Nothing conceivable is so petty, so insipid, so crowded with paltry interestsin one word, so anti-poeticas the life of a man in the United States. [Tocqueville];1Anyone who allows the growing respectability of mass culture to seduce him into equating a popular song with modem art because of a few false notes squeaked by a clarinet; anyone who mistakes a triad studded with "dirty notes" for atonality, has already capitulated to barbarism. Art which has degenerated to culture pays the price of (...) being all the more readily confused with its own waste-products as its aberrant influence grows. Education, traditionally the privilege of the few, is paid its due by self-conscious illiteracy which proclaims the stupor of tolerated excess to be the realm of freedom. Rebelling feebly, they are always ready to duck, following the lead of jazz, which integrates stumbling and coming-too-soon into the collective march lock-step. [Adorno]. (shrink)

This volume gathers essays by fourteen scholars, written to honor Fred Dallmayr and the contributions of his political theory. Stephen F. Schneck's introduction to Dallmayr's thinking provides a survey of the development of his work. Dallmayr's “letting be,” claims Schneck, is much akin to his reading of Martin Heidegger's “letting Being be,” and should be construed neither as a conservative acceptance of self-identity nor as a nonengaged indifference to difference. Instead, he explains, endeavoring to privilege neither identity (...) nor difference, the hermeneutic circle for Dallmayr must also be one of thoroughgoing critique and praxis. And, indeed, what joins together Dallmayr's many essays and explorations, what inheres within his “cosmopolitan” understanding of the contemporary world, and what lends his analyses their imperative, is this same “letting be.” "How many of us, over the last forty years, have opened up this or that book by Fred Dallmayr to acquaint ourselves with a new thinker or intellectual movement? It has happened to me several times. Each time, something else happens too. I become alert again to the distinctive and noble temper expressed in Dallmayr's work. _Letting Be_ consists of a series of essays by leading scholars who articulate and appreciate this temper, particularly as it has found expression in his thought about global politics work over the last two decades. This is a fine study, devoted to a thinker whose temper of critical responsiveness deserves wide emulation." —_William E. Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower Professor, Johns Hopkins University_ _ _ "These essays constitute a marvelous, extended conversation on how political theory should delineate its future tasks. The reader is treated to a lively debate about a crucial set of questions: what strands of traditional Western political thought offer the best resources today; how do we think more comparatively about the foundations of political life; how do we engage more fruitfully Islamic, Indian, and_ mestizo_ contributions; and how do we best envision cross-cultural dialogue and imagine the shape of a "cosmopolis" in ways that will do greater justice to human dignity and diversity? All in all a rich feast honoring a remarkable man and scholar, Fred Dallmayr." —_Stephen K. White, James Hart Professor, University of Virginia_ “This is not the first Festschrift for Dallmayr, and it may not be the last, but it is the first that begins to be in a position to assess his long career with all its twists and turns. I have never fully understood Dallmayr as a creative thinker in his own right until now, and even when I sensed he was, I couldn't precisely say how. Now I can.” —_C. Fred Alford, University of Maryland_. (shrink)

This book gathers six trenchant new analyses of the idea of the person as raised by the German philosopher and social theorist Max Scheler (1874–1928). The issues raised in the volume are both timely and perennial, from considerations of postmodernity, phenomenology, and metaphysics, to sharp-edged comparisons with other thinkers, including Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, Eric Voegelin, Richard Rorty, and Hannah Arendt.

Fukuyama’s most well known book, The End of History and the Last Man, argued that history was directed toward an end in liberal democracy and capitalism and that, generally, we had arrived. His argument appealed to those convinced that liberty in the human condition would invoke invisible hands to lift civilization into a bourgeois paradise. Yet its conclusion troubled others. Leftists and poststructuralists saw Fukuyama’s end as more like an iron cage to repress difference and class resistance. Traditional conservatives and (...) communitarians, on the other hand, saw the present age as one of great disruption—and not as one of triumphal completion. (shrink)

Roger Boesche's Theories of Tyranny covers familiar and well-trod ground: the canonical texts of the history of political thought in sequential order from Plato to Hannah Arendt. Yet, taking tyranny as its theme, and not justice or freedom, Boesche's survey of the texts offers a somewhat different and interesting perspective on this traditional fare.

Between the lines of this rich but sometimes uneven collection of essays on the legacy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, it is less 1789 and more the glow of 1989 that illumines things. The language is that of post-Cold War ennui: “end of history,” “modern closure,” “the totalized bourgeois,” “iron cage,” and even “the last man.” Yet the ambiance of the fourteen pieces is one of Weberian wistfulness, not of Nietzschean exuberance.

