L’emploi du syntagme creatio passive accepta dans le Commentaire des Sentences de saint Thomas d’Aquin s’inscrit dans un riche débat théologique dont les origines remontent aux années 1220-1230. Après avoir présenté la genèse de ce débat, cet article envisage la manière dont Bonaventure et Albert le Grand y prennent part. Enfin, la définition de la création passive forgée par le jeune Thomas dans son Commentaire des Sentences est analysée dans une perspective à la fois historique et doctrinale.

Probabilistic models have much to offer to philosophy. We continually receive information from a variety of sources: from our senses, from witnesses, from scientific instruments. When considering whether we should believe this information, we assess whether the sources are independent, how reliable they are, and how plausible and coherent the information is. Bovens and Hartmann provide a systematic Bayesian account of these features of reasoning. Simple Bayesian Networks allow us to model alternative assumptions about the nature of the information sources. (...) Measurement of the coherence of information is a controversial matter: arguably, the more coherent a set of information is, the more confident we may be that its content is true, other things being equal. The authors offer a new treatment of coherence which respects this claim and shows its relevance to scientific theory choice. Bovens and Hartmann apply this methodology to a wide range of much discussed issues regarding evidence, testimony, scientific theories, and voting. Bayesian Epistemology is an essential tool for anyone working on probabilistic methods in philosophy, and has broad implications for many other disciplines. (shrink)

_The VaKE Handbook: Theory and Practice of Values and Knowledge Education_ presents a theoretical model and many examples in various fields of education and training for the realization of the principle "Values without knowledge are blind, while knowledge without values is irresponsible".

This article proposes a number of models to examine through which mechanisms a population of autonomous agents could arrive at a repertoire of perceptually grounded categories that is sufficiently shared to allow successful communication. The models are inspired by the main approaches to human categorisation being discussed in the literature: nativism, empiricism, and culturalism. Colour is taken as a case study. Although we take no stance on which position is to be accepted as final truth with respect to human categorisation (...) and naming, we do point to theoretical constraints that make each position more or less likely and we make clear suggestions on what the best engineering solution would be. Specifically, we argue that the collective choice of a shared repertoire must integrate multiple constraints, including constraints coming from communication. Key Words: autonomous agents; colour categorisation; colour naming; connectionism; cultural evolution; genetic evolution; memes; origins of language; self-organisation; semiotic dynamics; symbol grounding. (shrink)

This volume is the direct result of a conference in which a number of leading researchers from the fields of artificial intelligence and biology gathered to ...

The review gives an introductory description of the successive development of data patterns based on comparisons between hearing-impaired and normal hearing participants’ speech understanding skills, later prompting the formulation of the Ease of Language Understanding model. The model builds on the interaction between an input buffer and three memory systems: working memory, semantic long-term memory, and episodic long-term memory. RAMBPHO input may either match or mismatch multimodal SLTM representations. Given a match, lexical access is accomplished rapidly and implicitly within approximately (...) 100–400 ms. Given a mismatch, the prediction is that WM is engaged explicitly to repair the meaning of the input – in interaction with SLTM and ELTM – taking seconds rather than milliseconds. The multimodal and multilevel nature of representations held in WM and LTM are at the center of the review, being integral parts of the prediction and postdiction components of language understanding. Finally, some hypotheses based on a selective use-disuse of memory systems mechanism are described in relation to mild cognitive impairment and dementia. Alternative speech perception and WM models are evaluated, and recent developments and generalisations, ELU model tests, and boundaries are discussed. (shrink)

The paper surveys the currently available axiomatizations of common belief (CB) and common knowledge (CK) by means of modal propositional logics. (Throughout, knowledge- whether individual or common- is defined as true belief.) Section 1 introduces the formal method of axiomatization followed by epistemic logicians, especially the syntax-semantics distinction, and the notion of a soundness and completeness theorem. Section 2 explains the syntactical concepts, while briefly discussing their motivations. Two standard semantic constructions, Kripke structures and neighbourhood structures, are introduced in Sections (...) 3 and 4, respectively. It is recalled that Aumann's partitional model of CK is a particular case of a definition in terms of Kripke structures. The paper also restates the well-known fact that Kripke structures can be regarded as particular cases of neighbourhood structures. Section 3 reviews the soundness and completeness theorems proved w.r.t. the former structures by Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi, as well as related results by Lismont. Section 4 reviews the corresponding theorems derived w.r.t. the latter structures by Lismont and Mongin. A general conclusion of the paper is that the axiomatization of CB does not require as strong systems of individual belief as was originally thought- only monotonicity has thusfar proved indispensable. Section 5 explains another consequence of general relevance: despite the "infinitary" nature of CB, the axiom systems of this paper admit of effective decision procedures, i.e., they are decidable in the logician's sense. (shrink)

