Decision theory without finite standard expected value

Economics and Philosophy 32 (3):383-407 (2016)
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Abstract

:We address the question, in decision theory, of how the value of risky options should be assessed when they have no finite standard expected value, that is, where the sum of the probability-weighted payoffs is infinite or not well defined. We endorse, combine and extend the proposal of Easwaran to evaluate options on the basis of their weak expected value, and the proposal of Colyvan to rank options on the basis of their relative expected value.

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Peter Vallentyne
University of Missouri, Columbia

Citations of this work

Infinite Aggregation and Risk.Hayden Wilkinson - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):340-359.
Infinite Prospects.Jeffrey Sanford Russell & Yoaav Isaacs - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):178-198.
Difference Minimizing Theory.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Vexing expectations.Harris Nover & Alan Hájek - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):237-249.
Relative Expectation Theory.Mark Colyvan - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (1):37-44.

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