The essence of essence

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):609-623 (2009)


Despite its appeal and popularity, the view that membership in a natural kind is essential to an individual is unsupported by the logic of essences and has no compelling reflective support. While the view has strong intuitive and empirical support this is insufficient to establish it. There are advantages to abandoning the view that kind membership is essential to individuals. One of these advantages is that it allows for a reconfiguring of the problem of material constitution in a way that removes much of the paradox

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References found in this work

The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1985 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.

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