This article is a review of the recently published book Max Scheler’s Acting Persons, edited by Stephen Schneck. It considers some issues regarding the relation between Scheler’s phenomenological personalism and his later metaphysics by way of a discussion of the articles contained in this volume. The review explores the various and varied discussions of the relation between Scheler’s phenomenological notions of person and spirit. It suggests that Scheler’s turn from a phenomenological anthropology to metaphysics has its roots not (...) only in this notion of spirit, which is distinguished both from Husserl’s absolute consciousness and from Heidegger’sDasein, but also in the ontology of values that is embedded in Scheler’s phenomenological axiology. (shrink)

Global Media Ethics is the first comprehensive cross-cultural exploration of the conceptual and practical issues facing media ethics in a global world. A team of leading journalism experts investigate the impact of major global trends on responsible journalism. The first full-length, truly global textbook on media ethics; Explores how current global changes in media promote and inhibit responsible journalism; Includes relevant and timely ethical discussions based on major trends in journalism and global media; Questions existing frameworks in media ethics in (...) light of the impact of global media; Contributors are leading experts in global journalism and communication. (shrink)

Substantial efforts have recently been made to reform the physician-patient relationship, particularly toward replacing the `silent world of doctor and patient' with informed patient participation in medical decision-making. This 'new ethos of patient autonomy' has especially insisted on the routine provision of informed consent for all medical interventions. Stronly supported by most bioethicists and the law, as well as more popular writings and expectations, it still seems clear that informed consent has, at best, been received in a lukewarm fashion by (...) most clinicians, many simply rejecting what they commonly refer to as the `myth of informed consent'. The purpose of this book is to defuse this seemingly intractable controversy by offering an efficient and effective operational model of informed consent. This goal is pursued first by reviewing and evaluating, in detail, the agendas, arguments, and supporting materials of its proponents and detractors. A comprehensive review of empirical studies of informed consent is provided, as well as a detailed reflection on the common clinician experience with attempts at informed consent and the exercise of autonomy by patients. In the end, informed consent is recast as a management tool for pursuing clinically and ethically important goods and values that any clinician should see as meriting pursuit. Concurrently, the model incorporates a flexible, anticipatory approach that recognizes that no static, generic ritual can legitimately pursue the quite variable goods and values that may be at stake with different patients in different situations. Finally, efficiency of provision is addressed by not pursuing the unattainable and ancillary. Throughout, the traditional principle of beneficence is appealed to toward articulating an operational model of informed consent as an intervention that is likely to change outcomes at the bedside for the better. (shrink)

I examine the (mediated) correspondence between Spinoza and Robert Boyle concerning the latter’s account of fluidity and his experiments on reconstitution of niter in the light of the epistemology and doctrine of method contained in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. I argue that both the Treatise and the correspondence reveal that for Spinoza, the proper method of science is not experimental, and that he accepted a powerful under-determination thesis. I argue that, in contrast to modern versions, Spinoza’s (...) form of naturalism was a highly rationalist and anti-empirical one. I conclude with a brief account of the value of experience and experimentation for Spinoza’s scientific method. (shrink)

Kant is often regarded as one of the founding fathers of modern liberal democracy. His political theory reaches its climax in the ground-breaking work, Perpetual Peace (1795), which sets out the basic framework for a world federation of states united by a system of international law. What is less well known is that two years earlier, in his Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (1793/1794), Kant had postulated a very different, explicitly religious path to the politics of peace: he (...) presents the idea of an “ethical community” as a necessary requirement for humanity to become “satisfactory to God”. While many recent scholars have noted the importance of Kant’s concept of the ethical community, few recognize the force of his argument that such a community is possible only if it takes the form of a church; as a result, the precise status of his proposal remains unclear and under-appreciated. He argues in Division One, Section IV, of Religion’s Third Piece that the idea of this community can become a reality only through a “church” that is characterized by four rational requirements: unity, integrity, freedom, and the changeability of all church rules except these four unchangeable marks. Prior to Section IV, Division One portrays this ethical community as having a political form, yet an essentially nonpolitical matter. He compares it with Jewish theocracy, but observes that the latter failed to be an ethical commonwealth because it was explicitly political. Whereas traditional theocracy replaces the political state of nature (which conforms to the law, “might makes right”) with an ethical state of nature (which conforms to the law that I call, “should makes good”), or attempts to synthesize them, non-coercive theocracy transcends this distinction through a new perspective: it unites humanity in a common vision of a divine legislator whose only law is inward, binding church members together like families, through the law of love. Whereas the legal rights supported by democracy and a system of international law can go a long way to prepare for world peace, Kant’s conviction is that it will be ultimately impossible without support from healthy religion. (shrink)

