In his classic paper On Computable Numbers Turing analyzed what can be done by a human computor in a routine, “mechanical” way. He argued that mechanical op-erations obey locality conditions and are carried out on configurations satisfying boundedness conditions. Processes meeting these restrictive conditions can be shown to be computable by a Turing machine. Turing viewed memory limitations of computors as the ultimate reason for the restrictive conditions. In contrast, Gandy analyzed in his paper Church’s Thesis and Principles for Mechanisms (...) what can be done by “discrete deterministic mechanical devices” and appealed to physical considerations to motivate restrictive principles. These devices include, crucially, ones that carry out parallel processes, e.g., cellular automata. Following Turing’s methodological ways and guided by Conway’s “Game of Life” as a paradigm, Gandy formulated four restrictive principles and proved that devices satisfying them are computationally equivalent to Turing machines. (shrink)

En 1810, Gall et Spurzheim posent le diagnostic suivant : la piètre connaissance du substrat cérébral des facultés mentales doit être imputée à la longue inféodation de l’anatomie par la métaphysique. Dans le présent article, nous interrogeons un tel jugement historique à partir du Discours sur l’anatomie du cerveau de Niels Steensen. La présentation des « systèmes » de localisation cérébrale que Steensen critique (celui des « Anciens », celui de Thomas Willis et celui de Descartes) nous permettra d’abord de (...) brosser un tableau des différentes conceptions possibles du « siège de l’âme » au XVIIe siècle. Nous montrerons ensuite comment, dans ces trois cas de figure, la mise en correspondance d’une anatomie neurocérébrale lacunaire et d’une topique des grandes facultés mentales conduit à postuler que telle ou telle partie cérébrale est le siège de la mémoire, celui de l’imagination ou encore celui du sens commun. Enfin, nous montrerons que c’est au nom de la science anatomique, restreinte à ce qui peut être attesté par des témoins oculaires, que Steensen a écarté le principe même des localisations cérébrales. (shrink)

Emil Sieg: Tocharologica. Selected Writings on Tocharian. Edited and introduced by Georges-Jean PInault and Michaël Peyrot. Monographien zur Indischen Archäologie, Kunst und Philologie, vol. 22. Bremen: Hempen, 2014. Pp. xx + 294, 3 plates. $70.

This paper reexamines the long-standing problem of the nature and magnitude of the catastrophic Hellenic expedition to Egypt c. 460-454. An uneasy scholarly consensus posits that many fewer than the 200 triremes implied by Thucydides were involved in the momentous defeat, yet the arguments employed by proponents and detractors of this hypothesis have not been decisive. This paper attempts to develop a better understanding of the final stages of the campaign in order to settle the question of losses. Thucydides offers (...) the most reliable narrative of the events in Egypt , but the compressed nature of the pentekontaetia has left us with a brief, lacunary text. Examination of the verbs poliorkein and kataklēiein and the noun poliorkia in appropriate contexts throughout Thucydides' history reveals that the words connote a tight blockade that seeks to deny all supplies to the besieged; the terms do not normally convey less stringent varieties of military harassment. Application of this understanding to the passages in question shows that the 200 triremes initially mentioned by Thucydides could not possibly have been engaged in Egypt when the siege of Prosopitis island began: a force of such size under a tight blockade could never have held out for 18 months. This conclusion is supported by an economic and demographic survey of the fifth-century B.C. Egyptian Delta, which suggests that resources would not have been plentiful in the region. A much smaller Greek force, perhaps 40 to 50 triremes, must have been involved in the final siege. (shrink)

Abstract“Victories of Freedom which Humans Achieved by Research in the Foundation of Things”. ‐ This article analyzes the political self‐conception of leading representatives of the natural sciences in 19th century Germany. It is argued that the main feature of this self‐conception which remained constant over the time consisted in a strong “rationalization‐imperative”, i.e. the postulate that state and society have to be reshaped on the basis of natural science. On the other hand, this imperative was put forward in very different (...) forms and with different political content: it shifted from revolutionary aspirations in the period of 1848 to moderate and sometimes even reactionary positions in the last decades of the century. (shrink)

C. F. Gellert's 1748 novel "Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G***" portrays the moral actions of Jews as a result of good Christian conduct. In reaction, G. E. Lessing disputes this depiction in his one-act-play "Die Juden" from 1749. The recognition that a Jew could fulfill the ideals of the Enlightenment helped overcome the prejudices of Christian stage characters and of the audience, but it failed in the social circumstances of the time. Christian reception understood a "noble Jew" to be (...) a violation of the poetic principle of probability - and even for Lessing such a figure was the exception. Moses Mendelssohn, however, believed that Judaism was especially well-suited for fostering the development of certain virtues. In light of far-reaching interreligious concepts on the one hand and religiously motivated conflicts on the other, Lessing's early works reveal today the persistent value of self-critical examination concerning hidden prejudices towards religious and cultural minorities. (shrink)

In 12th-Century France, political Augustinianism inherited from Gregory and Isidore was based on the absolute supremacy of spiritual power over temporal power in the name of the absolute primacy of grace over fallen nature. This could easily solve the question of what should true dominium be in a society based on Christian values. Just rule was connected with a ruler who was sanctioned by the Church: the king of France, defender of the Pax Dei. The Siege of Germigny shows how (...) cynical realpolitik finds philosophical justification in political Augustinianism. (shrink)

