TOT states may be viewed as a temporary and reversible microamnesia. We investigated the effects of lorazepam on TOT states in response to general knowledge questions. The lorazepam participants produced more commission errors and more TOTs following commission errors than the placebo participants . The resolution of the TOTs was unimpaired by the drug. Neither feeling-of-knowing accuracy nor recognition were affected by lorazepam. The higher level of incorrect recalls produced by lorazepam participants may be due to the fact that they (...) were more frequently temporarily unable to access a known item. For some of these items, the awareness of the retrieval failure resulted in a commission TOT . The resolution of the TOT conflict is discussed in the light of the anxiolytic and anticonflict effects of lorazepam. The data are discussed in terms of contemporary theories of TOTs and the effects that benzodiazepines have on semantic memory. (shrink)

Les deux ouvrages conjoints de 1960 et 1962, Mathématiques et métaphysique chez Descartes et La Philosophie de l’algèbre, marquent dans l’oeuvre de Vuillemin un tournant qui peut éclairer le sens philosophique de la classification des systèmes. Nous présentons successivement la contribution de ces ouvrages à la définition de la méthode dite génétique en philosophie, le nouvel arbitrage « structural » attendu entre les deux histoires des sciences et de la philosophie, le rodage de l’idée de classe de systèmes entre annonce (...) et rejet de l’« intuitionnisme » ultérieur. (shrink)

Condillac a tenu à souligner l’originalité radicale de la thèse défendue dans l’ Essai au sujet du statut des signes dans leur rapport originaire à la pensée. Il la maintiendra jusque dans l’ Art de penser inchangée malgré de profonds remaniements intervenus avec le Traité des sensations quant au contenu de cette interaction, que sa Grammaire et sa Logique lui semblent avoir pourtant « achevé de démontrer ». Ce statut des signes se trouve soumis à la critique dès les Lettres (...) à Gabriel Cramer. Condillac y répond à une question concernant la prérogative des signes arbitraires sur les signes naturels par rapport à la maîtrise de nos opérations de pensée. Et il y voit une objection formelle au caractère « embrouillé » de cette origine, une difficulté de fond qu’il n’avait pas prévenue, et enfin « le point le plus délicat de mon système sur la nécessité absolue des signes ». On peut supposer 1) que cette difficulté est liée à, mais distincte de la question formelle, comme des difficultés de contenu qu’y voit alors Condillac travaillant à son Traité des sensations, 2) que ce « point le plus délicat » ne s’éclaire et ne se spécifie qu’au regard de l’arrière-plan leibnizo-wolffien commun à Condillac, Cramer et Mlle Ferrand, et 3) n’est surmonté que par l’évocation de quelques références absentes de l’ Essai, à la Grammaire de Du Marsais dans l’ Encyclopédie et à la méthode de l’Abbé de l’Épée, comme exemples de la méthode analytique mise au service d’une genèse naturelle des signes artificiels sur le modèle de l’art d’une Nature qui commence tout en nous à notre insu. Ainsi s’achève bien le système « démontré » d’une présupposition mutuelle de la Nature et de l’Art, dont le premier ouvrage avait offert l’essai inaugural. (shrink)

resumo No chama do período do “estrutura l i s mo” defendeu-se a id é ia de que havia uma oposição ent re essa filosof ia e o idealismo, especia l mente o ide a l i s mo subjetivo. O propósito deste texto é defender a tese oposta, de que há um forte elo interno entre o criticismo kantiano e o método estrutural em história da filosofia. Esse elo é partic u l a r me nte visível no estrutura (...) l i s mo e na Dia no e m á t ica de Gueroult e também pode ser ilustrado na obra do grande intérprete da filosofia kantiana que é Louis Guillermit. Este aplicou seu método de “elucidação crítica” à interpretação da sistematicida de de todo o período crítico de Ka nt e especia l me nte da constituição pro g ressiva da Estética transcendental nas três Críticas. A eluc idação da gênese das estruturas perma nece int e r na ao sistema ka ntia no, de i xando em aberto a questão da natureza de sua ligação com os sistemas pós-kantianos, mas essa neutralida de é mais apare nte que real, e cons o a nte com a escolha do idealismo kantia no em detrimento do idealismo hegeliano. palavras- chave Estrutura l i s mo; Dia no e m á t ica; elucidação crítica; Ma r t ial Gueroult; Louis Guillermit; Idealismo alemão. (shrink)