This book develops a theory of how the imagination functions, and how it evolved. The imagination is characterized as an embodied cognitive system. The system draws upon sensory-motor, visual, and linguistic capacities, but it is a flexible, developmental ability, typified by creative improvisation. The imagination is a voluntary simulation system that draws on perceptual, emotional, and conceptual elements, for the purpose of creating works that adaptively investigate external (environmental) and internal (psychological) resources. Beyond the adaptive useful values of this system, (...) imagination also possesses significant intrinsic value (e.g., in the joy of play, and states of wonder). The book argues that imagination is not a late arrival in the evolution of mind, but one of the earliest human abilities. (shrink)

This issue of the Journal contains the material on physical mediumship originally scheduled for the Spring JSE. The plan for that issue had been to focus on the Felix Experimental Group (FEG) and its medium Kai Mügge, and Michael Nahm and I had each written very long papers describing and evaluating our detailed and extensive investigations of the group. But as I mentioned in my Editorial in the last issue, JSE 28:1 (Spring 2014), as we were preparing to send the (...) Spring issue to the printers, convincing evidence of fraud surfaced in the case, and the current issue now contains substantial revisions of those two long papers, reflecting what Nahm and I have learned and concluded in the interim. But first, since some (maybe many) JSE readers lack the background to put these contemporary investigations of physical mediumship into context, a few words on the subject are perhaps in order. As regular readers of our Historical Perspectives papers will know, physical mediumship flourished during a roughly 80-year period beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. The widespread emergence of physical mediums corresponded to the beginning, and then the heyday, of the Spiritualist movement, which began in the United States in the 1850s, and spread quickly to Europe. Spiritualism in the West fostered a more secular spiritism-the view that personal consciousness persists after bodily death, and that although some people are especially gifted mediumistically the rest of humanity can also experience a direct connection to "the other side." While mental mediums claimed to deliver messages from the deceased, say through automatic writing or trance impersonations, physical mediums purported to provide evidence of survival in various physical forms. The most common of these were "raps" or knocking sounds, either in the séance table or elsewhere in the room, typically answering "yes" or "no" questions by the number of sounds (e.g., two for "yes" and three for "no"). Sometimes, instead of raps, the séance table would tilt up and down several times, and in more dramatic cases the table would levitate fully. And in the most dramatic of those cases, sitters would report that the table carried people up and around the room with them, and many reported that they were unable to move the levitated table back to the floor once it was aloft. More dramatically still, many mediums purported to materialize objects resembling the deceased-for example, a disembodied hand and wrist (perhaps with characteristic deformations), or an image of the deceased's face, or a full-figure materialized human form. Although most spiritists insisted throughout that these physical phenomena were manifestations of the deceased mediated by the living, many investigators entertained and then gradually accepted the view that the carefully controlled (and presumably non-fraudulent) phenomena were actually psychokinetic productions of the living. Undoubtedly, many factors contributed to the decline of the Spiritualist movement and the apparent retreat of physical mediums to relatively inconspicuous enclaves or sitter groups. Not surprisingly, one of those is the richly documented history of mediumistic fraud perpetrated by soundrels only too willing to take advantage of grieving and gullible sitters. Nevertheless, and contrary to what many like to claim, it would be a mistake to think either that all physical mediums were frauds or that nobody managed to weed out the charlatans among them. First of all, investigators exposed many hundreds of fraudulent mediums during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Some of those investigators were self-styled skeptical debunkers-scientists or laypersons who made reputations for themselves by exposing mediumistic duplicity, and most of whom believed that spiritualistic phenomena simply couldn't be genuine. But others combined careful and critical research with a sympathetic or at least open-minded attitude toward the paranormal. One of the reasons this period is so important is that some physical mediums clearly stood out from the crowd. No matter how carefully they were controlled, and no matter how alert, competent, and familiar with conjuring were their investigators, these mediums produced effects that couldn't plausibly be dismissed as fraudulent or attributed to malobservation. In fact, one of the strongest bodies of evidence comes from the 1908 Naples sittings with Eusapia Palladino. Eusapia's three investigators were England's most experienced debunkers of fraudulent mediums. They knew the tricks of the trade (indeed, two of them were skilled conjurors); they knew what Eusapia's sometimes suspicious methods (and occasionally outright but simplistic tricks) were; they knew how to control for them; and the phenomena occurred in decent electric light and often at a distance from the medium. The investigators traveled to Naples believing they would establish once and for all that Eusapia was nothing but a trickster, and they left Naples grudgingly convinced that the nearly 500 phenomena they documented over eleven séances were not fraudulent. (shrink)