By examining the theories of justice developed by Joseph Butler and David Hume, the author discloses the conceptual limits of their moral naturalism. Butler was unable to accommodate the possibility that justice is, at least to some extent, a social convention. Hume, who more presciently tried to spell out the conventional character of justice, was unable to carry through that project within the framework of his moral naturalism. These limits have gone unnoticed, largely because Butler and Hume have been misinterpreted, (...) their relation misconstrued. Exegetes have persistently misunderstood the differences that divide them, have misconceived the notion of "public utility" in Hume's account of justice, have wrongly interpreted Butler as a forerunner of Immanuel Kant, and have altogether missed the degree to which Hume stands in the tradition of Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

Examining Scepticism and Animal Faith (SAF) together with the work of Descartes—first, in terms of structure, style, and substance; and second, in terms of method and purpose—supports a rethinking of Santayana’s philosophical project, supporting the notion that his primary aim was not epistemological but fundamentally moral. Considering the contrasting characters of Cartesian and Santayanan scepticism suggests that Descartes is not so much a foil but an inspiration for Santayana in attempting to order the mind as a sort of personal improvement.

Jan Sieg, Sohn von Marceli und Teresa, geb. Rhunke, wurde am 20. Oktober 1919 in Płocicz, im Kreis Sępólno Krajeńskie in Pommern geboren. In den Jahren 1930 bis 1938 besuchte er die Oberschule in Chojnice und legte dort die Reifeprüfung ab. Am 28. September 1940 ist er dem Jesuitenorden beigetreten, woraufhin er in Stara Wieś bei Krosno ein zweijähriges Noviziat absolvierte. Er studierte Philosophie in Nowy Sącz und Theologie in Stara Wieś und in Krakau. Ordiniert wurde er am 29. (...) Juni in Stara Wieś. (shrink)

Jan Sieg, Sohn von Marceli und Teresa, geb. Rhunke, wurde am 20. Oktober 1919 in Płocicz, im Kreis Sępólno Krajeńskie in Pommern geboren. In den Jahren 1930 bis 1938 besuchte er die Oberschule in Chojnice und legte dort die Reifeprüfung ab. Am 28. September 1940 ist er dem Jesuitenorden beigetreten, woraufhin er in Stara Wieś bei Krosno ein zweijähriges Noviziat absolvierte. Er studierte Philosophie in Nowy Sącz und Theologie in Stara Wieś und in Krakau. Ordiniert wurde er am 29. (...) Juni in Stara Wieś. (shrink)

This paper focuses on an unusual kind of writing that revisits the traumatic experience of the Siege of Leningrad (1941–1944). The main heroine of this article has never been studied in this context: Tamara Gabbe (1903–1960) was a children’s playwright, but in her narrow circle of friends (which included Anna Akhmatova) she was acknowledged as a moral authority. Gabbe’s private letters written after her evacuation from Leningrad repeatedly highlight the impossibility of speaking about everyday life, and her children’s plays enact (...) a happy resolution to the real-life troubles experienced by Gabbe and many others during and after the Great Terror, the Siege, and the Second World War—troubles that could not be described in the Soviet press overtly. This paper analyzes ethical and psychological ideas implicit in Gabbe’s works of 1942–1946; I propose that these ideas show some surprising parallels to the “logotherapy” developed by the Austrian-American psychologist and philosopher Viktor Frankl, and to the methods of existential psychotherapy as a whole. (shrink)

This paper describes a global pattern of declining academic freedom, often driven by powerful political interference with core functions of academic communities. It argues that countering threats to academic freedom requires doubling down on ethics, specifically standards of justice and fairness in pursuing knowledge and assigning warrant to beliefs. Using the example of the selection of a Qatari university to host the 2024 World Congress of Bioethics, the authors urge fairness towards diverse groups over time and efforts to counter injustices (...) that conferences generate. (shrink)

For almost half a century the democratic and social state has solved the twofold problem of growth and social exclusion through social inclusion within the borders of the national state. This solution since the 1970s came under threat of multiple crises of the environment, secular stagnation, under-consumption, legitimization and constitutionalization. There might be a social solution of present crisis possible through massive redistribution plus decent basic income plus green growth. However, after globalization of capital there are no longer national social (...) alternatives available. Therefore, there is no alternative to transnational democratic state-formation. But are there actors relevant, strong and motivated enough to do that? nema. (shrink)

The combative metaphor of Oscience warsO has taken on a predominant position within the collective conscious, from being featured on the programs of scientific meetings to being splashed across the pages of leading national magazines and newspapers. Some in the scientific community perceive their profession to be under siege by members of the academic left, radical environmentalists, religious fundamentalists, eco-feminists, and others. This book, based on in-depth interviews with sixty members of groups with alleged Oanti-scienceO attitudes, examines how pervasive and (...) uniform these critiques are. The research is designed to examine two conflicting hypotheses: 1) that anti-science attitudes reflect a general cynicism about all major social institutions, and 2) that anti-science views are not broadly based but are reflective, instead , of the particular interests of a given social grouping. In the final analysis, Perrucci and Trachtman dig at the root of the so-called Oscience warsO by presenting evidence that the wars are not the product of an overarching suspicion of the institutions at the core of our society, but are instead the product of organized interest groups, which shape the attitudes and beliefs of their respective members. (shrink)