, specifically women, to suggest that females of the (...) nonhuman species are biologically inadequate in relation to their male counterparts. Finally, I note that failure to notice and excise residual sexism in animal science also encourages people to be inattentive to and less considerate of a large and significant part of nature. I conclude with some suggestionsfor reform. (shrink)

In his Preface to Ideas, Husserl gives a concise overview of his phenomenology and addresses two serious objections to his phenomenological program. My Introduction to his Preface provides the background to the writing of the piece and suggests it does not do enough to counter the charges of psychologism and idealism.

Krukowski, a painter/philosopher, tries to understand postmodern art and then speculates about what post-postmodern art will be. He gives a valuable account of the roots of modernism in 19th C philosophy and of its slide into skepticism about art serving any epistemic function. Postmodern aesthetics though is just an inconsistent mix of modernist ideas and their opposites. Postmodern artists believed themselves creative only by coming up with a work, or an idea, unconnected to modernism. Post-postmodernists will likely do the same (...) to postmodernism since they too are constrained to deny any purpose or progress in art. In that case, Krukowski thinks, art will remain local and marginal, or end altogether. (In the sequel most artists now ignore the philosophical conundrum and get on with producing works, sometimes playful, sometimes deep, sometimes beautiful. This 21st C eclecticism is a welcome respite from the theory wars.). (shrink)

Nicholson's goal is to show that interpretation of a text can be done rigorously and be true. He argues this by showing that perception also has an interpretative dimension yet we usually accept claims rooted in perception as true. This effort to show the soundness of hermeneutical criticism is in fact an attempt to show that anti-foundationalism does not default to relativism. I trace his well-prosecuted argument for the truth of interpretation to the point where it becomes opaque. The argument (...) is nonetheless instructive and helps to better see the conundrum that anti-foundationalists create for epistomologists and perhaps for themselves. (shrink)

This is a collection of articles clarifying the nature of Husserlian phenomenology. Dreyfus argues that, given that Husserl put intentionality at the centre of cognitive investigation and painstakingly analyzed it and related concepts in logic, linguistics and psychology he is the father of current research in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. The authors include Follesdal, Fodor, Mohanty and Searle among others.

Jones sketches a theory of interpretation of literary works and tests it on Middlemarch, Anna Karenina, Brothers Karamazov and A la recherche du temps perdu. The theory centers on creativity and the strong parallelisms between artistic and critical production. The result is that the critic is shown to have considerable latitude in reading a text--perhaps too much. Jones acknowledges the danger of stressing inferred rather than observed features of texts. He sees his sketch of a theory of interpretation as a (...) creative process as a corrective to historical interpretation which has the reader uncover the author's meaning embedded in the text. A fuller account of his theory might skirt the radical subjectivism of criticism beyond the traditional boundaries. (shrink)