“What did the President know and when did he know it?”Senator Howard Baker, Watergate hearings, 1973Why do scientists accept or reject theories? More specifically: why do they change from one theory to another? What is the role of empirical tests in the evaluation of theories?This paper focuses on a narrowly-defined question: in judging theories, do scientists give greater weight (other things being equal) to successfulnovel predictionsthan to successful deductions of previously-known facts? The affirmative answer is called the “predictivist thesis” (Maher (...) 1988).It is primarily philosophers who are interested in this question, and they have treated it mostly as a normative or logical problem. Can the writings of historians of science tell us how scientists have treated novel predictions in the past? Until recently historians have rarely addressed this point. (shrink)

Anjan Chatterjee has promoted an analogy between the Bengalese finch and the human artist. With reduced selective pressure from females due to its domestication, the male finch’s song has become more elaborate. Similarly, art’s lack of a practical function facilitates the creative generativity shown by artists. I argue that this analogy is flawed on both sides. Only recently has some art been regarded as non-functional. And the elaboration of the finch’s song is an effect of female selection under the conditions (...) of domestication. (shrink)

There is an increasing recognition by friends of personal probability that the standard systems of personal probability do not provide a fully adequate basis for the theories of scientific inference and rational decision making. This recognition has methodological and formal components. On the methodological side, Jeffrey [8] and Spielman [16], [17] have suggested that personal probabilities should be interpreted as judgments about thecredibilityof propositions, i.e., as appraisals of the degrees of confidence that are warranted by the information available to the (...) appraiser. The idea behind this interpretation is that there are criteria for appraising degrees of confidence as rational, plausible, silly or unwarranted. They have not been canonized, with the exception of the traditional informal fallacies of insufficient evidence, and if they were, would be highly vague and subject to revision as knowledge advances. (shrink)

Those aspects of language use that are crucial to an understanding of language as a system, and especially to an understanding of meaning, are the acknowledged concern of linguistic pragmatics. Yet until now much of the work in this field has not been easily accessible to the student, and was often written at an intimidating level of technicality. In this textbook, however, Dr Levinson has provided a lucid and integrative analysis of the central topics in pragmatics - deixis, implicature, presupposition, (...) speech acts, and conversational structure. A central concern of the book is the relation between pragmatics and semantics, and Dr Levinson shows clearly how a pragmatic approach can resolve some of the problems semantics have been confronting and simplifying semantic analyses. The complexity of these issues is not disguised, but the exposition is always clear and supported by helpful exemplification. The detailed analyses of selected topics give the student a clear view of the empirical rigour demanded by the study of linguistic pragmatics, but Dr Levinson never loses sight of the rich diversity of the subject. An introduction and conclusion relate pragmatics to other fields in linguistics and other disciplines concerned with language usage - psychology, philosophy, anthropology and literature. Many students in these disciplines, as well as students of linguistics, will find this a valuable textbook. (shrink)

I defend the claim that understanding is the goal of explanation against various persistent criticisms, especially the criticism that understanding is not truth-connected in the appropriate way, and hence is a merely psychological state. Part of the reason why understanding has been dismissed as the goal of explanation, I suggest, is because the psychological dimension of the goal of explanation has itself been almost entirely neglected. In turn, the psychological dimension of understanding—the Aha! experience, the sense that a certain explanation (...) “feels right”, and so on—has been conspicuously overemphasized. I try to correct for both of these exaggerations. Just as the goal of explanation includes a richer psychological—including phenomenological—dimension than is generally acknowledged, so too understanding has a stronger truth connection than is generally acknowledged.Keywords: Understanding; Explanation; Philosophy of science; Epistemology. (shrink)