La Correspondance publiée entre Tracy et Maine de Biran présente un intérêt de premier plan pour l'interprétation de l'œuvre des Idéologues, dont elle permet de saisir le mouvement constitutif en un point particulièrement significatif, celui qui précède immédiatement l'éclatement du mouvement, et la rupture de Biran avec ses maîtres. Dans une première partie on trace les étapes principales de l'échange des idées, sur la question centrale du jugement; on cherche ensuite à en cerner l'incidence sur le problème idéologique du jugement (...) dont Biran offre une variante devenue incompatible avec l'entreprise plusieurs fois reprise de Condillac d'un « nouveau Traité des sensations »; enfin, l'aspect logique du problème du jugement met à découvert l'enjeu de cet échange de lettres et les limites indépassables qui se trouvent par là même éclairées, d'une Idéologie comme philosophie critique de la sensibilité exprimée dans les formes du langage. (shrink)

On se propose de montrer d’abord l’effectivité du concept d’intentionnalité dans la revendication par l’Aufbau de la pratique husserlienne de la réduction, et de son programme de constitution, alors même que ce programme débouche chez Carnap sur une neutralisation terminale du sens métaphysique de la relation intentionnelle. On précise ensuite le rôle que joue le concept philosophique de constitution, dans la mise en œuvre des méthodes logiques. On suggère l’effectivité d’une constitution intentionnelle au sens husserlien, mais armée des méthodes de (...) la logique mathématique, sur trois séries d’indices, pris dans l’exercice même des méthodes logiques dans l’Aufbau. Mais on voit par là que cette référence de l’intentionnalité carnapienne à la distinction aristotélicienne entre l’objet et le vécu intentionnel de la sensation et de la pensée en neutralise la dimension ontologique liée chez Aristote au concept métaphysique d’energéia, tout autant qu’à l’analyse catégoriale de la relation ici drastiquement réduite à une unique «relation fondée». Ainsi se trouve en définitive neutralisé plutôt que constitué dans l’Aufbau le sens d’un legs aristotélicien en matière d’intentionnalité. (shrink)

RésuméL'héritage kantien dans la philosophie fregéenne de la connaissance est aujourd'hui largement reconnu. La présente analyse porte sur la point, déjà réputé central par J. Vuillemin , du jugement de recognition. On tente de montrer: °) le style transcendantal du traitement fregéen du problème des objets logiques, dont la nécessité s'introduit a partir des Grundlagen avec celle des extensions de concept, absentes de la première idéographie; style dont on tente d'expliquer les changements qu'il opére dans le modèle de la Begriffsbildung (...) kantienne. 2°) l'ambiguité de la recognition fondée par la source logique de connaissance d'objets logiques, ou par un principe d'image logique, qu'explicitera Wittgenstein, des invariants les plus généraux des opérations de pensée dans l'idéolographie. 3°) le lien du principe de recognition avec une supposition de détermination complète et son ultime formulation dans la théorie de la source géométrique; ses racines dans la formation mathématique de Frege. On conclut par la question posée par l'algébrisation de la logique, étrangére au style transcendantal de l'une des œuvres qui lui ont, fût‐ce de manière voilée par un principe de recognition, donné naissance. (shrink)

Entre la première philosophie cavaillésienne de « l’expérience mathématique » et son réexamen au sein de l’œuvre posthume (Sur la logique et la théorie de la science), nous suggérons qu’il existe une différence radicale de statut, qui différencie de l’intérieur la philosophie du concept de celle de l’œuvre publiée. Le sens testamentaire du livre posthume comme sa conclusion hégélienne tiennent à cette différence. Le nouveau cadre construit pour la philosophie mathématique est celui d’un « Traité de logique », qui prend (...) la forme d’une histoire orientée par l’exigence de reconstruire le lien de la logique avec l’ontologie, alors que la première philosophie pouvait, à son niveau, sembler ignorer, ou même écarter cette exigence. Cette histoire de la logique n’annonce pas plus qu’elle n’offre la construction d’une dialectique identifiable à celle que Cavaillès avait d’abord reconnue dans la nécessité de l’expérience mathématique. Ses étapes, non chronologiquement ordonnées, sont celles de la préparation effective d’un passage de la conscience au concept en tant que principes de la doctrine de la science. Ce passage n’est pas un passage nécessité par la préexistence de contradictions à dépasser et la libre et créative réponse qu’elles demandent à la pensée humaine en mathématiques ; il est celui qui anime le libre choix de chercher, dans une Logique entendue comme théorie des formes de l’être, la liberté créatrice qui est définitoire de la pensée en tant que telle. (shrink)

Examines the development of the philosophy, culture, and civilization of ancient China and discusses the history of Taoism and Confucianism.