Proceedings of the Banff Congress on Theoretical Psychology. Philosophers and psychologists discuss the relative merits of their approaches to the study of consciousness.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:482 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY G. E. Michalson, Jr. TheHistoricalDimensions ofaRattonalFaith. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977. Pp. 222. $8.65. The primary intentionof this work is to argue that historical or ecclesiastical religion plays a vital role in Kant's religious thought, because it is necessary to provide a sensible content for the purely formal doctrine of Kant's "moral" religion. But Michalson resists that this strategy cannot succeed, because of (...) the technical requirements of Kant's eplstmology, and that we must ultimately encounter an "impasse" in Kant's thought on history and religion (pp. 77, 134, 169). This is an area of Kant's thought that has not until recently received the attention it deserves. A careful consideration of all the related issued helps one to recognize, from perhaps the most beneficial standpoint, how all the various parts of Kant's philosophical scheme fit together. Michalson quite rightly maintains that we must remain within the epistemological framework Kant has established for the Critical Philosophy. But unfortunately he recognizes only the negative aspects of this framework. What he chooses to call "Kant's principle of human limitations" (mentioned thirtynine times) is the essential element in his interpretation. Secondly, Michalson is unwilling to follow the lead of other commentators (e.g., Michel Despland and Ylrmiahu Yovel) in broadening the context still further in order to take into account the full scope of Kant's philosophical project. These two defects persist throughout Michalson's analysis, and ultimately they prevent any fruitful conclusions. The approach employed, in its most simple form, ~sto point out that historical religion belongs to the phenomenal order and that morality (as the basis for Kant's technical rehgious position) belongs to the noumenal order. Kant's recognition of the need to bridge this gap is dealt with in terms of the "schematism of analogy" (pp. 95, 112-13) mentioned in Religion withinthe Ltmits ofReasonAlone. Michalson provides an interpretation of the schematism m Chapter 3 and concludes that "Kant's Religion is not altogether consistent with certain basic teachings of the critical philosophy" (p. 132). His attempt to deal with this problem carries him into a discussion of teleology and the highest good (Chapter 4), and it is only in this concluding chapter that his various interpretive errors crystallze and produce their Inevitable consequences. Rather than emphasizing the negative aspects of Kant's conception of man, Despland offers Kant's positive perspective on man and his destiny----drawing, for example, on the Anthropologyfrom a PragmaticPoint of View. Employing equally good judgment, Yovel provides an interpretation of the highest good which shows it as the culmination (in the indefinite future) of the concrete process through which man's social, political, educational, and religious development takes place. These perspectives permit the historical dimension (both religious and secular) to be gradually transformed by the imposition of moral designs--as men ~lowly and painfully assume responsibility for directing the blind laws of nature into patterns that serve moral ends. Such commentators help us to see more clearly what Kant was attempting to achieve and how the elements of his total philosophical scheme are to be understood as interconnected. Michalson, on the other hand, has only his impasse to offer us. Because history is phenomenal and religion (as morality) is noumenal, he maintainsthat no bridge is possible between the two realms. But this is simply a failure to recognize Kant's strategy. For Kant is very careful to restrict knowledge (in the strict sense) to the phenomenal order. But he is equally clear in asserting that it is legitimate (indeed, necessary) to postulate those conditions which alone make it possible for us to act in conformity with the moral law. Therefore, we must postulate not only God and immortality but the possibility of a worldly order which conforms both to the laws of nature and to the moral law. And for Kant these postulates have the full strength of rational truths, m that--like the postulates of mathematics -reason cannot reject them. Interpreting Kant's phenomenon-noumenon distinction strictly (but misapplying it), Michalson insists that such a projected ideal state of the world is inconsistent with Kant's epistemological commitment. For such... (shrink)

This work is the product of several years of intense study of the various aspects of Kant's work, and the attempt to provide insights for students both with respect to the details of the Kantian system, and into the development and implications of the system as a whole. During that time many individuals have contributed to its ultimate formulation, and I would like to express my appreciation at least to the more generous contributors. For a careful reading of the manuscript (...) in its earlier forms, and suggestions which helped in many ways to improve the work and to crystalize its thesis, I would like to thank Professors Wilbur Long, A. C. Ewing, and Richard Bosley. For their interest and encouragement in the later stages of the project, I must thank Professor Lewis White Beck, and the many students who have taken my Kant seminar at the University of Alberta, especially Mr. Dieter Hartmetz. And finally, 1 acknowledge with pleasure my longstanding debt to Professor William H. Werkmeister for his years of critical advice and encouragement. Perhaps only Kant and my wife have contributed more to my philosophic development. Acknowledgment must also be made of the permission kindly granted by various publishers for the use of material from the following works under their copyright. Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, translated by Lewis White Beck (copyright 1956, by The Liberal Arts Press, Inc. (shrink)

A careful examination of descartes' works shows that innate ideas are not born with the mind, But are generated by (i.E., Born within) the mind. This is descartes' way of talking about empirical concept formation, As well as what the mind can infer from these concepts. Particular examples are examined to provide the material and formal conditions for identifying innate ideas. Descartes forces the transition from medieval to very modern epistemology.