Noûs 46 (4):587 - 634 (2012)
AbstractTraditional theories of sarcasm treat it as a case of a speaker's meaning the opposite of what she says. Recently, 'expressivists' have argued that sarcasm is not a type of speaker meaning at all, but merely the expression of a dissociative attitude toward an evoked thought or perspective. I argue that we should analyze sarcasm in terms of meaning inversion, as the traditional theory does; but that we need to construe 'meaning' more broadly, to include illocutionary force and evaluative attitudes as well as propositional content. I distinguish four subclasses of sarcasm, individuated in terms of the target of inversion. Three of these classes raise serious challenges for a standard implicature analysis
Similar books and articles
version presented at the 2006 Pacific APA Why Isn't Sarcasm Semantic, Anyway?* Nearly everyone assumes that sarcasm is a pragmatic phenomenon. But we can also construct a prima facie plausible..Elisabeth Camp - unknown
Linguistic communication and the semantics/pragmatics distinction.Robyn Carston - 2008 - Synthese 165 (3):321-345.
Semantics.David Beaver & Joey Frazee - forthcoming - The Oxford Handbook of Computational Linguistics 2nd Edition.
Relevance Theory and the Saying/Implicating Distinction.Robyn Carston - 2004 - In . pp. 155--181.
On the science and art of sarcasm.Albert N. Katz - 2009 - In Leslie Anne Boldt-Irons, Corrado Federici & Ernesto Virgulti (eds.), Disguise, Deception, Trompe-L'oeil: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Peter Lang.
Logic, Meaning, and Conversation: Semantical Underdeterminacy, Implicature, and Their Interface.Jay David Atlas - 2000 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
The Received Distinction Between Pragmatics, Syntax and Semantics.Charles Sayward - 1974 - Foundations of Language 11:97-104.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Imagination.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2011 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.
Why metaphors make good insults: perspectives, presupposition, and pragmatics.Elisabeth Camp - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):47--64.
References found in this work
Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication.Robyn Carston - 2002 - Oxford: Blackwell.
Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts.Kendall L. Walton - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature.Stephen C. Levinson - 2000 - MIT Press.