The Negation Problem states that expressivism has insufficient structure to account for the various ways in which a moral sentence can be negated. We argue that the Negation Problem does not arise for expressivist accounts of all normative language but arises only for the specific examples on which expressivists usually focus. In support of this claim, we argue for the following three theses: 1) a problem that is structurally identical to the Negation Problem arises in non-normative cases, and this problem (...) is solved once the hidden quantificational structure involved in such cases is uncovered; 2) the terms ‘required’, ‘permissible’, and ‘forbidden’ can also be analyzed in terms of hidden quantificational structure, and the Negation Problem disappears once this hidden structure is uncovered; 3) the Negation Problem does not arise for normative language that has no hidden quantificational structure. We conclude that the Negation Problem is not really a problem about expressivism at all but is rather a feature of the quantificational structure of the required, permitted, and forbidden. (shrink)

I take up three puzzles about our emotional and evaluative responses to fiction. First, how can we even have emotional responses to characters and events that we know not to exist, if emotions are as intimately connected to belief and action as they seem to be? One solution to this puzzle claims that we merely imagine having such emotional responses. But this raises the puzzle of why we would ever refuse to follow an author’s instructions to imagine such responses, since (...) we happily imagine many other implausible things. A natural response to this second puzzle is that our responses to fiction are real, and so can’t just be conjured up in response to an author’s demands. However, this simple response is inadequate, because we often respond differently to people and events in fiction than we would if we encountered them in real life. Solving these three puzzles in a consistent way requires the notion of a “perspective” on a fictional world. I sketch an account of this intuitive but frustratingly amorphous notion: perspectives are tools for organizing our thinking, which can in turn alter our emotional and evaluative responses. Cultivating a perspective can be illuminating, entertaining, or corrupting — or all three at once. (shrink)

Traditional theories of sarcasm treat it as a case of a speaker's meaning the opposite of what she says. Recently, 'expressivists' have argued that sarcasm is not a type of speaker meaning at all, but merely the expression of a dissociative attitude toward an evoked thought or perspective. I argue that we should analyze sarcasm in terms of meaning inversion, as the traditional theory does; but that we need to construe 'meaning' more broadly, to include illocutionary force and evaluative attitudes (...) as well as propositional content. I distinguish four subclasses of sarcasm, individuated in terms of the target of inversion. Three of these classes raise serious challenges for a standard implicature analysis. (shrink)

Philosophers have traditionally inclined toward one of two opposite extremes when it comes to metaphor. On the one hand, partisans of metaphor have tended to believe that metaphors do something different in kind from literal utterances; it is a ‘heresy’, they think, either to deny that what metaphors do is genuinely cognitive, or to assume that it can be translated into literal terms. On the other hand, analytic philosophers have typically denied just this: they tend to assume that if metaphors (...) express any genuine content at all, then that content can in principle be paraphrased into literal terms. They often conclude on this basis that metaphor is theoretically dispensable, and so that it poses no special challenges and affords no distinctive insights for the philosophy of language and mind. (shrink)

De re modality is eliminable if there is an effective translation of all wffs into non-de re equivalents. We cannot have logical equivalence unless 'logic' has odd theses, but we can have material equivalence by banning all essences, something the nonde re facts let us do, or by giving everything such humdrum essences as self-identity and banning the more interesting ones. Eliminability cannot be got from weaker assumptions, nor independent ones of even modest generality. The net philosophical import is that, (...) quite apart from the merits of essentialism, de re language has scant utility. (shrink)

Theorists often associate certain “poetic” qualities with metaphor – most especially, producing an open-ended, holistic perspective which is evocative, imagistic and affectively-laden. I argue that, on the one hand, non-cognitivists are wrong to claim that metaphors only produce such perspectives: like ordinary literal speech, they also serve to undertake claims and other speech acts with propositional content. On the other hand, contextualists are wrong to assimilate metaphor to literal loose talk: metaphors depend on using one thing as a perspective for (...) thinking about something else. I bring out the distinctive way that metaphor works by contrasting it with two other poetic uses of language, juxtapositions and “telling details,” that do fit the accounts of metaphor offered by non-cognitivists and contextualists, respectively. (shrink)