Among contemporary epistemologists and scholars of ancient philosophy, one often hears that transmitting propositional knowledge by testimony is usually easy and straightforward, but transmitting understanding and know-how by testimony is usually difficult or simply impossible. Further provocative conclusions are then sometimes drawn from these claims: for instance, that know-how and understanding are not types of propositional knowledge. In contrast, I argue that transmitting propositional knowledge is sometimes easy and sometimes hard, just as transmitting know how and understanding is sometimes easy (...) and sometimes hard. No general lessons can be drawn about the relationships among propositional knowledge, know how, and understanding by considering the case of testimony alone. (shrink)

Our knowledge of the world comes from various sources. But it is sometimes said that testimony, unlike other sources, transmits knowledge from one person to another. In this book, Stephen Wright investigates what the transmission of knowledge involves and the role that it should play in our theorising about testimony as a source of knowledge. He argues that the transmission of knowledge should be understood in terms of the more fundamental concept of the transmission of epistemic grounds, and that (...) the claim that testimony transmits knowledge is not only defensible in its own right, but indispensable to an adequate theory of testimony. This makes testimony unlike other epistemic sources. (shrink)

In this paper I elucidate various ways in which understanding can be seen as an excellence of the mind or intellectual virtue. Along the way, I take up the neglected issue of what it might mean to be an “understanding person”—by which I mean not a person who understands a number of things about the natural world, but a person who steers clear of things like judgmentalism in her evaluation of other people, and thus is better able to take up (...) different perspectives and view them with a sympathetic eye. Being an understanding person in this sense seems to be a character-level virtue that interestingly combines moral and epistemic elements; it also seems to be a virtue particularly needed in our age of deep political division, where it is commonly said that failures of mutual understanding are partly to blame for this problem. (shrink)

"Featuring a carefully selected collection of source documents, this tome includes traditional teaching tools from the Zen Buddhist traditions of China, Korea, and Japan, including texts created by women. The selections provide both a good feel for the varieties of Zen and an experience of its common core.... The texts are experiential teachings and include storytelling, poetry, autobiographies, catechisms, calligraphy, paintings, and koans. Contextual commentary prefaces each text. Wade-Giles transliteration is used, although Pinyin, Korean, Japanese, and Sanskrit terms are linked (...) in appendixes. An insightful introduction by Arai contributes a religious studies perspective. The bibliography references full translations of the selections. A thought-provoking discussion about the problems of translation is included.... Summing Up: Highly recommended. All levels." --_Choice_. (shrink)

Agonism emerged three decades ago as an assault on the overemphasis in political theory on justice and consensus. It has now become the norm. But its character and relation to core values of democracy are not as unproblematic today as is often thought, an issue that becomes more pressing as contemporary politics increasingly seem locked into notions of unrelenting conflict between “friends” and “enemies.” This essay traces alternative ontological roots and ethical implications of agonism, distinguishing between “imperializing” and “tempered” modes. (...) The former, exemplified in the popular Schmitt-Mouffe formulation, is shown to be fundamentally flawed in its failure to conceive politics in a fashion that does not allow the dynamic of friend–enemy to imperially trump appeals to democratic norms. In a world of insurgent white nationalism in democratic polities, this is no small fault. “Tempered” agonists, such as William Connolly and Bonnie Honig, offer ontologies where democratic norms can gain traction. Despite the admirable qualities of these alternatives, their formulations are nevertheless not fully persuasive. The difficulty lies in their underarticulated accounts of equality. I suggest an alternative formulation of agonism that embraces a central role for the idea of the moral equality of voice, a value that resides in the seam between notions of difference, resistance, and conflict emphasized by agonists, on the one hand, and the idea of fairness emphasized by notions of democratic justice, on the other. (shrink)

This collection offers original work on the nature of understanding by a range of distinguished philosophers. Although some of the essays are by scholars well known for their work on understanding, many of the essays bring entirely new figures to the discussion.

Academic misconduct is a problem of growing concern across the tertiary education sector. While plagiarism has been the most common form of academic misconduct, the advent of software programs to detect plagiarism has seen the problem of misconduct simply mutate. As universities attempt to function in an increasingly complex environment, the factors that contribute to academic misconduct are unlikely to be easily mitigated. A multiple case study approach examined how academic misconduct is perceived in universities in in Australia, New Zealand (...) and the United Kingdom via interviews with academics and administrators. The findings show that academic misconduct is a systemic problem that manifests in various ways and requires similarly diverse approaches to management. Greater consistency in policies and procedures, including a focus on preventative education for both staff and students, is key to managing the mutations of academic misconduct that continue to plague the higher education sector globally. (shrink)