:We address the question, in decision theory, of how the value of risky options should be assessed when they have no finite standard expected value, that is, where the sum of the probability-weighted payoffs is infinite or not well defined. We endorse, combine and extend the proposal of Easwaran to evaluate options on the basis of their weak expected value, and the proposal of Colyvan to rank options on the basis of their relative expected value.

We show that it is not possible to extend the ranking of one-stage lotteries based on their weak-expectation to a reflexive and transitive relation on the collection of one- and two-stage lotteries that satisfies two basic axioms, the minimal value axiom and the reduction axiom. We propose an extension that satisfies only the first axiom. This ranking takes payoffs, their probabilities, and the tree structure into account.

As soon as we stop talking aloud, we seem to experience a kind of 'inner voice', a steady stream of verbal fragments expressing ongoing thoughts. What kind of information processing structures are required to explain such a phenomenon? Why would an 'inner voice' be useful? How could it have arisen? This paper explores these questions and reports briefly some computational experiments to help elucidate them.

The Tragedy of the Commons is often associated with an n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma. But it can also have the structure of an n-person Game of Chicken, an Assurance Game, or of a Voting Games (or a Three-in-a-Boat Game). I present three historical stories that document tragedies of the commons, as presented in Aristotle, Mahanarayan and Hume and argue that the descriptions of these historical cases align better with Voting Games than with any other games.

Over the past 20 years business ethics in Europe witnessed a remarkable growth. Today business ethics is faced with two challenges. The first comes from the social sciences and consultants who have both reclaimed the topics of business ethics, regretfully often at the loss of the proper ethical perspective. The second comes from the remarkable rise of corporate social responsibility which has pushed aside the mainstream business ethics methodology with its emphasis on moral deliberation by the individual. These challenges can (...) be tackled by an institutional transformation in business ethics that links up to the long-standing European tradition of institutional analysis of the market. The second remedy is an enlargement of the research agenda in business ethics by coming closer to other parts of applied ethics where the business ethics view is at this moment grossly neglected. (shrink)

We address the question of how finitely additive moral value theories (such as utilitarianism) should rank worlds when there are an infinite number of locations of value (people, times, etc.). In the finite case, finitely additive theories satisfy both Weak Pareto and a strong anonymity condition. In the infinite case, however, these two conditions are incompatible, and thus a question arises as to which of these two conditions should be rejected. In a recent contribution, Hamkins and Montero (2000) have argued (...) in favor of an anonymity-like isomorphism principle and against Weak Pareto. After casting doubt on their criticism of Weak Pareto, we show how it, in combination with certain other plausible principles, generates a plausible and fairly strong principle for the infinite case. We further show that where locations are the same in all worlds, but have no natural order, this principle turns out to be equivalent to a strengthening of a principle defended by Vallentyne and Kagan (1997), and also to a weakened version of the catching-up criterion developed by Atsumi (1965) and by von Weizsäcker (1965). Footnotes1 For valuable comments, we would like to thank Marc Fleurbaey, Bart Capéau, Joel Hamkins, Barbara Montero, Tim Mulgan, and two anonymous referees for this journal. (shrink)

The existence of a transitive, complete, and weakly independent relation on the full set of gambles implies the existence of a non-Ramsey set. Therefore, each transitive and weakly independent relation on the set of gambles either is incomplete or does not have an explicit description. Whatever tools decision theory makes available, there will always be decision problems where these tools fail us. In this sense, decision theory remains incomplete.

Considerations regarding predication in ordinary language as well as the ontology of relations suggest a refinement of the Ontological Square, a conceptual scheme used in many foundational ontologies and which consists of particular substrates as well as their types on the one hand and particular attributes as well as their types on the other hand. First, the distinction between particulars and universals turns out to be one of degree, since particulars are merely the least elements in the subsumption hierarchy. Second, (...) relations may be analysed in terms of roles as ways of participating in events. In consequence, the Logic of the Ontological Square proposed in (Schneider 2009) has to be revised accordingly. (shrink)

We develop a probabilistic criterion for belief expansion that is sensitive to the degree of contextual fit of the new information to our belief set as well as to the reliability of our information source. We contrast our approach with the success postulate in AGM-style belief revision and show how the idealizations in our approach can be relaxed by invoking Bayesian-Network models.