Pioneering biblical critic, theorist of democracy, and legendary conflater of God and nature, Jewish philosopher Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) was excommunicated by the Sephardic Jews of Amsterdam in 1656 for his "horrible heresies" and "monstrous deeds." Yet, over the past three centuries, Spinoza's rupture with traditional Jewish beliefs and practices has elevated him to a prominent place in genealogies of Jewish modernity. The First Modern Jew provides a riveting look at how Spinoza went from being one of Judaism's most notorious outcasts (...) to one of its most celebrated, if still highly controversial, cultural icons, and a powerful and protean symbol of the first modern secular Jew. Ranging from Amsterdam to Palestine and back again to Europe, the book chronicles Spinoza's posthumous odyssey from marginalized heretic to hero, the exemplar of a whole host of Jewish identities, including cosmopolitan, nationalist, reformist, and rejectionist. Daniel Schwartz shows that in fashioning Spinoza into "the first modern Jew," generations of Jewish intellectuals -German liberals, East European maskilim, secular Zionists, and Yiddishists- have projected their own dilemmas of identity onto him, reshaping the Amsterdam thinker in their own image. The many afterlives of Spinoza are a kind of looking glass into the struggles of Jewish writers over where to draw the boundaries of Jewishness and whether a secular Jewish identity is indeed possible. Cumulatively, these afterlives offer a kaleidoscopic view of modern Jewish culture and a vivid history of an obsession with Spinoza that continues to this day."--Jacket. (shrink)

Research design is fundamentally central to all scientific endeavors, at all levels and in all institutional settings. This book is a practical, short, simple, and authoritative examination of the concepts and issues in interpretive research design, looking across this approach's methods of generating and analyzing data. It is meant to set the stage for the more "how-to" volumes that will come later in the Routledge Series on Interpretive Methods, which will look at specific methods and the designs that they require. (...) It will, however, engage some very practical issues, such as ethical considerations and the structure of research proposals. Interpretive research design requires a high degree of flexibility, where the researcher is more likely to think of "hunches" to follow than formal hypotheses to test. Yanow and Schwartz-Shea address what research design is and why it is important, what interpretive research is and how it differs from quantitative and qualitative research in the positivist traditions, how to design interpretive research, and the sections of a research proposal and report. (shrink)

Most of us create and use a panoply of non-sentential representations throughout our ordinary lives: we regularly use maps to navigate, charts to keep track of complex patterns of data, and diagrams to visualize logical and causal relations among states of affairs. But philosophers typically pay little attention to such representations, focusing almost exclusively on language instead. In particular, when theorizing about the mind, many philosophers assume that there is a very tight mapping between language and thought. Some analyze utterances (...) as the outer vocalizations of inner thoughts (e.g. Grice 1957, Devitt 2005), while others treat thought as a form of inner speech (e.g. Sellars 1956/1997, Carruthers 2002). But even philosophers who take no stand on the relative priority of language and thought still tend to individuate mental states in terms of the sentences we use to ascribe them. Indeed, Dummett (1993) claims that it is constitutive of analytic philosophy that it approaches the mind by way of language. In many ways, this linguistic model is salutary. Our thoughts are often intimately intertwined with their linguistic expression, and public language does provide a comparatively tractable proxy for, and a window into, the messier realm of thought. However, an exclusive focus on thought as it is expressed in language threatens to leave other sorts of thought unexplained, or even to blind us to their possibility. In particular, many cognitive ethologists and psychologists find it useful to talk about humans, chimpanzees, birds, rats, and even bees as employing cognitive maps. We need to make sense of this way of talking about minds as well as more familiar sentential descriptions. In what follows, I investigate the theoretical and practical possibility of non-sentential thought. Ultimately, I am most interested in the contours of distinctively human thought: what forms does human thought take, and how do those different forms interact? How does human thought compare with that of other animals? In this essay, however, I focus on a narrower and more basic theoretical question: could thought occur in maps? Many philosophers are convinced that in some important sense, thought per se must be language-like.. (shrink)

