Contents: Part I. Probability and the Idealizational Theory of Science. Marek GAUL: Statistical dependencies, statements and the idealizational theory of science. Part II. Probability - theoretical concepts in psychology - measurement. Douglas WAHLSTEN: Probability and the understanding of individual differences. Bodo KRAUSE: Modeling cognitive learning steps. Dieter HEYER, and Rainer MAUSFELD: A theoretical and experimental inquiry into the relation of theoretical concepts and probabilistic measurement scales in experimental psychology. Part III. Methods of data analysis. Tadeusz B. IWINSKI: Rough set methods (...) in psychology. Wilma KOUTSTAAL, and Robert ROSENTHAL: Contrast analysi in behavioral research. Part IV. Artifacts in psychological research and diagnostic assessment. David B. STROHMETZ, and Ralph L. ROSNOW: A mediational model of research artifacts. Jerzy BRZEZINSKI: Dimensions of diagnostic space. (shrink)

Ralph Wedgwood gives a general account of what it is for states of mind and processes of thought to count as rational. Whether you are thinking rationally depends purely on what is going on in your mind, but rational thinking is a means to the goal of getting things right in your thinking, by believing the truth or making good choices.

v. 1. Inheritance and vocation.--v. 2. Philosophy and psychology.

This is a review, by Sebastian Schmidt, of Ralph Wedgwood's The Value of Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2017).

Extensive and profound as philosophic speculation on the nature of knowledge may have been during the last twenty-five centuries, it must be conceded that it has, on the whole, failed in its undertaking. In fact, we do not seem to be much closer to the solution of the epistemological problem than were Kant and Hegel or, for that matter, Plato and Aristotle. Obviously enough, the problem should now be approached in some new way, perhaps one growing out of recent scientific (...) findings. (shrink)

Many centuries ago, at the very beginning of the systematic development of philosophy, Plato declared that the thinker's domain comprises “the wholeness of things;” and indeed, the earlier thinkers took all knowledge for their province and did not hesitate to discuss problems now referred to art, psychology, economics, mathematics, or physics. Since then the meaning of philosophy has appreciably changed, however, and the intellectual descendants of the great founder of the Academy no longer claim the monopoly of all fields of (...) study. For there appeared in the meantime a mighty competitor—or should we say a partner?—in the pursuit of truth, namely, science. (shrink)

Ralph Webers Beitrag setzt ein mit der Situation konfuzianischer Selbstkultivierung im Kontext aktueller politischer Entwicklungen der VR China. Sein Beitrag zeigt, wie schwer es führenden Vertretern der neukonfuzianischen Bewegung fällt, Selbstkultivierung kritisch zu denken, das heißt, nicht bloß als ideologischen Ersatz für die schwindende Legitimität des Marxismus-Leninismus im Rahmen des autoritären Regimes der kommunistischen Partei zu verstehen.

This is a review of Christopher Peacocke's book The Realm of Reason (Oxford University Press, 2004).

Mack and Rock show evidence that no consciousperception occurs without a prior attentiveact. Subjects already executing attention taskstend to neglect visible elements extraneous tothe attentional task, apparently lacking evenbetter-than-chance ``implicit perception,''except in certain cases where the unattendedstimulus is a meaningful word or has uniquepre-tuned salience similar to that ofmeaningful words. This is highly consistentwith ``enactive'' notions that consciousnessrequires selective attention via emotional subcortical and limbic motivationalactivation as it influences anterior attentionmechanisms. Occipital activation withoutconsciousness suggests that motivated search,enacted through the organism's (...) subcorticalmotivational functions, is needed beforevisual stimulation engenders consciousness.This enactive view – that searching for,rather than receiving or processing input isthe basis of consciousness – was slow ingaining acceptance lacking empirical evidenceof this kind, combined with thestimulus-response assumption that brain eventssubserving perceptual consciousness must resultfrom transformation of perceptual input ratherthan from the organism's self-regulatedactivity as manifested through subcorticalactivity. Implicit perception occurring withword priming is ``paradoxical'' according to Mackand Rock, suggesting late selection forattention after extensive unconsciousprocessing, while most trials involvingnonverbal rather than verbal images mightsuggest earlier selection, sinceunattended objects are unseen, apparently evenimplicitly. This paper argues that anteriorand subcortical motivational mechanisms play animportant role in early selection; posteriormechanisms then unconsciously enhance signals;if data survive early gating andcorticothalamic enhancement, then still further anterior-limbic loops motivatedlyactivate ``image schemas'' resonating withposterior nonconscious processing; at thatpoint, consciousness occurs. (shrink)

Enactivism has the potential to provide a sense of teleology in purpose-directed action, but without violating the principles of efficient causation. Action can be distinguished from mere reaction by virtue of the fact that some systems are self-organizing. Self-organization in the brain is reflected in neural plasticity, and also in the primacy of motivational processes that initiate the release of neurotransmitters necessary for mental and conscious functions, and which guide selective attention processes. But in order to flesh out the enactivist (...) approach in a way that is plausible and not merely an epiphenomenon, it is necessary to confront the problem of causal closure in a serious way. Atoms and molecules in the brain do not violate the normal causal principles that govern them in other contexts. The theory of self-organizing dynamical systems must be developed in a way that is compatible with causal closure rather than contradicting it. (shrink)

This is a precis of Ralph Wedgwood's book "The Nature of Normativity".