In the recent philosophical literature, several counterexamples to the interpretative principle that symmetry-related models are physically equivalent have been suggested The Oxford handbook of philosophy of physics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, Noûs 52:946–981, 2018; Fletcher in Found Phys 50:228–249, 2020). Arguments based on these counterexamples can be understood as arguments from scientific practice of roughly the following form: because in scientific practice such-and-such symmetry-related models are treated as representing distinct physical situations, these models indeed represent distinct physical situations. In (...) this paper, a strategy for analysing arguments of this type is presented and applied to the examples that can be found in the literature. I argue that if we are exclusively interested in models understood as representing entire possible worlds, arguments from scientific practice should involve some additional assumptions to guarantee they are relevant for models understood in this way. However, none of the examples presented in the literature satisfy all these additional assumptions, which leads to the conclusion that arguments from scientific practice based on these examples do not undermine the interpretative principle that different symmetry-related models represent the same possible world. (shrink)

The Ontological Square is a categorial scheme that combines two metaphysical distinctions: that between types (or universals ) and tokens (or particulars ) on the one hand, and that between characters (or features ) and their substrates (or bearers ) on the other hand. The resulting four-fold classification of things comprises particular substrates, called substances , universal substrates, called kinds , particular characters, called modes or moments , and universal characters, called attributes . Things are joined together in facts by (...) primitive ontological ties or nexus . This article describes a logic that is meant to capture the basic intuitions behind the Ontological Square. Given a minimal correspondence between atomic logical form and ontological structure, the commitment to nexus as a distinct ontological category entails a rehabilitation of copulae as ties of predication. Thus, the Logic of the Ontological Square is a copula calculus rather than a predicate calculus; its soundness and completeness can be established with respect to a model akin to a so-called first-order semantics for standard second-order logic. (shrink)

As the need for more diversity in business ethics is becoming more pressing in our global world, we provide an historical study of a Fair Trade (FT) movement, born in rural Mexico. We first focus on the basic assumptions of its founders, which include a worker–priest, Frans van der Hoff, a group of native Indians and local farmers who formed a cooperative, and an NGO, Max Havelaar. We then review both the originalities and challenges of the FT movement and its (...) potential contributions to the current theories and practices in business ethics. (shrink)

The problem of Common Knowledge will be considered in two classes of models: a class K.* of Kripke models and a class S of Scott models. Two modal logic systems will be defined. Those systems, KC and MC, include an axiomatisation of Common Knowledge. We prove determination of each system by the corresponding class of models. MSC: 03B45, 68T25.

One result of this note is about the nonconstructivity of countably infinite lotteries: even if we impose very weak conditions on the assignment of probabilities to subsets of natural numbers we cannot prove the existence of such assignments constructively, i.e., without something such as the axiom of choice. This is a corollary to a more general theorem about large-small filters, a concept that extends the concept of free ultrafilters. The main theorem is that proving the existence of large-small filters requires (...) a nonconstructive axiom like AC. (shrink)

In their recently published book Nudge (2008) Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein (T&S) defend a position labelled as ‘libertarian paternalism’. Their thinking appeals to both the right and the left of the political spectrum, as evidenced by the bedfellows they keep on either side of the Atlantic. In the US, they have advised Barack Obama, while, in the UK, they were welcomed with open arms by the David Cameron's camp (Chakrabortty 2008). I will consider the following questions. What (...) is Nudge? How is it different from social advertisement? Does Nudge induce genuine preference change? Does Nudge build moral character? Is there a moral difference between the use of Nudge as opposed to subliminal images to reach policy objectives? And what are the moral constraints on Nudge? (shrink)

In this paper, the process for firms to decide whether or not to invest in corporate social responsibility is treated from a real option perspective. We extend the Husted framework with an important extra parameter that allows us to understand the timing of CSR investment and explain why some companies drag their feet over CSR investments. Our model explicitly allows for the impact of the opportunity cost of delaying the CSR investment decision, providing firms with tools to determine the optimal (...) moment of exercising the CSR investment option. We illustrate our timing model through a case study and analyze governmental support strategies for CSR from a real options perspective. (shrink)