Does thought precede language, or the other way around? How does having a language affect our thoughts? Who has a language, and who can think? These questions have traditionally been addressed by philosophers, especially by rationalists concerned to identify the essential difference between humans and other animals. More recently, theorists in cognitive science, evolutionary biology, and developmental psychology have been asking these questions in more empirically grounded ways. At its best, this confluence of philosophy and science promises to blend the (...) respective strengths of each discipline, bringing abstract theory to bear on reality in a principled and focused way. At its worst, it risks degenerating into a war of words, with each side employing key expressions in its own idiosyncratic way – or worse, contaminating empirical research with a priori dogmas inherited from outmoded philosophical worldviews. In Baboon Metaphysics (2007), Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth offer an analysis of baboon cognition that promises to exemplify the very best interaction of philosophical theory and empirical research. They argue that baboons have a language of thought: a language-like representational medium, which supports the sophisticated cognitive abilities required to negotiate their complex social environment. This claim is intended to be surprising in its own right, and also to shed light on the evolution of spoken language. Because our own ancestors likely lived in a similarly complex social environment, Cheney and Seyfarth propose that the earliest humans also developed language first as a cognitive medium, and that spoken language evolved as a means to express those thoughts. There are two potential difficulties here. First, ‘Language of Thought’ (LOT) is a term of art, with much associated theoretical baggage and often comparatively little careful exposition. Thus, evaluating the claim requires getting clearer about just what LOT implies in this context.. (shrink)

Gerechtigkeit ist ein ebenso bedeutsames wie umstrittenes Ideal menschlichen Umgangs.

t. 1. Du pays de Foix à la cité d'Erasme.

Despite its appeal and popularity, the view that membership in a natural kind is essential to an individual is unsupported by the logic of essences and has no compelling reflective support. While the view has strong intuitive and empirical support this is insufficient to establish it. There are advantages to abandoning the view that kind membership is essential to individuals. One of these advantages is that it allows for a reconfiguring of the problem of material constitution in a way that (...) removes much of the paradox. (shrink)

What was it like to be a woman scientist battling the “old boy’s” network during the 1960s and 1970s? Neena Schwartz, a prominent neuroendocrinologist at Northwestern University, tells all. She became a successful scientist and administrator at a time when few women entered science and fewer succeeded in establishing independent laboratories. She describes her personal career struggles, and those of others in academia, as well as the events which lead to the formation of the Association of Women in Science, (...) and Women in Endocrinology, two national organizations, which have been successful in increasing the numbers of women scientists and their influence in their fields. The book intersperses this socio-political story with an account of Schwartz’s personal life as a lesbian and a description of her research on the role of hormones in regulating reproductive cycles. In a chapter titled “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” she examines the “evidence” from a scientist’s point of view for the hormonal and genetic theories for homosexuality. Other chapters provide advice on mentoring young scientists and a discourse on why it matters to all of us to have more women doing and teaching science. She also describes the process of putting together an interdisciplinary Center on Reproductive Science at Northwestern, which brought together basic and clinical scientists in an internationally recognized program of research and practice. (shrink)

Fear, sadness, surprise, anger, lust and love - virtually nothing was more important in the paintings ofthe Golden Age than convincingly depicting human emotions. In this publication, the Frans Hals Museum and Rembrandt expert Gary Schwartz present a selection of masterpieces in which these emotions are sublimely portrayed. According to seventeenth-century connoisseurs, the beauty of a painting was not even half as important as the passions that could be seen in that painting; they formed the soul of the work. (...) Painters such as Rembrandt, Frans Hals, Maerten van Heemskerck and Cornelis van Haarlem were masters at depicting a range of emotions. Their works are presented in a new context - the emotional life - and with a focus on the flourishing scientific study of emotions in our own time. Emotions will be published in conjunction with the first exhibition in the Netherlands to present this essential component of painting. Exhibition: Frans Hals Museum, Haarlem, the Netherlands (11.10.2014-15.02.2015). (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Friedrich Nietzsches Philosophie des europäischen Nihilismus" verfügbar.

Metaphors are powerful communicative tools because they produce ”framing effects’. These effects are especially palpable when the metaphor is an insult that denigrates the hearer or someone he cares about. In such cases, just comprehending the metaphor produces a kind of ”complicity’ that cannot easily be undone by denying the speaker’s claim. Several theorists have taken this to show that metaphors are engaged in a different line of work from ordinary communication. Against this, I argue that metaphorical insults are rhetorically (...) powerful because they combine perspectives, presupposition, and pragmatics in the service of speech acts with assertoric force. (shrink)

_A portion of the revenue from this book’s sales will be donated to Doctors Without Borders to assist in the fight against COVID-19._ The rapid spread of COVID-19 has had an unprecedented impact on modern health-care systems and has given rise to a number of complex ethical issues. This collection of readings and case studies offers an overview of some of the most pressing of these issues, such as the allocation of ventilators and other scarce resources, the curtailing of standard (...) privacy measures for the sake of public health, and the potential obligations of health-care professionals to continue operating in dangerous work environments. (shrink)

Mathematics professor from Brown University uses colorful illustrations and cartoons to display the concepts of infinity and large numbers.