Nexuses such as exemplification are the fundamental ties that structure reality as a whole. They are “formal” in the sense of constituting the form, not the matter of reality and they are “transcendental” inasmuch as they transcend the categorial distinctions between the denizens of reality, including that between existents and non-existents. I shall advocate a moderately particularist view about (external) nexuses and argue that it provides not only the best solution to Bradley’s regress, but also an elegant account of symmetrical (...) relations (both formal and material), as well as of temporal and modal change. These advantages are illustrated by the reconstruction of an Aristotelian ontology of exemplification involving substances, kinds and material attributes. (shrink)

El problema del presente es abordado en su dimensión de realidad dada al hombre. En primer lugar, este articulo ahonda en el carácter impersonal del tiempo y en su condición contradictoria de lugar de entrega de lo dado: al presentarse el presente no hay ni donador ni beneficiario. En segundo lugar, declinando el sentido de la palabra francesa "maintenant", se evidencia el "ahora" como nulidad entre pasado y futuro; como intersticio dual en el que se alcanza y se pierde toda (...) cosa. Apoyándose en la concepción kantiana del tiempo y en la noción de donación de Derrida, el autor indica que el "ahora" es receptividad inmediata, intuitiva y no conceptual: en el presente el hombre se da y se recibe a si mismo. El presente, a la vez que constituye el espacio de la identidad, es también vector de diferencia: al hacerse signo a si mismo de sí mismo, el presente aparece como su propia alteridad. La duración del presente, por expresar la relación del hombre consigo mismo, es signo de alternancia entre llegada y partida; entre muerte y reparación. En fin, se analizan las mutaciones del sentido que se le ha dado a la noción de promesa en la historia de Occidente, entendida como la experiencia de la proyección del ahora hacia el porvenir. The problem of present is analyzed as a reality given to man. First, the impersonal character of time is studied in its contradictory condition of opening place of giving: when present appears, there is not a giver, nor a receiver. In the second place, by considering the etymological sense of the French word "maintenant", it is showed that the "now" is a nullity between past and future, a dual interstice in which everything is reached or lost. Following the Kantian conception of time and the Derridian notion of "donation", the author highlights that the "now" is immediate receptivity, intuitive and not conceptual: in the present, man gives himself to himself and receives himself from himself. The present, at the same time that it constitutes the space of identity, it is also the vector of difference: when it becomes a sign to himself of himself, the present appears as his own alterity. The present duration, as it traduces the relation of man with himself, is a sign of alternation between coming and leaving; between dead and reparation. Finally, the mutations in the meaning of the notion of "promise" in Western history are investigated and understood as the experience of the now projected towards the future. (shrink)

The paper provides a classification of argumentation schemes used in German jurisprudence in accordance with recent developments in argumentation theory and legal methodology.

. Legal theory has so far focused exclusively on judicial activity, not on legislation. This is due to the specific legal framework of reasoning, upon which it is essential to act upon rules, wherever they come from. This form of legalism is criticized and replaced by weak legalism. Weak legalism makes it possible to detect the principles of legislation that underly the activity of the legislator. Legisprudence is the theory of these principles.

Absolute velocities in Newtonian mechanics are commonly regarded as unmeasurable. Roberts (Br J Philos Sci 59(2):143–168, 2008) provides a justification for this thesis which appeals to the observational indistinguishability of boost-related models of Newtonian mechanics. Middleton and Murgueitio Ramírez (Australas J Philos, 2020) criticise his argumentation by pointing out that his analysis of the notion of measurement is too restrictive, and that, under a weaker analysis (based on counterfactuals), absolute velocities are measurable. Jacobs (Australas J Philos, 2020) opposes their view, (...) arguing that, on a properly formulated counterfactual-based account of measurement, absolute velocities are unmeasurable. However, in his argument, observational indistinguishability plays no role, even though, intuitively, it is very relevant for the issue of (un)measurability. This paper’s aim is to bring observational indistinguishability back to this discussion. I build upon the observation that there is an analogy between possible views on knowledge and justification on the one hand, and on measurement on the other. In particular, I explore the distinction between externalist and internalist approaches. Counterfactual-based accounts are all externalist, whereas the observational indistinguishability of boost-related models becomes relevant if we are interested in an internalist concept of measurement. (shrink)